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i Introduction
A resurgence of metaphysics
This thesis falls within the research area of theoretical (systematic) 
philosophy. Its subject matter is metaphysics or ontology, or more 
specifically, cosmological arguments for the existence of a first cause.1 
As such this thesis belongs to the domain of natural theology, and is part 
of a broader program that deals with various issues having to do with 
the intellectual respectability of theism. Cosmological arguments are 
based upon the notion of causation. Now, theorizing about causation 
is perhaps as old as philosophy itself. More specifically, arguments for 
the existence of a first cause have a long and rich history.2 Ever since 
Plato philosophers developed first cause arguments. Some well-known 
examples from the philosophical tradition include Aristotle’s argument 
in Physics and Metaphysics for the existence of a first unmoved mover, 
the second of the ‘Five Ways’ of Thomas Aquinas in his Summa Theologiæ 
and Leibniz’s argument for the existence of a necessary being that 
accounts for the existence of the universe as a whole.3
With the rise of positivism in the second part of the nineteenth 
century and the decline of metaphysics that went with it, the interest 
in first cause arguments faded away. However, the last decennia of the 
twentieth century witnessed a ‘resurgence of metaphysics’ (Craig and 
Moreland 2009).4 The recent huge revival of interest in cosmological 
arguments for the existence of a first cause (Alexander 2008) can 
particularly be understood against this background. Several new 
cosmological arguments have been developed recently, notably those by 
R. Koons (1997), R. Gale and A. Pruss (1999) and J. Rasmussen (2010).
Structure of this thesis
My thesis starts in chapter ii with a detailed assessment of two 
paradigmatic forms of traditional first cause arguments. I derive both 
forms from respectively the Thomistic and Leibnizian cosmological 
arguments. As I shall argue, there are cogent objections against both 
paradigmatic forms that cannot be resolved, and that render these forms 
untenable as arguments for the existence of a first cause. In the next 
three chapters, i.e. chapter iii, iV and V, I provide a detailed assessment 
of the contemporary cosmological arguments of R. Koons, R. Gale and 
A. Pruss, and J. Rasmussen. As part of this assessment I identify and 
analyze a large range of objections to each of these arguments, both 
1 A first cause is an uncaused 
entity that is the direct or indirect 
cause of everything else besides 
itself. It follows that if there is a 
first cause, then that first cause is 
unique. So, there can be at most 
one first cause.
2 In this thesis a first cause 
argument is understood as an 
argument for the existence of a 
first cause that reasons from there 
being (caused or contingent) 
objects. The Kalam argument and 
the fine-tuning argument are not 
first cause arguments. First, they 
reason respectively from the claim 
that the universe began a finite 
time ago or that the cosmological 
constants are fine-tuned. 
Moreover, they only establish that 
the physical universe is caused 
and not that there is an origin of 
everything (including possibly 
‘non-physical’ objects).
3 Leibniz presents his argument 
in The Monadology, in On the 
Ultimate Origin of Things, in The 
Theodicy and in The Principles of 
Nature and of Grace, Based on 
Reason. See Craig (1980) for an 
overview.
4 In the introduction to 
The Blackwell Companion to 
Natural Theology W.L. Craig and 
J.P. Moreland write: ‘The collapse 
of positivism and its attendant 
verification principle of meaning 
was undoubtedly the most 
important philosophical event 
of the twentieth century. Their 
demise heralded a resurgence of 
metaphysics, along with other 
traditional problems of philosophy 
that verification had suppressed’ 
(Craig and Moreland 2009).
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from the literature and proposed by myself. In chapter Vi I propose 
my own new first cause argument by showing that atomism, i.e. the 
assertion that each composite object is composed of simple objects, 
together with causalism, understood as the assertion that every object 
is a cause or has a cause,5 logically entail the existence of a first cause 
if some additional general premises regarding the interrelationship 
between parthood, composition and causation are accepted as well. 
Thus I show that a commitment to atomism, causalism and the 
aforementioned additional premises result in a commitment to the 
existence of a first cause. After that, in chapter Vii, I turn to a critical 
assessment of my new first cause argument by considering whether 
the raised objections against the traditional cosmological arguments of 
Aquinas and Leibniz, and the raised objections against the contemporary 
cosmological arguments of Koons, Gale and Pruss, and Rasmussen, 
as evaluated in chapter ii, iii, iV and V, have any force against my new 
first cause argument. Moreover, I identify and assess a large number 
of additional objections that specifically address the new argument. 
As I shall argue for, all discussed objections in the chapter ii, iii, iV and 
V, including the additional specific objections, do not pose insuperable 
problems for my new first cause argument. In other words, the new 
argument is not vulnerable to any of the earlier and newly identified 
objections, which implies that the new argument for the existence of 
a first case is indeed cogent. Thus we are warranted in accepting it. 
Finally, in chapter Viii, I bring together the main threads of all previous 
chapters and point at some fruitful directions for further research. 
Most notably, I expound my view on how the main results of the 
previous chapters count as meaningful contributions to the intellectual 
discussion of the rationality of theism. In the final chapter I also sketch 
three supplementary deductive arguments for a personal first cause, 
which all rely dialectically either directly or indirectly on my new first 
cause argument. These three arguments are, as I shall argue, promising 
enough to be worked out in full detail by further philosophical research. 
In this way they can become a key part, together with my new first cause 
argument, of a renewed case for bare theism.
Ontological framework
In the rest of this introduction I shall say a little bit more about the 
relevant background and context of my new argument for the existence 
of a first cause. The new first cause argument is based on an explicit 
ontological framework within which the argument is set. In order to 
arrive at a cogent ontological framework underlying my new argument, 
I shall introduce a specific notion of causation with respect to coming 
into existence. The earlier mentioned principle of causalism, that is, 
everything that exists is caused by another object or is the cause of 
at least one other object,6 is, as will become clear in chapter Vi, an 
important part of the new argument’s underlying ontological framework 
as well. The posited disjunction is inclusive. So, it is possible that an 
5 Surely, the thesis of causalism 
does not rule out there being 
objects that are caused and that 
are the cause of one or more 
other objects.
6 This principle is already 
mentioned and accepted by 
Aristotle: ‘Everything has an 
origin or is an origin’ (Physics 
203b6). It is the negation of an 
earlier principle of existence as 
introduced by Parmenides of Elea 
according to which something 
exists if and only if it is uncaused 
and not itself a cause. The 
intuition behind Parmenides’ 
principle is that something can 
only exist if it is completely 
changeless and that being caused 
(or being a cause) implies change. 
The principle of Parmenides is 
highly problematic, since it would 
imply that none of the regular 
objects in our world, such as 
tables and chairs, actually exist.
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object is itself caused and is also the originating cause of one or more 
other objects. I shall provide reasons for accepting causalism. Note that 
this principle implies that mereological universalism7 is untenable since 
according to causalism the sum of all existing objects is not itself an 
object.8 Yet, I shall also mention independent reasons for not accepting 
mereological universalism, such as the ‘queerness argument’. In short, 
some mereological sums are simply ‘too queer’ to count as genuine 
objects. The new argument’s ontological framework is also based on a 
defense of mereological atomicity, that is to say, the assertion that each 
object is either a simple object or ultimately composed of two or more 
simple objects. Hence, according to mereological atomism every object 
consists ultimately of one or more basic indivisible building blocks. 
I shall develop a new a priori argument for atomism that, as will become 
clear later on, is not to be confused with the rational argument of 
Thomas Aquinas for the impossibility of an infinite downwards regress 
of simultaneous sustaining causes.
One may ask why I present my new argument for the existence of a 
first cause within the context of an explicit ontological framework. The 
reason for this is that I take it that an adequate first cause argument 
can only be obtained once all hidden implicit ontological assumptions 
are properly explicated and combined into a single formal framework 
that is both cogent and consistent. Indeed, as I shall show, the 
inadequacy of many versions of the cosmological argument is a direct 
result of the absence of a clear explicit ontological framework within 
which the argument is developed. For example, a lot of versions of the 
cosmological argument assume implicitly that all contingent objects 
are caused. But this is problematic since there are at least prima facie 
admissible assumptions on the nature of causation, parthood and 
composition which are entirely compatible with these arguments 
but which in fact entail that there are uncaused contingent objects 
after all, thus rendering these versions of the cosmological argument 
untenable. Take for example these initially prima facie quite reasonable 
premises: (1) the cause of the coming into existence of each object is 
mereological disjoint with that object, and (2) the cause of a caused 
part of a mereological whole is a part of the cause of that whole. 
Imagine a situation in which there exists an object A that is the cause 
of the coming into existence of object B. Let us imagine that wholly 
contingently object A and object B come together in order to form a 
composite ‘fusion’-object C that has A and B as its parts. Now, premises 
(1) and (2) actually imply that the contingent ‘fusion’-object C does not 
have a cause, which violates the implicit assumption that all contingent 
objects are caused. I show that C has no cause by contraposition. 
Assume that C is caused and let object D be the cause of C. According 
to (2) the cause of object B is a part of object D. Thus object A is part of 
object D. This result contradicts premise (1) since object A is also a part 
of object C. The present example therefore indeed shows that an explicit 
formalization of all relevant assumptions on causation, parthood and 
7 Mereological universalism is 
understood in this thesis as the 
claim that the mereological sum 
of any given collection of objects, 
however arbitrary, is an object. 
Hence the sum of all objects 
would also be an object.
8 It is not difficult to show that 
this is indeed the case. The 
mereological sum of all objects 
cannot be caused and can neither 
be the cause of another object 
since no object is outside the 
mereological sum of all objects.
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composition into a single coherent and complete ontological framework 
is required in order to avoid inadequate untenable cosmological 
arguments.9
Let me provide a second example to further illustrate this important 
point. Many versions of the cosmological argument are based upon an 
implicit conception of metaphysical modality that doesn’t exclude the 
metaphysical possibility of necessarily caused objects, that is, objects 
existing in every possible world and having an originating cause in every 
possible world.10 Now, under such an implicit conception of modality a 
valid derivation of the existence of a metaphysically necessary object 
is not sufficient to conclude that this object is also the first cause. 
The reason is that this derived object might be a necessarily caused 
object. It might exist and have been caused in every possible world. 
Cosmological arguments for the existence of a first cause that are based 
on the aforementioned implicit conception of metaphysical modality 
are therefore problematic as well. To be cogent they must rule out the 
possibility of there being necessarily caused objects. And this requires 
a framework within which all relevant metaphysical assumptions are 
explicitly formalized.
These two examples reveal that a critical examination and clarification of 
the nature of causality within the context of coming into existence and 
its relationship to mereological parthood and metaphysical modality is 
indeed required in order to obtain a cogent version of the cosmological 
argument. In other words, a convincing cosmological argument for the 
existence of a first cause can only be attained if the implicit background 
assumptions on the nature of causality, parthood and composition are 
properly clarified and combined into a coherent ontological framework. 
To acquire a cogent new first cause argument I therefore start first 
with uncovering the implicit assumptions on causation, parthood and 
composition as presumed by the earlier mentioned traditional and 
contemporary versions of the cosmological argument. This will help to 
ultimately arrive at a cogent ontological framework within which I can 
then present and defend my new first cause argument. By doing so 
the present thesis counts as a relevant contribution to the intellectual 
discussion of the intellectual reasonableness of bare or mere theism. 
Yet, as mentioned, a renewed case for bare or mere theism itself is 
not obtained until the end of chapter Viii, where I shall finally present 
and defend three further arguments for the inferred first cause to be 
personal, that is to say, to be a self-conscious subject instead of just 
some lifeless object.
Methodology
Let me also say something about methodology. In this thesis I shall 
use the methods of analytical philosophy. The emphasis is on the 
clarity of the used concepts and the logical validity of the provided 
9 Now, the example provided 
could also be invoked to argue 
that the principle that the cause 
of a part is part of the cause 
of the whole is problematic. 
Instead one may want to accept 
a weaker principle, namely that 
the cause of a part of a causally 
flat whole is a part of the cause of 
the whole, where a causally flat 
whole is a whole none of whose 
parts are partial causes of other 
parts. I thank Robert C. Koons for 
this remark. Yet, this alternative 
way of handling the example 
still supports my main point 
above, namely that an adequate 
cosmological argument has to 
be developed within the context 
of a clear explicit ontological 
framework.
10 For example a 
constitutionalist, i.e. someone 
who upholds that ontological 
constitution and mereological 
composition are two different 
relations, may claim that the 
universe, understood as the 
entity constituted by (but not 
identical with) the sum of all 
simples, is metaphysically 
necessarily caused. It is caused 
in the sense that in each possible 
world the unconstituted simples 
are collectively the sustaining 
or constitutive cause of the 
universe. To maintain her claim 
the constitutionalist must uphold 
that ‘total nothingness’ or ‘there 
not being anything at all’ is 
metaphysically impossible and 
that every composite object is 
ultimately composed of simple 
objects. The latter assertion is 
called mereological atomicity or 
mereological atomism.
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rational arguments. Methods utilized include, but are not limited to, 
(a) non-modal and modal first order predicate logic, (b) possible world 
semantics, (c) formal mereology, (d) axiomatic set theory, and (e) the 
philosophy of common sense or the appeal to certain supposedly 
insurmountable self-evident truths, such as ‘I exist’ and ‘There is an 
external world’. Where needed I shall also utilize modern axiomatic 
proof theory in order to investigate the logical consistency of specific 
frameworks combining causation, parthood and composition. Further, in 
a lot of cases I shall argue that a certain premise is cogent or sufficiently 
justified. By that I mean that the epistemic credibility of the premise 
in question is positioned in the middle between, on the one hand, 
‘being merely plausible or likely true’ and, on the other hand, ‘being 
true beyond any doubt because of some conclusive proof’. So, cogent 
or sufficiently justified propositions are propositions of which the 
epistemic credibility sits right in between that of ‘being just reasonable’ 
and ‘having absolute indisputable warrant’. They all fall exactly in 
between ‘the merely plausible’ and ‘the absolute certain’. So it is more 
than reasonable to accept them.
An initial objection
Now, before I start in the next chapter my assessment of traditional 
and contemporary cosmological arguments, I should notice that 
there is actually a quite interesting objection to all traditional and 
contemporary cosmological arguments that entail the existence of 
a metaphysically necessary being. According to the objection such 
cosmological arguments fail because on the one hand they imply the 
existence of a metaphysical necessary object, while at the same time 
these arguments are based upon (or do not exclude) conceptions of 
metaphysical modality according to which total nothingness, i.e. there 
not being anything at all, is a genuine metaphysical possibility,11 so that 
no object could exist necessarily. In this case, a balance of equally strong 
opposing arguments is arrived at12 and consequently judgment must be 
suspended.13 Thus, a cosmological argument that implies the existence 
of a necessarily existing object is only tenable if it is properly grounded 
in a clear notion of metaphysical modality that implies the metaphysical 
impossibility of total nothingness. In a stronger form, the objection 
goes beyond equipollence by concluding that in fact a necessary being 
cannot exist since such a being would have to exist in all metaphysically 
possible worlds, which, as the objection goes, is impossible, since the 
empty world, or total nothingness, is a genuine metaphysical possibility. 
If the present objection, either the initial or the stronger variant, is 
valid, then the project of trying to infer a necessary being is in trouble 
before coming of the ground. I take it that this objection has some force, 
but should not withhold us from studying cosmological arguments 
that entail the existence of a necessary being.14 The reason is that 
I believe there is an interesting argument for the impossibility of total 
nothingness, and I shall conclude this introduction by presenting it.
11 One of those not excluded 
possibilities could be the 
metaphysical possibility according 
to which there is an ‘empty 
world’, i.e. a possible world 
without any object but one 
within which it would still be true 
that certain states of affairs are 
metaphysically possible, such 
as me writing this thesis. This 
notion of an empty world is not 
in and by itself contradictory. In 
this case the accessibility relation 
between our world and the empty 
world would be symmetric, i.e. the 
empty world is reachable from our 
world and our world is reachable 
from the empty world. Another 
example would be the more 
extreme metaphysical possibility 
according to which there are no 
objects and no possible states of 
affairs. If that possibility would be 
actual then there would not even 
exist metaphysical possibilities 
other than the actual nothingness. 
The accessibility relation between 
our world and this second 
possibility would be asymmetric, 
i.e. this more extreme possibility 
is reachable from our world but 
our world is not reachable from 
the extreme possibility.
12 Namely, on the one hand 
the alleged possibility of total 
nothingness (which entails the 
impossibility of a necessary 
being) and on the other hand the 
cosmological argument for the 
existence of a necessary being.
13 The suspension of judgment 
as a result of there being equally 
strong arguments at both sides 
is a case of ancient Pyrrhonian 
equipollence (isostheneia). Such a 
skeptical epoche surely needs to 
be avoided.
14 As will become clear in chapter 
Vi the new first cause argument 
that I propose does not require 
any appeal to metaphysical modal 
notions such as necessary or 
contingent existence. Hence, this 
objection has no force against my 
new first cause argument. And, 
for the same reason, it does not 
apply to the Thomistic first cause 
argument either, which I shall 
discuss in the next chapter. Yet, 
I believe it is important to address 
it, since all other cosmological 
arguments do in fact infer the 
existence of a metaphysically 
necessary being.
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I propose a new a priori deductive argument for the metaphysical 
impossibility of total nothingness. The proposed argument does not 
depend on an appeal to the existence of a metaphysically necessary 
being. The conclusion that total nothingness is impossible follows 
logically from the following three premises:
(a) The Aristotelian-causal account of metaphysical modal facts is 
correct,
(b) There is at least one possible state of affairs,
(c) If a state of affairs is possible, then it is necessarily possible.
In his essay The Leibnizian Cosmological Argument Alexander R. Pruss 
(Pruss 2009) raises the question of the truth ground of metaphysical 
modal facts such as ‘It is necessary that P’, ‘It is impossible that Q’ 
or ‘It is possible that R’. Pruss presents five non-revisionist theories 
about what features of reality make metaphysical modal facts hold: 
narrowly logical, Lewisian, Platonic, Aristotelian-essentialist, and 
Aristotelian-causal. Pruss argues in detail that the first four theories 
are unsatisfactory, and concludes that we must accept the Aristotelian-
causal account until a better account is found. Pruss states that 
according to the Aristotelian-causal account of metaphysical modal 
facts ‘a non-actual state of affairs S is merely possible provided that 
something – an event or substance or collection of events or substances, 
say – exists (in the tenseless sense: existed, exists presently, exists 
eternally or will exist) with a causal power of bringing about S, or with 
a causal power of bringing about something with a causal power of 
bringing about S, or with a causal power of bringing about something 
with a causal power of bringing about something with a causal power 
of bringing about S, or more generally provided that something exists 
capable of originating a chain of exercises of causal power capable of 
leading to S’ (Pruss 2009, p. 43). Pruss explains further that, according to 
the Aristotelian-causal account, ‘a state of affairs is possible if it is either 
actual or merely possible’.
According to the second premise there is at least one possible state of 
affairs. This second premise cannot be substantiated by referring to the 
empirical observation that our world contains many actual and therefore 
possible states of affairs. For such an appeal to sense perception would 
turn the whole argument into an a posteriori argument instead of an a 
priori argument. Now, the second premise is a priori substantiated by 
the fact that we can a priori conceive a possible world that contains at 
least one actual and thus possible state of affairs. Take as an example 
a world consisting of a single atom. This world is surely possible and it 
indeed contains at least one actual and thus possible state of affairs.
The third premise is also a priori sufficiently plausible. Pruss states in 
his aforementioned essay: ‘However else things might have gone than 
they did, it would still be true that they could have gone as they actually 
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did’ (Pruss 2009, p. 44). The premise is a formulation of the axiom 
of Brouwer15 which states that if p holds, then p is possible in every 
possible world, i.e. the proposition ‘p is possible’ is true in every possible 
world. More generally, if X is metaphysically possible in some possible 
world w, that is, if the proposition ‘X is possible’ is true in world w, then 
X is metaphysically possible in all possible worlds, i.e. the proposition ‘X 
is possible’ is true in all possible worlds.16
To derive the metaphysical impossibility of total nothingness I show that 
the assumption that total nothingness is metaphysically possible results 
in a contradiction. Suppose that total nothingness is possible. In that 
case total nothingness could be actual. Let us assess the case that total 
nothingness is actual. In that case there is not any actual state of affairs. 
There are no merely possible states of affairs either, since there is nothing 
with the causal power of bringing about an actual state of affairs. Now, 
a state of affairs is possible if it is either actual or merely possible. From 
this it follows that there are no possible states of affairs in case total 
nothingness is actual. However, according to premise (b) there is at least 
one possible state of affairs S. Premise (c) implies that S is necessarily 
possible. S is necessarily a possible state of affairs. Therefore S must also 
be a possible state of affairs in the case that total nothingness is actual. 
This contradicts our earlier conclusion that there are no possible states 
of affairs in case total nothingness is actual. From this contradiction it 
follows that total nothingness cannot be actual. But this contradicts the 
original assumption that total nothingness is metaphysically possible. 
Therefore total nothingness is not metaphysically possible.
The argument shows that total nothingness is metaphysically impossible 
without having to argue for the existence of a metaphysical necessary 
being. Further, since the argument is a priori and not a posteriori, it does 
not only show that total nothingness is impossible, but also why it is 
impossible. The argument gives an explanatory reason for the fact that 
total nothingness is impossible without having to show that there is a 
necessary being.17
15 A reference to this axiom 
is found in the online Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy under 
‘modal logic’.
16 Note that here the S5 axiom 
system of modal logic is assumed. 
In the case of S5 all possible 
worlds are connected, that is, every 
possible world can be reached 
from out every other possible 
world. In this case it follows 
indeed that if state X is possible 
in some possible world, then X is 
possible in all possible worlds. For, 
if there is a possible world, say 
w, in which X is possible, i.e. ‘X is 
possible’ is true in w, then there is 
a possible world w2 in which X is 
true, so that, since w2 is reachable 
from out all other possible worlds, 
X is in fact possible in all possible 
worlds. And this is plausible in 
the specific case of metaphysical 
possibility under consideration. 
After all, in this case we are 
interested in the generic question 
of whether some state of affairs 
is possible simpliciter, that is, 
whether it can be actualized at all, 
which is a question whose answer 
does not appear to depend on 
which of the many possible worlds 
is actual. For, it is either possible 
or not.
17 An a priori argument explains 
a fact if it entails it and if its 
premises are sufficiently intuitive 
or evident.

ii Traditional cosmological arguments: 
two paradigmatic forms
Introduction
As mentioned the theorizing about causation is perhaps as old as 
philosophy itself. Ever since Plato many philosophers have developed 
cosmological arguments for the existence of a first cause. This chapter 
does not aim to provide an historical overview of all the first cause 
arguments offered by Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, Leibniz, Clarke and 
many others. For that would be a project in itself. Instead it describes 
two paradigmatic forms18 of the traditional first cause argument and 
analyses the problems associated with each of them.
The first paradigmatic form
In his Summa Theologiæ Thomas Aquinas presents five arguments for the 
existence of a first cause. These arguments are widely known as the ‘Five 
Ways’. In the second way Aquinas reasons from the observation that the 
observable world contains caused things:
‘The second way is based on the nature of causation. In the 
observable world causes are found to be ordered in series; we never 
observe, nor ever could, something causing itself, for this would 
mean it preceded itself, and this is not possible. Such a series of 
causes must however stop somewhere; for in it an earlier member 
causes an intermediate and the intermediate a last (whether the 
intermediate be one or many). Now if you eliminate a cause you also 
eliminate its effects, so that you cannot have a last cause, nor an 
intermediate one, unless you have a first. Given therefore no stop 
in the series of causes, and hence no first cause, there would be no 
intermediate causes either, and no last effect, and this would be an 
open mistake. One is therefore forced to suppose some first cause, 
to which everyone gives the name “God”’.19 
The second way is historically important because in it Aquinas is 
concerned with the cause of a thing’s existence and not with the cause 
of the motion or change of an already existing thing as Plato, Aristotle 
and others before Aquinas had done. The context of the second way 
is thus causation with respect to bringing about existence instead 
of bringing about motion or change. Aquinas’ second way can be 
schematized as follows:
18 Paradigmatic in the sense that 
both forms are derived from what 
the received view considers to 
be exemplary principal versions 
of an argument for a first cause, 
i.e. the second of the ‘Five Ways’ 
of Thomas Aquinas and Leibniz’s 
argument in his The Monadology. 
Surely, there are other exemplary 
versions.
19 Summa Theologiæ, First part, 
Question 2, Article 3.
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 1 There are caused objects (premise),
 2 There are no cyclic series of causes (premise),
 3 There are no downward infinite series of causes (premise),
 4 The series of causes of each caused object is finite and acyclic 
(from 2, 3),
 5 The series of causes of each caused object starts with an 
uncaused cause (from 4),
 6 There is a first cause (from 1, 5).20
Aquinas’ second way is at its face-value not a logically valid argument. 
Premise (1) and intermediate conclusion (5) imply that the total number 
of uncaused causes is greater than or equal to one and less than or equal 
to the number of caused objects. Now, how does the conclusion (6) 
that there is a first cause logically follow from this? The argument does 
not make this clear. Moreover, the argument would still not be logically 
valid if it could be assumed that the number of uncaused causes is 
equal to one. The reason is that this sole uncaused cause might still not 
be a first cause. After all, a first cause is the cause or an indirect cause 
of everything besides itself. Therefore, a single uncaused cause only 
qualifies as a first cause if there are no isolated objects (i.e. objects that 
are uncaused and that are neither the cause of another object).
From the above it follows that a logically valid argument for the 
existence of a first cause is obtained by adding the following two 
additional premises: (1) if there is an uncaused cause, then the number 
of uncaused causes is one, and (2) every uncaused object is itself a 
cause:
 1 There are caused objects (premise),
 2 There are no cyclic series of causes (premise),
 3 There are no downward infinite series of causes (premise),
 4 The series of causes of each caused object is finite and acyclic 
(from 2, 3),
 5 The series of causes of each caused object starts with an 
uncaused cause (from 4),
 6 There is an uncaused cause (from 1, 5),
 7 If there is an uncaused cause, then the number of uncaused 
causes is one (premise),
 8 There is one uncaused cause (from 6, 7),
 9 Every uncaused object is itself a cause (premise),
 10 There is one uncaused cause of everything besides itself (from 5, 
8, 9),
 11 There is a first cause (from 10 and the definition of ‘first cause’).
In what follows this argument is referred to as the first paradigmatic 
form of a first cause argument. It consists of five premises (1, 2, 3, 7 and 
9), five intermediate conclusions (4, 5, 6, 8 and 10) and a final conclusion 
(11). Aquinas’ second way is adequately thought of as being an instance 
20 As mentioned earlier, a first 
cause is an uncaused entity that 
is the direct or indirect cause of 
everything else besides itself. 
Hence, it follows that if there is a 
first cause, then that first cause is 
unique. So, there can be at most 
one first cause. An argument that 
entails the existence of a first 
cause also entails its uniqueness.
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of this form in case it is assumed that premises (7) and (9) are both 
implicitly part of Aquinas’ reasoning.
The first paradigmatic form is logically valid, that is, the conclusion that 
there is a first cause follows logically from the five premises. Therefore, 
if the premises are true, the conclusion is true as well. Now, are there 
good reasons to think that each of these five premises is true? In what 
follows each of these premises is considered in more detail.
premise  (1)
The first premise is entirely acceptable on empirical grounds. Surely, we 
perceive a world that appears to be full of all kinds of caused objects, 
such as tables, chairs, plants, trees, animals and humans. So, the 
first premise is an unproblematic observational datum. It is certainly 
plausible enough to be used as a premise. Note that this premise is a 
posteriori and not a priori justified. Hence the first paradigmatic form is 
an a posteriori argument.
premise  (2)
The second premise introduces the concept of a cyclic series of causes. 
A cyclic series of causes is a series of causes that starts and terminates 
with the same object. Such a series is properly described as either ‘A 
causes A’, ‘A causes B , B causes A’ or ‘A causes B, B causes something, 
… , anything causes A’. The second premise holds that there are no cyclic 
series of causes. The justification for this premise is that no object can 
be directly or indirectly ontologically prior21 to itself. In Aquinas’ second 
way this point is made when he writes: ‘we never observe, nor ever 
could, something causing itself, for this would mean it preceded itself, 
and this is not possible’. The second premise seems to be unproblematic. 
Surely, nothing can be the cause or an indirect cause of its own 
existence. So the second premise is intuitively plausible. It is certainly 
reasonable enough to accept as a premise.
premise  (3)
The concept of a downward infinite series of causes figures in the third 
premise. Such a series of causes is bounded from above but unbounded 
from below, i.e. it contains a last but not a first member. A downward 
infinite series of causes can be adequately denoted as ‘… , something 
causes B, B causes A’. According to the third premise there are no 
downward infinite series of causes. The second way does not provide 
a clear explicit justification for this premise.22 Still, the justification 
might be that an infinite downward regress of causes of an object is 
not possible since in that case the object would not be able to actually 
come into existence. This might seem to be a sufficient justification. 
An infinite regression of causes appears implausible since it is for us 
inconceivable how the existence of something could actually originate 
from an interminable sequence of causes without a lower bound, i.e. 
without an initial originating cause. The claim that an infinite downward 
21 It could be that Aquinas refers 
to temporal priority, i.e. being 
earlier than something else, 
instead of the broader conception 
of ontological priority. Still, his 
remark applies plausibly to the 
context of ontological priority 
as well. The remark ‘nothing 
precedes itself’ can adequately 
be understood as the a-temporal 
claim that it is incoherent to 
presuppose the existence of a 
thing in order to establish the 
very fact of its existence.
22 Rowe (1998) provides an 
interesting analysis of the second 
way argument of Aquinas. 
According to Rowe Aquinas’ 
reasoning in the second way 
against an infinite regress of 
causes appears to be question-
begging. Aquinas seems simply to 
assume that every series of causes 
has a first member. Rowe does not 
try to avoid the conclusion that 
Aquinas reasoning is question-
begging. Instead Rowe searches 
‘for something more substantial 
beneath the surface that may 
have been poorly expressed [by 
Aquinas] but, nevertheless, may 
represent his real view on the 
subject’. Rowe’s approach is based 
upon the thought that Aquinas 
might be concerned in his second 
way with the present existence of a 
thing and not with the coming into 
existence of a thing. Therefore, as 
Rowe argues, Aquinas is limiting 
himself to a specific kind of series 
of causes (i.e. so-called ‘essentially 
ordered’ series of causes) for 
which it can according to Rowe be 
argued that they do have a first 
member. The scope of this chapter 
however is causation with respect 
to the bringing about of existence. 
The bringing about of existence is 
not limited to causing the present 
existence of a thing. Hence 
Rowe’s approach does not help 
to obtain a justification for the 
more general claim that no series 
of causes of objects proceeds to 
infinity.
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regression of causes is impossible is thus certainly not groundless since 
it is at least acceptable as an assertion about how we perceive reality. 
The third premise appears to be justified as a common sense proposition 
about how the world is intuited by us. So, it seems to be a sufficiently 
warranted premise to utilize within metaphysical inquiries. On the other 
hand it has to be admitted that apart from these considerations there 
seems to be no good argument for the third premise that proceeds to its 
conclusion through discursive reasoning rather than direct intuition. An 
infinite regress of causes might be possible even though it is hard for us 
to conceive. A first cause argument that does not rely upon this premise 
should therefore, everything else being equal, be preferred above a first 
cause argument that does. As becomes clear in the rest of this thesis 
the second paradigmatic form and the proposed renewed version of a 
first cause argument do not rely upon the questionable premise that an 
infinite downward regress of causes is impossible.
premise  (7)
According to this premise, if there is an uncaused cause, then the 
number of uncaused causes is one. This premise surely seems 
implausible. Why could there not be two or more uncaused causes? 
Nevertheless, if mereological universalism, i.e. the claim that every 
sum23 of objects is itself an object, is true, one could argue that there is 
a sense in which there is only one uncaused cause. Let Uc be the sum of 
all uncaused causes. Uc is an object if mereological universalism is true. 
Further, Uc is uncaused since it is the sum of only uncaused objects. 
Thus Uc is itself an uncaused cause and each uncaused cause is a part24 
of it. Given this, one could argue that Uc is the single uncaused cause 
that contains every other uncaused cause as one of its proper parts.25 
The problem of this argumentation is that mereological universalism 
itself is a controversial thesis. In the contemporary literature objections 
to mereological universalism are raised and alternative mereological 
accounts have been proposed, such as those of Van Inwagen (1990), 
Fine (1999), Johnson (2002) and Koslicki (2008). Without mereological 
universalism, there appears to be no cogent way of holding that 
there could be at most one uncaused cause. Premise (7) is therefore 
too problematic. There seems to be no plausible reason for it that 
could convince those who do not accept the claim that every sum of 
objects is an object. Now, one might respond that we in fact do not 
require universalism to argue that Uc is an object. For, perhaps we 
can point at certain specific features of the collection of all uncaused 
causes which justify us to infer that the sum of this collection, Uc, is 
an object regardless of whether universalism is true or false. But what 
features should we refer to in this specific case? I take it that whatever 
features we suggest, the claim that the collection in question has these 
features will be controversial, and, moreover, the claim that the sum 
of each collection having these features constitutes an object will be 
controversial as well.
23 The sum of two or more 
objects is a mereological term 
to denote the totality of those 
objects, i.e. those objects taken 
together.
24 In this chapter the 
mereological notion of parthood 
is taken to be a relationship 
between two objects. One object 
can be a part of another object. 
Parthood is taken to be a basic 
concept and thus not definable 
in terms of other more basic 
concepts. Object A is called a 
proper part of object B if and only 
if A is a part of B and A is not 
equal to B. Object A is called an 
improper part of object B in case 
A is equal to B. Further, object A 
is said to contain object B if and 
only if B is a part of A. Another 
mereological conception used 
in this chapter is the concept 
of disjointness. Disjointness is 
defined here in terms of parthood. 
Two objects are disjoint in case 
they do not share a (proper or 
improper) part.
25 Uc is maximal in the sense 
that it is the unique uncaused 
cause that contains each other 
uncaused cause.
26 This principle is mentioned 
and accepted already by Aristotle: 
‘Everything has an origin or is an 
origin’ (Physics 203b6). A variant 
of it can be found in Plato’s The 
Sofist. In this dialogue the stranger 
says: ‘My notion would be, that 
anything which possesses any sort 
of power to affect another, or to 
be affected by another, if only for 
a single moment, however trifling 
the cause and however slight 
the effect, has real existence’ 
(Project Gutenberg, Benjamin 
Jowett translation). The principle 
that everything that exists is a 
cause or has a cause is related to 
a contemporary position within 
the philosophy of science known 
as causalism. Causalists such as 
N. Cartwright argue ‘that we are 
entitled to speak of the reality of 
[objects] because we know that 
they have quite specific causal 
powers’ (Hacking 1983). The exact 
opposite of the principle that 
everything that exists is caused 
or a cause is the principle of 
existence from Parmenides of 
Elea. Parmenides maintains that 
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premise  (9) 
This premise holds that every uncaused object is itself the cause of 
another object. It is a direct logical consequence of the metaphysical 
principle that everything that exists is caused by another object or is the 
cause of at least one other object.26 The posited disjunction is inclusive. 
It is possible that an object is itself caused and is also the cause of one or 
more other objects. Note that this metaphysical principle immediately 
implies that mereological universalism is untenable since it follows that 
the sum of all objects is not an object.27 Premise (9) seems plausible 
enough to accept as a premise. The intuition behind it is that something 
can only exist if it is part of ‘the causal fabric’ of the world. Something 
that is not caused and that is neither the cause of anything else can not 
exist simply because it does not take part in the all-embracing process of 
causation. Premise (9) is thus grounded in the viewpoint that the world 
as a whole is a causally intertwined whole or that the world does not 
contain fully isolated inert objects.28 Reality is a causally interweaved 
coherent unity in which every object participates. Everything that exists 
is causally connected because reality is in its broadest sense a linked 
unity. In fact, premise (9) is a premise of the new first cause argument 
presented later on in this thesis.29
eVAluAtion
From the above it can be concluded that the first two premises are 
sufficiently justified. Premise (9) seems to be sufficiently justified as 
well. However, premise (3) and premise (7) are quite problematic. It is 
questionable whether we are warranted to think that these premises are 
true. From this it follows that the first paradigmatic form is not a good 
argument. It is not a good argument because two of its premises are 
not sufficiently warranted. Now, as a next step, the second paradigmatic 
form is presented and evaluated.
The second paradigmatic form
In his The Monadology Leibniz argues that there exists a metaphysically 
necessary being which is the sufficient reason for the existence of the 
universe. In other words, this being is the reason or rational ground 
for there being a totality of contingent beings.30 This totality is to be 
understood as all contingent beings taken together. The existence 
of a metaphysically necessary being is Leibniz’ answer to his famous 
question as to why there are contingent beings at all or, more generally, 
why there is anything at all rather than just nothing. Leibniz provides the 
following argument:
‘[…] there must […] be a sufficient reason for contingent truths […]. 
[Now,] there is an infinity of figures and of movements, present and 
past, which enter into the efficient cause of my present writing, and 
there is an infinity of slight inclinations and dispositions, past and 
something exists if and only if it 
is uncaused and not itself a cause. 
The intuition behind Parmenides’ 
principle is that something can 
only exist if it is completely 
changeless and that being caused 
or being a cause implies change. 
The principle of existence from 
Parmenides is surely problematic 
since it implies that none of the 
regular objects in our world, such 
as tables and chairs, exist.
27 It is not difficult to show 
that this is indeed the case if 
we assume that the cause of 
the existence of an object is 
mereologically disjoint with that 
caused object. Later on in this 
chapter, when the second form 
is discussed, it is argued that 
this assumption is sufficiently 
reasonable. Now, the sum of all 
objects cannot be caused and can 
neither be the cause of another 
object because such a cause or 
effect would have to be disjoint 
with all objects taken together. 
This is impossible since there is 
nothing outside the sum of all 
objects.
28 The idea that reality as such 
is a causally interweaved whole 
is surely plausible as assertion 
about reality as we perceive it. 
Indeed, premise (9) is about the 
actual world. It is not argued 
for that premise (9) holds in all 
metaphysically possible worlds. 
In fact, such a modal claim would 
be highly implausible, for we can 
of course imagine possible worlds 
in which premise (9) is false, such 
as a world consisting of just one 
object.
29 Both René van Woudenberg 
and Jeroen de Ridder indicated 
a specific objection to this 
premise. Abstract objects, as 
this objection goes, are causally 
inert, that is, they are uncaused 
and they do not cause anything. 
As such they falsify premise (9). 
Now, this objection does not 
have sufficient force. First, there 
might not be abstract objects, 
that is, nominalism with respect 
to abstract objects could be true. 
Nominalism regarding abstract 
objects, i.e. the position that all 
objects are concrete objects, is 
surely a defensible position. Due 
to space limitations this point is 
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present, of my soul, which enter into the final cause. And as all this 
detail only involves other contingents, anterior and more detailed, 
each one of which needs a like analysis for its explanation, we make 
no advance: the sufficient or final reason must be outside of the 
sequence or series of this detail of contingencies, however infinite it 
may be. And thus it is that the final reason of things must be found 
in a necessary substance […]; and this is what we call God’.31
Leibniz considers the universe as a whole, i.e. as the totality of all 
contingent objects. He holds that there must be a sufficient reason for 
the fact that there are contingent objects at all rather than nothing. In 
other words, the existence of the universe must have a rational basis 
or ground. It is important to notice that Leibniz does not exclude the 
possibility of an infinite downward regress of causes, as Aquinas did. 
There might be series of causes that proceed to infinity. However, 
according to Leibniz, such series, if they exist, do not constitute a 
sufficient reason for the existence of the universe itself, i.e. the totality 
of all finite and infinite causal series. In other words, some series of 
causes might go to infinity, but this cannot account for the fact that 
there exists a totality of contingent objects. A sufficient reason for the 
universe considered as a whole can only be found in an object that 
exists outside the realm of contingent objects, i.e. a non-contingent 
and therefore necessary existing object. This metaphysically necessary 
object is referred to by Leibniz as ‘the final reason of things’. As ‘the final 
reason of things’ it is not only the sufficient reason for the existence of a 
totality of contingent objects, but also for its own existence. Hence, by 
virtue of its own nature, it is not possible for this necessary being not to 
exist.32
Leibniz characterizes this necessarily existing object as being the 
ultimate reason for the existence of the universe, not as being the first 
cause of the universe. However, it seems obvious that the only way 
in which an object can be the reason for the existence of a totality of 
other objects is by being the originating cause of the existence of that 
totality. In other words, if the reason of the universe is a specific object, 
as Leibniz holds, then that object is properly described as being the 
originating cause of the universe. Therefore, Leibniz’ argument can be 
schematically represented as a first cause argument as follows:
 1 There must be a sufficient reason for each contingent truth 
(premise),
 2 The universe is the sum of all contingent objects (definition),
 3 It is a contingent truth that there is a universe (premise),
 4 There must be a sufficient reason for the existence of the 
universe (from 1, 3),
 5 The reason for the existence of the universe is found outside the 
universe (premise),
not further discussed. Second, 
even if there are abstract objects, 
one could argue that they are 
all caused and therefore do not 
falsify premise (9). After all, 
concepts and propositions are 
examples of abstract objects. 
Abstract objects such as ‘bicycle’, 
‘elevator’ and ‘The bicycle is 
in the elevator’ are certainly 
plausibly understood as being the 
product of human thought and 
therefore as being caused. The 
same can be maintained for other 
classes of abstract objects, such 
as the objects of mathematics. 
One could plausibly argue that 
mathematical objects are caused 
by a specific activity of human 
thought, namely abstraction from 
or idealization of the concrete 
objects in nature. This line of 
thought can be further extended, 
that is, it can be defended that all 
abstract objects are man-made 
artifacts and thus caused. Note 
that this line of thought collapses 
into a defense of nominalism 
with respect to abstract objects 
if one contend that humans can 
only cause concrete objects, 
i.e. mental contents or material 
states of affairs. Third, even if 
some abstract objects, such as 
sets, are uncaused, it might be 
the case that they are the (logical 
or sustaining) cause of other 
abstract objects. One could for 
example argue that sets are the 
(logical or sustaining) cause 
of numbers since numbers are 
mathematically produced from 
sets. So, uncaused abstract 
objects are causes and therefore 
they do not falsify premise (9). 
Fourth, suppose that there are 
causally inert abstract objects 
after all. In that specific case one 
could recast the first paradigmatic 
form of the first cause argument 
by replacing all occurrences 
of ‘object’ by ‘concrete object’, 
i.e. by limiting the ontological 
domain to concrete objects. 
The conclusion of the argument 
would then be that there is a 
unique concrete object that is 
the first cause within the realm of 
concrete objects, which is surely 
a quite interesting non-trivial 
metaphysical conclusion. The 
fourth option was proposed by 
Jeroen de Ridder.
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 6 There is a necessary being that is the reason for the universe’s 
existence (from 2, 5),
 7 If a being is the reason for the universe’s existence, than it is its 
cause (premise),
 8 There is a necessarily existing being that is the cause of the 
universe (from 6, 7),
 9 If the cause of the universe exists necessarily, then it is a first 
cause (premise),
 10 There is a first cause (from 8, 9).
The first premise of the above argument is widely known as the principle 
of sufficient reason (psr). In addition to the formulation of psr  in 
the above quoted fragment, i.e. ‘there must be a sufficient reason 
for contingent truths’, Leibniz provides many other formulations of 
this famous principle in his work.33 According to the psr there is a 
sufficient explanation for every contingently true proposition. The psr 
is nowadays rather controversial. A forceful objection against it has 
been raised by Van Inwagen (1983). He argues against psr  by showing 
that the conjunction of all contingently true propositions is itself a 
contingently true proposition that cannot have an explanation. His 
line of reasoning is in essence as follows.34 Since no necessarily true 
proposition explains a contingently true proposition,35 it follows that 
the explanation of the conjunction of all contingently true propositions 
is a contingently true proposition E. The contingently true proposition E 
explains itself since E is part of the conjunction of all contingently true 
propositions and E explains this conjunction and therefore each part of 
it. But it is surely impossible that proposition E explains itself since no 
contingently true proposition can explain itself. The assumption that the 
psr is true leads therefore to a contradiction. Consequently, the psr 
is to be rejected. Now, this powerful line of reasoning of Van Inwagen 
cannot be applied to the following weaker version of the psr:
(1*) Every contingent object is caused by another object.
This more restricted version of the psr only claims that each contingent 
object is caused, not that for every contingently true proposition there 
is a sufficient explanation. It is based on the intuition that a contingent 
object exists but could not have existed, and must therefore have a 
reason for its existence, being the fact that its existence is caused 
by another contingent or necessary object. In order to argue against 
(1*) in a way comparable to Van Inwagen’s forceful objection to (1) 
one would have to argue that the totality of all contingent objects, 
i.e. all contingent objects taken together, is itself a contingent object 
that cannot have been caused by another object. This is however not 
possible, precisely because of the fact that one could counter such 
an objection by maintaining that the contingent aggregation of all 
contingent objects is a contingent object that has a metaphysical 
30 An object is contingent if it 
exists but could not have existed, 
i.e. if it exists in the actual world 
and there is a possible world in 
which the object does not exist. 
Take for example the chair on 
which one is sitting. This chair is 
a contingent object since it exists 
and there are possible worlds 
without it. The chair, although it 
happens to exist, could, if things 
would have gone differently, 
not have existed. Further, a 
metaphysically necessary object 
is an object that could impossibly 
not exist, i.e. it exists in every 
possible world.
31 This fragment is a slightly 
abridged version of Leibniz’ 
argumentation as quoted in Craig 
(1980). Leibniz provides similar 
arguments in his On the Ultimate 
Origin of Things, The Theodicy 
and The Principles of Nature and 
of Grace, Based on Reason (Craig 
1980).
32 Later on in this thesis it 
is argued that there might be 
necessary beings that do not 
exist by virtue of their own 
nature. If there indeed are such 
objects, then, from the fact that 
a given object exists necessarily, 
one cannot conclude that this 
particular object exists by virtue 
of its own nature, as Leibniz 
appears to be doing.
33 See Craig (1980) for a 
comprehensive overview of 
Leibniz’ various formulations of 
the psr .
34 This summary follows Pruss 
(2009) in which Van Inwagen’s 
objection to the psr is discussed 
in detail. J. Ross, W. Rowe and 
P. Francken and H. Geirsson 
defend similar objections to the 
psr (Pruss 2009).
35 Hereby it is assumed that 
the notion of explanation 
includes logical entailment, that 
is, if a proposition P explains 
a proposition Q then Q is 
logically implied by P. Hence, 
no necessarily true proposition 
explains a contingent proposition 
since all logical consequences of 
a necessarily true proposition are 
necessarily true.
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necessary object as its cause. In fact, this claim is exactly what the first 
cause argument as derived from the quoted fragment of Leibniz’s The 
Monadology amounts to. Therefore, by replacing (1) by (1*), and adjusting 
some of the other propositions accordingly, a first cause argument 
is obtained that is not directly vulnerable to Van Inwagen’s forceful 
objection to the psr:
 1* Every contingent object is caused by another object (premise),
 2 The universe is the sum of all contingent objects (definition),
 3 There are contingent objects (premise),
 4 The sum of all contingent objects is a contingent object 
(premise),
 5 The universe is a contingent object (from 2, 3, 4),
 6 The universe is caused (from 1, 5),
 7 The cause of an object is disjoint with that object (premise),
 8 The cause of the universe is not a contingent, i.e. a necessary, 
object (from 2, 6, 7),
 9 If the cause of the universe exists necessarily, then it is a first 
cause (premise),
 10 There is a first cause (from 8, 9).
In what follows this argument is referred to as the second paradigmatic 
form of a first cause argument. It consists of five premises (1*, 3, 4, 7 and 
9), an explicit definition (2), three intermediate conclusions (5, 6 and 8) 
and a final conclusion (10). Leibniz’ argumentation for the existence of a 
metaphysically necessary being that constitutes a sufficient reason for 
the existence of the universe, as presented in the quoted fragment from 
The Monadology, can be adequately thought of as being an instance of 
the second paradigmatic form if we may assume that premises (1*), (4) 
and (9) are part of Leibniz’ reasoning.
The second paradigmatic form is logically valid, that is, the conclusion 
that there is a first cause follows logically from the five premises. Thus, if 
the premises are true, the conclusion is true as well. Now, are there good 
reasons to think that each of these five premises is true? In what follows 
each of these premises is assessed in more detail.
premise  (1*)
As mentioned the premise that every contingent object is caused is 
a weaker version of Leibniz’ principle of sufficient reason (psr). As 
being more restricted than psr , it is not vulnerable to Van Inwagen’s 
objection. Nevertheless, the first premise is problematic. To understand 
why consider the following two propositions:
 
(a) The cause of a caused part of a caused object is a part of the 
cause of that object,
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(b) There is at least one object A for which it holds that A is the 
cause of an object B, and the sum of A and B is a contingent 
object C.36
Both propositions seem to be prima facie sufficiently plausible if taken 
into account that, as mentioned in the introduction, the context of 
causation is causation with respect to bringing about the existence of 
an object, i.e. an object X is the cause of an object Y if and only if X is 
the cause of the existence of Y. It is now shown that (a), (b) and premise 
(7), i.e. the premise that an object and its cause are mutually disjoint, 
together contradict premise (1*). According to (b) object C is contingent. 
Now assume that C is caused and let object D be the cause of C. 
According to proposition (a) the cause of B is a part of D. Thus A is a part 
of D. Now, A is a part of C, and therefore D and C are not disjoint, which 
clearly contradicts premise (7). It therefore follows that the assumption 
that the contingent object C is caused is untenable. So, C is an uncaused 
contingent object, which counters premise (1*). Now, as is argued below, 
premise (7) is in fact properly justified on independent grounds. Thus, 
there are two prima facie plausible propositions, (a) and (b), that, as 
shown above, together with the independently justified premise (7) 
refute premise (1*). Therefore, the first premise, i.e. the premise that 
states that every contingent object is caused by another object, is not 
sufficiently plausible and thus problematic.
premise  (3)
This premise is empirically sufficiently warranted. The world surely 
contains objects that, if things would have gone differently, would have 
not existed, such as for example the chair one is sitting on. Note that 
because of this premise the second paradigmatic form is an a posteriori 
and not an a priori argument. In this respect it is similar to the first form.
premise  (4)
This premise maintains two things. First, that the sum of all contingent 
objects is itself an object, and, second, that this object is a contingent 
object. Now, the second claim is highly plausible. Surely, it would be 
extremely counter-intuitive to hold that the sum of all contingent 
objects is a necessarily existing object. Some philosophers contend that 
each sum has its parts essentially. In that case it follows immediately 
that the sum of all contingent objects is contingent, since the sum fails 
to exist in those possible worlds in which at least one of its parts does 
not exist. The first claim, i.e. the claim that the sum of all contingent 
objects is an object, is implied by mereological universalism, i.e. the 
thesis that each arbitrary sum of objects is also an object. However, 
as mentioned mereological universalism is a controversial thesis, due 
to the various objections and alternatives by Van Inwagen (1990), Fine 
(1999), Johnson (2002), Koslicki (2008) and others. Hence, the first claim, 
36 In reality objects sometimes 
fuse, i.e. come together to 
constitute a third object. There 
is thus no reason to hold that a 
cause could not fuse with the 
object that its causes. Some of 
these fusions between a cause 
and its effect are indeed plausibly 
thought of as being contingent. 
For example in case the cause 
or effect is itself an contingent 
object that belongs to the fusion 
essentially, i.e. without one of 
these parts the fusion object 
ceases to exist. Therefore, it is 
justified to claim that there is at 
least one contingent object that is 
the sum of two objects, one cause 
and the effect of that cause. This 
is precisely what is claimed by (b).
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and thus premise (4) itself, is quite problematic. Without universalism, 
there is no good reason for accepting the claim that the sum of all 
contingent objects is an object. Again, one might respond that we do not 
need universalism to conclude that the sum of all contingent objects is 
an object. For, couldn’t there be specific features of the collection of all 
contingent objects which justify us to infer that its sum is an object? Yet, 
I take it that whatever features we suggest, the claim that this collection 
has these features, or the claim that the sum of a collection with these 
features is an object, will be controversial.
premise  (7)
This premise is sufficiently warranted. Plausibly, the cause of the 
existence of an object is ontologically prior to that object and each of 
its parts. So, if an object’s cause would not be disjoint with the caused 
object, it would follow that the cause of the object is prior to a part of 
itself, which seems surely impossible. This point can be put in a different 
way. Suppose object A is the cause of B and assume that A and B are not 
disjoint. In that case A and B share a part C. Now, A is the cause of the 
existence of B. Since C is a part of B it follows that A is also the cause of 
the existence of C.37 But C is a part of A as well. Thus A is the cause of 
a part of itself. This is definitely counter-intuitive. Nothing is prior to a 
part of itself. Therefore the cause of an object is always disjoint with that 
object. The cause and the caused object have a separate existence: they 
do not share a common part.
premise  (9)
According to this premise a necessarily existing cause of the universe 
must be a first cause. This premise is problematic for two reasons. First, 
the necessarily existing cause of the universe, let’s call it object A, might 
not be the cause or an indirect cause of everything besides itself. After 
all, the argument does not rule out the existence of other metaphysically 
necessary objects that are not caused or indirectly caused by A. If such 
other objects exist, A is obviously not the cause or an indirect cause 
of everything besides itself, and thus not a first cause. Second, object A 
might not be uncaused and therefore not be a first cause. In order to 
understand why it is important to notice first that the argument does 
not exclude the existence of objects that exist in every possible world 
and that are caused in every possible world. In fact, there seems to be 
no good reason for denying the existence of such objects. Surely, such 
objects could not exist if every metaphysically necessary object exists 
because of its own nature.38 But why should all necessarily existing 
objects exist by virtue of their own nature? Earlier in this chapter a 
necessarily existing object is defined as an object that could impossibly 
not exist, i.e. that exists in every possible world. Now, this definition 
does not exclude the existence of objects that exist necessarily and 
that are caused in all possible worlds.39 So, the fact that an object is 
metaphysically necessary does not imply that it is uncaused. There is 
thus no good reason why object A should be uncaused. Consequently, 
37 Note that a maximally 
inclusive conception of causality 
is implicitly assumed here. In 
other words, the cause of the 
existence of an object includes 
everything that is responsible 
for the existence of that object 
and all of its parts. The cause of 
a painting contains for example 
not just the painter but also the 
object that produced the paint 
used by the painter, the object 
that produced the frame of the 
painting, etc.
38 An object that exists in every 
possible world and that is caused 
in every possible world would be 
a necessary object that does not 
exist by virtue of its own nature. 
It would not exist because of its 
intrinsic features but because of 
the external fact that it is caused 
in each and every possible world.
39 One could for example 
conceive an object A that (1) exists 
by virtue of its own nature, and 
(2) that, again by virtue of its own 
nature, causes another object B. 
Since A exists by virtue of its own 
nature it follows that A exists in 
every possible world. Further, 
since A causes B by virtue of A’s 
own nature, it follows that B is 
caused, and hence exists, in every 
possible world. Object B is thus an 
example of a necessarily existing 
object that is caused in every 
possible world.
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since every first cause is uncaused, there is no good reason why A must 
be a first cause. Because of this, and the former problematic aspect, 
premise (9) is not cogent and should therefore be rejected.
eVAluAtion
From the five premises of the second paradigmatic form of a first cause 
argument only premise (3) and premise (7) are sufficiently justified. 
Premise (1*), (4) and (9) are too problematic. From this it follows that the 
second form is not a good argument either.
Closing remarks
As we have seen in this chapter both paradigmatic forms of the 
traditional cosmological argument are not tenable. In the next chapter 
I shall turn to a detailed assessment of the first of three contemporary 
versions of the cosmological argument, that is to say, the new 
cosmological argument of Robert C. Koons.

40 Koons also infers seven 
corollaries from his argument 
(1997, pp. 199–200). The first 
corollary establishes the existence 
of a necessary being included 
in the first cause. The other six 
establish certain properties of 
this necessary being (such as 
‘being simple’, ‘having all its 
basic attributes by necessity’ 
and ‘being outside space-time’). 
In this way Koons aims to show 
that his cosmological argument 
is ‘quite useful to the project of 
natural theology, providing very 
helpful support to a number of 
important arguments for theism’ 
(1997, p.199). These corollaries are 
not part of Koons’ cosmological 
argument, i.e. his argument for 
the existence of a first cause, 
and therefore will not be further 
discussed in this chapter.
iii The cosmological argument of Koons
Introduction
In this chapter Robert C. Koons’ version of the cosmological argument 
(Koons 1997) is discussed. His argument aims at establishing the 
existence of a first cause of the cosmos.40 The concept ‘cosmos’, as 
employed by Koons, is to be interpreted in the following way: ‘There 
may be an infinity of parallel universes, representing every possible 
permutation of possible physical laws and initial Big Bang conditions. 
[…] Let us call each of the spatiotemporally complete, causally isolated 
histories “a universe”. The totality of all such universes I shall call “the 
cosmos”. The cosmos is thus a vast aggregate, composed of infinitely 
many parallel universes’ (1997, p. 207). From this it is clear that Koons 
takes the cosmos to be all of space-time, including all of its contents, 
such as matter and energy, structured either as a single universe (being 
in that case the universe we inhabit) or as a multi-verse of (infinitely) 
many parallel universes, one of which we inhabit. In short, he takes the 
cosmos to be the entire natural realm or the whole of physical reality.
Koons draws on contemporary developments in philosophy to 
construe his version of the cosmological argument. Examples of these 
developments include, but are not limited to, modern modal logic and 
the formal calculus of parts and wholes (modern mereology). According 
to Koons these developments made it possible to cast the cosmological 
argument in a form that is not vulnerable to the classical objections 
from Hume, Kant, Russell and others. As any traditional cosmological 
argument Koons’ argument relies on the notion of causation. Now, as 
Koons points out: ‘The notion of causation has taken root once again 
within philosophy, proving to be indispensable to recent advances in 
semantics, epistemology and cognitive science’ (1997, p. 193). The same 
holds, as Koons explains, for the philosophical concepts of necessary 
and contingent facts (1997, p. 198). Later on in this chapter I shall 
provide a brief elucidation of his accurate observation that metaphysical 
modalities have come to play an important role again in contemporary 
philosophical discourse. Because of the indispensability of the notion 
of causation and the resurgence of the conceptions of metaphysical 
possibility and necessity it is not really convincing anymore to reject a 
cosmological argument by merely pointing to the alleged unreality of 
causation and necessary facts. In other words, the objection that the 
notions of ‘causation’ and ‘necessary fact’ are problematic does not have 
sufficient force against Koons’ new argument. Or, if such an objection 
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does have force, then we should reject a host of other philosophical 
and scientific arguments that are nowadays widely accepted. Yet, I take 
it that an argument for a first cause that does not rely on the notions 
of metaphysical necessity and possibility, such as the new first cause 
argument I propose in chapter Vi of this thesis, is, everything else being 
equal, preferable to arguments that do. The reason is that a first cause 
argument relying on metaphysical modalities may still be vulnerable to 
any thus far unforeseen future criticisms of these modalities. Moreover, 
the aim of Koons’ first cause argument is, as mentioned above, to 
establish the existence of an uncaused cause of the natural realm. 
Now, the concept of ‘being uncaused’ does not in and by itself refer to 
metaphysical modal notions. Hence, everything else being equal, a first 
cause argument that does not employ the apparatus of metaphysical 
possibility and metaphysical necessity, such as the argument that I shall 
propose later on, is in general simpler than one that does rely on these 
metaphysical modalities.
First I start with a description of the relevant background and context 
of Koons’ renewed argument. After that I present the argument itself 
and discuss Koons’ responses to a large number of objections to his 
argument. I will argue that all but three of Koons’ responses are cogent. 
I next show that two of the three inadequate responses can be repaired. 
This leaves us with one remaining objection which is, as I argue, beyond 
repair. As will become clear in this chapter this objection springs from 
the question where the cause of the cosmos came from. At the end 
of this chapter I raise another objection against Koons’ argument 
that is not addressed by Koons. This additional objection amounts to 
the observation that the effect for which Koons derives a necessarily 
existing cause is not shown to be identical with (or include) the entire 
natural realm. Thus, as this objection goes, the necessarily existing 
cause as inferred by Koons is not shown to be the cause of the whole 
cosmos and as such is not plausibly understood as being a first cause. 
Now, this additional objection is quite serious since it touches on the 
heart of Koons’ argument. Together with the aforementioned remaining 
objection it leads to the conclusion that Koons’ cosmological argument 
does not convincingly establish that there is a first cause.
Background
Koons (1997) provides a logically deductive argument for the claim 
that the cosmos has a cause that is a necessary fact.41 That is to say, 
the conclusion of his argument is logically implied by the argument’s 
premises. Koons develops his argument within the context of a formal 
framework. The framework is a modal logic42 supplemented by the 
Lesniewski-Goodman-Leonard calculus of individuals. Koons assumes 
a fixed domain of possible facts.43 The notion of possibility used is that 
of broadly logical or metaphysical possibility. He adopts the following 
definitions. A possible world is some grouping of possible facts, but 
41 One of the premises of Koons’ 
argument is the causal principle 
that every wholly contingent 
fact has a cause. Koons’ notion 
of a wholly contingent fact 
is explained later on in this 
chapter. Koons insists that this 
causal principle needs to be read 
defeasibly, that is, as a default 
or exception permitting rule. As 
he points out: ‘In the absence 
of evidence to the contrary, we 
may infer, about any particular 
wholly contingent fact, that it 
has a cause.’ (1997, p. 196). So, 
according to Koons, the causal 
principle is actually a defeasible 
rule that should be formulated 
as: ‘Normally, a wholly contingent 
fact has a cause’ (1997, p. 197). The 
defeasible nature of the causal 
principle ‘allow us to infer that 
any given wholly contingent 
fact has a cause unless some 
positive reason can be given for 
thinking that the fact in question 
is an exception to the rule’ (1997, 
p. 197). Koons’ insistence on a 
defeasible reading of his causal 
principle does however nothing 
to change the logically deductive 
character of his argument. Koons 
logically derives the conclusion 
that there is a first cause from 
the argument’s premises, i.e., 
Koons proves that if the premises 
(including the general principle 
that every wholly contingent 
fact has a cause) are true, then 
the conclusion of his argument 
is true as well. I shall have a bit 
more to say about Koons’ appeal 
to defeasible reasoning later on in 
this chapter.
42 Koons does not explain 
which modal system he assumes. 
However, from his paper it is clear 
that Koons assumes M logic. M 
logic is a rather weak system. 
For example, it is weaker than 
S5, and it is even weaker than 
S4. Therefore, M logic is not (or 
hardly) a controversial system. 
It is obtained from propositional 
logic by adding three axioms. 
First, the necessitation rule, which 
holds that, if A is a theorem of 
M, then so is ▫A. Second, the 
distribution axiom, i.e. ▫(A→B) 
→ (▫A→▫B), which is referred 
to by Koons as ‘the K axiom of 
modal logic’. Third, the axiom that 
whatever is necessary is the case, 
i.e. ▫A→A. The third axiom 
31III The cosmological argumenT of Koons
not every grouping of possible facts is a possible world. The actual 
world is the totality of all actual facts, i.e. all facts that obtain. A fact is 
contingent in case it holds in the actual world and there is a possible 
world within which that fact does not hold. A fact is necessary in case it 
holds in all possible worlds. From these additional definitions it follows 
immediately that a necessary fact obtains, since the actual world is a 
possible world. In Koons’ framework facts are concrete situations or 
states of affairs that make certain propositions true and others false. 
Thus, facts are not propositions or quasi-linguistic representations. 
Further, events, such as the death of Caesar, or the Civil War, are 
understood as ‘thick’ or ‘complex’ facts. Koons holds that each fact 
includes at least one being (or thing) and at least one property of that 
being. Therefore, within the context of his formal framework, facts are 
not to be identified with beings either. Koons also needs the notion 
of a wholly contingent fact. A wholly contingent fact is a contingent 
fact none of whose parts are necessary. Note that from this definition 
it follows directly that every wholly contingent fact is an actual fact. 
Indeed, wholly contingent facts are contingent facts, and contingent 
facts are actual. In addition, Koons identifies the cosmos or the 
natural realm with the aggregate or sum of all wholly contingent facts. 
Moreover, his framework is based on two sets of ontological principles: 
mereological and causal principles. More specifically, he adopts the 
following five mereological principles (‘mereological axioms’):44
(1) Fact X is part of fact Y iff every fact Z that overlaps with X also 
overlaps with Y,
(2) If there are any facts of type Ω, then there is an aggregate or sum 
of all the Ω-facts,
(3) Fact X is identical to fact Y iff X is part of Y and Y is part of X,
(4) If fact X and fact Y overlap, then X and Y have a common part,45
(5) If fact X is a part of fact Y, then, necessarily, fact X obtains if fact 
Y obtains.
Premise (5) of Koons’ argument, i.e. if fact X is a part of fact Y, then, 
necessarily, fact X obtains if fact Y obtains, is in the literature also 
referred to as mereological essentialism or the position that wholes 
have their parts essentially. In other words, ‘one and the same whole 
cannot survive losing any of its parts’, as Koslicki puts it (Koslicki 2008, 
p. 113). Mereological essentialism seems to be a thesis that one could 
reasonably argue for. It is ‘associated in contemporary metaphysics most 
prominently with the work of Roderick Chisholm’ (Koslicki, p. 113). In 
addition, as mentioned, Koons’ formal framework also contains causal 
principles. Koons adopts three causal principles (‘causal axioms’):
(6) If fact X is the cause of fact Y, then both X and Y obtain,
(7) If fact X is the cause of fact Y, then fact X and fact Y do not 
overlap,
(8) Every wholly contingent fact has a cause.
is quite important for Koons 
because, surely, he wants his 
derived necessary cause of the 
cosmos to obtain.
43 From this it follows 
immediately, as Koons mentions, 
that the modal logic he adopts 
as part of his formal  framework 
includes the so-called Barcan and 
converse Barcan axioms (Koons 
1997, p. 195).
44 In a more recent account 
of his argument Koons adds 
another mereological axiom: ‘the 
existence of all the members of 
a sum necessitates the existence 
of the sum itself’ (Koons 2001, 
p. 193). As he explains: ‘In “A New 
Look”, I inadvertently omitted 
[this axiom], which is needed 
in proving Lemma 2 […] but 
which clearly fits the intended 
interpretation of aggregation’ 
(2001, p. 193). Now, I do not see 
how this additional axiom adds 
anything to mereological axiom 
(2) with respect to proving Lemma 
2. In fact it seems to me that the 
additional axiom does not add 
anything to (2) at all. But maybe 
some subtlety of the mereological 
formal calculus as adopted by 
Koons escapes me. In any case 
the additional axiom is surely 
reasonable.
45 Actually Koons himself does 
not include this principle in his 
list of mereological axioms. He 
considers it as a ‘theorem of 
mereology’ (1997, p. 198). Koons 
appeals to this theorem twice in 
the sketch of his proof.
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The argument
The core of Koons’ argument can be clarified by the following 
argumentation scheme:
(a) There are contingent facts (premise),
(b) Every contingent fact has a wholly contingent part (premise),
(c) The cosmos is the sum of all wholly contingent facts (premise),46
(d) The sum of all wholly contingent facts is a wholly contingent fact 
(premise),
(e) Each wholly contingent fact has a cause (premise),
(f) The cosmos has a cause (from c, d and e),
(g) Causes and effects do not overlap (premise),
(h) The cosmos has a necessary cause (from b, c, f and g).47
Now, although the outline above clarifies the core of Koons’ argument, 
the structure of the proof that he gives for the conclusion that the 
cosmos has a necessary cause does not concur with the outline’s 
structure. Koons begins with a proof of five different lemmata from his 
eight mereological and causal principles. After that he shows that the 
lemmata, together with some of the aforementioned principles, imply 
that the cosmos is caused by a necessary fact. The first lemma states 
that all parts of a necessary fact are themselves necessary, which indeed, 
as Koons explains, follows from principle (5) and the ‘K axiom of modal 
logic’. The second lemma states that every contingent fact has a wholly 
contingent part. To prove this lemma Koons appeals to his mereological 
principles (1), (2) and (4).48 The derivation of this lemma is perfectly 
sound and is not reiterated here. According to the third lemma, if there 
are any contingent facts, then the aggregate of all wholly contingent 
facts is itself a wholly contingent fact. To prove the third lemma Koons 
employs the first four of his mereological principles and the first and 
second lemma. Again, the derivation of the third lemma is valid and is 
not repeated here. Now, surely the third lemma together with principle 
(8) imply the fourth lemma, that is, if there are contingent facts, then 
the aggregate of all wholly contingent facts has a cause. The fifth 
lemma holds that every contingent fact overlaps with the aggregate of 
all wholly contingent facts. This follows, as Koons points out, from the 
second lemma and the fact that the aggregate of all wholly contingent 
facts overlaps with each and every wholly contingent fact.
From the above five lemmata Koons proves his overall conclusion 
that, if there are any contingent facts, then the aggregate of all wholly 
contingent facts, i.e. the cosmos, has a cause that is a necessary fact. 
This last step of the proof is quite straightforward. Koons accepts as a 
further premise that there are contingent facts: ‘We know that there is 
at least one contingent fact’ (1997, p. 199). From the fourth lemma it thus 
46 The first two premises imply 
that there is at least one wholly 
contingent fact. Therefore, the 
sum of all wholly contingent facts 
is not empty, which is important 
since Koons identifies this sum 
with the cosmos. Note that this 
identification is not a definition. 
Indeed, as discussed earlier, the 
cosmos is defined by Koons as the 
whole of space-time, including 
all of its contents, structured as a 
single universe or as a multi-verse.
47 Indeed, (g) implies that the 
cause of the cosmos (see (f)) is 
disjoint from the cosmos. Hence, 
(c) implies that this cause does 
not contain wholly contingent 
parts. So, from (b) it follows that 
this cause is not contingent. It 
must therefore, since the cause of 
the cosmos is an actual fact, be a 
necessarily existing fact.
48 The appeal to (4) is not made 
explicit by Koons here. Still, he 
needs (4) in order to prove this 
lemma.
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follows that the aggregate of all wholly contingent facts has a cause. 
Due to principle (7) this cause does not overlap with the aggregate of all 
wholly contingent facts. Also, principle (6) implies that this cause is an 
actual fact. Now, since according to the fifth lemma every contingent 
fact overlaps with the aggregate of all wholly contingent facts, it follows 
directly that the cause of the aggregate of all wholly contingent facts is 
a necessary fact. Therefore, since Koons accepts as a further premise the 
co-extensionality of this aggregate and the cosmos, it follows that the 
cosmos has a cause that is a necessary fact. From the list of principles 
appealed to by Koons and from the preceding description of his proof 
we can schematize Koons’ argumentation as follows:
 1 Fact X is part of fact Y iff every fact Z that overlaps with X also 
overlaps with Y (premise),
 2 If there are any facts of type Ω, then there is an aggregate or sum 
of all the Ω-facts (premise),
 3 Fact X is identical to fact Y iff X is part of Y and Y is part of X 
(premise),
 4 If fact X and fact Y overlap, then X and Y have a common part 
(premise),
 5 If fact X is a part of fact Y, then, necessarily, fact X obtains if fact 
Y obtains (premise),
 6 If fact X is the cause of fact Y, then both X and Y obtain (premise),
 7 If fact X is the cause of fact Y, then fact X and fact Y do not 
overlap (premise),
 8 Every wholly contingent fact has a cause (premise),
 9 All the parts of a necessary fact are themselves necessary (from 
5, K axiom of modal logic),
 10 Every contingent fact has a wholly contingent part (from 1, 2, 4),
 11 If there are any contingent facts, then the aggregate of all wholly 
contingent facts is itself a wholly contingent fact (from 1, 2, 3, 4, 
9, 10),
 12 If there are any contingent facts, then the aggregate of all wholly 
contingent facts has a cause (from 8, 11),
 13 Every contingent fact overlaps with the aggregate of all wholly 
contingent facts (from 10, definition of aggregate),
 14 At least one contingent fact obtains (premise),
 15 The aggregate of all wholly contingent facts has a cause (from 12, 
14),
 16 The cause of the aggregate of all wholly contingent facts obtains 
(from 6, 15),
 17 The cause of the aggregate of all wholly contingent facts is a 
necessary fact (from 7, 13, 16),
 18 The cosmos is coincidental to the aggregate of all wholly 
contingent facts (premise),
 19 The cosmos has a cause that is a necessary fact (from 17, 18).
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Objections
As mentioned in the introduction I shall evaluate all the objections 
discussed and criticized by Koons. One of these objections, as I shall 
argue, is entirely cogent. After that I provide an additional objection 
not mentioned by Koons. I shall argue that this new objection is cogent 
as well. It makes, together with the former one, Koons’ argument 
unconvincing.
Objections discussed and criticized by Koons
the ClAssiCAl humeAn,  K AntiAn And russelliAn 
objeC tions
Koons (1997) describes the classical objections of Hume (the lack of 
other universes as reference cases; only logical truths can be necessary), 
Kant (the universality of causation is an a priori transcendental concept 
that does not pertain to mind-independent reality; the presupposition 
of the unsound ontological argument) and Russell (committing the 
fallacy of composition; universality of causation is merely heuristic). 
He provides convincing responses to these classical objections. It is not 
required to ‘collect a large sample of worlds and observe that nearly all 
of them have causes’, as Hume argued (1997, p. 202). As Koons points 
out it is known that (nearly) all wholly contingent facts have causes 
and thus it may be concluded that the world, being a wholly contingent 
fact, is caused as well, unless one provides a good reason for thinking 
otherwise.49 To the Humean objection that only logical truths can be 
necessary Koons responds that the existence of a necessary fact was the 
conclusion of his argument. So, as he explains, it is not assumed upfront 
that there are necessary facts. If one wants to deny the existence of 
necessary facts, then one must refute one or more of the premises of 
Koons’ argument, or show that the conclusion does not follow logically 
from the premises. In short, one must propose other objections against 
the argument. Besides, ‘the sweeping denial of modality is simply 
obscurantist, undermining fruitful philosophical research into the nature 
of natural law, epistemology, decision, action and responsibility, and a 
host of other applications’ (1997, p. 204). Indeed, as Koons points out, 
the notions of metaphysical necessity and possibility play a central 
role ‘in a growing body of philosophical work’, and moreover, ‘attempts 
since the day of logical positivism to reduce [these notions] to logical 
consistency […] with all definitional or “analytic” truths […] have 
failed’. In addition, as he explains, ‘the attempt to avoid the supposed 
“mysteries” of metaphysical possibility […] leads to the much more 
serious difficulties of set theoretic Platonism […]’. And, as Koons argues, 
‘recent efforts at making sense of mathematical reality make use of the 
notion of metaphysical modality […] indicating that the proper order of 
explanation starts with modality, not with mathematical entities’ (1997, 
p. 198). The Kantian objection that causation is an a priori category of 
our mind and not a feature of mind-independent reality is refuted by 
49 Note the appeal to defeasible 
reasoning here. The principle 
that all wholly contingent facts 
are caused is considered to be a 
default or exception permitting 
rule, i.e. a rule that applies to the 
case in question unless there is 
some positive evidence available 
for thinking that the case at hand 
is an exception to the rule.
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Koons by explaining that his argument does not take the axioms of 
causality as a priori transcendental truths. Instead, they are empirical 
a posteriori generalizations justified by the success in finding scientific 
causal explanations of empirical phenomena. Moreover, Koons points 
out that the Kantian objection that the cosmological argument depends 
on the unsound ontological argument does not apply to his new 
argument since it ‘in no way presupposes any version of the ontological 
argument’ (1997, pp. 204–205). His argument only assumes that the 
notion of necessary fact is not inconsistent, which is, as mentioned 
before, reasonable. The Russellian objection of committing the fallacy 
of composition is that it is faulty to conclude that the world as a whole 
is caused because each of the parts is caused. Koons replies correctly 
that he does not commit such a fallacy. His argument demonstrates 
that the cosmos, defined by him as the aggregate of all wholly 
contingent facts, is itself wholly contingent and therefore, due to the 
premise that all wholly contingent facts have causes, caused. Another 
objection ascribed to Russell is that ‘the universality of causation is 
a canon or prescriptive rule for reason, and not […] a description of 
mind-independent reality’.50 As Russell insisted: ‘There is a difference 
between claiming that scientists should always look for a cause and 
claiming that there is always a cause there to be found’ (1997, p. 197). 
Koons responds adequately that the enormous success of the empirical 
sciences in finding explanatory causes warrants the universality of 
causation as a cogent descriptive generalization of mind-independent 
reality. Moreover, not accepting this universality as a justified inductive 
inference, results in a radical form of skepticism. As Koons explains: ‘All 
of our knowledge about the past […] depends on our inferring causes 
of present facts. […] Moreover, our knowledge of […] the probable 
consequences of our actions depends on the assumption that the 
relevant future states will not occur uncaused. The price of denying [the 
universality of causation as a cogent descriptive generalization] is very 
steep: embracing a comprehensive Pyrrhonian skepticism’ (1997, p.197).
the objeC tions from quAntum meChAniCs  And 
libertAriAn freedom
Koons also discusses the objection that quantum mechanics provides 
counter-evidence to the universality of causation. His response to this 
objection amounts to the observation that principle (8) does not assume 
that causes necessitate their effects, or that all reliable statistical 
correlations can be explained. As such there is no conflict between (8) 
and the Copenhagen version of quantum mechanics. Further, Koons 
argues adequately that the notion of causation employed within his 
framework does not exclude the possibility of libertarian freedom. So, 
the objection that his argument excludes libertarian freedom does not 
go through. It is worthwhile to understand how precisely Koons shows 
that his argument is compatible with there being libertarian free acts. 
Koons argues that there is no one-to-one correspondence between 
propositional truths and facts. For example, if A and B are both true 
50 Koons states that Russell 
followed here a suggestion from 
Kant (1997, p. 197). However, it is 
important to clearly distinguish 
the Kantian objection that the 
universality of causation is an 
a priori transcendental mental 
category (and thus not a property 
of the real – in Kant’s terminology: 
‘noumenal’ – world) from the 
Russellian objection that the 
universality of causation is just a 
heuristic principle for obtaining 
knowledge about the real world 
(instead of being a justified 
descriptive generalization of the 
nature of the real world).
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propositions whose truth-makers are the facts a and b, then the truth-
maker of the proposition A&B is the sum of a and b, not a third special 
conjunctive type of fact. Also, if moral truths supervene on non-moral 
facts, then there is no need to posit moral facts. Or, as another example, 
if ‘a fact makes it true that I have three coins in my pocket, then the 
same fact also makes true the proposition that the number of coins in 
my pocket is the square root of nine’ (1997, p. 195). What follows from 
this? Well, the objection that his argument is not compatible with 
libertarian free acts is based upon the observation that the relata of the 
causal relation are facts. Thus, as the objection goes, if a causes b, then 
a and b are facts and so no room is allowed for ‘libertarian freedom’, 
i.e. a being a libertarian free agent who freely chooses to cause b. The 
response of Koons can be understood in the following way. Since there is 
no strict one-to-one correspondence between propositional truths and 
facts, it might be the case that no fact corresponds to the propositional 
truth that, let’s say, state of affairs S is freely caused by libertarian free 
person p. So, in that case, the propositional truth that S is freely caused 
by P supervenes on the truth of some proposition ‘A causes S’, where 
A is typically a sum of facts including facts such as ‘Person P exists’, 
‘Person P possesses the relevant powers to bring about S’, etc. Surely, 
this response requires a slight modification of Koons’ framework not 
mentioned by Koons. This modification would be to allow the relata 
of causal relations to be not just facts but also sums of facts. Such an 
extension to his framework seems both minor and natural, and therefore 
unproblematic. Another point to mention is that this response clearly 
shows that indeed nothing within Koons’ formal framework requires 
that effects are necessitated by their causes. Koons does not assume 
that causes are sufficient conditions for their effects. After all, fact A 
might have obtained without P actually freely choosing to bring about S. 
Thus A might have obtained while ‘A causes S’ is false. So, even when ‘A 
causes S’ is true, there might be a possible world in which A, but not S, 
obtains. Indeed, as mentioned above, fact A does not correspond to the 
propositional truth that P freely chooses to bring about S.
the objeC tions from infinite  regress
The objection that the impossibility of an infinite regress is assumed 
without any warrant is refuted by Koons as well. Koons clearly states 
that his argument only assumes there being a totality of all wholly 
contingent facts, and that ‘there is little, if any, reason to think that 
there is anything improper about [this totality]. We are talking only 
about ontologically basic facts, not about mathematical or semantical 
truths that supervene upon them. We are simply aggregating concrete 
particulars […]’ (1997, p. 204). Further, Koons adapts an objection of 
James Ross into an objection to his own argument in the following way: 
‘Consider the fact that the First Cause causes the cosmos. Call this fact 
C*. C* is clearly a contingent fact, since if it were necessary, the cosmos 
itself would be necessary […]. If C* is also wholly contingent, then it 
must be a part of the cosmos, and the First Cause must cause C*, i.e., 
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the First Cause must cause the fact that it causes the cosmos. The same 
argument can be repeated, showing that the First Cause must cause 
that it causes that it causes the cosmos, ad infinitum. This appears to 
be a vicious infinite regress’ (1997, p. 206). Now, Koons’ response to this 
objection seems quite cumbersome and not compelling. It involves the 
claim that the truth that some fact causes another fact does actually 
not correspond to a third fact, but instead, supervenes ‘upon the cause, 
the effect, and certain non-factual truths about the modal relationships 
between the cause and the effect’. From this it follows that C* is not a 
fact and thus a vicious infinite regress is prevented. I propose a simple 
direct refutation of the ‘adjusted Ross objection’. The truth that the 
First Cause causes the cosmos might correspond to a third fact, e.g. C*. 
However, there is no reason to suppose that C* is wholly contingent. 
What’s more, one could argue that C* is not wholly contingent since 
it contains the First Cause, being a necessary fact, as one of its parts. 
A vicious regress is thus avoided since there is no reason to apply the 
principle that all wholly contingent facts are caused to C*.
Koons also refutes a variant of the adjusted Ross objection. This variant 
is provided by William Rowe. Rowe’s objection starts with the claim that, 
from the point of view of the defenders of the cosmological argument, 
there is some fact that corresponds with the true proposition that 
there are contingent facts. Further, as Rowe’s objection goes, this fact is 
itself contingent and therefore caused by the alleged First Cause. This 
again results in a vicious infinite regress and therefore the cosmological 
argument would be invalid. Now, Koons responds to this objection 
in the same way as he responds to the adjusted Ross objection. He 
argues that there is no fact that corresponds to the truth of there 
being continent facts. According to Koons ‘Facts are not closed under 
existential generalization, as propositions are’ (1997, p. 207). As Koons 
points out the cosmos itself is the truth-maker of the truth of there 
being contingent facts, thus there is no need at all to posit a separate 
fact in order to make this truth true. Koons’ response is adequate. 
However, also here a simpler response seems to be possible. After all, 
one could respond to Rowe’s objection by asking why the fact that there 
are contingent facts should be wholly contingent. Indeed, in absence of a 
convincing reason for it being wholly contingent Koons’ premises do not 
allow us to infer that it is caused. And without this inference an infinite 
regress is prevented, which renders Rowe’s objection invalid.
the objeC tion thAt,  t ypiCAlly,  effeC ts  hAVe Contingent 
CAuses
Another objection discussed by Koons is the objection that there being 
a necessary cause is in conflict with the empirically well-established 
generalization that all effects have contingent causes, and therefore 
Koons’ cosmological argument is not cogent. As Koons writes: ‘This is 
probably the most promising [objection] to the cosmological argument. 
It is an instance of a wider strategy: focus on some unique feature of the 
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First Cause, and point out the cause of the world’s having that feature is 
an exception to some well-established generalization’ (1997, p. 205). In 
what follows I argue that Koons’ response to the objection that typically, 
effects have contingent causes, is not adequate. Central to his response 
is his thesis that ordinary cases of causation indicate that ‘a cause is 
always more necessary or less contingent than its effect’ (1997, p. 205). 
The notion of ‘being more necessary’ is defined by Koons as follows:
‘Fact a is more necessary than fact b just in case a holds in every 
world in which any part of b holds but a could hold in the absence of 
any part of b.’ (1997, p. 205)
Thus, Koons’ thesis that a cause is more necessary than the effect 
amounts to the claim that the cause holds in every possible world in 
which at least one of the parts of the effect holds. And, in addition, for 
each part of the effect there is some possible world in which the cause 
holds but that part of the effect does not hold. Let us assume for now 
that this thesis is rationally compelling. So, we assume that causes 
are indeed more necessary than their effects in the sense defined by 
Koons. As a next step of his response Koons wants to show that from 
this it follows that, contra the ‘well-established generalization that all 
effects have contingent causes’, it is perfectly natural and reasonable 
to hold that the cause of the cosmos is a necessary fact. In order to do 
this he wants to prove that the cosmos is a fact of ‘absolutely minimal 
contingency’, that is to say, no contingent fact can be more necessary 
than the cosmos. I cite his proof of this claim below.
‘Suppose, for contradiction, that a were a contingent fact that is more 
necessary than the cosmos. This would mean that a is more necessary 
than every part of the cosmos, including the wholly contingent parts in 
common to both the cosmos and a. But this is impossible, since no fact 
can be strictly more necessary than itself.’ (1997, p. 206)
As is clear from the citation above, Koons’ proof invokes the following 
lemma: If fact x is more necessary than fact y, then fact x is more 
necessary than every part of y. Koons does not provide a formal 
deduction of this lemma. Perhaps he believes it to be obvious. For 
completeness I shall provide such a deduction. Let fact x be more 
necessary than fact y. Further, let fact z be a part of y. We have to prove 
that x is more necessary than z. First, consider a possible world W in 
which some part u of z holds. Now, u is a part of y as well. Since x is 
more necessary than y it follows that x holds in W. Thus, indeed, x holds 
in every possible world in which any part of z holds. Second, consider 
some part u of z. Fact u is a part of y as well. Since x is more necessary 
than y it follows that there is a possible world in which x holds while u 
does not hold. Hence, also, for each part u of z there is some possible 
world in which x holds but u does not hold. From these two results it 
follows that fact x is more necessary than fact z. This completes the 
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deduction of the lemma. In the above cited proof Koons infers as a next 
step correctly that fact a is more necessary than some wholly contingent 
part of itself.51 But this is, as he concludes, impossible since ‘no fact can 
be strictly more necessary than itself’.52 Now, surely, no fact can be more 
necessary than itself. For, suppose that fact x would be more necessary 
than itself, and let y be a part of x. From the definition of ‘being more 
necessary than’ it follows that there is a possible world in which x holds 
while y does not hold. But this conflicts with principle (5), that is, the 
principle of mereological essentialism that says that wholes have their 
parts essentially. So, indeed, nothing is more necessary than itself. From 
this truth it does however not follow, as Koons appears to maintain, that 
it is impossible for a to be more necessary than some wholly contingent 
part of itself. Still, it is quite straightforward to derive this impossibility. 
If a is more necessary than some wholly contingent part of itself, then, 
similar as before, it follows immediately from the definition of ‘being 
more necessary than’ that there is a possible world in which fact a holds 
while that wholly contingent part of a does not hold. But this conflicts 
with principle (5) in the same way as before. So, indeed, it is impossible 
for fact a to be more necessary than some wholly contingent part of 
itself, and we therefore have to conclude that the assumption that a is 
a contingent fact more necessary than the cosmos must be rejected. 
So, indeed, the cosmos is a fact of absolutely minimal contingency. 
Now, the proof provided by Koons is quite cumbersome and actually 
from a logical point of view not entirely correct. After all, as mentioned, 
from the true proposition that no fact can be more necessary than 
itself the aforementioned impossibility does not follow. Although it 
is, as I showed, quite easy to repair this small incorrectness, I propose 
to replace the whole proof by a much simpler proof of the claim that 
the cosmos is a fact of absolutely minimal contingency. Suppose, for 
contradiction, that f were a contingent fact that is more necessary than 
the cosmos. Now, as shown by Koons, every contingent fact has a wholly 
contingent part. Therefore f has a wholly contingent part g. The cosmos 
is by definition the sum of all wholly contingent parts and therefore g is 
a part of the cosmos. Since f is assumed to be more necessary than the 
cosmos it follows that there is a possible world in which part g of the 
cosmos does not hold while f holds. But this results in a contradiction 
since g is a part of f and, because of principle (5), fact f has its part g 
essentially. Thus, also according to this simpler proof, it follows that 
there is no contingent fact more necessary than the cosmos.
Now, as Koons’ response continues, since no contingent fact is more 
necessary than the cosmos, the cosmos is a fact of absolutely minimal 
contingency, and hence its cause, as being more necessary than the 
cosmos itself, must be a necessary fact. As Koons writes: ‘Since the 
cosmos is a fact of minimal contingency, it is not surprising that it 
should have no contingent cause, but it would still be very surprising if 
it had no cause at all’ (1997, p. 206). It is therefore, according to Koons, 
indeed natural and reasonable to hold that the cause of the cosmos is a 
51 Koons of course appeals here 
implicitly to his earlier derived 
lemma that each contingent fact 
has a wholly contingent part.
52 Note that the adverb ‘strictly’ 
as used by Koons does not add 
anything meaningful. It would 
have been sufficient to claim that 
no fact can be more necessary 
than itself. In what follows I shall 
not make use of it.
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necessary fact, which is the core of his response to the objection that, 
typically, effects have contingent causes. Is this response convincing? 
Well, if causes are more necessary than their effects, it would indeed be 
very natural and reasonable, given that the cosmos is a fact of absolutely 
minimal contingency, to hold that the cause of the cosmos must be a 
necessary fact, which was the core point of Koons’ response. So, could 
we conclude that Koons’ response to the objection is convincing? This 
is not the case. As mentioned his response appeals to the thesis that 
causes are more necessary than their effects. I shall now argue that this 
thesis is not properly justified by Koons. Therefore his response has to 
be rejected after all. So, how does Koons intend to justify the thesis that 
causes are more necessary than their effects? Koons (1997) provides four 
reasons for it.
First, he maintains that causes are always necessitated by their effects, 
that is, an effect’s holding necessitates the holding of its cause, or, in 
other words, the cause of an effect is essential to the identity of that 
effect. As Koons points out: ‘The cause […] of a fact [is] essential to its 
identity: had the very same truth been verified by a fact caused in a 
different way, we would not have had the same fact as verifier. […] [So] 
a fact’s holding necessitates the holding of its cause […]’ (1997, p. 205). 
The view that an effect necessitates its cause is commonly referred 
to as Kripkean origin essentialism. Origin essentialism indeed implies 
that the cause of an effect holds in every possible world in which the 
effect itself holds.53 But, origin essentialism does not imply at all that 
the cause of an effect holds in every possible world in which any part 
of the effect holds. Neither does it imply that for each part of the effect 
there must be a possible world in which this part of the effect does 
not hold while the cause holds. So, Koons’ appeal to Kripkean origin 
essentialism does nothing to infer that a cause is more necessary 
than the effect.54 Another problem is that Koons does not provide a 
sufficiently convincing reason for accepting Kripkean origin essentialism 
itself. There seems to be enough room to remain totally unconvinced 
that origin essentialism is a cogent position. After all, let us conceive a 
possible world W that contains a painting referred to as the Mona Lisa. 
Suppose that the painting consists of precisely the same molecules 
as the Mona Lisa in the actual world and, moreover, assume that the 
physical arrangement of those molecules is exactly the same as the 
physical arrangement in the actual world. Suppose in addition that the 
whole spatiotemporal historical chain of events is entirely the same for 
both paintings, with the exception of only one aspect: the Mona Lisa 
in possible world W has not been painted by Leonardo da Vinci but by, 
suppose, one of his students. Now, it seems to me perfectly rational to 
claim that the painting in possible world W is the same painting as the 
painting in the actual world, even though their originating causes are 
not identical. Perhaps this case against origin essentialism is even more 
convincing if we take an abstract object as an example, for example the 
Iliad of Homer. Surely, it is quite reasonable to maintain that the Iliad in 
53 Or, to be a bit more precise, 
the proposition that the cause 
of an effect holds in every 
possible world in which the effect 
itself holds is a consequence 
of Kripkean origin essentialism 
combined with principle (6). That 
is to say, together they imply 
that the effect necessitates 
the existence of its cause. For, 
according to origin essentialism 
the cause is essential to the effect, 
and according to principle (6), this 
cause is to obtain.
54 One might think that origin 
essentialism could be invoked 
as a reason if we replace Koons’ 
definition of ‘being more 
necessary than’ by the following 
alternative definition: ‘Fact a is 
more necessary than fact b if and 
only if (i) fact a holds in every 
possible world in which fact b 
holds, and (ii) there is a possible 
world in which fact a holds but 
fact b does not’. This is however 
not a way out. First, although 
origin essentialism constitutes a 
reason for maintaining that the 
cause holds in every possible 
world in which the effect holds, 
it does not constitute a reason 
for maintaining that there is a 
possible world in which the cause 
holds but the effect does not. For 
all we know the cause might hold 
only in those worlds in which the 
effect holds. This would still be 
consistent with Kripkean origin 
essentialism. Besides, second, 
if we accept the alternative 
definition, it follows that the 
cosmos might not be a fact of 
absolutely minimal contingency! 
Take as a counter-example the 
following model: (i) facts: a, b 
and c, (ii) possible worlds: W1 = {a, 
b}, W2 = {b} and W3 = {c}, and (iii) 
actual world = W1. In this model 
the cosmos is the sum of the facts 
a and b. Now, fact b is contingent 
since it is actual and it does not 
hold in W3. Further, fact b holds 
in each possible world in which 
the cosmos, i.e. the sum of a and 
b, holds. Also, there is a possible 
world in which fact b holds while 
the sum of a and b does not hold, 
i.e. W2. Therefore, according 
to the alternative definition, 
the contingent fact b is more 
necessary than the cosmos, and 
thus, the cosmos here is not a fact 
of minimal contingency.
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the actual world is identical to a poem in another world W if the poem 
in W is also referred to as the Iliad and consists of precisely the same 
sentences in precisely the same order as the Iliad in the actual world, 
even if it would be the case that the poem in that other possible world 
is not written by Homer. So, there is indeed sufficient reason to remain 
reasonably unconvinced of origin essentialism. Besides, as I argued, even 
if we accept this origin essentialism, it does not help us to infer that 
causes are more necessary than their effects in the sense as described 
by Koons. Therefore, the first of Koons’ four reasons for his thesis that 
causes are more necessary than their effects has to be rejected.
The second reason for Koons’ thesis is an appeal to the authority of 
Aristotle and the Aristotelian tradition. I understand this appeal as 
the viewpoint that the core claims of Aristotle and the Aristotelian 
tradition are likely to be true. If so, then, although I have a huge respect 
for Aristotle and the Aristotelian tradition, this appeal can hardly be 
called a reason at all. So I will not further consider it. The third and 
fourth reasons are not reasons either, but instead appeals to what 
would be very helpful. Indeed, accepting the thesis that causes are more 
necessary than their effects would be very helpful since it ‘explains 
the transitivity and asymmetry of [the causal] relation’ (1997, p. 205). It 
would also enable us ‘to specify exhaustively the “potential causes” of 
a given fact: a is a potential cause of b if, and only if, a is less contingent 
than b. Such a specification is necessary if we are to account for the 
statistical properties of causal connections […]’ (1997, p. 205). This may 
all be so, but from this it cannot be concluded that causes are indeed 
more necessary than their effects. For, it would indeed be helpful if it 
were true, but that of course does not make it true! I conclude that none 
of the four reasons provided by Koons for his thesis that causes are 
more necessary than their effects is cogent. And therefore the response 
of Koons to the objection that, typically, effects have contingent causes, 
which depends on the acceptance of this thesis, is inadequate. However, 
Koons has also provided another response. To discuss this I need to take 
Oppy’s criticism of Koons’ argument into account.
Graham Oppy has put forward an objection to Koons’ cosmological 
argument that is very similar to the objection that, typically, effects have 
contingent causes. As discussed the argument of Koons appeals to the 
principle that every wholly contingent fact has a cause, i.e. principle 
(8). Oppy’s point is that there are restricted versions of principle (8) 
that are equally well supported by the available observational evidence 
(Oppy 1999, Alexander 2008). Examples include the restricted principle 
that each wholly contingent non-first55 event has a cause (8*) and the 
restricted principle that each wholly contingent fact has a contingent 
cause (8**). Oppy’s objection amounts to the observation that these 
equally well supported principles render Koons’ argument untenable. 
Indeed, because the coming into being of the cosmos is plausibly a first 
event, principle (8*) is not strong enough, together with Koons’ other 
55 A spatiotemporal event 
E is understood to be a ‘first 
event’ if and only if there are 
no spatiotemporal events that 
are temporally prior to event E. 
(Alexander 2008, Oppy 1999)
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premises, to infer that the cosmos has a cause. And principle (8**) is in 
direct conflict with the conclusion of Koons’ argument, i.e. the existence 
of a necessary cause. So, as Oppy’s objection goes, as long as Koons 
provides us with no good reason to prefer (8) above (8*) or (8**), his 
argument is not rationally compelling.
Nevertheless there seems to me to be a good reason to prefer principle 
(8) above principle (8*). Principle (8*) requires us to restrict the relata 
of the causal relation to events. Indeed Oppy insists that we should 
limit ourselves to spatiotemporal events as causal relata (Alexander 
2008, Oppy 1999). But, one should only accept a restriction to 
spatiotemporal events in case there are strong reasons to abandon the 
more generic context of facts. Thus far, no compelling reasons for such 
a limitation have been proposed. Facts appear to be perfectly proper 
and natural candidates for entering into causal relationships.56 In order 
to refute Koons’ argument one must therefore propose an objection 
that respects this generic context, instead of insisting on beforehand 
to an unwarranted restriction to spatiotemporal events.57 Moreover, 
as Alexander (2008) points out, a limitation to spatiotemporal 
events forces the proponents of Koons’ argument to endorse four-
dimensionalism,58 since the position of presentism is clearly in conflict 
with Koons’ adherence to Kripkean origin essentialism, i.e. the claim 
that the cause of an effect is essential to the identity of the effect or, in 
other words, that an effect necessitates its cause.59 A limitation to the 
context of spatiotemporal events would thus sidetrack the discussion to 
a separate debate on whether four-dimensionalism or presentism is the 
most reasonable viewpoint to adopt.
Let us therefore stick to the most generic context of facts as causal 
relata and focus on the objection that there is no good reason to 
prefer (8) above (8**) and that (8**) refutes Koons’ argument. Now, 
interestingly, in his reply to Oppy Koons provides a response to it 
which, if cogent, would be a cogent refutation of the objection that, 
typically, effects have contingent causes as well (Koons 2001). Koons 
argues that (8**) is ‘less natural’ than (8) and therefore, in absence of 
a good reason to favor (8**) above (8), it is very reasonable to commit 
to the ‘most natural generalization’, which is (8) instead of (8**). One 
must, as he points out, come up with a good reason for restricting the 
natural principle (8) to the less natural principle (8**). And the whole 
point of Koons’ response is that no such good reason has been provided 
by Oppy or others. Now, I think that Koons’ appeal to the ‘naturalness’ 
of principles has some force. Indeed, if two empirical generalizations 
are equally well supported by the same observational evidence, then, 
everything else being the same, it is reasonable to favor the more 
natural, i.e. less ad-hoc or less arbitrary, empirical generalization. For 
example, as Koons points out, it is unreasonable to restrict some well-
established time independent empirical generalization to only instances 
56 Indeed, as D.M. Armstrong 
puts it: ‘It is plausible that 
causation, singular causation, 
this causing that, is a relation 
between states of affairs. It is 
particulars that act. But they 
act in virtue of their properties 
and the effect of their action is 
determined by the properties 
of the thing that they act upon. 
This strongly suggests a relation 
between states of affairs. Putting 
it in a no doubt oversimplified 
way, that a is F brings it about that 
b is G’ (Armstrong 1993, p. 438). 
Note that Koons’ facts can be 
associated with states of affairs.
57 Oppy notes that ‘one of the 
commonest complaints that 
one hears about the inclusion 
of facts and states of affairs 
in one’s ontology is that these 
are entities which obey some 
weird, non-mereological kind of 
composition’. Moreover, he writes: 
‘It is events not facts, or states of 
affairs […] which stand in causal 
relations’ (Oppy 1999, p. 379). 
Now, Oppy does not provide any 
reason for these claims, which 
make them nothing more than 
mere stipulations. Further, I would 
say that the causal relation is 
considered by many philosophers 
to be a relation between relata 
properly referred to as being 
‘states’ (and thus akin to ‘facts’).
58 Actually, it forces the 
proponents to endorse eternalism. 
Eternalism is the view that 
present, past and future events 
are all equally real, i.e., they do all 
exist. This view is the opposite of 
presentism, according to which 
only the events of the present 
exist. Four-dimensionalism entails 
eternalism, but is not identical 
to it.
59 Similarly as before, it would 
also in this case be more precise 
to say that the position of 
presentism is in conflict with an 
adherence to Kripkean origin 
essentialism together with 
principle (6). For, together they 
imply that the effect necessitate 
the existence of its cause. As 
we have seen Koons appeals to 
Kripkean origin essentialism in 
order to defend his thesis that a 
cause is more necessary than its 
effect.
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before some arbitrary date in the future, although this restriction is 
supported equally well by all the available empirical evidence (Alexander 
2008, Koons 2001). The problem is however that, even so, Koons’ appeal 
to naturalness will not do to favor principle (8) over (8**). A restriction 
to contingent causes in (8**) is not ad hoc in the way that a restriction 
to instances before some future date is. The relevant difference is that 
‘being contingent’ is a non-relational or intrinsic property of the objects 
in question and as such of importance to their nature and lawful 
behavior, while ‘occurring before some date in the future’ is merely a 
relational or extrinsic property that does not say anything about the 
nature and lawful behavior of the objects in question. Proper inductive 
generalizations are therefore limited to the intrinsic inherent properties 
of the objects they are about. From this it follows that (8**) is not 
less natural than (8), whereas indeed a restriction to some future date 
would be ad-hoc or arbitrary. One could even maintain that (8**) is to 
be rationally preferred above (8) since (8**) fits the available empirical 
evidence much more closely than (8), that is, all observed causes thus 
far are plausibly to be understood as being contingent. Hence Koons’ 
response to the objection that there is no reason to favor (8) above 
(8**) is unconvincing. Now, actually Koons has a bit more to say in 
response to Oppy’s criticism (Koons 2001). He again insists to read (8) 
as a defeasible rule, that is, as a default or exception permitting rule 
instead of as a universal inductive generalization. As Koons explains: 
‘The most effective response, dialectically speaking, is to insist that, at 
the very least, our experience warrants adopting the causal principle 
[i.e. principle (8)] as a default or defeasible rule. This means that, in the 
absence of evidence to the contrary, we may infer, about any particular 
wholly contingent situation, that it has a cause. […] The burden is then 
shifted to the agnostic, who must garner evidence of a positive sort 
for the proposition that the cosmos really is an exception to the rule.’ 
(2001, p. 195). In other words, (8) applies to the specific case of the 
origin of the cosmos unless Oppy is able to provide a good reason for 
why (8) should not hold in this case. This response is however a non-
starter since Oppy can easily reply that the principle (8**) is to be read 
defeasibly as well,60 and, as a default rule, it applies to the case of the 
origin of the cosmos, unless Koons is able to provide a good reason for 
why (8**) should not hold in this case. Now, since Koons’ thesis that 
causes are more necessary than their effects is shown to be unjustified, 
Koons is in fact not warranted to consider the origin of the cosmos 
as an exception to default rule (8**). Therefore, Koons’ appeal to the 
defeasible nature of principle (8) does nothing to reject the objection at 
stake. It simply brings us to the quite similar objection that there is no 
reason why (8), understood as a default rule, has to be preferred above 
(8**), understood as a default rule.
Does this imply that the objection that there is no reason to prefer 
(8) above (8**) stands unrefuted? I argue that this is not the case. 
60 Actually Oppy does interpret 
principle (8*) as a default or 
exception permitting rule. For 
he writes: ‘The principle which 
we want is that, in the absence of 
reason to think otherwise [italics 
mine], we should think that 
particular, wholly contingent 
events which are not first events 
have causes’ (Oppy 1999, pp. 380–
381). There is no good reason why 
Oppy should not understand 
principle (8**) as a defeasible rule 
as well.
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There is a quite straightforward refutation of this objection. Koons’ 
new cosmological argument can be employed to reject empirical 
generalization (8**). Assume, for reductio, that (8**) is in fact true. 
In that case (8) is also true since (8**) logically implies principle (8). 
Further, all other premises of Koons’ argument are no less reasonable 
than before. The additional assumption that (8**) is true did not make 
one of these other premises suddenly less reasonable. However, as 
Koons’ argument shows, principle (8) together with the other premises 
imply that (8**) is false. Hence we arrive at a contradiction. Therefore 
the assumption that (8**) is true is incorrect and needs to be rejected. 
Principle (8**) does not hold. Here we have a sound refutation. We have 
provided a reason why (8) should be favored above (8**). The only way 
to refute this response is to show that (8) or one of the other premises 
of Koons’ argument is erroneous, but such a move would do nothing 
more than to bring us back to one of the other objections to Koons’ 
argument as discussed in this chapter. The straightforward response 
provided here is a response to the objection that, typically, effects have 
contingent causes as well. Hence, taking everything into account, we 
can conclude that the objection that, typically, effects have contingent 
causes, can be adequately rejected.
the multi-Verse  objeC tion 
Koons also discusses the objection that there is no need to argue for 
a First Cause, since the fine-tuning of our universe61 can be perfectly 
explained by positing a multi-verse. The objection suggests that ‘there 
may be an infinity of parallel universes, representing every possible 
permutation of possible physical laws and initial Big Bang conditions’ 
(1997, p. 207). In that case, as the objection goes, most likely there are 
intelligent life permitting universes. And therefore ‘it is not surprising 
that we inhabit one of these vanishingly rare universes’ (1997, p. 207). 
While intelligent life develops in some of these intelligent life permitting 
universes it will inevitably at some point in time ask the pressing 
question why the universe is fine-tuned. Now, this explanation of the 
fine-tuning of the universe is not really an objection to Koons’ argument. 
A multi-verse containing many parallel universes is no less ‘natural’ than 
a single all-encompassing uni-verse. Thus, as Koons explains, a multi-
verse would have to be identified with the cosmos in the same way 
as a single uni-verse would have to be, and the whole point of Koons’ 
argument is to show that the cosmos has a necessary cause. Hence 
the question on whether there is a multi-verse or not is irrelevant to 
Koons’ argument. If there is a multi-verse, then the cosmos is properly 
identified with the multi-verse. And if there is no multi-verse, then 
the cosmos is simply identical to the single universe. In both cases 
Koons’ argument shows that the cosmos has a necessary cause, and 
any objection to this argument has to deal with its premises or logical 
derivation, instead of just pointing to the mere possibility of there being 
a multi-verse. Koons’ response to the multi-verse objection is therefore 
cogent.
61 The fine-tuning of our 
universe is the observation that 
the intelligent life permitting 
universe we inhabit is extremely 
unlikely from a statistical point 
of view. If the value of one of 
the cosmological constants as 
discovered by physics would have 
been only inappreciably different, 
then our universe would have 
evolved into a universe that does 
not permit intelligent life. Thus 
we live on a razors edge. It is so 
incomprehensibly improbable 
that our universe is intelligent-
life-permitting that it would be 
unreasonable to explain this 
state of affairs by a mere appeal 
to chance. Hence, some other 
rational explanation for the fine-
tuning is needed.
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the objeC tion thAt AsKs  where the CAuse of the Cosmos 
CAme from
The conclusion that the aggregate of all wholly contingent facts is 
caused by a necessary fact follows logically from Koons’ premises. 
That is, if these premises are true, then the conclusion is true as well. 
However, the more important question is whether the argument of 
Koons is a good first cause argument. Koons believes that this is indeed 
the case. He writes: ‘It is legitimate to call this cause [i.e. the cause of 
the aggregate of all wholly contingent facts] a “first cause” if we assume 
(as seems plausible) that all effects are contingent’ (Koons 1997, p. 199). 
I agree that if we assume that all effects are contingent, then the cause 
of the aggregate of all wholly contingent facts cannot be an effect since 
it is a necessary fact. Thus, in that case this cause is itself uncaused and 
therefore indeed, as Koons points out, a first cause. But, is it plausible 
to hold that all effects are contingent? There appears to be enough 
room to reasonably withhold this ontological presumption. After all, 
nothing appears to exclude there being facts that hold in every possible 
world and that are caused in every possible world. So there seems to 
be no convincing reason for denying the existence of such facts. Surely, 
such facts could not exist if all necessary facts exist by virtue of their 
own nature.62 But why should all necessary facts exist by virtue of 
their own nature? A necessary fact is defined within Koons’ framework 
as a fact that holds in every possible world, i.e., a fact for which it is 
impossible to not obtain. Now, this definition does not exclude there 
being facts that are necessary and caused in every possible world.63 
Therefore, the circumstance that a fact is metaphysically necessary 
does not imply that it is uncaused. There is thus no good reason why 
the cause of the aggregate of all wholly contingent facts should be 
uncaused. Consequently, since a first cause is by definition uncaused, 
there is no good reason why the cause of the aggregate of all wholly 
contingent facts should be a first cause. Hence it appears that Koons’ 
argument does not establish a first cause, that is, an uncaused cause of 
the cosmos.64 One might perhaps respond that Hume’s account of the 
nature of causal priority, i.e. causal priority implies temporal priority, 
shows that the cause as derived by Koons cannot be caused. After all, 
the cause of the aggregate of all wholly contingent facts is considered 
to be the cause of the cosmos and therefore the cause of all time and 
space itself. But this implies, due to principle (7), that the cause of 
the aggregate of all wholly contingent facts has to be non-temporal. 
Moreover, as the response could continue, the alleged cause of the 
cause of the cosmos has to be non-temporal as well, since time itself 
is ontological posterior to the cause of the cosmos and therefore it is 
also posterior to the cause of the cause of the cosmos. Thus, both the 
cause of the cosmos and the alleged cause of the cause of the cosmos 
must be non-temporal. This surely contradicts, as the response could 
conclude, Hume’s account of the temporal priority of the cause to the 
effect. This response is however not sufficiently conclusive. For, even 
Koons himself considers an appeal to Hume’s account of the nature 
62 A fact that holds in every 
possible world and that is caused 
in every possible would be an 
example of a necessary fact that 
does not exist by virtue of its 
own nature. For, it would not 
exist because of its own intrinsic 
inherent features but because of 
the external circumstance that it 
is caused in every possible world.
63 One could for example 
conceive a fact a that (1) exists by 
virtue of its own nature, and (2) 
that, again by virtue of its own 
nature, causes another fact b. 
Since a exists by virtue of its own 
nature it follows that a holds in 
every possible world. In addition, 
since a causes b by virtue of a’s 
own nature, it follows that b is 
caused in every possible world. 
But then fact b holds in every 
possible world, i.e. fact b is a 
necessarily existing fact that is 
caused in every possible world.
64 Yet, one might for example 
invoke Benardete’s Grim Reaper 
paradox (Benardete 1964) to argue 
that an actual infinite number of 
objects cannot exist. So that, even 
if the cause of the cosmos is not 
uncaused, it still follows that the 
causal series of a-temporal (and 
thus co-existing) causes starting 
with the cause of the cosmos, and 
proceeding with the cause of the 
cause of the cosmos, the cause 
of the cause of the cause of the 
cosmos, etc., cannot be infinite. 
And from this it follows that there 
must be a first cause after all.
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of causal priority unconvincing. He writes: ‘The nature of temporal 
priority is even more obscure than that of causal priority, and the best 
accounts of temporal priority seem to be those that presuppose the 
ontologically prior existence of causal priority (as I argue in Chapter 4 of 
Realism Regained)’ (Koons 2001, p. 197).65 Besides, there does not seem 
to be anything incoherent with the conception of non-temporal causes 
and effects. Take as an example a traditional Platonic interpretation 
of mathematics according to which the objects of mathematics exist 
outside the spatiotemporal order, that is to say, they exist in a non-
temporal and non-spatial manner. Further, as part of this example, let us 
introduce the concept of a ‘logical sustaining cause’, that is, something 
that in a non-temporal and non-spatial manner grounds the existence 
of something else. In this example it would be plausible to maintain 
that sets are the logical sustaining cause of numbers since the latter 
are logically grounded in the former, i.e. numbers are constructed or 
derived from sets in a non-spatial and non-temporal sense. This example 
shows that there is indeed nothing contradictory with the notion of non-
temporal causation. Moreover, we can analyze the causal relationship 
in such a way that we do not have to refer to time at all. For example, 
we may have it that A causes B if and only if (a) If A were not to exist, 
then B would not exist, and (b) If B were not to exist, A would still exist. 
Causation thus understood allows for temporal and non-temporal 
causation. Hence the notion of non-temporal causation is coherent. 
Indeed, without it the fundamental question of the origin of the cosmos, 
of all time and space and its contents, could not even be raised, which is 
absurd, since this is surely a meaningful question that cannot so easily 
be suppressed. Modern cosmology is doing nothing else than trying to 
answer this question, and for that they in fact do employ the notion of a-
temporal causation in many cosmological models.66 Therefore, an appeal 
to Hume’s account of the nature of causation, according to which causes 
and effects must always stand in a relationship of temporal priority, does 
indeed not have sufficient force to refute the objection under discussion.
However, in order to refute the objection ‘Where did the cause of the 
cosmos come from?’ Koons actually provides two other reasons for his 
claim that necessary facts cannot be effects (which truth indeed implies 
that the cause of the cosmos, being a necessary fact, is uncaused). The 
first reason is quite straightforward. As we have seen Koons accepts 
the thesis that causes must be more necessary than their effects. Well, 
no fact can be more necessary than a necessary fact, and therefore it 
follows indeed that necessary facts cannot be caused. This first reason 
depends entirely on the aforementioned thesis, and, since I argued 
that this thesis is not warranted, this first reason can be rejected. I now 
turn to the second reason for Koons’ claim that necessary facts cannot 
be effects. Koons argues: ‘We know that the totality of all facts cannot 
be caused (since there is no fact that does not overlap it), and the best 
explanation of this fact is that this totality contains necessary facts, and 
necessary facts cannot be caused.’ (Koons 1997, p. 206). This is however 
65 Perhaps unsurprisingly 
Koons rejects Hume’s account 
of the temporal priority of the 
cause to the effect. Indeed, the 
cause of the cosmos as derived 
within Koons’ framework is 
non-temporal and therefore not 
temporally prior to the cosmos. 
A rejection of Hume’s account 
of the temporal priority of the 
cause to the effect is however 
still compatible to the claim that 
causes and effects have to stand 
at least in some kind of temporal 
relationship. Now, would such a 
claim refute Koons’ cosmological 
argument because the cause of 
the cosmos is non-temporal and 
hence not temporally related to 
the temporal cosmos? This is not 
the case. One could for example 
argue that the act of causing the 
cosmos is temporally simultaneous 
to the coming into being of the 
cosmos, that is, the moment that 
the First Cause causes the cosmos 
is exactly the same moment as 
the moment that the cosmos 
came into being. So, simultaneous 
causation, while violating Hume’s 
account, still allows for a temporal 
relationship between the cause 
of the cosmos and the cosmos. 
Moreover, it seems to me that 
there is nothing incoherent with 
the viewpoint that the act of 
causing the cosmos is temporally 
simultaneous to the coming into 
being of the cosmos. This view 
has been defended by amongst 
others William Lane Craig (Craig 
1992). As part of his defense Craig 
points out that the notion of 
simultaneous causation makes 
perfect sense. For example, the 
downward pressure exerted 
by the head that causes the 
indentation in the pillow is a 
proper example of simultaneous 
causation. Thus, simultaneous 
causation can be appealed to if 
one wants to deny that the cause 
of the cosmos has to be temporally 
prior to the cosmos, while still 
holding onto the principle that 
a cause and its effect have to be 
in some way always temporally 
related. Such an appeal would 
indeed be fully compatible with 
Koons’ formal framework and his 
renewed cosmological argument. 
Now, if we accept the claim that 
causes and effects are always 
temporally related, would 
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not a convincing reason. The problem is that it is not required at all 
to appeal to necessary facts in order to explain that some contingent 
fact is uncaused. As I have argued in the chapter on Leibniz’ first cause 
argument, under some very general and sufficiently plausible conditions 
regarding the nature of causation and mereological parthood, it logically 
follows that it is possible that there are uncaused contingents that do 
not contain necessary parts.67 Therefore, Koons’ second reason is not 
sufficiently justified, and as such, it has to be rejected as well. We come 
to the conclusion that Koons’ response to the objection that asks where 
the cause of cosmos comes from is not adequate. Or, in other words, 
Koons’ argument is indeed not a good first cause argument. It does not 
imply a first cause, that is, an uncaused cause of the cosmos.
A new objection: the cause of the aggregate of all wholly contingents 
is not a first cause
There appears to be another problematic aspect of Koons’ argument 
that is not discussed by Koons. This aspect stems from a difficult 
challenge facing any argument that pertains to infer the existence of a 
first cause. This challenge is the seemingly easy but in fact enormously 
tricky question what it is that we are trying to establish a first cause for. 
The hard question is how we are to define the effect for which we want 
to infer a first cause. So, everybody who wants to develop a first cause 
argument needs to start with finding an answer to the question what the 
effect is for which one wants to infer a first cause. Surely, ‘the whole of 
reality’ is too broad, since the first cause, if it exists, is a part of reality 
itself and therefore, according to principle (7), not the cause of the 
whole of reality. Also, ‘our universe’ is too narrow, since, for all we know, 
space-time might be partitioned in many parallel universes, and if so, the 
first cause is properly understood as the cause of the whole of space-
time instead of just ‘our universe’. In fact, even the whole of space-time 
is too narrow as an candidate for the effect, since, for all we know, there 
could be realms outside space-time that are nevertheless part of derived 
reality,68 and if so, they should be part of the effect of the first cause as 
well. Now, as we know, the effect for which Koons infers a first cause is, 
‘the entire natural realm’, ‘the whole of physical reality’ or ‘the cosmos’. 
The cosmos according to Koons is, as we have seen, defined as the whole 
of space-time, including all of its contents, such as (but not necessarily 
limited to) matter and energy, and structured as a universe or multi-
verse. Apparently he believes that derived reality is coextensive with the 
whole of space-time, or to put it differently, that there is nothing within 
derived reality that exists outside space-time.
First, let us assume that this is indeed the case. Let us assume that 
the cosmos exhaust the whole of derived reality. I shall show that 
Koons’ cosmological argument, if we accept this assumption, does not 
qualify as a cogent first cause argument. After that I shall argue that 
his argument is not adequate either if we reject the aforementioned 
then an appeal to simultaneous 
causation help to refute the 
objection under consideration? 
For example, by arguing that 
the act of causing the cosmos is 
temporally simultaneous to the 
moment at which the cosmos 
comes into existence, whereas 
there is no construal conceivable 
of a temporal relation between 
the alleged cause of the cause of 
the cosmos and the cause of the 
cosmos, resulting in a rejection 
of such an alleged cause? This 
would indeed constitute a cogent 
response to the objection that 
there is no reason to suppose 
that the cause of the cosmos is 
itself uncaused. Nevertheless, 
as the example on mathematical 
Platonism in the main text will 
show, there is no good reason to 
accept the claim that there should 
always be some kind of temporal 
relationship between a cause 
and its effect. Now, one might 
think that a cogent response can 
be construed if we accept the 
weaker claim that at least one 
of both, the cause or the effect, 
is temporal (or, alternatively, 
contingent). After all, the cosmos 
is both a temporal and contingent 
effect, whereas the cause of the 
cosmos and the cause of the 
cause of the cosmos are both 
non-temporal and not contingent. 
Yet, this does not constitute a 
cogent response either, because, 
in the aforementioned example 
on mathematical Platonism, the 
cause and effect are both non-
temporal and not contingent. In 
the absence of a reason to refute 
such causal scenarios the weaker 
claim does not help to obtain a 
cogent refutation either.
66 There are also good 
metaphysical arguments which 
entail an instance of a-temporal 
causation without assuming up-
front that a-temporal causation is 
possible. A well-known example 
is the Kalam argument (Craig 
and Sinclair 2009). If everything 
that begins to exist has a cause, 
and if the cosmos began to exist, 
then the cosmos must have had 
a cause. Since the cosmos is all 
of time and space, its cause must 
be an instance of a-temporal 
causation. For, the cause of all 
time and space cannot itself be in 
time and space.
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assumption. So, what does the cosmos actually include? Does the 
mental belong to it? Do abstract objects, if they exist, such as numbers, 
properties and propositions, belong to it? Many questions similar 
to these could be raised and Koons’ definition of the cosmos is not 
precise enough to answer them. So, in order to develop a proper first 
cause argument Koons needs a more precise characterization of the 
cosmos. But, as we have seen, Koons does provide a more precise 
characterization. He claims that the cosmos is identical to the aggregate 
of all wholly contingent facts. Or, in other words, the whole of space-
time is considered to be coextensive with the mereological sum of all 
wholly contingent facts. Based upon this identification he infers that 
the inferred cause of the aggregate of all wholly contingent facts is 
the cause of the cosmos, and thus is indeed properly called the first 
cause. But is this adequate? It is justified to identity the cosmos with 
the aggregate of all wholly contingent facts? This seems not to be the 
case. It is far more natural and plausible to identify the cosmos with the 
aggregate of all contingent facts instead of with the aggregate of all 
wholly contingent facts. After all, why should some contingent fact that 
contains one or more necessary parts not belong to the cosmos? Now, 
if we choose to follow the far more natural and plausible approach, we 
have to assert that the cosmos is coextensive with the aggregate of all 
contingent facts. But then, within Koons’ framework, it is not correct to 
conclude that the cause of the aggregate of all wholly contingent facts 
is the cause of the cosmos. For, since Koons does not exclude there 
being necessary facts (indeed, Koons’ inferred cause of the aggregate of 
all wholly contingent facts is an example of a necessarily existing fact), 
it follows that the aggregate of all wholly contingent facts is a proper 
part of the aggregate of all contingent facts.69 So, the cause of the 
former is not shown to be also the cause of the latter. And, thus, Koons’ 
argument is not a cogent argument for the existence of a first cause, 
that is, an uncaused cause of the cosmos. Koons might have shown that 
the aggregate of all wholly contingent facts has a cause, but he has not 
shown that this cause is also the cause of the cosmos, i.e. all of space-
time including its contents.
Yet, as Koons points out: ‘In my 1997 paper, I argued that necessary 
(non-contingent) situations cannot be located in space or time’ (Koons 
2001, p. 198). From this it follows that the cosmos, that is, the whole 
of space-time including all of its contents, does not contain necessary 
situations. In other words, the cosmos or the whole of physical reality 
only contains facts that are wholly contingent. Since it was assumed 
that derived reality contains nothing outside space-time, and hence 
that all contingent facts are part of the cosmos, we can conclude that 
the cosmos is coextensive to the aggregate of all wholly contingent 
facts after all. Now, did Koons argue convincingly that necessary facts 
can never be located in space-time? I contend that this is not the case. 
67 Note that this possibility is 
a problem for Koons’ argument 
in itself, since it goes against 
principle (8).
68 ‘Derived reality’ is a term I use 
to denote the effect for which the 
first cause is the originating cause.
69 That is, this follows if we, 
reasonably, assume that there is at 
least one necessary fact and one 
wholly contingent fact for which it 
holds that their mereological sum 
is itself also a fact. In that case the 
aggregated fact is contingent but 
not wholly contingent. 
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Koons refers to pp. 199–200 of his 1997 paper for an alleged inference of 
his claim that necessarily existing facts must be always outside space-
time (Koons 2001, p. 198). However, on these pages no such inference 
can be found. The only related claim that is argued for on those pages 
is that the necessary being contained in the first cause is not in space-
time. But from this it does of course not follow that all necessarily 
existing facts exist outside space-time. Moreover, his inference of the 
aforementioned claim on those pages is not convincing. It depends on 
the controversial viewpoint that the spatial location of a being is part 
of its ‘basic’, that is, ‘causally and ontologically fundamental’ properties 
(Koons 1997, p. 200). But Koons does not provide a good reason for 
believing that this is true. Hence, we have to conclude that Koons has 
not provided us with a convincing reason for his claim that space-time 
cannot contain necessary facts or, in other words, that all necessary 
facts are outside space-time. Besides, if atomism is true, which, as I shall 
argue in a later chapter, seems to be a quite plausible viewpoint, then, 
perhaps, some (or all) of the atoms might in fact be necessarily existing 
objects residing within space-time. Therefore, the cosmos or natural 
realm is not shown to be identical to or coextensive with the aggregate 
of all wholly contingent facts, that is to say, it is not shown that the 
cosmos does not contain necessary facts. Hence Koons did not prove 
that the effect of the first cause includes the whole cosmos, and this 
surely conflicts with the conception of being a first cause. After all, the 
whole cosmos should originate from something that is cogently called 
the ‘First Cause’.
Second, as mentioned, let us now assume that space-time is a proper 
part of the whole of derived reality, or to put it differently, that there are 
facts within derived reality that exist outside space-time. In this second 
case Koons’ argument must be interpreted differently. For we should not 
choose the cosmos (i.e. the whole of space-time and its contents) as the 
candidate for the effect of the first cause, but instead, we should focus 
directly on the sum of all wholly contingent facts (each of which may 
or may not reside in space-time) as the effect for which a first cause is 
to be inferred. As we have seen, the argument of Koons establishes an 
originating cause of the aggregate of all wholly contingent facts. But, 
again, is this cause cogently understood as being the first cause? Well, 
surely, in the same way as before we can infer that, within the formal 
framework of Koons, the aggregate of all wholly contingent facts is a 
proper part of the aggregate of all contingent facts, and therefore, given 
that the aggregate of all contingent facts is a more suitable candidate 
for the effect of the ‘first cause’, we must conclude that Koons’ argument 
also fails in this second case: the cause of all wholly contingent facts is 
not cogently understood as being the first cause. Therefore, taking both 
cases into account, i.e. the case that derived reality is coextensive with 
the whole of space-time and the case that space-time is a proper part 
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of derived reality, it follows that Koons’ argument is not a convincing 
argument for the existence of a first cause, that is, an originating cause 
of the whole of derived reality.
Closing remarks
As I have argued in this chapter, Koons’ cosmological argument has 
some force. Typical objections against the traditional cosmological 
arguments have no force against it and some specific other objections 
addressing Koons’ argument directly can be refuted as well. 
Nevertheless, two objections stick, one is that the necessarily existing 
cause of the aggregate of all wholly contingent facts is not shown to 
be uncaused, and the other objection is that this necessarily existing 
cause is not shown to be the cause of the cosmos or something else that 
would properly qualify as the whole of derived reality. Both objections 
taken together render the renewed cosmological argument of Koons 
unconvincing as a first cause argument, that is, as an argument for the 
existence of an uncaused originating cause of the whole of derived reality. 
I shall turn in the next chapter to the new cosmological argument of 
Richard Gale and Alexander Pruss.
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70 They assume the Libertarian 
notion of free will, i.e. they take 
this necessary being to be a 
Libertarian free agent or an agent 
that could have done otherwise 
than it actually did (Gale and 
Pruss 1999, p. 467, 471).
71 Actually they argue for more 
than that. After having inferred 
that there exists a necessary 
being that freely causes the 
universe, Gale and Pruss go on 
and argue that this necessary 
being is a very powerful, intelligent 
and good supernatural being 
that freely designs and creates 
the universe. Now, in order to 
establish these additional features 
of being very powerful, intelligent 
and good, Gale and Pruss refer to 
‘the whole battery of teleological 
arguments’ (1999, p. 468) and to 
‘all the extant theodicies’ (1999, 
p. 474). Teleological arguments 
are arguments for the existence 
of a powerful intelligent designer-
creator of the universe that 
reason from the ‘wondrous 
complexity [displayed by the 
universe] due to its law-like unity 
and simplicity, fine tuning of 
natural constants, and natural 
purpose and beauty’ (1999, 
p. 468), whereas theodicies 
are justificatory arguments 
to reconcile the goodness, 
benevolence and justice of the 
designer-creator with the known 
evils in the world by showing that 
this designer-creator plausibly 
‘has morally exonerating reasons 
for permitting these evils’ (1999, 
p. 474). Such teleological and 
justificatory arguments, while 
forming a crucial part of any 
global case for theism, are not 
part of a cosmological argument 
proper. Therefore I shall not 
discuss the last teleological and 
justificatory stage of the new 
iV The cosmological argument of Gale 
and Pruss
Introduction
Right at the end of the twentieth century Gale and Pruss published a 
new cosmological argument (Gale and Pruss 1999). Their new argument 
is based upon a weak version of Leibniz’s principle of sufficient reason. 
This weak version, which they ascribe to Duns Scotus, has it that 
every fact or every true proposition possibly has an explanation. By 
utilizing this weak version of Leibniz’s principle, their new cosmological 
argument, as they claim, is much less subject to the charge of begging 
the question than traditional cosmological arguments relying on 
Leibniz’s principle itself, i.e. that every fact or every true proposition 
actually has an explanation. In this chapter the cosmological argument 
of Gale and Pruss will be analyzed. First, I shall provide a detailed 
exposition of their new argument. After that I assess various objections 
to it. I start with the objections discussed by Gale and Pruss (1999) 
themselves. After that I shall pay attention to the objections as raised 
by respectively Oppy (2000), Davey and Clifton (2001) and Almeida 
and Judisch (2002). As part of this I also take the response of Gale and 
Pruss to Oppy and Davey and Clifton (Gale and Pruss 2002) and the 
response of Pruss to Almeida and Judisch (Pruss 2003) into account. 
Finally I propose a number of additional objections. Although, as will 
become clear in this chapter, most of the raised objections can be 
rebutted, there remain two objections for which no tenable rebuttal 
appears to be available. Hence I conclude at the end of the chapter that 
the new cosmological argument as proposed by Gale and Pruss (1999) 
still contains flaws. This chapter begins with a detailed description of 
the concepts and distinctions that Gale and Pruss introduce to set the 
background and context for their new argument.
Background
Gale and Pruss provide what they take to be a valid deductive argument 
for the existence of a necessary being that freely70 and intentionally 
brought the universe into existence.71 The act of bringing the universe 
into existence is also referred to as causing the existence of the universe, 
or, more shortly, causing the universe (Gale and Pruss 1999, p. 473). So, 
the claim that there exists a necessary being that brings it about that the 
universe exists is to be understood as the claim that there is a necessary 
being that is the cause of the universe. Further, a necessary being is 
defined by Gale and Pruss in the following way: ‘A being is a ‘necessary 
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being’ (or has necessary existence) if and only if it is necessary that it 
exists. Such a being is a self-explaining being in that there is a successful 
ontological argument for its existence, even if we aren’t up to giving 
it’ (1999, p. 462). This definition indicates that Gale and Pruss take this 
necessarily existing being to be an uncaused being. It exists by virtue of 
its own nature, that is, it is impossible for it not to exist. Hence, Gale 
and Pruss’s argument purports to establish the existence of an uncaused 
cause of the universe, that is, their new argument aims at being an 
argument for the existence of a first cause.
Their argument relies upon a number of concepts and distinctions. First, 
a fixed domain of abstract propositions is introduced. A conjunction 
of abstract propositions is maximal if and only if for each abstract 
proposition p, either p or not-p is a conjunct of the conjunction. In 
addition, a conjunction of abstract propositions is compossible if and 
only if it is conceptually or logically possible that all of the conjuncts 
be true together (1999, p. 461). Second, Gale and Pruss provide the 
following definition of a possible world: ‘A possible world is a maximal, 
compossible conjunction of abstract propositions’ (1999, p. 461). This 
definition perhaps suggests that Gale and Pruss simply equate possible 
worlds with conjunctions of abstract propositions, i.e. it seems as if 
they say that possible worlds are in fact conjunctions of propositions. 
However, this is not the case at all. Some of the abstract propositions 
are necessarily true because they, as Gale and Pruss explain, report 
the existence of a necessary being or a necessary state of affairs. All 
the other abstract propositions are contingently true because ‘these 
propositions report the existence or nonexistence of a contingent being 
[or] the occurrence or non-occurrence of a contingent event or state 
of affairs’ (1999, p. 462).72 Now, according to Gale and Pruss a possible 
world is a collection of beings and events or states of affairs that verifies 
or makes true all of the conjuncts of some maximal, compossible 
conjunction of abstract propositions. This conjunction is called the Big 
Conjunctive Fact of that possible world. Hence ‘the Big Conjunctive Fact 
for a given [possible] world comprises all the propositions that would 
be true if this world were to be actualized’ (1999, p. 462). Every possible 
world has one and only one Big Conjunctive Fact. After all, two of such 
facts would differ with respect to at least one conjunct, let us say p, 
and therefore the possible world would have to make both p and not-
p true, which is impossible. Conversely, every maximal, compossible 
conjunction of abstract propositions is the Big Conjunctive Fact of one 
and only one possible world. So, each possible world is individuated by 
its Big Conjunctive Fact. This is because Gale and Pruss identify possible 
worlds with maximal, compossible conjunctions of abstract propositions, 
which is in fact the real meaning of their definition of a possible world 
as mentioned above: a possible world is identified with (which is not 
the same as being equal to) a maximal, compossible conjunction of 
abstract propositions. Further, the Big Conjunctive Contingent Fact of 
some possible world is the conjunction of all contingent propositions 
argument as presented by Gale 
and Pruss. In this chapter ‘the 
argument of Gale and Pruss’ thus 
only refers to the first stage of 
their argument, i.e. the deduction 
of the existence of a necessary 
being that freely intentionally 
brought the universe into 
existence.
72 Gale and Pruss define 
contingency in the following way: 
‘A “contingent proposition” (or 
“being”) is one that possibly, in 
the broadly conceptual or logical 
sense, is true (or existent) and 
possibly is false (or nonexistent)’ 
(1999, p. 462). Note that, 
according to this definition, a 
contingent proposition does 
not have to be true in the actual 
world. Neither does a contingent 
being have to exist in the actual 
world. So, the definition of 
contingency of Gale and Pruss is 
different from the definition of 
contingency used by Koons.
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that would be true if that world would be the actual world. It follows 
immediately that the Big Conjunctive Contingent Fact of a possible 
world is maximal with respect to the abstract contingent propositions. 
Surely, the Big Conjunctive Contingent Fact of a possible world is 
contained73 in its Big Conjunctive Fact. Now, let us suppose that two 
possible worlds have the same Big Conjunctive Contingent Fact, then, 
since all necessarily true abstract propositions are contained in the 
Big Conjunctive Fact of every possible world, it would follow that both 
possible worlds have the same Big Conjunctive Fact as well, which is 
impossible. Therefore, no two worlds have the same Big Conjunctive 
Contingent Fact, that is to say, a possible world is also individuated by 
its Big Conjunctive Contingent Fact (1999, p. 462).
As mentioned in the chapter on Koons’ cosmological argument, 
everybody who wants to develop a first cause argument must start with 
finding an answer to the question what the effect is for which one wants 
to infer a first cause. Gall and Pruss define this effect as ‘the universe’. 
Their argument intends to establish that there exists a necessary being 
that freely intentionally brought ‘the universe’ into existence. But, as 
we have seen in the chapter on Koons’ new argument as well, in order 
to develop a proper first cause argument, we need a more precise 
definition of what is meant by the concept ‘universe’. Now, according 
to Gale and Pruss ‘a world’s universe is what verifies or makes true all 
of the conjuncts in this world’s Big Conjunctive Contingent Fact’ (1999, 
p. 463). Thus, a universe of a possible world is a part of that possible 
world. It’s the part that verifies all contingent propositions in the Big 
Conjunctive Fact of that world. Note that according to this definition 
also the contingent acts of a necessary being (if such a being exists) 
would be part of the universe of the possible worlds in which this being 
performs these acts.
Further, as mentioned earlier, Gale and Pruss accept as one of the 
premises of their cosmological argument a weak version of Leibniz’ 
principle of sufficient reason, since, as they say: ‘It would be imposing 
on the atheistic opponents of our argument to ask them baldly to 
accept [Leibniz’ principle of sufficient reason itself], as do all traditional 
cosmological arguments. For [Leibniz’ principle of sufficient reason] 
occupies almost as high an echelon in one’s wish book as does the 
proposition that God exists’ (1999, p. 463). Now, the principle of 
sufficient reason endorsed by Leibniz can be formulated as the claim 
that for every proposition p, if p is true, there is a proposition q that 
explains p. So, according to Leibniz’ principle of sufficient reason, every 
proposition necessarily has the property of having an explanation if true 
(Oppy 2000, p. 353). The weak version of Leibniz’ principle, as introduced 
by Gale and Pruss, is the claim that for each proposition p, if p is true, it 
is possible that there exists a proposition q such that q explains p. Thus, 
according to this weak version, there is no proposition which is both 
possibly true and necessarily unexplained (Oppy 2000, p. 353). For the 
73 According to Gale and Pruss 
some proposition is contained in 
another proposition if and only 
if every conjunct of the former 
is also a conjunct of the latter. In 
addition, two propositions are 
identical if ‘every conjunct in one 
is a conjunct in the other’ (1999, 
p. 462).
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purpose of their argument Gale and Pruss cast their weak version of the 
principle of sufficient reason in the following way:
‘For any proposition, p, and any world, w, if p is in w’s Big Conjunctive 
Fact, then there is some possible world, w1, and proposition, q, such 
that w1’s Big Conjunctive Fact contains p and q and the proposition 
that q explains p’ (1999, p. 463)
Gale and Pruss maintain that it would be unreasonable for atheistic 
opponents not to grant them the above casted weak version of the 
principle of sufficient reason (1999, p. 463). As mentioned, within the 
framework of Gale and Pruss, propositions report the existence or non-
existence of beings or states of affairs. The proposition that q explains 
p thus reports the existence of some state of affairs, i.e., the state of 
affairs that proposition q explains proposition p. This state of affairs 
is clearly to be understood as being an abstract entity. The framework 
of Gale and Pruss therefore presupposes the existence of abstract 
entities, that is, there presumably are possible worlds that contain one 
or more abstract entities. For this reason anti-realists with respect to 
abstract entities might favor another casting of the weak version of the 
principle of sufficient reason. Further, Gale and Pruss do not define the 
relationship ‘explains’ or ‘is explained by’ between two propositions. 
In their framework this relation appears as a primitive term. But this 
raises already some pressing questions. For example, do Gale and Pruss 
exclude the possibility of there being two possible worlds, w1 and w2, 
and two propositions, a and b, such that (i) a and b are true in w1 and w2, 
(ii) a explains b in w1, and (iii) a does not explain b in w2? And, as another 
example, is it presumed that both a and b are part of the Big Conjunctive 
Fact of all those possible worlds for which it holds that a explains b? 
Further, is logical entailment a necessary condition for explanation, 
that is, does it have to be the case that a logically entails b for a being 
an explanation of b? Or, the other way around, is logical entailment a 
sufficient condition for explanation? Moreover, what is the relationship 
between the explanation of a conjunction and the explanations of its 
conjuncts? In the rest of this chapter I shall come back to these and 
similar questions regarding the relationship ‘explains’ between two 
propositions, as presupposed by Gale and Pruss (1999).
The argument
On the preceding pages I discussed Gale and Pruss’s preliminary stage-
setting for their cosmological argument. After this initial stage-setting 
we are in the position to formulate and evaluate the new argument 
itself. I shall first present, with some minor modifications, a short 
concise representation of their argument as provided by Davey and 
Clifton (2001, pp. 485–486). This helps to understand the essence of 
Gale and Pruss’s new cosmological argument. After that I shall engage 
upon a detailed and comprehensive discussion of their new argument, 
74 Note that, strictly speaking, 
this conclusion does not follow 
from the impossibility of an 
actually false proposition to be 
true in w. It follows from this 
impossibility together with the 
second impossibility of an actually 
true proposition to be false in 
w. The reasoning as provided 
in (3) only establishes the first 
impossibility. However, the 
second impossibility is derived 
in a similar way. That is most 
likely the reason why Davey 
and Clifton (2001) have left the 
logical derivation of the second 
impossibility wholly implicit.
75 Indeed, since, the actual 
world and w have the same Big 
Conjunctive Contingent Fact, and, 
as mentioned before, possible 
worlds are individuated by their 
Big Conjunctive Contingent Fact.
76 Every explanation consists of 
an explanandum and an explanans. 
The explanandum is that which 
is to be explained, whereas the 
explanans is that which provides 
the explanation.
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based on the exposition that Gale and Pruss provide themselves (Gale 
and Pruss 1999). Let w-psr denote the weak principle of sufficient 
reason, and let E (p) be a proposition that is true in world w if and only if 
proposition p has an explanation in world w. Davey and Clifton provide 
the following rendering of the argument of Gale and Pruss:
 1 Let A be the Big Conjunctive Contingent Fact of the actual world.
 2 From w-psr it follows that there is a possible world w in which 
E (A) and A are true,
 3 If there were a proposition p true in w that is [false in the actual 
world], then, since A would entail not-p and A is true in w, both p 
and not-p would have to be true in w – which is absurd. Thus, the 
actual world and w must agree on all contingent propositions.74
 4 It follows immediately that w is the actual world and, thus, that A 
has an explanation in the actual world.75
 5 All explanations are either personal explanations, that rely on an 
individual’s agency, or scientific explanations.
 6 Proposition A cannot be given a scientific explanation, 
because any relevant scientific laws are themselves contained 
as conjuncts in the explanandum,76 and laws are not self-
explaining.77
 7 Therefore, the only explanation A can have is that it is made true 
by the free agency of an individual.78 This individual must exist 
necessarily; for a contingent being cannot bring about its own 
existence.
The above argumentation scheme clarifies the core of Gale and Pruss’s 
new cosmological argument. I shall now proceed to discuss in detail the 
actual argumentation provided by Gale and Pruss (1999) themselves. 
Gale and Pruss’s argumentation consists of the sixteen stages below 
(1999, pp. 462–469).79
 1 If p1 is the Big Conjunctive Contingent Fact of a world w1 and p2 is 
the Big Conjunctive Contingent Fact of a world w2, and if p1 and 
p2 are identical, then w1 = w2 [premise]
 2 p is the actual world’s Big Conjunctive Contingent Fact 
[definition]
 3 For any proposition, p’, and any world, w, if p’ is in w’s Big 
Conjunctive Fact, then there is some possible world, w1, and 
proposition, q, such that w1’s Big Conjunctive Fact contains p’ and 
q and the proposition that q explains p’ [premise]
 4 If p is in the actual world’s Big Conjunctive Fact,80 then there is 
some possible world, w1, and proposition, q,81 such that w1’s Big 
Conjunctive Fact contains p and q and the proposition that q 
explains p [from (3)]
 5 There is a possible world w1 and a proposition q, such that w1’s 
Big Conjunctive Fact contains p and q and the proposition that q 
explains p [from (2), (4)]
77 Here it is assumed that if 
some proposition p explains a 
conjunction of propositions, then 
p explains each of its conjuncts. 
Indeed, if all relevant scientific 
laws are included in A, then 
the assumption that E (A) is a 
scientific law, and thus a conjunct 
of A, would imply, due to the 
aforementioned principle, that 
E (A) has to explain itself, which is 
clearly impossible since it is taken 
in (6) that scientific laws are not 
self-explaining.
78 It is assumed here that the 
proposition ‘A is made true by 
the free agency of an individual’ 
has the same meaning as the 
proposition ‘The universe is 
brought into existence by the 
free agency of an individual’, 
which is the conclusion of Gale 
and Pruss’s argument. Indeed, the 
only way to make true A seems 
to be by bringing into existence 
those beings and states of affairs 
that verify A. And, since Gale 
and Pruss define the universe as 
that part of the actual world that 
verifies A, it follows immediately 
that bringing into existence the 
aforementioned beings and states 
of affairs amounts to bringing into 
existence the universe. Later on 
I shall come back to this presumed 
identification of meanings, 
which is, as I shall argue, highly 
problematic.
79 Note that, as mentioned 
earlier, I shall not take into 
account the final teleological and 
justificatory stage of their new 
argument because such a stage 
does not belong to a cosmological 
argument proper.
80 Gale and Pruss in fact write: 
‘If p is in the actual world’s Big 
Conjunctive Contingent Fact 
[italics mine] […]’ (1999, p. 464). 
However, from the context it is 
clear that they intend to refer to 
the actual world’s Big Conjunctive 
Fact instead of the actual world’s 
Big Conjunctive Contingent Fact.
81 The phrase ‘and proposition, 
q’ is actually omitted by Gale and 
Pruss (1999, p. 464). But again, 
from the context it is obvious that 
Gale and Pruss intend to have this 
phrase included, which is what 
I have done.
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 6 w1 = the actual world [from (1), (2), (5)],
 7 There is in the actual world a proposition q, such that the actual 
world’s Big Conjunctive Fact contains p and q and the proposition 
that q explains p [from (5), (6)]
 8 q is either a personal explanation or q is a scientific explanation 
[premise]
 9 q is not a scientific explanation [premise]
 10 q is a personal explanation [from (8), (9)]
 11 q reports the intentional action of a contingent being or q reports 
the intentional action of a necessary being [from (10)]
 12 It is not the case the q reports the intentional action of a 
contingent being [premise]
 13 q reports the intentional action of a necessary being [from (11), 
(12)]
 14 q is a contingent proposition that reports the intentional action 
of a necessary being [from (1), (2), (13)]
 15 q is a contingent proposition that reports the free intentional 
action of a necessary being that explains the existence of the 
actual world’s universe [from (14)]
 16 It is contingently true that there exists a necessary being that 
intentionally freely creates the actual world’s universe [from (15)] 
(Qed).82
Stage (1) follows directly from the already discussed observation that 
possible worlds are individuated by their Big Conjunctive Contingent 
Fact, that is, no two possible worlds have the same Big Conjunctive 
Contingent Fact. Stage (2) is merely a definition. Gale and Pruss 
introduce the constant p to denote the Big Conjunctive Contingent 
Fact of the actual world. Stage (3) introduces Gale and Pruss’s weak 
version of the principle of sufficient reason as a premise. Stage (4) is 
obtained from (3) by substituting the constant p, i.e. the Big Conjunctive 
Contingent Fact of the actual world, for the variable p’ and the actual 
world for the variable w. Stage (5) follows directly from (2) and (4) by 
implication. Now, to establish the result of stage (6) Gale and Pruss 
need more work. They show that p, the Big Conjunctive Contingent Fact 
of the actual world, is identical to the Big Conjunctive Contingent Fact 
of w1, which they denote by p1. From this it follows indeed from (1) that 
the actual world and w1 are identical. So, how do Gale and Pruss in fact 
establish that p = p1? They provide the comprehensive derivation cited 
below.
‘Since every conjunct of p is a contingent proposition true in w1 (by 
(2) and (5)), every conjunct of p is a conjunct of p1 by definition of p1. 
Conversely, suppose r is a conjunct of p1. Then either r or not-r will 
be true in the actual world by bivalence. If not-r is true in the actual 
world, then not-r is a conjunct in p (since not-r is contingent as r is), and 
hence is a conjunct in p1 as we have shown that every conjunct in p is a 
conjunct in p1, so that then both r and not-r are conjuncts in p1, which 
82 In their paper Gale and Pruss 
deploy the symbol p both as a 
constant and as a variable. In 
order to prevent confusion I have 
used p’ instead of p in (3).
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contradicts the fact that p1 is the Big Conjunctive Contingent Fact of a 
possible world. Hence, not-r cannot be true in the actual world, so r must 
be true there. Since r is contingent, it must then be a conjunct of p.’ 
(1999, p. 464).
In this way Gale and Pruss indeed show that every conjunct of p1 is a 
conjunct of p and vice versa, so that, because of (1), the result of (6) 
immediately follows. The seventh stage is a consequence of stage (5) 
and (6) by substituting the actual world for w1 in (5). At this point in 
their argument Gale and Pruss have established the existence of a 
proposition q that is true in the actual world and that explains the Big 
Conjunctive Contingent Fact of the actual world. In the second part of 
their argument Gale and Pruss set themselves to ‘flesh out’ proposition 
q. Stage (8) is justified in the following way:
‘The only sort of explanations that we can conceive of [italics mine] 
are personal and scientific explanations, in which a personal 
explanation explains why some proposition is true in terms of the 
intentional action of an agent and a scientific one in terms of some 
conjunction of law-like propositions, be they deterministic or only 
statistical, and one that reports a state of affairs at some time’ (1999, 
p. 465).
Now, this justification of (8) might be problematic, since there seems 
to be no compelling reason to hold that there are no other types of 
explanation, i.e. types of explanation we cannot (yet) conceive of. 
Nevertheless, stage (8) seems to be sufficiently warranted since, as Gale 
and Pruss correctly point out, ‘in philosophy we ultimately must go with 
what we can make intelligible to ourselves after we have made our best 
effort’ (1999, p. 465), and, the above two types of explanation appear 
to be the only ones we can think of after having made our best effort. 
The next stage also requires more argumentation. According to Gale 
and Pruss q is not a scientific explanation. This stage will be thoroughly 
evaluated as part of the discussion of the objections to Gale and Pruss’s 
argument later on in this chapter. For now I shall only outline the 
reasoning that Gale and Pruss present to justify their claim that q cannot 
be a scientific explanation. Gale and Pruss maintain that each scientific 
explanation consists of one or more ‘law-like propositions’, which seem 
to be, as they point out, contingent. Thus, if q would be a scientific 
explanation, then q would be part of the Big Conjunctive Contingent 
Fact of the actual world, i.e. p. Further, since q must explain each of the 
conjuncts of p, it would follow that q would have to explain itself, which 
is impossible since, as Gale and Pruss hold, ‘law-like propositions cannot 
explain themselves’ (1999, p. 465). Note that in this derivation Gale 
and Pruss apparently presume the principle that the explanation of a 
conjunct (i.e. q explaining p) necessarily explains each of the conjuncts 
of the conjunct (i.e. q explaining q). This seems to be indeed a plausible 
principle. After all, a conjunction logically entails each of its conjuncts. 
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Hence, if some proposition explains some conjunction, then it seems 
cogent to employ that explaining proposition as an explanation of 
each of the conjuncts of the conjunction. Indeed, more generally, if a 
proposition a explains a proposition b, and if b logically entails some 
proposition c, then, reasonably, a also counts as an explanation of 
proposition c. But, is it reasonable to assume that each and every ‘law-
like proposition’ is contingent? And, even if this would be the case, is it 
cogent to assume that ‘law-like propositions’ are not self-explaining? As 
mentioned, I shall have more to say about these pressing questions later 
on in this chapter. The next stage of the argument, (10), surely is a direct 
consequence of (8) and (9). But what about the eleventh stage of their 
derivation? According to Gale and Pruss (11) follows immediately from 
(10) since (11) amounts to a definition of what a personal explanation 
actually is. I do not believe that (11) exhaust the possibilities of what 
could count as a personal explanation, and I shall come back to this 
point once I turn to a discussion of the objections to Gale and Pruss’s 
argument. The next two stages, (12) and (13), result in the conclusion 
that the being mentioned in (11) exists necessarily. So, how do Gale and 
Pruss infer from (11) that the being in question is a necessarily existing 
being? Well, they provide the following argumentation, which I take to 
be sufficiently cogent:
‘It is impossible that q reports the intentional action of a contingent 
being. The reason is that if it did, there would be in the Big 
Conjunctive Contingent Fact a proposition reporting the existence 
of the contingent being in question. But q itself is not able to explain 
why the contingent being it refers to exists, since a contingent 
being’s intentional action evidently must presuppose, and hence 
cannot explain, that being’s existence’ (1999, p. 465).
Notice that in the reasoning cited above Gale and Pruss employ, 
again, the principle that the explanation of a conjunction must be an 
explanation of each of its conjuncts. At this point in their derivation 
Gale and Pruss have argued for there being an intentional action of a 
necessarily existing being that explains the Big Conjunctive Contingent 
Fact of the actual world, that is to say, they have arrived at stage 
(13) of their new cosmological argument. To show that q is in fact a 
contingently true proposition, i.e. to obtain (14), they subsequently 
provide the following reductio ad absurdum:
‘If q is necessary, q is a conjunct in every possible world’s Big 
Conjunctive Fact. But q entails p, since that a necessary being 
intentionally brings it about that p entails that p, and thus p also 
is a conjunct in every possible world’s Big Conjunctive Fact. Given 
that p is the actual world’s Big Conjunctive Contingent Fact and that 
a possible world is individuated by its Big Conjunctive Contingent 
Fact, it follows that every possible world is identical with the actual 
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world.83 Therefore, there is only one possible world. And, this, is 
surely absurd’ (1999, p. 467).
The above derivation is problematic for two reasons. First, it seems to 
beg the question against deterministic worldviews, that is, worldviews 
according to which libertarian free will does not exist and everything 
occurs by necessity.84 After all, such a worldview would in fact imply 
that there is only one possible world. Second, Gale and Pruss apparently 
presume that the proposition ‘q explains p’ and the proposition ‘q 
reports the intentional action of a necessary being’ together entail the 
proposition ‘q reports that a necessary being intentionally brings it 
about that p’. But this entailment is not justified and not even plausible. 
I come back on both problematic aspects as part of my discussion 
of objections to the argument of Gale and Pruss. To bridge the gap 
between (14) and (15) Gale and Pruss set themselves to show that the 
action reported by q is a (libertarian) free action. Again, they presume, 
as they did in their previous derivation, that the proposition q can be 
taken to report that there is a necessary being who intentionally brings 
it about that p. Their strategy is to show that q cannot be understood 
as the proposition, denoted by q2, that there is a necessary being who 
unfreely and intentionally brings it about that p.85 To show this Gale and 
Pruss provide a reductio ad absurdum. They hold that, ‘If q is understood 
as q2, there is a proposition, r, not identical with q2, that explains q2’ 
(1999, p. 467).86 Now, surely, r is either necessarily true or contingently 
true. In order to complete their reductio Gale and Pruss provide the 
following reductio of each of both possibilities:
‘Let us first assume that r is a necessary proposition. r entails q2, 
because the proposition that something coerces q2’s necessary being 
to bring it about that p entails the proposition […] q2. […] But [since r 
is necessary] it follows that [q2 is necessary]; however, q has already 
been proven to be contingent, and since q is assumed to be the same 
as q2, the contradiction that q2 is both necessary and contingent 
results. Things fare no better if we assume that r is contingent. r 
explains q2, since r explains how it is that q2’s necessary being is 
coerced into bringing it about that p. And q2, in turn, explains p. But, 
since r is contingent, r is a conjunct in p, and this results in a vicious 
circularity of explanation – r explains q2, while q2 explains r since q2 
explains p and therefore every conjunct in p, including in particular r’ 
(1999, p. 468).
Again, as I shall explain later on in more detail, the reductio ad absurdum 
proposed by Gale and Pruss in order to arrive at (15) gives problems as 
well. For example, why should q2 have an explanation? It seems that Gale 
and Pruss invoke the principle of sufficient reason itself here, instead of 
only their weaker variant of this principle. Hence, it seems, contrary to 
what they have claimed, that their new argument is no advance because 
83 Gale and Pruss refer to their 
explicit derivation of step (6) 
of the argument. Indeed, their 
derivation of (6) can be invoked 
here to obtain the conclusion that 
every possible world is identical to 
the actual world.
84 A deterministic worldview 
is understood here as being 
a worldview according to 
which everything that exists is 
necessarily caused by natural laws 
that themselves are necessarily 
true. So, a deterministic 
worldview does not allow for 
the existence of free will acts, 
genuine chance events, or brute 
unexplained facts.
85 Indeed, from this it follows 
that q is to be understood as 
the proposition that there is 
a necessary being who freely 
intentionally brings it about 
that p, which is precisely what 
(15) reports if we, as Gale and 
Pruss do, (i) identify p with the 
actual world’s universe and, 
(ii), hold that ‘brings it about 
that the actual world’s universe 
exists’ entails ‘explains the 
existence of the actual world’s 
universe’. Now, surely, the latter 
assumption seems obvious and 
thus unproblematic, but the 
first is, as I shall explain later on, 
problematic.
86 ‘r will report’, as Gale and 
Pruss point out, ‘that something, 
perhaps something psychological 
or perhaps and external force, 
compels the necessary being 
mentioned in q2 to bring it about 
that p’ (1999, p. 467).
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it ultimately, similar to most traditional cosmological arguments, relies 
upon Leibniz’ principle of sufficient reason.87 The conclusion of their 
argument, as mentioned in (16), is that it is contingently true that there 
exists a necessary being that intentionally and freely creates the actual 
world’s universe. This result is a direct consequence of stage (15) since 
q is proven to be a true proposition in the actual world, and because 
of the fact that Gale and Pruss, as we have seen, presume that ‘being 
an explanation of the existence of the actual world’s universe’ really 
amounts to ‘being that which brings the actual world’s universe into 
existence’, which is, as explained earlier, according to Gale and Pruss 
taken to be the same as ‘being that which causes (and thus creates) the 
actual world’s universe’.
Objections
In what follows I shall concentrate on a large number of objections 
to Gale and Pruss’s new argument. Gale and Pruss already present a 
number of objections themselves (1999, pp. 469–476). These I will assess 
first. After that I continue with an evaluation of the objections raised by 
Oppy (2000), Davey and Clifton (2001) and Almeida and Judisch (2002). 
I conclude with some further objections to the argument as identified 
by myself. As I shall argue most but not all objections can be adequately 
rebutted. Hence a number of objections remain unchallenged. They 
make Gale and Pruss’s argument unconvincing.
Objections discussed and rebutted by Gale and Pruss (1999)
the ClAssiCAl humeAn objeC tion
As discussed before the traditional Leibnizian cosmological argument 
infers the existence of a necessary being from the premise that the 
totality of all contingent beings must be explained by something outside 
this totality. Now, in section IX of Hume’s Dialogues Concerning Natural 
Religion Cleanthes expresses the following critique to the Leibnizian 
cosmological argument: ‘Did I show you the particular causes of each 
individual in a collection of twenty particles of matter, I should think it 
very unreasonable, should you afterwards ask me, what was the cause of 
the whole twenty. This is sufficiently explained in explaining the causes 
of the parts’. Hume’s critique as expressed by Cleanthes amounts to the 
following. If each and every part of some whole is explained by referring 
to one or more other parts of that particular whole, then, the whole 
itself is explained. Therefore, in such cases, there is no need to refer to 
some external explanation that explains the whole. Hume’s objection 
surely applies to Gale and Pruss’ new cosmological argument. Indeed, 
one could point out that Gale and Pruss’s argument simply overlooks 
the possibility that the actual world’s Big Conjunctive Contingent 
Fact is internally explained, that is, each of its conjuncts might be 
fully explained by one or more other conjuncts. Thus, according to 
this objection, it is not true that the actual world’s Big Conjunctive 
87 Perhaps, as Jeroen de Ridder 
pointed out to me, Gale and 
Pruss would argue that ‘being 
compelled by something’ is part 
of the meaning of performing 
an intentional act unfreely. If 
so, it would be analytically true 
that there is a proposition, r, not 
identical with q2, that explains 
q2. Nevertheless, an opponent 
could object that it might be a 
genuine random event that the 
being in question intentionally 
brings it about that p. And, as the 
opponent could continue, genuine 
random acts might be unfree 
without having an explanation.
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Contingent Fact is explainable only by the free action of a necessary 
being. And therefore, there is no reason at all to accept the existence 
of such a being, unless Gale and Pruss successfully show that the actual 
world’s Big Conjunctive Contingent Fact is not internally explained. 
Now, how do Gale and Pruss try to rebut this objection? They provide 
the following reply:
‘[The Humean objection] assumes that explanation is agglomerative, 
meaning that it is closed under conjunctive introduction: if there 
is an explanation for P and another explanation for Q, there is an 
explanation for the conjunction (P & Q). [But] it could be a mere 
coincidence that P and Q are true together, even when each of them 
has some explanation. It also is possible that there is a common 
cause that explains their conjunction – their being true together’ 
(1999, p. 469) 
Gale and Pruss hold that the Humean objection relies on an 
incorrect assumption, namely the assumption that explanations 
are agglomerative. It is true that this assumption is vital to Hume’s 
objection. Without it the Humean objection fails. However, it seems to 
me that it is absurd to deny that explanations are agglomerative. What 
reason do Gale and Pruss provide to deny the agglomerative character 
of explanations? They say that ‘it could be a coincidence’ that two 
propositions are true together. Well, indeed, but I genuinely fail to see 
how this correct observation amounts to a rejection of the claim that 
explanations are agglomerative. For if someone provides an explanation 
for P, and, in addition to that, he or she also provides an explanation 
for Q, then, surely, those two explanations taken together provide an 
explanation for the claim that P and that Q. Oppy (2000) also seems to 
struggle with Gale and Pruss’ reasoning for rejecting the agglomerative 
character of explanations. As Oppy writes: ‘Gale and Pruss give an 
argument against the claim that explanation is agglomerative […] which 
turns on the fact that an explanation for a conjunction p&q must be an 
explanation, not merely of each of the p and q, but also of their joint 
obtaining’ (Oppy 2000, p. 349). If this is indeed the essence of Gale and 
Pruss’ argument,88 then I believe it does not hold. Why should someone 
asked to explain p&q also have to explain their ‘joint obtaining’? Within 
the formal framework as deployed by Gale and Pruss the notion of 
‘joint obtaining’ is not defined at all. The only notion that their formal 
framework allows is the straightforward conception of ‘being true 
together’ or ‘being simultaneously true’, but, precisely because of 
this reason, an explanation of p concatenated to an explanation of q 
already suffices as a proper explanation of p&q. So, to conclude, there 
seems to be no convincing reason for denying that explanations are 
agglomerative, and hence, the rebuttal of Gale and Pruss to the Humean 
objection fails. Now, nevertheless, I think that one can adequately rebut 
the Humean objection. For that I would like to refer to the response 
offered by James van Cleve in his book Problems from Kant (James van 
88 Gale and Pruss’s reference 
to ‘common causes’ as an 
example of a proper explanation 
of conjunctive facts confirms 
Oppy’s proposed reading of Gale 
and Pruss’s argument against 
the agglomerative character of 
explanations. For, if one is able to 
detect a common cause of two 
facts, then one not only explains 
both facts, but also why these 
facts jointly obtain. Their joint 
obtaining is grounded in their 
common cause.
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Cleve 1999). The type of explanation as pointed at by David Hume, i.e. 
internal explanations, is analyzed by Van Cleve in the following way. The 
explanandum of this type of explanation is: ‘All members of the set {a, b, 
c, d, e, …} of Fs exist’, and the corresponding explanans can typically be 
rendered as: ‘a exists because b and c caused a to exist, b exists because 
d and e caused b to exist; and so on’ (James van Cleve 1999, p. 205). Van 
Cleve then continues to argue: ‘You would be giving an explanation 
of this type if you tried to explain the existence of zebras by noting, 
for each zebra, that it is the offspring of two other zebras – Zeb was 
begotten by Zeke and Zelda, and so on. I maintain that explanations of 
this sort are circular. The explanans invokes the existence of Fs, but Fs 
are the very beings for whose existence an explanation is being sought. 
To be sure, the circularity is not quite of the ‘P because P’ variety, since 
the existence of each zebra is explained by reference to other zebras. 
But if what is to be explained is the existence of zebras in general (or 
why there are zebras at all), the explanans provokes the very question 
it is supposed to answer. This is the sense in which the explanation is 
circular. If what is demanded is an explanation of the existence of zebras 
in general, no amount of appeal to zebras begetting zebras will satisfy 
it. The demand will be satisfied only when resource is had to something 
that is not a zebra – as happens equally in the explanations offered by 
creationists and evolutionists’ (James van Cleve 1999, pp. 205–206). 
Now, this reasonable response can be invoked to rebut the Humean 
objection to Gale and Pruss’s argument as well. For, let F be the property 
of ‘being a contingently true proposition’. An internal explanation of 
the Big Conjunctive Contingent Fact would then be an explanation 
of why {a, b, c, d, e, …} are the contingently true propositions from 
the explanans that, let us say, ‘a is true because of b and c; b is true 
because of d and e; and so on’. But then, again, it would be left entirely 
unexplained why there are contingently true propositions, i.e. Fs, at all. 
Therefore, we have to conclude that, although the rebuttal provided 
by Gale and Pruss (1999) to the classical Humean objection is not 
convincing, Hume’s objection can in fact be cogently rebutted by 
referring to Van Cleve’s analysis.
the objeC tion thAt q is  not self-explAining 
The argument of Gale and Pruss infers that there is a contingently true 
proposition q that explains the existence of the actual world’s universe 
by reporting that this universe came into being as the result of the free 
intentional action of a necessary being. Now, as we have seen, Gale 
and Pruss identify the actual world’s universe with the actual world’s 
Big Conjunctive Contingent Fact. Hence proposition q explains the 
conjunction of all the actual world’s contingently true propositions. 
Assuming that an explanation of a conjunct explains each of the 
conjuncts, it follows that proposition q has to explain itself. After all, q 
is a contingent truth and hence part of the Big Conjunctive Contingent 
Fact. But is q a self-explaining proposition? Gale and Pruss turn this 
89 My rendering of what Gale 
and Pruss call ‘the taxicab 
objection’ is quite different from 
the rendering that Gale and 
Pruss present themselves. They 
write: ‘Our argument proved that 
the Big Conjunctive Contingent 
Fact is explained by a contingent 
proposition that reports the 
free action of a necessary being. 
But this contingent proposition 
goes unexplained. And, since 
we are willing to countenance 
an unexplained proposition why 
should we not have accepted as 
a brute, unexplained fact the Big 
Conjunctive Contingent Fact with 
which our argument started? 
Is not our argument […] like a 
taxicab that we hire and dismiss 
when it suits our purpose?’ (1999, 
pp. 469–470). I’m not in favor of 
this rendering of what Gale and 
Pruss call ‘the taxicab objection’. 
Simply pointing out that q is left 
unexplained is not an objection 
to Gale and Pruss’s argument at 
all. After all, Gale and Pruss do 
not accept Leibniz’s principle 
that all true propositions have 
explanations. The objection is 
that q is not a self-explaining 
proposition. Indeed, this would, 
if true, contradict the fact 
that, within Gale and Pruss’s 
framework, proposition q has to 
be self-explaining.
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question into a swift objection to their cosmological argument, called 
‘the taxicab objection’. The objection is that q is not a self-explaining 
proposition and that therefore their new cosmological argument fails.89
Gale and Pruss respond to this objection by saying that q is self-
explaining and that ‘the reason for this is that a necessary being is one 
whose existence can be explained by an ontological argument, even if 
we cannot give it, and that a being freely performs an action, such as 
freely causing the actual cosmos to exist, stands in need of no further 
explanation, at least on the Libertarian Theory’ (1999, p. 470).90 Now, 
it seems to me that this response is insufficient. What also needs to be 
explained, in order for proposition q to be genuinely self-explaining, is 
why the necessary being reported by q has free will. It is very important 
to understand that the question is not to show that the necessary being 
reported by q has free will. Indeed, Gale and Pruss’s argument already 
shows this to be the case. The point here is to explain why this being 
has free will. Proposition q is only genuinely self-explaining if we are 
able to provide an explanatory reason for the fact that the necessary 
being reported by proposition q has free will. Only in that case, to put it 
differently, one may truly say that q is a ‘regress-of-explanation ender’ 
(1999, p. 470).
What I will show is that the reason for the necessary being reported by q 
to have free will is that ‘being free’ is an essential property of the being 
in question, that is, the necessary being reported by q has free will in 
all possible worlds. Indeed, assume that this being is not free in some 
possible world w. In that case the proposition that the necessary being 
reported by q has free will is contingently true and therefore part of the 
Big Conjunctive Contingent Fact of the actual world, which would imply 
that q has to explain that the being reported by q has free will. But this is 
surely impossible. Proposition q is not able to explain why the necessary 
being it reports has free will, since a necessary being’s free action must 
presuppose, and hence cannot explain, that being having free will. We 
therefore conclude that the necessary being reported by q is essentially 
free, i.e. free in all possible worlds, which explains it having free will 
in the actual world. I conclude that the objection that q is not self-
explaining, and thus not a ‘regress-of-explanation ender’, can be refuted 
once we add to the response of Gale and Pruss the further observation 
that the necessary being reported by proposition q is essentially free, 
explaining why it is free in the actual world. Further, it might be 
worthwhile to note that, apart from the derivation provided here, it 
seems to be very reasonable to hold that ‘having free will’ is an essential 
property in the sense that no being can lose this property without 
ceasing to exist, without stopping to be that very being. Thus, it seems, 
if some being is free, then that being is essentially free. Of course, this 
does not imply that ‘being free’ is a necessary condition for personhood 
or for being human. If some human person loses its free will, than he or 
90 On the Libertarian Theory 
free acts do not need a further 
explanation because such acts 
are taken to be self-explaining. 
Now, one may respond that 
free acts are always based upon 
reasons. If I freely take a glass of 
water, then I most likely have a 
reason for doing this, for example 
because I’m thirsty. Yet, this 
reason is not the originating 
cause of my free act. Reasons, 
being abstract objects, are not 
causes. On libertarianism the 
free act of taking a glass of 
water is caused by me as free 
agent. The reason can thus never 
explain the actual occurrence 
of the free act. The occurrence 
of the act is solely explained by 
referring to the free act itself. 
So, indeed, on libertarianism the 
proposition ‘I freely take a glass 
of water’ or ‘I freely take a glass 
of water because I’m thirsty’ does 
not stand in need of a further 
explanation. It is genuinely self-
explaining.
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she will stop being that very human person, yet, there would still remain 
a human person, having the same human rights as any other human 
person endowed with free will.
the objeC tion thAt the AC tuAl world’s  big ConjunC tiVe 
Contingent fAC t is  unexplAinAble
Another objection considered by Gale and Pruss is the objection that 
the universe as a whole, identified by the actual world’s Big Conjunctive 
Contingent Fact, cannot have an explanation since explanations are to 
be based on empirical observations that indicate a statistically relevant 
relationship between causes and effects, and, as the objection goes, 
such a statistical pattern is not available in case of the question of 
the origin of the entire universe. Now, this objection is actually not a 
specific objection to Gale and Pruss’s new argument at all. It is, more 
generally, a criticism of the entire project of natural theology or, for all 
that matter, the whole enterprise of metaphysics, or even philosophy as 
such. If all explanations would have to be based on statistically relevant 
observable patterns, then explanation within the context of (non-
experimental) philosophy, such as metaphysics, would become entirely 
impossible. And in fact, even providing explanations within most (if not 
all) parts of fundamental physics, such as string theory, would become 
impossible. Further, there seems to be no specific reason why each and 
every explanation should be based on statistical observable patterns. 
Surely, from the fact that explanations within large parts of the empirical 
sciences are based on statistical observations it doesn’t follow that all 
explanations, including those within metaphysics and fundamental 
physics, are to be grounded on observable statistical relationships. 
The objection therefore seems to be, as Gale and Pruss correctly 
point out (1999, p. 471), begging the question against the enterprise 
of metaphysics and fundamental physics. The objection seems to 
be nothing more than invoking the baseless dogma that revealing 
statistically relevant observations exhausts the realm of proper 
explanations. Hence the objection is unconvincing. It does not engage 
itself with the discourse of metaphysics within which the argument of 
Gale and Pruss is properly positioned. From the premises of Gale and 
Pruss’s argument it follows that there is a necessary being that freely 
brought the actual world’s universe into existence, and any serious 
objection to this argument should be sufficiently specific, i.e. actually 
engage with its premises and the way the conclusion is logically derived 
from them. Just stepping outside the discourse of natural theology 
in order to try to totally reject the entire project of metaphysics, and 
even philosophy itself, will not do to arrive at a good objection. Such an 
objection casts its net too wide. It’s a ship passing in the night.
the objeC tion thAt An essentiAlly free  And neCessArily 
existing being is  impossible
Gale and Pruss briefly address the objection that their argument is 
to be rejected since a free necessary being cannot possibly exist, 
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i.e. there is no possible world in which some being has free will and 
exists necessarily. They reject this objection by noting that it lacks 
argumentative support and therefore amounts to nothing more than 
mere stipulation.91 Now, I do not agree with Gale and Pruss that this 
objection is unsupported. I have shown earlier that the necessary being 
arrived at by Gale and Pruss is essentially free, that is, it is an essential 
property of this being to posses free will. Therefore, the objection 
can be sharpened by holding that an essentially free and necessarily 
existing being is impossible. And it is precisely this sharpened objection 
that can be based upon an argumentation. For, let us assume that an 
essentially free necessarily existing being is possible. In that case there 
is a possible world that contains such a being. By definition of necessary 
existence this being exists in all possible worlds. From this it follows 
that there is no possible world that does not contain a necessarily 
existing and essentially free being. But, it seems to me that there are 
such possible worlds. Take for example some world w that only contains 
one single necessarily existing and totally unconscious thing. This 
thing exists necessarily but is not free, since, plausibly, being free in 
the Libertarian sense (which is the theory embraced by Gale and Pruss) 
requires the possession of consciousness. World w surely seems to be 
a possible world in the broadly logical sense, but it does not contain 
some essentially free necessarily existing being, which contradicts the 
assumption that such a being is possible. Hence, an essentially free 
and necessarily existing being is impossible if we accept the broadly 
logical possibility of world w, and therefore, as the objection goes, the 
new argument of Gale and Pruss fails. Now, as we see this sharpened 
objection is supported by an argument. One cannot reject this objection 
by simply pointing out that it is unsubstantiated by argumentative 
support. On the other hand I would hold that this objection is not strong 
enough to justify us to reject Gale and Pruss’s argument. After all, one 
may still hold that the argument of Gale and Pruss in fact shows us, 
perhaps contrary to our ordinary modal intuitions, that an essentially 
free and necessarily existing being is possible, and hence w is not a 
possible world after all. So, one may say, the argument of Gale and 
Pruss, unless properly rejected because of other independent reasons, 
forces us to reconsider our prima facie modal intuitions in this specific 
case. From this I conclude that the sharpened objection according to 
which an essentially free and necessarily existing being is impossible is 
not decisive. Gale and Pruss’s argument establishes the existence, and 
therefore broadly logical possibility, of such a being, and any convincing 
rejection of it has to deal directly with the cogency of its premises and 
logical derivation.
the objeC tion thAt the Cosmos is  CAused by blind 
indeterministiC  meChAniCAl CAusAtion
Gale and Pruss refer to an objection proposed by Phil Quinn. According 
to this objection the new argument of Gale and Pruss does not 
exclude the broadly logical possibility of there being a necessarily 
91 In fact, in addition to this 
main response, Gale and Pruss 
provide another rejection of the 
objection under consideration. 
They argue as follows: ‘We gave 
a reductio ad absurdum argument 
against the existence of [Leibniz’ 
and Spinoza’s] God, who is a 
necessary being determined by 
His nature [i.e. not being free] to 
actualize the best of all possible 
worlds, which showed that then 
there is only one possible world 
and that every true proposition is 
necessary’ (1999, p. 471). Now, this 
response to the objection fails. 
For even a necessarily existing 
unfree being could, by necessity, 
produce agents having Libertarian 
free will, and then not every true 
proposition would be necessary. 
In other words, there being 
free will could originate from a 
necessary and unfree being by 
necessity, for example if the best 
of all possible worlds is a world 
containing free will. But, perhaps 
more importantly, the rejection 
Gale and Pruss provide here is not 
a rejection of the objection at all, 
since, the point is not to argue for 
the necessary being being free, 
which is something they already 
did as part of their new argument, 
but to rebut the objection that 
such a being could not exist at all.
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existing impersonal being that does not have consciousness and thus 
no free will, and that ‘generates the cosmos by means of blind […] 
indeterministic mechanical causation’ (1999, p. 472). In their paper Gale 
and Pruss provide two rebuttals of this objection. First, they hold that a 
blind indeterministic force leaves unexplained that the ‘cosmos displays 
considerable law-like regularity and simplicity, as well as remarkable fine 
tuning of its physical constants’ (1999, p. 472). However, it seems to me 
that one could reconcile a blind origin with our fine-tuned universe by 
holding that there is not just a single universe, but an ensemble of many 
universes, all blindly generated by a single impersonal origin. In any case 
I take it that the first response is not part of a defense of a cosmological 
argument proper, and hence I shall not further assess Gale and Pruss’s 
teleological line of reasoning. The second response they provide is as 
follows:
‘Moreover, there is a dilemma argument possible. Either 
the impersonal force acts deterministically or not. If it acts 
deterministically, then we end up in a universe that could not be 
other than it is. In such a case, e.g., that there exist humans will 
be a logical necessity. This seems highly implausible. On the other 
hand, if the impersonal force acts indeterministically then we still 
do not have an explanation of why it acted as it did, and so the 
objection contradicts the conclusion of our argument that there is 
an explanation of the actual universe, since any such explanation 
will have to be a self-explainer. For an indeterministic action is a self-
explainer only if it is a free action’ (1999, p. 472)
This response is premised on a very substantial thesis on the nature 
of causation. Gale and Pruss maintain that there are basically two 
ontologically different modes of causation in reality, i.e. causation 
resulting from deterministic mechanical processes and causation 
resulting from free actions of free agents. In other words, according 
to Gale and Pruss there is no causation resulting from random events. 
Reality does not contain stochastic processes that produce effects. 
The reason for this is that reality does not contain random processes 
at all. Randomness is not part of mind-independent reality. What 
we refer to as chances are not objective inherent features of reality. 
Chances only have epistemological import. They are not part of the 
ontological inventory of the world. If we accept this thesis then the 
dilemma argument of Gale and Pruss is indeed cogent. Now, this thesis 
seems indeed to be very plausible and reasonable. Our regular appeal 
to randomness and chances in ordinary cases, such as throwing a dice, 
is a consequence of the fact that we do not have sufficient information 
and computing power to timely forecast the outcome of the event in 
question, i.e. the final position of the dice. If we would have sufficient 
knowledge, i.e. if we would know precisely the initial conditions of the 
dice such as its mass, its velocity, its height, its volume, the wind speed, 
etc, and if we would have sufficient computation power to calculate the 
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entire trajectory of the dice, we would have no need at all to appeal to 
randomness, chances and stochastic processes. Thus in these ordinary 
day-to-day cases there is in fact no reason to hold that reality itself is 
inherently random. But also in the case of quantum mechanics, which is 
entirely based on chances and stochastic functions, nothing really forces 
us to accept that reality itself is inherently random. Quantum mechanics 
only forces us to accept that the mathematical formulas on which 
it is grounded are best rendered in terms of chances and stochastic 
functions. So nothing is prescribed regarding the nature of these 
chances and stochastic functions. For all we know they have nothing 
to do with mind-independent reality itself. As Dennis Dieks points 
out: ‘Even if it is accepted that quantum mechanics is a fundamentally 
probabilistic theory, this provides us with no special reason to believe in 
“chances” in the sense of objectively existing factors that are responsible 
for the relative frequencies we encounter in experiments’ (Dieks 2010, 
p. 117). It should therefore not surprise us that in addition to the classic 
indeterministic Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics, as 
formulated by Niels Bohr and Werner Heisenberg in 1927, deterministic 
interpretations of quantum mechanics have been developed as well, 
such as those of David Bohm and Heinz Dieter Zeh (Bohm 1952, Zeh 
1970). So, from both examples, throwing a dice and quantum mechanics, 
it becomes clear that there are no good reasons for holding that chances 
are objective features of mind-independent reality itself. Moreover, 
wholly independent of these examples, it seems to be inconceivable 
anyway how reality itself could be truly inherently random. Is not any 
occurring event eventually grounded in something that forces that 
event to take one of the many available equivalent routes it can take? In 
all those cases there must have been something that forced the event 
to take the direction it actually took instead of one of the many equally 
feasible alternative directions it could have taken. And what else could 
this ‘something’ be than a deterministic mechanical cause or a cause 
based on the free act of some free agent? Our causal ontology allows 
therefore of mechanical determinism and free acts. And as long as there 
are no compelling reasons to extend this ontology with a third type, 
i.e. causation from inherent randomness, Ockham’s razor tells us to 
withhold ourselves from doing so. I conclude that the aforementioned 
thesis is cogent. Hence the dilemma argument as provided by Gale and 
Pruss constitutes an adequate rejection of Phil Quinn’s objection.
the objeC tion thAt the weAK Version of the prinCiple 
of suffiCient reAson begs the question
A final objection discussed by Gale and Pruss92 is the objection that 
the weak version of Leibniz’s principle, as employed by Gale and Pruss, 
begs the question against atheism in a similar way as the possibility 
premise of the S5-based modal ontological argument, i.e. possibly 
there is a necessarily existing perfect being, does. Gale and Pruss do 
agree that atheists are rationally justified to charge this premise from 
begging the question against atheism. Why? Because its meaning is 
92 There is one other objection 
evaluated by Gale and Pruss 
in their paper, namely the 
objection that the conclusion 
of their new argument, even if 
we take the second teleological 
and justificatory stage of this 
argument into account, is not 
sufficient to warrant theism. 
For that, as the objection goes, 
one would also have to show 
that the derived necessarily 
existing supernatural being 
that intentionally freely created 
the cosmos is not just very 
powerful, intelligent and good, 
but in fact absolutely perfect, 
that is, essentially one, essentially 
good, essentially omnipotent, 
essentially omniscient and 
essentially omnipresent. As 
mentioned earlier my review of 
Gale and Pruss’s new argument 
is restricted to the first, proper 
cosmological, stage of their 
argument. Since this objection 
also brings the second stage into 
play, I shall not further analyse it 
here. Having said that, it seems to 
me that even the final conclusion 
of the first stage of Gale and 
Pruss’s new argument, i.e. there 
being a necessarily existing being 
that freely created the cosmos, is 
already sufficient to favour theism 
above atheism. After all, how 
could such a being be reconciled 
with an atheistic worldview?
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grounded in the S5-axiom that what is possibly necessary is necessary, 
and thus, a commitment to the possibility premise comes down to 
a commitment, contra atheism, to there being a necessarily existing 
perfect being. But Gale and Pruss deny that the weak version of Leibniz’ 
principle they employ in their new argument begs the question against 
atheism. Although, as they explain, ‘it might be felt that [the weak 
version of Leibniz’ principle] leads too quickly, with too few steps, to 
the highly controversial and amazing proposition that there actually is 
an explanation for the actual world’s Big Conjunctive Contingent Fact’, 
this conclusion is in fact not immediate since much of their argument 
consists in its ‘stage-setting – the concepts and distinctions that it 
employs’ (1999, p. 475). And the real force of their argument depends 
for a very large part on these employed concepts and distinctions, as 
Gale and Pruss maintain. I do agree with Gale and Pruss that one must 
take the power and originality of an argument’s background framework 
of concepts and distinctions into account if one wants to answer the 
question whether it begs the question or not, especially if the argument 
seems to rely on premises that almost immediately logically imply 
the conclusion argued for. However, in the case of Gale and Pruss’s 
argument it seems to me that their background framework is not that 
distinguishing and original at all. It employs fairly standard concepts, 
such as abstract propositions, states of affairs and possible worlds, in a 
straightforward manner. The only real distinguishing factor seems to be 
an appeal to a specific weak version of the principle of sufficient reason. 
Yet, I agree that this weak version of the principle is prima facie more 
plausible than the principle of sufficient reason itself. After all, it seems 
much more likely that for any given true proposition p one can always 
construct some possible world, be it actual or not, in which p has an 
explanation, than that p must actually have an explanation in the world 
we live in. Especially if one realizes that there is a huge infinite plurality 
of possible worlds, and we may make use of our endless imaginative 
powers to find in this enormous heterogeneous infinitude just one 
possible world in which p has an explanation.93 Therefore, unless the 
atheist gives a reason for doubting the weak principle, or convincingly 
shows it to be epistemically equivalent to Leibniz’ principle itself, 
there is no ground for accepting the objection that the weak principle 
of sufficient reason, as employed by Gale and Pruss, is begging the 
question against the atheistic worldview.
summAry
We have seen that in fact all main objections as raised by Gale and Pruss 
themselves can be cogently rejected. In the next section I shall turn to 
the objections from Graham Oppy.
Objections raised by Graham Oppy
Graham Oppy has raised a number of additional objections against Gale 
and Pruss’s new argument (Oppy 2000). In what follows I present these 
93 Here I implicitly appeal 
to Hume’s principle that 
conceivability entails 
metaphysical possibility. 
Now, as Chalmers (2002) 
points out: ‘In recent years, 
conceivability arguments have 
faced considerable opposition. 
Many philosophers hold that 
the step from conceivability 
to metaphysical possibility 
has been shown to be invalid, 
not least due to a number of 
apparent counterexamples. For 
example, it is often suggested 
that complex mathematical 
falsehoods (such as Goldbach’s 
conjecture or its negation) are 
conceivable but impossible. It 
is also widely believed that a 
posteriori identities provide 
counterexamples: on this view, 
it is conceivable but not possible 
that Hesperus is not Phosphorus, 
and that water is not H2O’ (2002, 
pp. 145–146). Now, I do not appeal 
to Hume’s principle as a strict 
universal rule. Instead, I invoke 
it as a default or exception 
permitting rule, that is, normally, 
a conceivable state of affairs is 
metaphysically possible. It seems 
to me that Hume’s principle, 
considered as a defeasible rule, is 
still sufficiently plausible. See e.g. 
Chalmers (2002) for a detailed 
assessment of specific notions of 
conceivability and an examination 
of the extent to which each 
of these notions justify an 
entailment from conceivability to 
metaphysical possibility.
94 Oppy first shows that the Big 
Conjunctive Fact of each possible 
world has an explanation if the 
weak version of Leibniz’s principle 
holds. Second, he infers the strong 
version of Leibniz’s principle as 
follows: since the explanation of 
a conjunction is an explanation 
of each of its conjuncts, every 
proposition in every possible 
world has an explanation if the 
Big Conjunctive Fact of every 
possible world has an explanation. 
My rendering of the derivation as 
presented by Oppy does not need 
such a ‘two-stage approach’.
95 Oppy contends that the claim 
that an explanation of a conjunct 
also explains its conjuncts, i.e. 
in his words, that explanation is 
dissective, ‘seems plausible, to say 
the least’ (Oppy 2000, 
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objections and assess whether they are strong enough to compel us to 
reject Gale and Pruss’s argument. For this I also take Gale and Pruss’s 
response to Oppy’s objections into account (Gale and Pruss 2002).
the objeC tion thAt leibniz ’s  weAK Version is  no 
AdVAnCe s inCe it  implies  the strong one
Oppy points out that the weak version of the principle of sufficient 
reason, i.e. for every true proposition p it is possible that p has an 
explanation, entails the strong version of this principle, i.e. every true 
proposition has an explanation. To show that the weak version implies 
the strong version he presents an ingenious derivation (Oppy 2000, 
p. 347). For our discussion I present a slightly simplified variant of his 
derivation.94 Suppose that the weak version of Leibniz’s principle is 
true. And assume, for reductio, that there is some possible world w and 
proposition p such that p is true in w and p has no explanation in w. 
Now consider the conjunctive proposition ‘p and p has no explanation’. 
This conjunction is true in w. Hence, according to the weak version 
of the principle of sufficient reason, there is a possible world w2 such 
that ‘p and p has no explanation’ is true in w2 and has an explanation 
in w2. Now, surely, p is true in w2 as well. Moreover, since, as Gale 
and Pruss maintain, the explanation of a conjunction also explains 
each of its conjuncts,95 it follows that the explanation of ‘p and p has 
no explanation’ is an explanation of p as well. Hence p does have an 
explanation in w2. But this contradicts with there being no explanation 
for p in w2. We conclude that our initial assumption is incorrect. There is 
no possible world w and proposition p such that p has no explanation in 
w, that is to say, the strong version of Leibniz’s principle is indeed true 
in case the weaker version of this principle is true.96 From this Oppy 
concludes that Gale and Pruss’s new argument is no improvement over 
traditional cosmological arguments employing the stronger version 
of Leibniz’s principle. After all, as Oppy has it, the alleged weaker 
version of the principle is not weaker at all: not only does the strong 
version imply the weak version, which is of course trivially true, but it 
is also the case that the weak version implies the strong version. Thus 
both versions are equivalent and hence no advance over the classical 
cosmological arguments has been obtained. To put the point differently, 
the Gale-Pruss proof could be criticized for being just ‘a notational 
variant of familiar cosmological arguments which rely on the stronger 
principle’ (2000, p. 348). So, as the objections goes, Gale and Pruss’s 
argument occasions the same charge of begging the question that was 
leveled against cosmological arguments employing the strong version of 
Leibniz’s principle (Gale and Pruss 2002, p. 90).
This objection is unconvincing. It is indeed the case, as Oppy correctly 
claims, that both the weak and strong version of Leibniz’s principle 
logically entail each other. They are therefore logically or deductively 
equivalent. But from this it does not follow that both versions are 
epistemically equivalent.97 For, as I argued before, the weak version is 
p. 347). As he asks himself: ‘how 
could there be an explanation 
of why it is that both p and q if 
there is no explanation of why 
it is that p?’ (2000, p.347). Later 
on he writes that the argument 
of Gale and Pruss against 
the claim that explanation is 
agglomerative ‘seems to take 
for granted that explanation is 
dissective’ (2000, p. 349). And 
also: ‘It seems to me that there is 
no evidence that Gale and Pruss 
intend to deny that explanation 
is dissective; and it also seems 
to me that there is evidence that 
explanation is dissective’ (2000, 
p. 349). Apparently Oppy does 
not realize that Gale and Pruss’s 
new argument already makes 
heavily use of the claim that 
explanation is dissective. So there 
is no need at all to argue for the 
plausibility of dissectiveness as 
part of an objection against their 
new argument. Nor is it needed 
to suggest a commitment of Gale 
and Pruss to dissectiveness on the 
indirect basis of how they refute 
the claim that explanation is 
agglomerative.
96 Oppy also mentions that 
Pruss pointed out to him that 
the new argument of Gale and 
Pruss itself implies the strong 
principle of sufficient reason. 
After all, let w be a possible world. 
Now assume w to be the actual 
world. Then, according to the 
new argument of Gale and Pruss, 
the Big Conjunctive Contingent 
Fact of w has an explanation in 
w. Further, all necessarily true 
propositions are self-explaining. 
Or, to be more precise, according 
to Gale and Pruss all necessarily 
true propositions report the 
existence of necessarily existing 
items such as beings, events 
and states of affairs, and these 
items are such that there is a 
successful ontological (i.e. a 
priori and therefore possible 
world independent) argument for 
their existence (Gale and Pruss 
1999, p. 462). This implies that 
all necessarily true propositions 
have an explanation in w as well. 
So the Big Conjunctive Fact of 
w has an explanation in w. Since 
explanation is dissective, all 
true propositions in w have an 
explanation. Now, the possible 
world w was arbitrarily chosen. 
Towards a  renewed Case for Theism70
prima facie much more plausible than the principle of sufficient reason 
itself. After all, it is more likely that a true proposition will have an 
explanation in some possible world, i.e. in at least one of the infinitely 
many possible worlds, than that it must have an explanation in the 
actual world, of which there is in any given situation just only one. 
Moreover, there seems to be a generic way of generating a possible 
explanation for any true proposition. Let p be a true proposition in the 
actual world. Proposition p might or might not have an explanation 
in the actual word. Suppose it has. In that case p possibly has an 
explanation because it has one in the actual world and, surely, 
everything actual is possible. But let us now suppose that p does not 
have an explanation in the actual world. In that case we can envision 
another possible world, w, which is in all respects the same as the actual 
world, except for the fact that there is an agent in w that does nothing 
else but freely realizing the state of affairs S as reported by proposition 
p, and so making p true in w. In this way we have constructed a possible 
world in which p does have an explanation. Hence, in both cases p 
possibly has an explanation, and thus, since p was arbitrarily chosen, the 
weak version of Leibniz’s principle holds.98
Secondly, the derivation of the weak version from the strong version 
of the principle of sufficient reason is trivial, whereas the derivation 
of the strong version from the weak version is far from being obvious. 
Indeed, as Gale and Pruss point out in their response to Oppy, it was 
not discovered until recently that the weak version entails the strong 
one (Gale and Pruss 2002, p. 92). Besides, Oppy writes that it would 
be nice to know the identity of an anonymous referee who provided 
an interesting Fitch-style derivation of the strong version of Leibniz’s 
principle from the weak one (2000, p. 353). But, as Gale and Pruss rightly 
wonder, ‘why would it be nice to know the identity of this referee if the 
argument were obvious or trivial?’ (2002, p. 91).
Further, Oppy also claims in his response that, in order to understand 
the meaning of the weak version, it is necessary to know that the weak 
version entails the strong version (2000, pp. 349–350). From this it 
would follow that Gale and Pruss’s new argument is still as question-
begging as arguments relying on the strong version of Leibniz’s 
principle. But, as Gale and Pruss explain, it is absurd to claim that this 
knowledge is required, since it would imply that nobody understood 
the statement that every true proposition possibly has an explanation 
until recently, i.e. until it became known that this statement entails that 
every true proposition has an explanation (Gale and Pruss 2002, p. 92). 
Therefore, contrary to what Oppy says in his response (2000, p. 350), 
the situation regarding the weak version of Leibniz’s principle in Gale 
and Pruss’ new argument is very different from the situation regarding 
the possibility premise of the ontological argument, which can, as we 
discussed before, only be understood if we already know the S5 axiom 
that being possibly necessary entails being necessary. Because of this 
Thus every true proposition 
in every possible world has an 
explanation, that is, the strong 
version of Leibniz’s principle 
is true (2000, p. 348). Now, 
surely, this derivation is much 
more cumbersome than the one 
presented before since it relies on 
the new cosmological argument 
of Gale and Pruss.
97 I take it that two propositions, 
a and b, are epistemically 
equivalent if and only if, ignoring 
any possible logical entailment 
relationships between both, 
the evidence for a is equally 
convincing as the evidence for b. 
Here evidence for a proposition 
refers to immediate empirical 
evidence, evidence from direct 
intuition, or evidence based on 
the coherence of the proposition 
in question with already accepted 
scientific theories.
98 This defense of the weak 
principle is an adjusted variant 
of a defense that Oppy himself 
considers and subsequently 
rejects in his paper (Oppy 2000, 
p. 351). I agree with the rejection 
of the defense of the weak 
principle presented by Oppy and 
shall therefore not discuss that 
defense here. But I believe that 
the adjusted variant I present is 
not vulnerable to Oppy’s rejection 
of the defense he himself 
considers.
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observation and the other considerations we are sufficiently justified 
to reject Oppy’s objection that Gale and Pruss’s new argument is no 
improvement over traditional cosmological arguments due to the 
alleged equivalence of the strong and weak version of Leibniz’s principle.
the objeC tion thAt the new Argument fAils  s inCe 
leibniz ’s  strong prinCiple  does not hold 
Another objection from Oppy is that the new cosmological argument 
of Gale and Pruss is inadequate since it is based on a premise, i.e. the 
weak version of Leibniz’s principle, that entails, as we have seen, the 
strong version of that principle; and the strong version of the principle 
of Leibniz ‘is something which nontheists have good reason to refuse 
to accept’ (2000, p. 349). This objection is problematic. What could be 
a good reason for nontheists to reject the strong principle of sufficient 
reason? Surely, it could not be the fact that they are nontheists, since 
that would evidently beg the question against theism. Now, Oppy 
writes: ‘Granted that nontheists can be reasonable in refusing to take 
on theistic beliefs, nontheists can be reasonable in refusing to believe 
things which fail to cohere with other things which they believe’ (2000, 
p. 349). From this it seems that Oppy holds that it is known that the 
strong version of Leibniz’s principle of sufficient reason entails theism 
and nontheists reasonably reject theism and therefore the strong 
version. But this in itself does not constitute a rejection of Gale and 
Pruss’s new argument. Indeed, the point of their argument is precisely 
to challenge the reasonability of nontheism, so an objection to Gale 
and Pruss cannot rely upon them simply granting that it is reasonable 
to refuse to take on theistic beliefs. So, to qualify as a proper objection 
Oppy would have to reject theism on cogent independent grounds, 
which Oppy does not do in his criticism of Gale and Pruss’s argument. 
Besides, if the aforementioned is a correct interpretation of Oppy’s 
objection, then his objection appears to come down to the point that 
the new argument of Gale and Pruss must be rejected since one of 
its premises entails theism and nontheists have good reason to reject 
theism. And this is in fact all that the objection amounts to, since Oppy 
writes: ‘If nontheists have strong independent ground for refusing to 
accept theism, then the discovery that [the weak version of the principle 
of sufficient reason] entails theism will surely be good grounds for 
rejecting [this version and thus Gale and Pruss’s argument itself]’ (2000, 
p. 350). But, as said, this indeed does not suffice as a proper objection 
without providing those ‘strong independent grounds’. And in addition, 
even providing strong independent grounds is not sufficient. To count 
as an adequate objection Oppy would also have to show that these 
independent grounds are equally or more compelling than Gale and 
Pruss’s new cosmological argument.
However, although Oppy does not discuss this in his paper, there is in 
fact a well-known rejection of Leibniz’s principle of sufficient reason 
that in no way relies on the claim that this principle implies theism. In 
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the chapter on the Leibnizian cosmological argument I presented the 
well-known rejection of Peter van Inwagen of the principle of sufficient 
reason (Van Inwagen 1983, pp. 202–204). Now, if Van Inwagen’s rejection 
fits within the framework that Gale and Pruss deploy, then we must 
reject their argument since one of its premises entails Leibniz’s principle 
of sufficient reason. Well, as I pointed out in the aforementioned 
chapter, the reductio of the principle of sufficient reason provided by 
Van Inwagen relies upon the premise that no contingent proposition 
explains itself. But, this premise is wholly unacceptable within the 
framework that Gale and Pruss employ, since Gale and Pruss accept 
Libertarian free will and they take it that, as they write in their paper, ‘an 
indeterministic action is a self-explainer only if it is a free action’ (1999, 
p. 472). Therefore, Gale and Pruss allow for contingent propositions that 
explain themselves. These are precisely the propositions that report 
the free actions of a Libertarian free agent.99 So the rejection of Van 
Inwagen does not affect Gale and Pruss’s argument. I conclude that the 
objection that their argument must be rejected since it entails Leibniz’s 
principle of sufficient reason is indefensible.
the objeC tion thAt we Are justif ied only to sAy thAt 
leibniz ’s  weAK prinCiple  is  neArly true
Oppy claims in his paper that there is an even weaker version of 
Leibniz’s principle than the weak version as deployed by Gale and 
Pruss. He describes this weaker version in the following way: ‘for most 
propositions p and worlds w, if p is true in w, then there is a world w* in 
which p is true and in which there is a true proposition q which explains 
p’ (Oppy 2000, p. 351). I shall denote Gale and Pruss’s weak version 
of Leibniz’s principle by (w) and the yet even weaker version of this 
principle, as presented by Oppy, by (w2). According to Oppy principle 
(w2) has no less intuitive force than (w). In addition, as the objection 
would go, (w2) is not sufficient to infer the conclusion that the Big 
Conjunctive Contingent Fact of the actual world has an explanation. 
Hence, since we have no reason to prefer (w) above (w2), the new 
argument of Gale and Pruss is untenable. Now, I do not think that this 
objection goes through. First of all, (w2) actually amounts to a defeasible 
reading of (w), that is, to a reading of principle (w) as a default or 
exception permitting rule: Normally, for every proposition p and world w, 
if p is true in w, then there is a world w* in which p is true and in which 
there is a true proposition q which explains p. In other words, in absence 
of a good reason to think otherwise, we may infer, about any particular 
true proposition p in some world w, that there is a world w* in which 
p has an explanation. In this way the burden of proof is again shifted 
to Oppy, who must now argue that the case of the Big Conjunctive 
Contingent Fact of the actual world is an exception to the rule. 
Therefore, unless Oppy provides a good reason for thinking that this 
case is indeed an exception, his objection is underdeveloped. Second, 
I believe that there is in fact an argument which warrants us to adopt 
(w) itself instead of its defeasible variant (w2). The argument I have in 
99 Interesting enough, in 
his article ‘The Leibnizian 
Cosmological Argument’ as 
published in The Blackwell 
Companion to Natural Theology, 
edited by W.L. Craig and 
J.P. Moreland, Alexander Pruss 
analyses Peter van Inwagen’s 
refutation of the principle of 
sufficient reason (Craig and 
Moreland 2009, pp. 50–56). He 
provides a formal rendering of 
Van Inwagen’s reductio. The 
second premise of that rendering 
is the one that holds that no 
contingent proposition explains 
itself. This is what Pruss says 
about Van Inwagen’s reductio: 
‘Let me now offer an argument 
that someone who accepts the 
possibility of libertarian free will 
must reject the Van Inwagen 
argument. Since Van Inwagen is a 
libertarian, he too must reject his 
own argument’ (2009, p. 54). What 
follows accords with the citation 
above: libertarian free actions are 
self-explaining contingent truths, 
and thus proper counterexamples 
to Van Inwagen’s premise that no 
contingent truth explains itself.
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mind is the construction of an explanation for any given proposition 
that I provided earlier. After all, the generic construction I presented 
starts with a wholly arbitrary true proposition, and therefore there 
seems to be no good reason at all to restrict ourselves to (w2), as would 
perhaps be the case if our only evidence for (w) would be intuition or 
inductive generalization. But more importantly, why should we, even 
in the absence of the aforementioned generic construction, insist to 
take into account the default exception permitting rule (w2)? Why 
would it, even if the aforementioned construction is not at our disposal, 
be unreasonable to accept (w) itself as a justified universal inductive 
generalization of the many available instances of possibly explainable 
propositions? After all, isn’t many-instance inductive generalization a 
well-established cogent argumentative method? This question must be 
answered in order to arrive at a real objection, and this is something that 
Oppy does not do in his paper. Overall, I conclude that the objection 
fails.
the objeC tion thAt the AbstrAC t propositions 
employed beg the question or Are unCleAr 
In the final part of his paper Oppy presents two worries that can be 
considered as further objections to the new argument of Gale and Pruss. 
The first worry is that ‘Gale and Pruss begin by taking for granted the 
notion of an abstract proposition’ and that it ‘would be problematic if 
their proof stood or fell with the details of their favoured account of 
the nature of abstract propositions’ (2000, p. 352). Now, this first worry 
can be transformed into a corresponding first objection by stating 
that the cosmological argument of Gale and Pruss begs the question 
against materialism or nominalism100 because, as Gale and Pruss 
concede in their response to Oppy, ‘it is ontologically committed to 
Platonic abstracts, which clashes with the nominalistic commitments 
of materialism’ (2002, p. 93). The rebuttal of Gale and Pruss to this first 
objection is two-fold. First, they say that they ‘are prepared to argue 
that any argument for nominalism […] employs premises that are less 
plausible than [the weak version of the principle of sufficient reason]’ 
(2002, p. 93). Apparently Gale and Pruss take it that the weak version 
of Leibniz’s principle entails a commitment to Platonic propositions 
and therefore, if nominalism is less plausible then the weak version of 
Leibniz’s principle, it immediately follows that a nominalistic account of 
propositions is less plausible than a Platonic rendering of propositions, 
which is indeed what one would have to show in order to counter this 
first objection. Yet, I don’t think this is a cogent rebuttal at all. The 
reason is that the weak version of Leibniz’s principle does not imply 
a commitment to a Platonic rendering of propositions, since we can 
reformulate the weak version of the principle as follows: ‘For each 
sentence in the actual world that truly affirms or denies the obtainment 
of some state of affairs in the actual world, there is a possible world 
in which there is an explanation for why this sentence is true’. This 
rendering of the weak version of Leibniz’s principle does not rely on 
100 Nominalism is understood 
here as the thesis that abstract 
objects do not exist, neither in a 
possible world nor in some realm 
transcending the possible worlds. 
Abstract objects are objects 
that are neither spatial nor 
temporal. Putative examples of 
abstract objects include, but are 
not limited to, propositions and 
universals.
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there being any Platonic abstract propositions, so it should be wholly 
acceptable for nominalists. Now, one might object that the notion of a 
possible world itself is already problematic for nominalists and so the 
rendering is not compatible with nominalism after all. However, as my 
emphasis of the word ‘this’ in the phrase ‘this utterance’ indicates, I rely 
on the Kripkean account of possible worlds, which is compatible with 
nominalism as I shall argue in what follows. In his book Naming and 
necessity Kripke uncovers the so-called transworld identity problem, 
that is, the problem of trying to give any sense to the notion of the 
identity of two objects in different worlds, as a pseudo-problem. Since 
nominalism makes it virtually impossible to solve the transword identity 
problem, the Kripkean account, which eliminates this problem as being 
a pseudo-problem, allows for nominalism. Besides, perhaps even more 
importantly, the Kripkean account is entirely epistemological instead 
of ontological.101 This is pivotal for being compatible with the thesis of 
nominalism since non-Kripkean ontological accounts of possible worlds 
define possible worlds as being separate entities not located in space 
and time, that is to say, as abstract entities. Therefore, since nominalists 
reject abstract entities, these accounts are entirely unacceptable for 
them, as opposed to the Kripkean account I deploy above. So, my 
alternative rendering of the weak version of Leibniz’s principle is indeed 
compatible with nominalism. And thus, the first part of Gale and Pruss’s 
rebuttal doesn’t go through.
But, as mentioned, the rebuttal of Gale and Pruss to the first objection 
is two-fold: they also point out that ‘it is not clear that [their new 
cosmological] argument could not accommodate a nominalistic 
rendering of propositions’ (2002, p. 93). In order to count as a proper 
rebuttal they would have to show that this is indeed the case, which 
they do not do in their response to Oppy. However, a nominalistic 
rendering of their new argument seems to me certainly possible, from 
which I conclude that Oppy’s first objection has to be rejected. How 
would we cast a proper nominalistic version of Gale and Pruss’s new 
argument? Well, I already presented a nominalistic rendering of the 
weak version of Leibniz’s principle. Furthermore, we can, also in a 
nominalistic context, refer to the Big Conjunctive Contingent Fact of the 
actual world. Hence, the first stage of a nominalistic version of the new 
argument of Gale and Pruss would proceed in the following way. Let 
a be the sentence in the actual world that affirms the obtaining of the 
Big Conjunctive Contingent Fact A of the actual world and that at the 
same time denies the obtaining of all that does not obtain in the actual 
world. According to the weak version of Leibniz’s principle there is a 
possible world w for which it holds that this sentence a is true and has 
an explanation. Hence, in world w it is the case that this state of affairs, 
A, obtains. Now, every state of affairs in the actual world is contained in 
A. Since A obtains in w it follows that every state of affairs in the actual 
world is a state of affairs in w. Vice versa, let s be a state of affairs in w. 
Suppose that s is not a state of affairs in the actual world. In that case 
101 For Kripke a possible world 
is nothing more than just a 
stipulated epistemic alternative 
of the actual world. He holds 
that it is incorrect to think about 
possible worlds in the ontological 
sense as being some kind of 
separately existing entities: 
‘One thinks […] of a possible 
world as if it were like a foreign 
country’. ‘One looks upon it as 
an observer’ which is ‘the wrong 
way of looking at what a possible 
world is’ (Kripke 1980, p. 43). 
‘Possible worlds’, according to 
Kripke, ‘are total ways the world 
might have been’ (1980, p. 18). 
Indeed, ‘a possible world isn’t 
a distant country that we are 
coming across, or viewing through 
a telescope’, but ‘possible worlds 
are stipulated, not discovered by 
powerful telescopes’ (p. 44). And 
thus it follows that ‘a possible 
world is given by the descriptive 
conditions we associate with it’ 
(p. 44). Kripke’s epistemological 
approach to possible worlds is 
also apparent from his remark 
that we are ‘running through all 
the possible worlds in our heads’ 
(p. 38). So, his account doesn’t 
need us to see them as abstract 
entities.
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the claim that s does not obtain is part of this sentence a. Hence the 
claim that s does not obtain is part of this sentence a in possible world 
w, which contradicts the assumption that s is a state of affairs in w. The 
conclusion is therefore that the states of affairs of the actual world and 
world w coincide. In other words, w is in fact the actual world. Thus, A 
has an explanation in the actual world. And from this the new argument 
of Gale and Pruss can proceed, with minor modifications, as before. 
So, there is in fact a nominalistic rendering of the new cosmological 
argument of Gale and Pruss, and hence the first objection fails.
The second worry of Oppy starts with the claim that, for reasons which 
I do not reiterate here, the new argument of Gale and Pruss seems to 
rely on the thesis that each abstract proposition is either atomic or a 
conjunction of atomic propositions. And, as the second worry goes, it 
is unclear what the notion of an atomic proposition amounts to in Gale 
and Pruss’s framework (Oppy 2000, p. 352). To transform this worry into 
a second objection one could say that Gale and Pruss’s argument is not 
cogent, unless they supplement their argument with an explicit account 
of atomicity. Now, Gale and Pruss actually do provide such an account in 
their response to Oppy. They write: ‘For the purpose of our argument we 
can accept an account of atomicity that is relativized to a given language 
or context of inquiry. A singular positive proposition counts as atomic if 
either it is not further analyzable relative to a given language, or it does 
not require any further analysis for the purpose for which it is being 
used in some inquiry’ (2002, p. 93). Hence, even if we grant the point 
that Gale and Pruss need to provide an account for atomicity, then, 
since Gale and Pruss in response do provide such an account, the second 
objection fails as well.
summAry
We have seen that in fact all main objections as raised by Oppy (2000) 
can be cogently rejected. In the next section I shall turn to Davey and 
Clifton’s objections (2001).
Objections raised by Davey and Clifton
Davey and Clifton (Davey and Clifton 2001) raise some quite interesting 
objections which I shall analyze in what follows.
the objeC tion thAt,  neCessArily,  the ConjunC tion of 
All  Contingent truths is  unexplAinAble
The new cosmological argument of Gale and Pruss relies on there being 
a possible world in which the Big Conjunctive Contingent Fact of the 
actual world has an explanation. In fact, the only reason for Gale and 
Pruss to introduce and defend their weak version of the principle of 
sufficient reason is precisely to show that there is such a possible world. 
Now, the objection of Davey and Clifton is that the Big Conjunctive 
Contingent Fact of the actual world is necessarily unexplainable, that 
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is, there is no possible world in which this fact has an explanation, and 
so Gale and Pruss’s new cosmological argument has to be rejected. The 
proof Davey and Clifton offer for their claim is quite terse and perhaps 
for this reason hard to grasp. In what follows I turn to a detailed analysis 
of their proof.
Davey and Clifton start with some terminology (Davey and Clifton 2001, 
p. 486). They denote the Big Conjunctive Contingent Fact of the actual 
world, that is, the conjunction of all contingently true propositions, by 
A. Further, for all propositions p, E (p) denotes the proposition ‘p has 
an explanation’. So, for all propositions p, E (p) entails p. Based on this 
terminology, what Davey and Clifton intend to prove is: ‘Necessarily 
(not E (A))’ or, even more briefly, ▫¬E (A). In order to do this they further 
introduce the notion of proper sub-proposition. For any two propositions 
p and q Davey and Clifton write p < q if and only if ‘q = E (p) or q is a 
non-trivial conjunction of which p is a conjunct’ (2001, p. 486). They do 
not clarify what they mean with a non-trivial conjunction. Yet, I take it 
that for their proof we can assume that a non-trivial conjunction is a 
conjunction consisting of two or more distinct propositions.102 Thus, 
for example, ‘1 + 1 = 2 ∧ 2 + 3 = 5’ is non-trivial, whereas ‘2 + 3 = 5 ∧ 2 + 3 = 5’ 
is not. The transitive closure of the relation ‘<’ is denoted by ‘⊂’, that is 
to say, for any two propositions p and q we may write p ⊂ q if and only 
if ‘p < r’, ‘r < s’, … , ‘t < q’ for finitely many propositions r, s, …, t. If p ⊂ q 
Davey and Clifton say that proposition p is a proper sub-proposition of q. 
Further, a proposition p is a sub-proposition of q, denoted by p ⊆ q, if and 
only if p ⊂ q or p = q.
Davey and Clifton define proposition A* as being the conjunction of 
all contingently true propositions p such that not (p ⊂ p). It is clear that 
every conjunct of A* is also a conjunct of A. Moreover, A* is a non-
trivial conjunction since it contains many distinct conjuncts, such as 
for example the contingently true propositions p1 = ‘The Eiffel tower is 
located in Paris’ and p2 = ‘Berlin is the capital of Germany’. Indeed, these 
two propositions satisfy respectively not (p1 ⊂ p1) and not (p2 ⊂ p2). Why? 
Well, propositions p such as these have clearly nothing to do with the 
‘has an explanation’ predicate E (x). Therefore, they only would satisfy 
p ⊂ p if it is possible to select some conjunct c1 from p, and then some 
conjunct c2 from c1, and then some conjunct c3 from c2, and so on, until, 
after a finite number of steps, we arrive at some conjunct cn equal to p. 
But this is impossible since these propositions do not contain conjuncts! 
And therefore they indeed satisfy not (p ⊂ p).
Davey and Clifton simply state that A* ⊂ A. But this is not obvious at all. 
I shall provide a detailed derivation of their assertion that A* ⊂ A. First, 
are there any contingently true propositions p for which p ⊂ p holds? 
For, if such propositions do not exist, then every conjunct of A would 
be a conjunct of A*, and thus A and A* would be the same. Well, in their 
response to the article of Davey and Clifton, Gale and Pruss present 
102 In their paper Davey and 
Clifton introduce a conjunction 
(for the point I want to make 
here it is irrelevant which one) 
and point out that it ‘is non-
trivial, because it contains, e.g. 
the propositions “Pittsburgh is a 
city” and “Father Christmas does 
not exist”’ (2001, p. 486). From 
this brief remark it appears that 
they understand a non-trivial 
conjunction more specifically 
as being a conjunction that 
consists of at least two distinct 
propositions a and b, such that 
the proposition ‘a = b’ is not a 
tautology.
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the following infinite proposition: ‘1 = 1 and (1 = 1 and (1 = 1 and (1 = 1 and 
(1 = 1 … ))))’ (Gale and Pruss 2002, p. 93). This proposition, let us denote 
it by q, is a non-trivial conjunction that has itself as conjunct, thus q < 
q. Yet, q is not a contingent truth. However, q can easily be adjusted in 
order to obtain a contingently true proposition r such that r < r. Consider 
the proposition r that is obtained from q by replacing each and every 
instance of ‘1 = 1’ by ‘Paris is the capital of France’. Now, surely, r is both 
a contingently true proposition and a non-trivial conjunction. Moreover, 
r has itself as a conjunct, hence r < r. Thus r ⊂ r since the relation ⊂ is 
the transitive closure of the relation <. From this all it follows that r is a 
conjunct of A but not of A*. And so we conclude that not every conjunct 
of A is a conjunct of A*, i.e. A* is a strict part of A. Now, second, it 
follows that the proposition A consists of two collections of conjuncts: 
those together constituting A* and those that do not belong to A* (such 
as r and many others). In order to arrive at A* ⊂ A, it seems that they 
allow us to consider the former collection, i.e. the collection of those 
conjuncts of A that together constitute A*, as being itself a conjunct of 
A.103 For then it indeed directly follows that A* < A, and therefore A* ⊂ 
A, which was the claim to be derived.
After these preliminary steps Davey and Clifton continue their proof 
by assuming, for reductio ad absurdum, that there is a possible world 
w in which A has an explanation, that is to say, that there is a possible 
world w in which E (A) is true (2001, p. 487). Hence, A is true in w as well. 
And thus, following the same reasoning as Gale and Pruss did in their 
argument, it follows that every contingent truth in the actual world is a 
contingent truth in w as well. Moreover, every contingent truth in w is 
also a contingent truth in the actual world, because, if the contingent 
truth p in w would be false in the actual world, then, since not-p would 
be contingently true in the actual world, it follows immediately that 
not-p is also true in w, which is impossible. Hence, the Big Conjunctive 
Fact of the actual world is the same as the Big Conjunctive Fact of w, and 
therefore w is in fact the actual world. So, E (A) is indeed actually true, as 
Davey and Clifton conclude (p. 487). As a next step they show that E (A*) 
⊂ E (A*). This step is quite clear and I cite it below:
‘E (A) is actually true. But because A → A* is a tautology, E (A*) 
must also be true [in the actual world]. Since E (A*) entails A*, and 
A* is not true necessarily, E (A*) can only be contingently true. […] 
Moreover, E (A*) must be a proper sub-proposition of itself. For, if 
not (E (A*) ⊂ E (A*)) were true, E (A*) would have to be a conjunct 
of A*, and (hence) E (A*) ⊆ A*. But plainly, A* ⊂ E (A*); so, by 
transitivity, E (A*) ⊂ E (A*). Thus, in any case E (A*) ⊂ E (A*)’ (2001, 
p. 487).
Davey and Clifton proceed with a crucial remark, which will be of 
eminent importance in what follows later in my analysis of their proof. 
They say: ‘Now, because the only proper sub-propositions of E (A*) are 
103 As an example, take the 
proposition a ∧ b ∧ c ∧ d ∧ e ∧ f ∧ 
g. Apparently, Davey and Clifton 
allow us to consider not only a, b, 
or a ∧ b ∧ c, but also b ∧ e ∧ g to 
be a conjunct of a ∧ b ∧ c ∧ d ∧ e ∧ 
f ∧ g. And therefore we may write 
b ∧ e ∧ g < a ∧ b ∧ c ∧ d ∧ e ∧ f ∧ g.
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the sub-propositions of A*, E (A*) ⊆ A*’ (p. 487). Well, if the only proper 
sub-propositions of E (A*) are the sub-propositions of A*, then indeed 
it follows directly that E (A*) ⊆ A*. After all, it has just been established 
that E (A*) itself is a proper sub-proposition of E (A*)! Furthermore, since 
A* is a proper sub-proposition of E (A*) it cannot be affirmed that the 
only proper sub-propositions of E (A*) are the proper sub-propositions of 
A*, for it is not guaranteed that A* is a proper sub-proposition of itself, 
which explains the lack of the adjective ‘proper’ in the conditional’s 
consequent. But the key question here is: why would the only proper 
sub-propositions of E (A*) be the sub-propositions of A*? Well, according 
to the definition of proper sub-proposition, the only way to obtain 
a proper sub-proposition q of a given proposition p seems to be by 
either removing the ‘has an explanation’ predicate E from p (if p is of 
the form E (q)), or by ‘picking’ the relevant conjunct of p (if p is a non-
trivial conjunction having q as one of its conjuncts), and moreover, by 
repeating this procedure finitely many times. If this is so, then, since 
E (A*) is itself not a non-trivial conjunction, the only way we could obtain 
a proper sub-proposition of E (A*) is by removing the E predicate, i.e. 
A* is a proper sub-proposition of E (A*), or, due to the transitivity of ⊂, 
by ‘picking’ conjuncts from A*. So it follows that the only proper sub-
propositions of E (A*) are A* itself and the proper sub-propositions of 
A*, that is to say, the only proper sub-propositions of E (A*) are indeed 
the sub-propositions of A*.
As a next step Davey and Clifton conclude that E (A*) ⊆ A* entails 
E (A*) ⊂ A* since E (A*) is not equal to A*. After all, A* is a non-trivial 
conjunction whereas E (A*) is not. Subsequently they point out that 
the only way E (A*) could be a proper sub-proposition of A* is if E (A*) 
is a sub-proposition of one of the conjuncts of A* (p. 487). This is clear 
from what has been said before about how proper sub-propositions are 
generated. Now, since A* ⊂ E (A*), it follows that A* is a proper sub-
proposition of one of the conjuncts of A*. Hence there is a contingently 
true proposition p such that not(p ⊂ p) and A* ⊂ p. And, since p is a 
conjunct of A*, it is also the case that p ⊂ A*, but then, due to the 
fact that ⊂ is transitive, it follows that p ⊂ p, which contradicts the 
fact that not(p ⊂ p). Hence Davey and Clifton conclude that the initial 
assumption has to be rejected: there is no possible world w in which 
A has an explanation, and therefore the new argument of Gale and 
Pruss fails: the Big Conjunctive Fact of the actual world is necessarily 
unexplainable.
Now, is this objection against the argument of Gale and Pruss 
sufficiently compelling to reject their new cosmological argument? In 
their response to Davey and Clifton Gale and Pruss point out that A* is 
not a proposition at all, and therefore the reductio ad absurdum of Davey 
and Clifton does not go through (Gale and Pruss 2002, p. 94). What Gale 
and Pruss seem to be saying is that the reductio provided by Davey and 
Clifton is in fact to be understood as a reductio of the assumption that 
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A* is a proposition. Indeed, one could, as Gale and Pruss do, accept the 
weak version of the principle of sufficient reason to infer that there is a 
possible world w within which A has an explanation. From then on we 
can simply follow the proof of Davey and Clifton, assuming that A* is a 
proposition, in order to arrive at the earlier established contradiction, 
and thus arriving at the conclusion that this assumption is false, that is, 
that A* is not a proposition. From this point of view the proof of Davey 
and Clifton is quite harmless. It suffices to reject the assumption that A* 
is a proposition, but it is useless to reject the cosmological argument of 
Gale and Pruss.
Yet, Davey and Clifton’s objection is not so easily rejected. As Gale 
and Pruss know, and also acknowledge in their response, Davey and 
Clifton argue in their paper that if A is a proposition, then so is A* (2001, 
pp. 486–487). And hence it would follow that a refutation of the claim 
that A* is a proposition implies that we have to refute the claim that A 
is a proposition as well, thus forcing us to reject the new cosmological 
argument of Gale and Pruss after all. Let us therefore see how Davey and 
Clifton establish their claim that if A is proposition, so is A*. They write: 
‘[Gale and Pruss] might claim that [the collection of all contingently 
true propositions p such that not(p ⊂ p)] is a class, and, therefore, the 
proposition A* does not exist. But, if [the collection of all contingently 
true propositions p such that not(p ⊂ p)] is a class, so is the collection 
of all contingently true propositions, and the proposition A would not 
exist for the same reason’ (2001, p. 487). Well, the point Davey and 
Clifton make here is entirely correct. But it has no implications for Gale 
and Pruss at all, since, as I take it, Gale and Pruss reject the claim that a 
conjunction of a class cannot be a proposition. Indeed, they know that 
the collection of all contingently true propositions is not a set (Gale and 
Pruss 2002, p. 94), and hence, for all they know, this collection might be 
a class. Thus, if Gale and Pruss would contend that a conjunction of a 
class cannot be a proposition, their crucial Big Conjunctive Contingent 
Fact might not be a proposition at all, making their whole argument 
baseless! Still, Davey and Clifton do provide a second reason for their 
thesis that A* is a proposition if A is one. They state: ‘Perhaps [Gale and 
Pruss] could argue, however, that [the collection of all contingently true 
propositions p such that not (p ⊂ p)] is not even a class, because [this 
collection] can only be constructed by applying the axiom of separation 
to the class [of all contingently true propositions], yet the axiom of 
separation fails for classes. But [the collection of all contingently true 
propositions] is also obtained by applying the axiom of separation to the 
class of all propositions, and so, again, [Gale and Pruss] would have to 
question the existence of A itself’ (2001, p. 487). Well, again, this point 
is also entirely correct, but, similar as before, without any consequences 
for Gale and Pruss. Indeed, what Davey and Clifton appear to suggest is 
that, if Gale and Pruss hold that a conjunction of a collection that is not 
even a class cannot be a proposition, they would, under the assumption 
that the collection of all contingently true propositions p such that 
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not(p ⊂ p) is not even a class, have to accept that not only A*, but also 
A itself, is not a proposition. But why would Gale and Pruss have to hold 
that a conjunction of a collection that is not even a class cannot be a 
proposition? I take it that, precisely because of the reason as mentioned 
by Davey and Clifton, Gale and Pruss simply do not hold this. What 
Gale and Pruss do hold is the following, as they clearly explain in their 
response to Davey and Clifton: ‘A given candidate for a proposition [i.e. 
A or A*] should be innocent until proven guilty. We have proved above, 
relying on [Davey and Clifton’s] own argument, that the conjunction of 
all contingent true propositions that are no sub-formulae of themselves 
is guilty, that is, is not a proposition. But [Davey and Clifton] have 
not offered any paradox starting merely with the [Big Conjunctive 
Contingent Fact], and so the [Big Conjunctive Contingent Fact] is still 
innocent’ (2002, p. 94). Indeed, we can conclude that the first objection 
of Davey and Clifton has to be rejected.
the objeC tion thAt we hAVe no Authorit y to infer thAt, 
possibly,  the bCCf 104 i s  explAinAble
Based upon the aforementioned inquiry we are justified to contend 
that A is a proposition and A* is not, so that the first objection of Davey 
and Clifton does not go through. But the paper of Davey and Clifton 
contains another objection against the new argument of Gale and Pruss 
that allows for A being a proposition, whereas A* is not. They start 
with an analogy (2001, p. 487). Ben, who does not know Avogadro’s 
number, that is, the (fixed) number of molecules in one mole, is told 
truthfully that some given vessel holds one mole of hydrogen. Of course 
he cannot detect that the proposition p = ‘This vessel contains an even 
number of molecules’ is true. Moreover, he even cannot infer that p is 
possibly true, since whether p is possibly true ‘is entirely determined by 
a fact about the value of Avogadro’s number that Ben simply does not 
know. Modal intuitions […] can offer him no help in deciding whether 
[there is a possible world in which p] is true’ (2001, p. 487).105 Davey and 
Clifton turn this analogy into an objection against Gale and Pruss’s new 
argument that, as said, would work even if A is a proposition and A* is 
not. I shall provide my own rendering of this objection below.
The proposition E (A) is either true or false in the actual world. Well, 
if E (A) is true in the actual world, then there exists a possible world, 
namely the actual world, in which E (A) is true, and so it is perfectly valid 
to infer that, possibly, E (A) is true. On the other hand, if E (A) is false in 
the actual world, then either not-E (A) is contingently true or not-E (A) 
is necessarily true. Now, if not-E (A) is necessarily true, then there is 
no possible world in which E (A) is true, and so it would be invalid to 
infer that, possibly, E (A) is true. And, if not-E (A) is contingently true, 
then A, being the conjunction of all contingent truths in the actual 
world, logically entails not-E (A), and thus, since A consists of the same 
conjuncts in all possible worlds, A entails not-E (A) in all possible worlds. 
From this it follows that, since E (A) entails A, that there is no possible 
104 bccf refers to the Big 
Conjunctive Contingent Fact of 
the actual world, that is to say, the 
conjunction of all contingently 
true propositions in the actual 
world. Surely, in the present 
context bccf is denoted by A.
105 Davey and Clifton point 
out that they ‘treat Avogadro’s 
number as a rigid designator; i.e. 
[they] assume it has the same 
value in all possible worlds’ (2001, 
p. 490). This assumption is indeed 
important because else Ben 
could easily stipulate a possible 
world within which p would be 
true, namely any possible world 
within which Avogadro’s number 
has some even value. Further, we 
have to assume that ‘this vessel’ 
in p may only denote a vessel that 
contains a mole of molecules. For 
else it is trivial that p is possibly 
true. Indeed, any possible world in 
which the number of molecules in 
this vessel is, if needed, changed 
into some even value, would 
do. Now, in their paper Davey 
and Clifton maintain that p is 
contingently true in the actual 
world (p. 487). But, since we treat 
‘Avogadro’s number’ rigidly and 
take it that ‘this vessel’ in p always 
contains a mole of molecules, it 
follows that p is either necessarily 
true or necessarily false. This 
however is not a real problem 
for the analogy that Davey and 
Clifton provide. I simply avoid the 
incorrectness in my rendering 
above by not claiming that p is 
contingently true.
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world in which E (A) is true, that is to say, it would again be invalid 
to infer that, possibly, E (A) is true. In summary, if E (A) is true in the 
actual world, then we can infer that, possibly, E (A) is true, and if E (A) 
is false in the actual world, then we cannot infer that, possibly, E (A) is 
true. So, according to Davey and Clifton, ‘We are thus in precisely the 
same situation Ben was in with respect to his ignorance of the value 
of Avogadro’s number. Whether or not E (A) is possibl[y true] is fully 
determined by something we do not know: this time, whether [E (A) is 
true or E (A) is false in the actual world]. Again we are not free simply 
to exercise our modal imaginations, for they give us no authority to 
[decide whether, possibly, E (A) is true]’ (2001, p. 488). And therefore, as 
the objection concludes, Gale and Pruss are not justified at all to infer 
that there is some possible world w in which E (A) is true, which, since 
they essentially rely on this inference, makes their new cosmological 
argument ungrounded.106
Now, let us first see how Gale and Pruss respond to this objection. They 
write: ‘A person who is ignorant of chemistry does not have epistemic 
grounds for determining whether or not it is possible for this piece 
of gold to have a certain atomic weight. [Davey and Clifton] suggest 
that analogously we lack adequate epistemic grounds for determining 
whether it is or is not possible for the actual world’s Big Conjunctive 
Contingent Fact to have an explanation […]’ (2002, p. 98). Gale and 
Pruss take it that Davey and Clifton’s objection ‘suffers from a crucial 
disanalogy’ (p. 98). Science must discover the essential properties of 
certain types of entities, and thus, as Gale and Pruss contend, ‘it is not 
the prerogative of science to determine the sort of modal issues that 
enter into [their] argument, such as whether […] the actual world’s 
Big Conjunctive Contingent Fact possibly has an explanation’ (2002, 
p. 98). I believe that this response has some force, but is not sufficiently 
convincing to reject the objection at stake. In what follows I propose 
a rejection that I believe more clearly shows why the objection of 
Davey and Clifton fails. Perhaps Gale and Pruss would maintain that 
this rejection amounts to the same point they make above. Well, let 
me start with pointing out that I fully agree with Davey and Clifton 
that Ben cannot decide whether p could be possibly true. It all depends 
on the exact fixed value of Avogadro’s number. If it is even, then p is 
necessarily true and thus also possibly true, but if it is odd, then p is 
necessarily false and hence not possibly true. There is no way in which 
Ben can make a justified choice between both alternatives since he 
simply does not know Avogadro’s number, and there are no other 
principles he might rely on to make an informed decision between both 
alternatives. But, as I contend, the epistemic situation in the case of 
the cosmological argument of Gale and Pruss is quite different from 
the epistemic situation Ben finds himself in. The two alternatives in this 
case are ‘E (A) is true in the actual world’ and ‘E (A) is false in the actual 
world’. As we have seen, if E (A) is true in the actual world, then, possibly, 
E (A) is true, and if E (A) is false in the actual world, then it is not the 
106 The rendering of the 
objection of Davey and Clifton 
that I provide here differs from 
the formulation that Davey and 
Clifton provide in their paper. 
They simply say that we know 
that either, necessarily, A entails 
E (A), or, necessarily, A entails 
non-E (A), and continue by stating 
that we simply do not know 
which of these two entailments 
hold. It seems to me that they 
take for granted that A, being 
the conjunction of all contingent 
truths in the actual world, either 
entails E (A) or not-E (A), since in 
the actual world either E (A) is 
contingently true or not-E (A) is 
contingently true. But this does 
not follow at all. They overlook 
the third possibility that not-E (A) 
is necessarily true and therefore 
E (A) would be necessarily false. 
In my rendering I take this third 
possibility into account. Having 
said this, it is surely not the case 
that the formulation of Davey 
and Clifton is incorrect, since, if 
E (A) is necessarily false, it also 
follows, trivially, that, necessarily, 
A entails E (A)! Yet, I take it that 
the rendering I provide has more 
appeal, since its dilemma is 
confined to one basic proposition, 
i.e. E (A), that is either true or false 
in the actual world, whereas the 
dilemma in the formulation of 
Davey and Clifton refers to two 
relatively complex entailments, 
only one of which is true in 
all possible worlds. Therefore, 
the analogy between ‘the Ben 
example’ and my rendering is 
clearer.
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case that, possibly, E (A) is true. Initially we are inclined to say, just as 
Davey and Clifton do, that Gale and Pruss simply do not know whether 
E (A) is true or false in the actual world, and therefore they seem to be 
not allowed to infer that, possibly, E (A) is true. But this is in fact not the 
case at all. Indeed, as part of their new argument Gale and Pruss have 
introduced and defended a weak version of Leibniz’s principle, according 
to which every contingent truth possibly has an explanation. As we have 
seen this principle is not just stipulated. On the contrary, I discussed 
and presented a number of good arguments in favor of this principle, 
which I shall not repeat here. Hence, while Ben has no further principle 
to invoke, Gale and Pruss have such a principle to appeal to, namely 
their weak version of Leibniz’s principle of sufficient reason. From this 
principle it follows, since A is contingently true in the actual world, that, 
possibly, E (A) is true. And this implies, based upon the aforementioned, 
that E (A) is true in the actual world. Now, from this stage on the new 
argument of Gale and Pruss can proceed similar as before. Thus, in fact, 
the objection of Davey and Clifton comes down to nothing more than 
just an invitation to recast the new argument of Gale and Pruss in the 
following way:
 
 1 In the actual world E (A) is either true or false (bivalence)
 2 If, in the actual world, E (A) is true, then, possibly, E (A) is true 
(shown above)
 3 If, in the actual world, E (A) is false, then it is not the case that, 
possibly, E (A) is true (”)
 4 E (A) is possibly true (according to the weak version of Leibniz’s 
principle)
 5 E (A) is true in the actual world (from 1, 2, 3 and 4)
 6 <Include previous stages of the new cosmological argument to 
obtain the final conclusion>
Now, the only way to reject this reformulation is to refute the weak 
version of Leibniz’s principle itself, or any other part as referred to by 
(6), and, as we have seen, the objection at stake fails to do this. Hence, 
I conclude that the second objection of Davey and Clifton is inadequate 
as well. It does not establish that Gale and Pruss are not authorized to 
infer that, possibly, the actual world’s Big Conjunctive Contingent Fact 
has an explanation.
the objeC tion thAt the weAK Version of leibniz ’s 
prinCiple  ViolAtes  our modAl intuitions
In fact, Davey and Clifton provide a third objection in their paper that 
directly attacks the weak version of Leibniz’s principle as adopted by 
Gale and Pruss in their new argument. They grant that this version 
enjoys some intuitive appeal, since they ‘can imagine that there might 
have been some explanation for the occurrence of the Big Bang, or 
some joint explanation for the fact that Kevin has two cats and Rob only 
one, even if there are no such explanations in the actual world’ (2001, 
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p. 489). But, as they contend, this does not warrant us to accept the 
weak version of Leibniz’s principle without restriction. In what follows 
I present my own rendering of their objection. Suppose, for reductio, 
that the weak version of Leibniz’s principle holds without restriction. 
In that case the weak version of Leibniz’s principle entails the strong 
version. Indeed, as discussed before, if p is true and E (p) is false in 
some possible world, then, by applying the weak version of Leibniz’s 
principle to ‘p and not-E (p)’ it follows that there is a possible world in 
which ‘p and not-E (p)’ has an explanation, which is impossible since it 
would imply that E (p) is true and false in that world.107 But, as Davey 
and Clifton maintain, our modal intuitions strongly suggest that there 
must be possible worlds (perhaps including the actual world, but this is 
not required) in which there are ‘genuinely random events [i.e. events 
which do not have an explanation in those worlds] such as the flip of a 
coin that comes up heads, or a quantum measurement of an electron 
that returns a value of “spin up”’ (2001, p. 489). In short, our modal 
intuitions strongly suggest us that it must at least be possible that some 
proposition is true without having an explanation. Now, as the objection 
continues, this possibility violates the strong version of Leibniz’s 
principle and so also the weak version of this principle. Hence, as the 
objection concludes, given that the weak version entails the strong 
version, and given that there are possible worlds containing truths 
without any explanation, we have to reject the weak version of Leibniz’s 
principle. And therefore we have to reject the new argument of Gale and 
Pruss, which relies on this principle, as well.
In their response to this objection Gale and Pruss offer four related 
considerations that together are supposed to ‘lead credence to the 
claim that [the weak version of Leibniz’s principle] is more deeply 
entrenched than is the […] claim that it is possible that a given 
contingent proposition has no explanation’ (2002, p. 96). First, our 
strong tendency to find explanations suggest we at least believe it is 
possible for truths to have explanations. Second, while we know what 
it is like to verify explanations, we do not know what it is like to verify 
that some proposition does not have an explanation. Third, they point at 
the deep resistance of scientists to the idea that there are unexplainable 
events. Fourth, in the case of the Big Conjunctive Contingent Fact, it is 
possible that God exists, and thus it is possible that the Big Conjunctive 
Contingent Fact has an explanation. Now, I fail to see why the second 
consideration would add to the creditability of the weak version 
of the principle of sufficient reason. And the same holds for third 
consideration. The first and fourth consideration have some force, but 
are together not convincing enough to conclude that the objection fails. 
However, as part of my analysis of the objection that the cosmos is caused 
by blind indeterministic mechanical causation I argued that the whole 
notion of genuinely random events is, for us as human beings, wholly 
unintelligible. So, since the objection of Davey and Clifton appeals to the 
possibility of genuinely random events, we are warranted to conclude 
107 Oppy says in his On ‘A 
new cosmological argument’ 
that Pruss and a referee from 
Religious Studies told him about 
an alternative derivation of the 
strong version from the weak 
one. He writes: ‘By inspection 
[the argument of Gale and Pruss] 
works for any world, not just the 
actual world: so, given [the weak 
version of Leibniz’s principle], 
there cannot be a world in which 
the Big Conjunctive [Contingent] 
Fact for that world has no 
explanation in that world. But 
explanation is dissective. So, given 
[the weak version of Leibniz’s 
principle], every true [contingent] 
proposition in every world has 
an explanation, i.e. [the strong 
version].’ (Oppy 2000, p. 348). As 
part of this derivation the weak 
version of Leibniz’s principle is, 
through the new argument of 
Gale and Pruss, applied to the Big 
Conjunctive Contingent Fact of a 
possible world, which is warranted 
by the above mentioned 
assumption that the weak version 
of Leibniz’s principle holds without 
restriction. Davey and Clifton 
do not refer to this alternative 
derivation in their paper. This 
makes sense, since they believe 
to have shown that Gale and 
Pruss’s new argument fails if 
a Big Conjunctive Contingent 
Fact would be a proposition. 
I argued this is not so, making the 
alternative derivation relevant 
here as well.
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that it is not sufficiently convincing after all. Moreover, I also argued that 
we can understand the weak version of the principle of sufficient reason 
as being a default or exception permitting rule, that is, as a rule that 
applies unless we have good reasons to suspect that it does not apply to 
the specific case at hand. Well, the Big Conjunctive Contingent Fact does 
not seem to be such an exception. For, as argued above the objection 
that, necessarily, the conjunction of all contingent truths is unexplainable 
fails. And third, even if we would reject a defeasible reading of the weak 
version, it still seems to be the case that, possibly, the actual world’s 
Big Conjunctive Contingent Fact has some explanation. For, according 
to Gale and Pruss’s fourth consideration above, it is at least logically 
possible that some supernatural entity exists and also explains the Big 
Conjunctive Contingent Fact (2002, pp. 96–97). I conclude that these 
three observations, added to the first and fourth consideration of Gale 
and Pruss, provide us with a sufficient reason to reasonably reject the 
third objection obtained from Davey and Clifton’s paper.108
summAry
We have seen that the main objections as raised by Davey and Clifton 
can be cogently rejected. In the next section I turn to objections 
proposed by Almeida and Judisch (2002).
Objections raised by Almeida and Judisch
In their paper A new cosmological argument undone Almeida and Judisch 
(Almeida and Judisch 2002) raise further objections to Gale and Pruss’s 
new cosmological argument. In what follows I present and criticize the 
additional objections that they have put forward.
Almeida and Judisch start with an important observation concerning the 
first premise of Gale and Pruss’s new argument. As discussed, Gale and 
Pruss formulate the first premise of their new argument, by using the 
language of possible worlds, in the following way:
‘If p1 is the Big Conjunctive Contingent Fact of a world w1 and p2 is 
the Big Conjunctive Contingent Fact of a world w2, and if p1 and p2 
are identical, then w1 = w2’ (1999, p. 462).
This premise comes down to the claim that possible worlds are 
individuated by their Big Conjunctive Contingent Fact, that is to say, 
there are no two possible worlds that have the same Big Conjunctive 
Contingent Fact. Gale and Pruss ground this claim by pointing out 
that all possible worlds ‘share the same necessary propositions’ (1999, 
p. 462). Indeed, since Gale and Pruss, by definition, identify worlds with 
their Big Conjunctive Facts, it follows that, if all of them share the same 
necessary truths, then every Big Conjunctive Contingent Fact uniquely 
identifies a single possible world. Now, in their paper Almeida and 
Judisch note that: ‘if we wish to have the same necessary propositions 
108 One might perhaps invoke 
one other argument against the 
weak version of Leibniz’s principle. 
Take the proposition p = ‘p has 
no explanation’. This proposition 
is necessarily true. Indeed, if it 
would be false in some possible 
world, then it would have an 
explanation in that possible 
world, which is impossible since 
E (p) entails p. Moreover, p is 
necessarily unexplainable. For, 
it is true in all possible worlds, 
and thus, in all those worlds it 
says truly of itself that it has no 
explanation. We might therefore 
conclude that proposition p is 
a falsifier of the weak version 
of Leibniz’s principle. However, 
Gale and Pruss could easily resort 
to a defeasible reading of the 
weak version and hold that in 
the particular case of the self-
referring proposition p the default 
rule that all truths possibly have 
an explanation simply doesn’t 
apply. And, since p is necessarily 
true, p is not a conjunct of the 
Big Conjunctive Contingent Fact. 
So, the crucial case of the Big 
Conjunctive Contingent Fact rests 
unchallenged. Besides, they could 
argue that assertion p is actually 
not a well-formed proposition at 
all. Indeed, for all propositions q, 
shouldn’t q be unequal to both 
E (q) and not-E (q)?
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as conjuncts in every Big Conjunctive Fact (i.e., holding in every possible 
world) we must further assume that nothing weaker than the logic of S5 
governs our modal inferences’ (2002, p. 56). The reason being that ‘S5 is 
usually characterized as permitting every world access to every world’ 
(2002, p. 62).109 Hence, as Almeida and Judisch have made clear, the new 
argument of Gale and Pruss is committed to the axioms and (thus) all 
theorems of the S5 system of modal logic. Subsequently, Almeida and 
Judisch utilize this fact to arrive at a reductio ad absurdum of Gale and 
Pruss’s new argument, which I shall outline below.
The cosmological argument of Gale and Pruss establishes that there is 
in the actual world w a contingently true proposition q that explains the 
actual world’s Big Conjunctive Contingent Fact p (1999, pp. 462–469). 
Since q is contingently true in the actual world, there are possible worlds 
in which not-q is true. Moreover, since for every proposition it holds that 
‘being an explanation of some other proposition’ entails ‘being true’, it 
follows that the proposition ‘q is not an explanation of p’ is true in those 
worlds in which not-q is true. To arrive at their reductio of Gale and 
Pruss’s new argument, Almeida and Judisch assert a much stronger claim 
than the aforementioned rather evident observation. They maintain that 
there must be a possible world in which not just not-q and ‘q is not an 
explanation of p’ are true, but in which, moreover, p itself is true. Now, 
indeed, if this would be the case, then, surely, their reductio succeeds, 
since, as we have seen, any world containing the Big Conjunctive 
Contingent Fact p of the actual world is in fact equal to the actual world, 
and this leads to a contradiction because it would entail that both q and 
not-q are true in the actual world, which is clearly impossible. Yet, their 
claim that the premises of Gale and Pruss’s new cosmological argument 
entail there being a possible world verifying p, not-q and ‘q does not 
explain p’ is definitely not evident. In their paper Almeida and Judisch 
provide two derivations for it. As I argue below, both derivations fail, 
which implies that their proposed reductio of the new cosmological 
argument of Gale and Pruss is untenable.
The first derivation is a reductio as well, which goes as follows: ‘Suppose 
it were not true that there is some world […] which contains the Big 
Conjunctive Contingent Fact of [the actual world], p, and not-q and 
the fact that q does not explain p. In that case, every world […] which 
contained p would also contain q and the fact that q explains p. But that 
is just to say that [q is necessarily true], contrary to [q being contingently 
true]’ (2002, p. 63). It follows indeed that q is true in each world in which 
p is true, since p and not-q entail that q does not explain p, which violates 
the assumption that there is no world in which p, not-q and ‘q does not 
explain p’ are all true. But, this is not what Almeida and Judisch hold. 
They hold that possible worlds that contain p, also contain q and the fact 
that q explains p. It seems that they take it that if q explains p in some 
world, then q explains p in all worlds for which p and q are true. But why 
do they take this for granted? The argument of Gale and Pruss does not 
109 This interpretation of S5, 
according to which every possible 
world is accessible from every 
other possible world, implies that 
a proposition that is possibly true 
in some world is in fact possibly 
true in every world, that is to say, 
all worlds share the same possible 
truths. And, since all worlds share 
the same necessary truths as 
well, it follows that, under the S5 
system of modal logic, the very 
same modal propositions are true 
at each and every possible world, 
that is, all possible worlds are 
modally equivalent (2002, p. 56).
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require explanations to be invariant across possible worlds. Yet, perhaps 
proposition q is a special case? After all, Gale and Pruss’s argument 
entails that q is to be understood as ‘a contingent proposition that 
reports the free intentional action of a necessary being that explains 
the existence of the actual world’s universe’ (1999, p. 468). Therefore, in 
each world in which q is true, q is an explanation of the universe of that 
world, and, since the universe of each world is defined by Gale and Pruss 
as the part of the world that verifies its Big Conjunctive Contingent Fact, 
it follows immediately that q is an explanation of the Big Conjunctive 
Contingent Fact of each world in which q is true. But then, since p is a 
part of the Big Conjunctive Contingent Fact of each world in which p is 
true, and explanation is dissective, it follows that q is also an explanation 
of p in each world in which both p and q are true. So, we can indeed 
accept their claim that, under the assumption of the reductio, worlds 
that contain p, also contain q and the fact that q explains p.110 Now, 
as mentioned above, Almeida and Judisch conclude their reductio by 
asserting that this ‘is just to say that [q is necessarily true], contrary to 
[q being contingently true]’ (2002, p. 63). But why would this follow from 
the previous result? Why would proposition q be necessarily true? After 
all, they have only established that q is true (and explains p) in those 
worlds in which p is true, and this does not exclude there being a world 
in which p is false! For such a world, i.e. for a world in which p is false, 
we have no reason to assert that q is true. And, moreover, according to 
the argument of Gale and Pruss there must in fact be a possible world 
in which p is false, since p is a contingent proposition! So, the first 
derivation of Almeida and Judisch fails.111
The second derivation is a direct proof. It starts with the observation 
that proposition q is a contingent explanation of the Big Conjunctive 
Contingent Fact p of the actual world. And, as the direct proof continues, 
from this it follows that p might have had some other explanation r 
which is logically incompatible with q, that is, r is false in those worlds 
in which q is true and vice versa (2002, p. 63). Subsequently, it follows 
that there is a world w2 in which r and p hold. Due to the logical 
incompatibility of r and q, world w2 verifies not-q. Moreover, ‘q does not 
explain p’ is true in w2 since q is false in w2. We conclude that w2 verifies 
p, not-q and ‘q does not explain p’, which completes the proof. Now, 
this second derivation fails as well. It does not follow at all that p might 
have had another explanation incompatible with q. For, surely, q is a 
contingent explanation, but this only means that q is an explanation and 
that there is a possible world in which q is false. Thus, to claim that it 
means that there might have been a logically incompatible explanation 
of p is an erroneous case of equivocation. Almeida and Judisch shift 
unwarrantedly to an entirely different meaning of ‘being a contingent 
explanation’, and hence their second derivation is invalid, as also 
Pruss and Gale point out (2003, p. 68). So, as mentioned, the reductio 
ad absurdum of the new cosmological argument of Gale and Pruss, as 
110 In their response to Almeida 
and Judisch Pruss and Gale 
provide us with yet another 
reason for accepting that worlds 
containing p and q also contain 
‘q explains p’. For they point out: 
‘Our argument proves that q 
explains p in [the actual world], 
and moreover (q explains p) is a 
contingent proposition since it 
is actually true and entails the 
contingent proposition p […]. 
Thus, (q explains p) is a conjunct 
of p. […] And since (q explains 
p) is a conjunct in p, there is no 
possible world that has p and 
not-(q explains p) as conjuncts […]’ 
(Pruss and Gale 2003, p. 67).
111 Pruss and Gale arrive along 
quite similar lines at the same 
conclusion in their response to 
Almeida and Judisch (Pruss and 
Gale 2003, p. 67).
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proposed by Almeida and Judisch, has to be rejected. It is based on 
untenable derivations.
To finalize their objection against Gale and Pruss’s new argument, 
Almeida and Judisch present in their paper some options ‘to preserve 
the soundness of the new cosmological argument’, and argue, by 
utilizing their earlier mentioned observation that this argument is 
committed to the S5 axioms of modal logic, that each of these options 
fail (2002, pp. 59–60). However, since, as shown above, their initial 
reductio ad absurdum does not hold, we do not have to analyze these 
options. After all, there is just nothing to repair.
Yet, from the paper of Almeida and Judisch a second objection can be 
extracted. To see this we must take a closer look at their invalid reductio 
ad absurdum. The whole reductio comes down to this inference: Suppose 
the new argument of Gale and Pruss holds. In that case it follows that 
q is a contingent explanation of the Big Conjunctive Contingent Fact p 
of the actual world. From this it follows that p might have had another 
explanation r which is incompatible with q, that is, there is no possible 
world in which r and q are both true. Furthermore, the world containing 
r and p must be equal to the actual world (since it contains p), and this 
implies that the actual world contains both r and q, which is clearly 
impossible. As we have seen this reductio is invalid since it is based 
on an erroneous equivocation on the phrase ‘contingent explanation’. 
But, nevertheless, it can be adjusted easily into a valid reductio ad 
absurdum by accepting the following weak version of Leibniz’s principle 
of sufficient reason: ‘Any contingently true proposition possibly has an 
explanation, and it possibly has a second explanation that is logically 
incompatible with the first one’. This alternative weak version is clearly 
stronger than the weak version as employed by Gale and Pruss. After all, 
the former entails the latter while the latter does not entail the former. 
Furthermore, if we accept the alternative weak version, then, indeed, 
the aforementioned reductio ad absurdum succeeds, and therefore the 
real crucial question now becomes whether opponents of the new 
cosmological argument of Gale and Pruss are rationally justified to 
accept the alternative, stronger, weak version of Leibniz’s principle. 
For, if so, the new cosmological argument of Gale and Pruss has to be 
rejected.
Pruss and Gale are fully aware of this point, and in their response to 
Almeida and Judisch they provide several reasons for rejecting the 
alternative version of Leibniz’s principle of sufficient reason (2003, 
pp. 68–71). Pruss and Gale note that, since the alternative version is 
stronger than the weak version, it is quite reasonable to hold that the 
weak version they employ is more plausible, that is, more likely, than the 
alternative version (2003, p. 69). Hence ‘the epistemically reasonable 
thing to do when confronted with a choice between accepting [the weak 
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version-]based cosmological argument and accepting [the alternative 
weak version-]based reductio of it is to accept the former’ (2003, p. 69). 
I do believe that this reason has some force, but, surely, Pruss and Gale 
need more reasons to be warranted to reject the alternative version of 
Leibniz’s principle. Another reason they provide is that the alternative 
version, contrary to the weak version they employ themselves, 
cannot be ‘generalized’ to necessarily true propositions, for these 
propositions, if taken to be self-explanatory, do not have more than 
one explanation. This fact, as they argue, ‘cautions one not to think that 
there is something about the nature of explanations that ensures that 
there are always alternative explanations’ (2003, p. 71). I agree that, if 
we assume that all necessary truths are self-explaining, there is some 
support for preferring the weak version above the alternative one, 
since, if no necessary truth allows for multiple explanations, the weak 
version seems to be the most natural of both. However, why should 
we take it that all necessarily true propositions explain themselves? 
Surely, within the framework of Gale and Pruss each necessary truth 
reports the existence of a necessary being or state of affairs (Gale and 
Pruss 1999, p. 462). And, within their framework, a necessary entity is 
self-explanatory in the sense that there exists a conclusive ontological 
argument for its existence. But why should we assume that all necessary 
entities explain themselves? Why couldn’t there be some being or some 
state of affairs that exists in every possible world because it is caused in 
every possible world? If such an entity exists (let us call it E) and if there 
are at least two possible worlds for which the causes of E differ, then it is 
not the case that necessary truths do not have alternative explanations, 
which would render the appeal to the naturalness of the weak version 
less convincing. So, after all, to hold that the weak version is more 
natural than the alternative version is not very persuasive either.
What Pruss and Gale need is a good direct argument against the 
alternative weak version. In fact, in their response to Almeida and 
Judisch they present a direct argument, that is, they provide a reductio 
of the alternative weak version of Leibniz’s principle (2003, p. 70), 
which I shall analyze in what follows. It is evident that the alternative 
weak version, if applied to the Big Conjunctive Contingent Fact of 
the actual world, entails a logical contradiction. Indeed, if there are 
two incompatible possible explanations of the actual world’s Big 
Conjunctive Contingent Fact, then both explanations would have to 
be true in the actual world,112 which is clearly impossible. Pruss and 
Gale take this to be a cogent reductio of the alternative version. For, 
suppose the alternative weak version is true, then, if we apply it to the 
Big Conjunctive Contingent Fact of the actual world, a contradiction 
arises, and therefore, the alternative version simply cannot be true. This 
line of reasoning however fails, since an opponent of Gale and Pruss’s 
new cosmological argument could respond that their aforementioned 
reductio is in fact not a reductio of the alternative weak version, but 
instead, it is a reductio of their premise that the Big Conjunctive 
112 This is a direct consequence 
of the fact that each of these 
possible explanations is true 
in some world, and worlds 
containing the actual world’s Big 
Conjunctive Contingent Fact are 
in fact equal to the actual world.
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Contingent Fact is a proposition! This premise is crucial to the new 
cosmological argument, and thus, as our opponent could proceed, what 
their reductio shows is that their new argument is invalid. Now, this 
response has force, especially if we take into account Gale and Pruss’s 
rejection of Davey and Clifton’s reductio of the new cosmological 
argument. For, as we have seen, Gale and Pruss, in order to refute Davey 
and Clifton’s reductio, argue that it is not to be understood as a reductio 
of the weak version of Leibniz’s principle, but, instead, as a reductio of 
the assumption that conjunction A*113 is a proposition (Gale and Pruss 
2002, p. 94). In other words, in the case of refuting Davey and Clifton’s 
reductio, when having to decide between giving up a weak version of 
Leibniz’s principle or the idea that some conjunction is a proposition, 
Gale and Pruss opt for the latter. So, why should we now, in the present 
case of their own reductio, opt for the opposite? That is to say, why 
should we this time conclude that we have to give up the version of 
Leibniz’s principle under consideration, here being the alternative 
weak version? Why not, like they did before, give up the idea that the 
conjunction at hand, here being the conjunction of all contingently true 
propositions, is a proposition? Without a good answer to this question, 
I take it that the response of our opponent indeed has force: Pruss and 
Gale’s reductio of the alternative weak version lacks proper ground. 
Their ‘direct argument’ is not cogent.
On the other hand, the direct argument of Pruss and Gale reveals 
something important. It seems that there is something problematic 
with considering the alternative weak version of Leibniz’s principle as a 
universal law without any exceptions. For, indeed, the specific case of 
the Big Conjunctive Contingent Fact is at the very least a problematic 
case. It is a case for which we do not appear to be justified to apply the 
alternative weak version of Leibniz’s principle. Moreover, Pruss and 
Gale present two examples of problematic cases for the alternative 
weak version that are at least as problematic as the case of the actual 
world’s Big Conjunctive Contingent Fact. Their first example appeals to 
Kripkean origin essentialism: ‘[The alternative weak version of Leibniz’s 
principle] is incompatible with the Kripkean doctrine that there exist 
entities whose origin is essential to them. For suppose that it is essential 
to me that I come from a union of sperm A and egg B. Then that I exist 
is explained by A and B having come together. Moreover, […] there is 
no [possible] world in which my existence is explained by a proposition 
incompatible with the one based on A and B coming together, and 
this would be a counter-example to [the alternative weak version of 
Leibniz’s principle]’ (2003, pp. 70–71). As a second example they point 
out that it would be implausible to hold that moral obligations have 
multiple explanations that are mutually incompatible, since, plausibly, 
moral values arise from a single source in all possible worlds, being 
either God, nature or convention (2003, p. 71). Although I consider the 
first example much more convincing than the second one, I take it that 
in general we can conclude that, besides many ordinary normal cases 
113 As we have seen during our 
evaluation of the objections of 
Davey and Clifton, conjunction A* 
is defined as the conjunction of 
all contingently true propositions 
s such that not (s ⊂ s). That is, 
conjunction A* is the conjunction 
of all contingently true 
propositions that are not a proper 
sub-proposition of themselves.
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to which the alternative weak version could be applied without any 
problem,114 there are also at least a number of problematic cases to 
which the alternative weak version does not apply. So, if the alternative 
weak version of Leibniz’s principle is to have any force, it will only be 
as a default or exception permitting rule: Normally, a contingently true 
proposition possibly has an explanation, and it possibly has a second 
explanation that is logically incompatible with the first one. In other 
words, in absence of a good reason to think otherwise, we may infer, about 
any particular contingently true proposition s in some world w, that 
there is a world w* in which s has an explanation t, and a world w** in 
which s has an explanation that is incompatible with t. But, if we grant a 
defeasible reading of the alternative weak version, then the dialectical 
situation changes significantly in favor of Pruss and Gale. For, their 
reductio should now simply be understood as being a reason to maintain 
that the case of the Big Conjunctive Contingent Fact of the actual world 
is an exception to the rule. We have a good reason to maintain that the 
alternative version, being an exception permitting rule, does not apply 
to the a-typical case of the actual world’s Big Conjunctive Contingent 
Fact, and hence Almeida and Judisch’s second objection, that is, the 
adjusted reductio of Gale and Pruss’s new cosmological argument, fails 
as well.
summAry
We have seen that the main objections as raised by Almeida and Judisch 
can be cogently rejected. In the next, final, section I shall argue that 
despite the fact that all objections discussed thus far do not go through, 
there are a number of yet unnoticed objections that render the new 
cosmological argument of Gale and Pruss untenable after all.
Further objections
The new cosmological argument consists, following the argumentation 
scheme provided by Gale and Pruss themselves (1999), of sixteen 
stages. Earlier in this chapter each of these stages has been described 
in detail. The first part of their argument comprises seven stages and 
results in the intermediate conclusion that there is in the actual world 
a true proposition q that explains the Big Conjunctive Contingent Fact 
p of the actual world. The second part of their argument is composed 
of nine stages and leads to the final conclusion that proposition q 
reports the existence of a necessary being that intentionally and freely 
brought the universe into existence.115 Well, up until now, we assessed 
fifteen objections against the new cosmological argument. Notably, of 
these fifteen objections no less than twelve are solely directed at the 
first part of Gale and Pruss’s argument, that is, at the derivation of the 
intermediate conclusion that the Big Conjunctive Fact of the actual 
world has an explanation.116 In fact, none of the objections raised by 
Oppy, Davey and Clifton, and Almeida and Judisch are aimed against 
the second part of the new argument. All these opponents assail 
114 Pruss and Gale mention as 
an example of such an ordinary 
case the state of affairs of Smith’s 
briefcase lying on his desk. They 
argue ‘that Smith’s briefcase is 
on his desk is explained by the 
proposition that he left it there 
but [is] also possibly explained 
by the incompatible proposition 
that his wife left it there’ (2003, 
p. 69). Surely, there are many 
unproblematic day-to-day cases 
like this.
115 Gale and Pruss present in 
their paper further stages to 
establish that this necessary being 
is very powerful, intelligent and 
good. However, as mentioned 
in the beginning of this chapter, 
I have left aside these stages 
since they invoke teleology and 
theodicies, thus bringing us 
outside the realm of cosmological 
arguments.
116 One of these twelve 
objections is the very first 
objection discussed in this 
chapter, that is, the classical 
Humean objection. Now, to be 
precise, the classical Humean 
objection grants that the 
actual world’s Big Conjunctive 
Contingent Fact p is explainable. 
However, the point of this 
objection is, as we have seen, 
that p might be wholly internally 
explained, i.e., each of the 
conjuncts of p may be explained 
by one or more other conjuncts 
of p. Thus, as the objection goes, 
there is no need to infer an 
external explanation q of p, contra 
the intermediate conclusion. In 
this sense this objection targets 
the intermediate conclusion as 
well.
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nothing else than the intermediate conclusion. The only objections, 
three in total, that target the second part of Gale and Pruss’s argument 
are mentioned by Gale and Pruss themselves (1999). These objections 
are respectively, first, the objection that proposition q cannot be a 
contingent truth,117 second, that q cannot truly report the existence of a 
free and necessary being, and, third, that, for all we know, q might report 
that the cosmos is caused by blind indeterministic mechanical causation.
Apparently non-theistic opponents of the new cosmological argument 
are so averse to the idea of there being some explanation q of the Big 
Conjunctive Contingent Fact of the actual world, that they fully fixate 
on trying to reject this intermediate conclusion, thus focusing entirely 
on just the first part of Gale and Pruss’s argument, and hence brushing 
aside its second part, which infers that the explanation q in question 
reports there being a free necessary entity causing the cosmos. Indeed, 
the eagerness to distrust any candidate explanation of the universe, 
regardless of its specific content, is quite obvious from what for example 
Oppy states in his rebuttal of the new cosmological argument: ‘While 
there are things to contest in [the second part of Gale and Pruss’s 
argumentation], it seems to me that most nontheists will not be happy 
with [italics mine] the claim that there is an explanation for the [Big 
Conjunctive Contingent Fact] of the actual world; in any case, my aim is 
just to object to the argument to this conclusion’ (Oppy 2000, p. 346). 
And, Davey and Clifton also notice as part of their refutation of the 
new argument: ‘Our main interest [italics mine] is not in the philosophy 
of science and religion steps of [Gale and Pruss’s new cosmological 
argument], but rather the logical and metaphysical assumptions 
underlying [the first steps of this argument]’ (Davey and Clifton 2001, 
p. 486). Yet, as we have seen, all discussed attempts to reject the first 
part of Gale and Pruss’s argument have failed.118 Now, in what follows 
I shall show that Gale and Pruss’s cosmological argument can be refuted 
after all if we provisionally grant there being some explanation q of p 
and subsequently shift our attention to some unnoticed weaknesses 
involving the neglected second part of their new cosmological 
argument. I do this by proposing two objections to Gale and Pruss’s 
argument that address these weaknesses and that I take to be cogent.
 
the possibil it y  of An infinite  downwArd regress  within 
the proposition q is  not exCluded
Stage (7) of Gale and Pruss’s new cosmological argument establishes 
the existence of a proposition q that explains the actual world’s 
Big Conjunctive Contingent Fact. Now, as we saw, the argument 
proceeds with the claim that proposition q is either a personal or a 
scientific explanation. Gale and Pruss hold that q cannot be a scientific 
explanation since q, if contingent, would have to explain itself119 
whereas scientific laws, according to Gale and Pruss, are contingent but 
not self-explaining. Well, I surely agree that scientific laws, if contingent, 
are not self explaining, since within Gale and Pruss’s formal framework a 
117 It should be noted, though, 
that, although Almeida and 
Judisch (2002) do not specifically 
object to q being contingent, 
in their reductio ad absurdum 
of Gale and Pruss’s argument 
they make use of the fact that 
according this argument q is in 
fact contingently true. They need 
this fact in order to start-up their 
reductio.
118 Surely, for that matter, the 
aforementioned three objections 
that do focus on the second 
part of Gale and Pruss’s new 
cosmological argument also have 
to be rejected, as I argued for 
earlier in this chapter as well.
119 Indeed, q is an explanation of 
the conjunction of all contingent 
truths, and thus, since Gale and 
Pruss take explanation to be 
dissective, q also explains each 
individual contingent truth, 
including q if q is contingent.
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proposition that explains itself is either a (self-evident) necessary truth, 
or the report of a libertarian free action (which applies to personal, not 
scientific, explanations). However, there seems to be no reason to hold 
that all scientific laws are contingent. Why couldn’t there be some final 
scientific theory, i.e. ‘a theory of everything’, that consists of one or 
more necessarily true scientific laws? Perhaps the universe we inhabit is 
just one of many universes that together comprise a single multiverse 
governed by one or more necessarily true scientific laws. Moreover, 
perhaps these necessary laws imply that each of the individual universes 
inherits some specific collection of natural laws. This would explain 
why the natural laws ruling our universe appear to be contingent. Or, 
as another option, perhaps the scientific laws known to us are not the 
most basic laws governing the universe. Perhaps there are much more 
fundamental, necessarily true, laws that ultimately govern the universe 
and that conclusively explain all seemingly arbitrary aspects of the 
scientific laws we today appeal to, such as the seemingly arbitrary values 
of the cosmological constants. However, I shall not further pursue this 
criticism. Let us for now grant that all scientific laws are contingent. In 
that case, indeed, as mentioned, it follows that proposition q cannot 
be a scientific explanation. Thus q must be a personal explanation.120 
Now, the problem I want to point to occurs at stage (11) of Gale and 
Pruss’s argumentation. They maintain that a personal explanation 
allows for only two options: either q reports the intentional action of 
a contingent being or q reports the intentional action of a necessary 
being. Yet, as I already mentioned earlier in this chapter, I do not believe 
that these two options exhaust the possibilities of what could count 
as a personal explanation. Perhaps, one could argue that these two 
options exhaust the possibilities of a one-person explanation, but there 
is no reason at all why we should exclude there being many-person 
explanations. I take this to be a quite fundamental point. Remember that 
the framework of Gale and Pruss allows for infinite propositions, that 
is, propositions consisting of infinitely many conjuncts, and it seems 
to me that q, being the explanation of the Big Conjunctive Contingent 
Fact, which is plausibly an infinite proposition, could very well be 
an infinite proposition itself. For example, why couldn’t there exist 
infinitely many necessarily existing persons {Pn}n such that person P1 
intentionally brought the universe into existence, P2 intentionally and 
necessarily121 brought P1 into existence, P3 intentionally and necessarily 
brought P2 into existence, P4 intentionally and necessarily brought 
P3 into existence, and so on, ad infinitum? In this case we do have a 
multi-person explanation, and thus a personal explanation, of the 
universe at our disposal that doesn’t meet stage (11). One might object 
that necessarily existing persons cannot be caused. But, as I argued 
earlier, there is no reason at all to maintain that there couldn’t exist 
some being that exists necessarily because it is caused in each and 
every possible world. The only remaining way to exclude such multi-
person explanations might be to notice that they imply there being an 
infinite downward regress of causes, which violates our basic intuitions. 
120 Note that I already conceded 
earlier in this chapter that, 
plausibly, there are no more than 
two different types of explanation, 
being ‘scientific explanations’ and 
‘personal explanations’. Therefore, 
if q is not a scientific explanation, 
then we may indeed reasonably 
conclude that q must be a 
personal explanation.
121 In order to count as a 
coherent explanation it is required 
to maintain that P1 is necessarily 
brought into existence by P2. For, 
if not, P1 would be a contingent 
being, and therefore part of the 
universe. Now, since P1 brought 
the universe into existence it 
would follow that P1 brought itself 
into existence, which is absurd: 
no contingent being can be its 
own originating cause. The same 
holds for all other persons in 
the collection {Pn}n. Note that to 
derive (12) from stage (11) of their 
argument Gale and Pruss make a 
quite similar point.
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However, this does not seem to be sufficiently convincing, since an 
infinite downward regress of causes might be possible, even though it 
is hard for us to conceive. Besides, and more importantly, such a move 
would imply that Gale and Pruss’s new cosmological argument is no 
improvement over the mediaeval cosmological argument of Aquinas, 
that is, ‘the second way’ of his ‘Five Ways’ in Summa Theologiæ, which, 
as shown in an earlier chapter, ultimately also relies on nothing more 
than the implausibility of an infinite regress of causes. Therefore, an 
appeal to the intuitive impossibility of an infinite downward regress of 
causes is not an option for Gale and Pruss. Their goal is to provide an 
improved cosmological argument that does not rely on the implausibility 
of an infinite downward regress of causes.122 This is quite relevant 
because most (if not all) non-theists do not accept the absurdity of 
such a regress. Indeed, there would be no need at all for an improved 
cosmological argument if non-theists would agree that one could 
reasonably exclude there being an infinite regress. For in that case (a 
slightly improved version of) the second way of Aquinas would suffice 
to convince non-theists. So, to conclude, we have to reject stage (11) 
and therefore also the subsequent five stages of Gale and Pruss’s new 
cosmological argument.
A being thAt brings All  Contingent things into 
existenCe itself  ViolAtes  l ibertAriAn theory
At stage (14) of their new argument Gale and Pruss conclude that q is 
contingent. They argue that q entails proposition p, so that, if q would 
be necessarily true, it would follow that p reports a necessary truth as 
well, which is impossible since proposition p, being the actual world’s 
Big Conjunctive Contingent Fact, is by definition a contingent truth. 
But why do Gale and Pruss hold that q logically entails p? It is not the 
case that they contend that logical entailment is a necessary condition 
for explanation. For the formal framework of concepts and principles 
that they deploy to get their argument does not presuppose, nor 
requires, that the explanans of each explanation logically entails its 
explanandum. Indeed, as we have seen, Gale and Pruss provide a specific 
argumentation for their claim that q logically entails p: ‘[…] q entails p, 
since that a necessary being intentionally brings it about that p, entails 
that p’ (Gale and Pruss 1999, p. 467). Now, as I mentioned earlier, their 
argumentation is quite problematic. Apparently Gale and Pruss hold 
that proposition p is part of q, so that q is to be rendered as: ‘There is 
a necessary being that intentionally brought it about that p’. In other 
words, the necessary being itself brought into existence all contingent 
states of affairs verifying p. But this conflicts with the Libertarian theory 
of free will, as adopted by Gale and Pruss for their argument, because, 
under this theory, the products built by craftsmen, or the artworks 
created by artists, are contingent things that have been brought into 
existence by those people (due to their free will) instead of by the 
necessary being as reported by q. So, the only way to render stage 
(14) valid is to assume that humans do not have free will, but are just 
122 And, of course, as discussed 
earlier, they also intend their 
new cosmological argument 
to be an improved version 
of the traditional Leibnizian 
cosmological argument, which 
is based on Leibniz’s famous 
principle of sufficient reason. That 
is why Gale and Pruss’s argument, 
as they have argued, appeals to a 
much more convincing version of 
Leibniz’s principle, being the claim 
that every truth possibly has an 
explanation.
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unconscious mechanical products of the necessary being that q reports. 
This is surely something that Gale and Pruss would not be prepared to 
accept, since they both take it that human beings are libertarian free 
creatures. As a consequence, their derivation of stage (14) does not go 
through, and thus their new cosmological argument is not sufficiently 
convincing after all.
Yet, one might want to refute this objection by invoking a distinction, 
proposed by Alvin Plantinga, between strong actualization and weak 
actualization (Plantinga 1974, pp. 172–173). Thomas P. Flint explains this 
distinction in the following way: ‘[The phrase] “bring about” can be 
given (at least) two rather different meanings. On the one hand, we 
can be said to bring about that which we directly cause; on the other 
hand, we can be also be said to bring about those states of affairs 
which result, albeit not with causal necessity, from situations which we 
directly cause’ (Flint 1998, p. 110). He also gives an example to illustrate 
the difference: ‘It was […] in the first of these senses that Henry II 
brought it about that he uttered the words, “Will no one rid me of this 
turbulent priest?”; it was […] in the second of these senses that Henry 
could be said to have brought about the death of Thomas Becket [who 
was killed by four knights who freely reacted to Henry’s words]. To use 
the terminology introduced by Plantinga, Henry may have strongly 
actualized his pronouncing those words, but he only weakly actualized 
Becket’s death’ (Flint 1998, p. 111). In other words, strong actualization 
of the state of affairs X by agent S refers to the activity of agent S that 
directly determines the obtaining of X, while weak actualization refers to 
the activity of S that places one or more free creatures in circumstances 
in which they freely cause X. Now, as the response would continue, 
in order to ensure that Gale and Pruss’s argument is compatible with 
libertarian free will, proposition q, rendered as ‘There is a necessary 
being that intentionally brought it about that p’, is to be interpreted 
as: ‘There is a necessary being that intentionally weakly actualizes a 
contingent state of affairs verifying p’. This interpretation of q meets 
Gale and Pruss’s requirement that q logically entails p, for, that a 
necessary being intentionally weakly actualizes a contingent state of 
affairs verifying p, entails that p. Moreover, as the response goes, this 
specific interpretation of q allows for there being creaturely libertarian 
free agents, created by the necessary being referred to by q, whose free 
activity, together with the free acts of the necessary being, results in 
the obtaining of the state of affairs verifying p. Hence, indeed, as the 
response concludes, the aforementioned interpretation of q ensures 
that Gale and Pruss do not have to give up the idea that humans are 
endowed with free will, which forces us to reject the objection that their 
argument doesn’t allow for human free will.123 Nevertheless, I do not 
find this response convincing. In what follows I shall explain why.
Let us grant that we should indeed interpret q as the report that there is 
a necessary being that intentionally weakly actualizes a state of affairs 
123 The response I discuss here 
was suggested to me by Jeroen 
de Ridder.
95IV The cosmological argumenT of gale and Pruss
verifying p. Now, the premises of the Gale and Pruss’s argument imply 
that proposition q is a personal explanation instead of some impersonal 
scientific one. Because of this the intentionality of the necessary being in 
question is crucial. It is not just the case that some necessarily existing 
entity produced unintentionally and wholly arbitrarily some agents 
whose free choices just happened to result into a contingent state of 
affairs verifying p. For, such a course of events would not be a genuine 
case of intentionally actualizing p. In order for q to be a genuine personal 
explanation, the necessary being as reported by q must therefore have 
had p in mind as a goal. Indeed, it actualized p intentionally. Its aim was 
precisely to actualize p and not something else. From this observation 
it follows that what proposition q is in fact saying is that there is a 
necessary being A that intentionally creates a collection of free agents 
B and circumstances C such that the free acts of A and B together result 
in a contingent state of affairs verifying p. But how was this necessary 
being able to do that? How did this being succeed that p and only p was 
actualized instead of something else? The only way seems to be that the 
necessary being in question has so-called ‘middle knowledge’.
Now, the notion of middle knowledge was introduced by the sixteenth 
century theologian Luis de Molina.124 It holds that God knows truths 
about how any individual person would freely act in any situation, if that 
person would be placed in that situation. More precisely, to say that 
God has middle knowledge is to say that God has knowledge of all true 
counterfactuals of creaturely freedom, that is, of all counterfactuals of 
the form ‘If creaturely essence P were instantiated in […] circumstances 
C […], the instantiation of P would (freely) do A’ (Flint 1998, p. 47). Note 
that each true counterfactual of creaturely freedom is a contingently 
true proposition. Indeed, although God knows that person P would do 
X in circumstances Y, it is still true that P is free in Y not to do X, that is, 
the state of affairs of P not doing X in Y is metaphysically possible. There 
is a metaphysical possible world in which P is not doing X in Y. Also, the 
true counterfactuals of creaturely freedom are not under God’s control. 
Thus, God’s middle knowledge limits His creative options. Due to God’s 
middle knowledge, there are universes that God cannot actualize. In 
other words, there are universes that are metaphysically possible but 
nevertheless not feasible for God to bring about. Therefore, to specify 
God’s middle knowledge amounts to specifying which metaphysically 
possible universes are feasible for God to actualize. In the specific case 
of Gale and Pruss’s new argument, if we assume that the necessary 
being reported by q has middle knowledge, then, indeed, the necessary 
being is able to intentionally create a collection of free agents B and 
circumstances C such that the B’s free actions, together with the 
necessary being’s free actions, result in a state of affairs verifying p, 
thus reconciling Gale and Pruss’s argument with human free will. But, 
this doesn’t mean that the response to the objection is convincing. For, 
first, it relies on the presumption that the necessary being has middle 
knowledge, which is a quite drastic and rather controversial assumption. 
124 See Flint (1998) for a solid 
development and defense of 
the Molinist account of middle 
knowledge.
Towards a  renewed Case for Theism96
In any case, the invocation of middle knowledge seems to be a much 
too strong premise for a cosmological argument to rely on, especially 
if we take into account that Gale and Pruss’s aim is to establish a new 
cosmological argument based on weaker premises than the traditional 
arguments. Second, I take it that the whole concept of middle 
knowledge is not sufficiently tenable. For, how could the necessary 
being, or for that matter, God, a priori know what some agent will freely 
do in a specific situation? If that agent is truly free, then it is really finally 
up to the agent itself what to do, and there just isn’t something for 
God to know upfront about what that free agent will freely do in those 
circumstances.
Moreover, I propose the following argument against middle knowledge. 
Let us suppose that Molinism holds. In that case, there is at least one 
true counterfactual of creaturely freedom, that is, it is true that subject 
S in circumstances C will freely perform action A. Let us denote this 
true counterfactual by {S, C, A}. Now, since {S, C, A} is true, S will in 
fact perform A in C. Yet, since S is a libertarian free agent, S could have 
decided not to do A in C. Thus S could have brought it about that {S, C, 
A} is false. Hence, S could have brought it about that {S, C, A} is true 
and false.125 In other words, although S will not do A in C, S still had 
the power in C to do A. But this is impossible. Nobody, free or not, 
can ever be in a position to bring it about that a logical contradiction 
obtains. There just aren’t situations in which an agent would be capable 
of realizing a logical contradiction, even if that agent never uses 
this alleged power. Therefore we have to conclude that our original 
assumption that Molinism holds is not cogent. Middle knowledge is 
untenable.
Based upon the above considerations, I conclude that the proposed 
refutation is not convincing. Thus, the objection that Gale and Pruss’s 
new argument cannot be reconciled with human free will remains 
cogent, until a more convincing rejection of it is proposed.
Closing remarks
As we have seen all objections mentioned by Gale and Pruss are already 
properly refuted by themselves or can be cogently refuted if we take 
some further considerations into account. The classical Humean, 
Kantian and Russellian objections to their argument do not go through 
either, and the same is true of the main contemporary objections from 
Oppy, Davey and Clifton, and Almeida and Judisch. Yet, I showed that 
there are two strong objections against Gale and Pruss’s cosmological 
argument. In the next chapter I turn to a detailed assessment of the 
various cosmological arguments of J. Rasmussen.
125 Note that the following 
modal-logical principle is applied 
here. If proposition X is true, and 
if agent S has the power to bring 
it about that proposition Y is true, 
then S has also the power to bring 
it about that the conjunction of X 
and Y is true. Indeed, {S, C, A} is 
assumed to be true, and S has the 
power to bring it about that {S, C, 
A} is false, so that the principle 
entails that S has the power to 
bring it about that the conjunction 
of {S, C, A} and the negation of {S, 
C, A} is true, that is, that {S, C, A} 
is both true and false.
V Cosmological arguments of 
Rasmussen
Introduction
As we have seen in the previous chapter, Gale and Pruss (1999) arrive at 
a new cosmological argument by turning Leibniz’s principle of sufficient 
reason, that is, the principle according to which every contingent truth 
actually has an explanation, into a weaker version, holding ‘only’ that 
every contingent truth possibly has an explanation. Their reason for 
doing so, as discussed, is that, due to the objections raised, amongst 
others by Peter van Inwagen (1983), Leibniz’s principle has become 
quite controversial for many nontheists, such as for example Oppy 
(2000). Yet, as I explained in the chapter on the traditional cosmological 
arguments of Aquinas and Leibniz, there is a restricted version of Leibniz’s 
principle that is, as I showed, not vulnerable to Van Inwagen’s criticism. 
This restricted version is, as we saw, the principle according to which 
every contingent concrete object actually has a cause for its existence. 
Hence, the restricted version merely claims that contingent concrete 
objects have originating causes, not that all contingent truths have 
explanations. Now, recently Joshua Rasmussen has proposed a renewed 
cosmological argument for the existence of a concrete necessary being 
(Rasmussen 2010a, pp. 183–194). His point of departure, as I understand 
it, is to do the same to the restricted version of Leibniz’s principle as 
Gale and Pruss did to Leibniz’s principle itself, that is to say, Rasmussen 
turns the restricted version of Leibniz’s principle into the following weak 
version: every contingent concrete object possibly has a cause. From this 
weak restricted version he develops a path to a cosmological argument 
that I shall refer to as the argument from a maximal contingent state 
of existence. And moreover, Rasmussen has proposed three additional 
alternative paths to the existence of a concrete necessary being, which 
I shall examine in this chapter as well (Rasmussen 2010a, pp. 194–196; 
2010b).
The argument from a maximal contingent state of existence
Background framework
The main argument for the existence of a concrete necessary being that 
Rasmussen develops assumes a metaphysical framework. Central to this 
framework is the existence of ‘abstract states of affairs that can obtain 
or fail to obtain’ (Rasmussen 2010a, p. 183).126 For example, that Paris 
is the capital of France is an abstract state of affairs that obtains, and 
126 Rasmussen often omits the 
adjective ‘abstract’ when talking 
about abstract states of affairs. 
Similarly, in what follows, I shall 
use the phrase ‘state of affairs’ as 
a short-hand for ‘abstract state 
of affairs’.
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127 One might wonder how one 
state of affairs can entail another 
state of affairs. It seems that, 
according to Rasmussen, state of 
affairs X entails state of affairs Y 
if and only if the proposition that 
X obtains entails the proposition 
that Y obtains, which I take to be 
a cogent definition of entailment 
between states of affairs.
128 Note that in this formulation 
a direct reference to entailment 
between states of affairs is 
avoided. Instead the definition 
of entailment between states 
of affairs, as mentioned in the 
previous footnote, is invoked.
that Paris is the capital of Italy is an abstract state of affairs that fails to 
obtain. In general, as becomes apparent from Rasmussen’s paper, a state 
of affairs is taken to be comprised of one or more concrete objects, and, 
optionally, of some of their properties or interrelationships. Further, the 
framework includes the conception of ‘possible world’, which is defined 
by Rasmussen in the following way: ‘A possible world W is a state of 
affairs such that for every possible state of affairs, W either entails it 
or its complement’ (2010a, p. 184).127 This definition gives rise to two 
worries. First, the definition refers explicitly to possible states of affairs. 
Now, this may seem to suggest that according to Rasmussen there are 
also impossible states of affairs. But, what is the meaning of these types 
of states of affairs? It seems wholly unfeasible to provide a definition 
of both sorts without assuming a prior understanding of the notion of 
possible world. And this, if true, renders the definition circular. Now, in 
fact the adjective ‘possible’ in the definition is redundant. It does not do 
any work. Indeed, Rasmussen’s framework is premised on a fixed given 
collection of abstract states of affairs and hence the adjective ‘possible’ 
can simply be removed from the definition. As a second worry, the 
definition takes it that each abstract state of affairs has a complement. 
Yet, Rasmussen does not provide a definition of the complement of a 
state of affairs. Does he assume that the complement of a state of affairs 
is itself a state of affairs? So, for example, are we supposed to assume 
that the complement of the state of affairs that Paris is the capital of 
France would be the state of affairs that Paris is not the capital of France? 
But, one might ask, could the latter really be a structural element of 
reality? Therefore, to avoid the objection that negative states of affairs 
are ‘just unwarranted reifications’ Rasmussen would have to introduce 
and defend a thorough conception of negative states of affairs, and this 
he does not do in his paper. Now, surely, Rasmussen could argue that 
the complement of a state of affairs is not a single state of affairs, but 
instead a whole range of states of affairs. For example, the complement 
of the state of affairs that Paris is the capital of France would be a 
collection including states of affairs such as that Paris is the capital of 
Italy, that Nice is the capital of France, and many more. Such a move 
would suffice to avoid the aforementioned objection. Nevertheless, 
without providing a proper definition of the complement of a state of 
affairs Rasmussen’s reference to complements of states is unfounded. 
Still, this second worry can be resolved if we modify the definition as 
follows: A possible world W is an abstract state of affairs such that for 
every abstract state of affairs S, the proposition that W obtains either 
entails that S obtains or that S does not obtain.128 This definition does 
not contain any reference to complements of states of affairs anymore. 
In what follows I shall assume this definition.
Rasmussen leaves the notion of ‘obtainment’ undefined. It is one of 
the primitive terms of his metaphysical framework. Instead of saying 
that an abstract state of affairs obtains [does not obtain] one could also 
say that that state of affairs is actual [non-actual]. The framework also 
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includes the notions of necessary and contingent state of affairs. Here 
Rasmussen adopts the well-known characterizations, that is, state of 
affairs X is necessary if and only if X exists in all possible worlds, and, 
state of affairs X is contingent if and only if X exists in some but not all 
possible worlds (2010a, p. 184). In these definitions ‘existence’ is a two-
place predicate. It takes a state of affairs and a possible world as its 
arguments: state of affairs A exists in world B. Conversely, ‘obtainment’ 
is a one-place predicate, taking a state of affairs as its argument: state 
of affairs A obtains. So, in Rasmussen’s framework the notion ‘existence’ 
is, contrary to that of ‘obtainment’, always relative to a possible world. 
Rasmussen’s metaphysical framework further presumes that causal 
interactions are relations between obtaining states of affairs. Thus, we 
can speak about some obtaining state of affairs S having a cause or a 
causal explanation (Rasmussen 2010a, p. 184). One final characteristic 
of Rasmussen’s background framework that needs to be mentioned is 
that it includes S5 modal logic, most importantly the modal axioms that 
‘if it is possible that it is necessary that P, then it follows that it is simply 
necessary that P’, and, ‘if it is necessary that P, then it is necessary that 
it is necessary that P’ (Rasmussen 2010a, p. 184). With these remarks 
we are now in the position to follow the path of Rasmussen to his 
cosmological argument for the existence of a concrete necessary being.
The argument
As mentioned Rasmussen’s first steppingstone is to posit the principle 
that each contingent concrete object possibly has a cause that 
accounts for its existence. This principle is indeed rather intuitive. 
Rasmussen states: ‘[It] can be supported by reflecting upon familiar 
concrete objects. Consider, for example, your favorite armchair. 
Surely the armchair’s existence can be the result of causal factors, 
such as a craftsman or factory machine piecing together materials 
[…]. The principle seems to apply to very small objects, too: neutrinos, 
for example, can be produced from proton collisions in a particle 
accelerator. It is natural to generalize: […] any contingent concrete 
object can have a cause’ (2010a, p. 185). Rasmussen notes that, assuming 
Kripkean origin essentialism, this principle entails the stronger and 
more controversial thesis that each contingent concrete object actually 
has a cause. For, ‘Kripke’s doctrine […] implies that necessarily, if a 
[concrete contingent] object has no cause, then it cannot have a cause 
(if having no cause is a kind of origin)’ (2010a, p. 185). And this, indeed, 
would directly contradict the principle that concrete contingents 
are possibly caused. However, in what follows Rasmussen does not 
adopt Kripke’s view that objects have their origin essentially. Further, 
Rasmussen readily acknowledges that perhaps the principle might fail 
for concrete objects that are radically different from ‘ordinary concrete 
particulars’ such as armchairs and neutrinos. Therefore, in order to 
avoid the objection that there is no ground to accept the principle as a 
universal rule, he opts for a defeasible reading of it: Normally, if X is a 
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contingent concrete object, then, possibly, X is caused. In other words, 
we are justified to apply the principle in a given case; unless there is a 
good reason for holding that the case in question is in fact an exception 
to the rule. Take for example the uncaused contingent that I constructed 
in the chapter on the traditional cosmological arguments of Aquinas and 
Leibniz. In order to arrive at a case that is an exception to the default 
rule that concrete contingents are possibly caused, I shall slightly modify 
that example below, while limiting myself to a brief sketch. Those who 
would like to work out the modified example in its full detail should 
refer back to the details I provided in the aforementioned chapter. Now, 
consider some contingent concrete object F that is essentially composed 
of two parts, F1 and F2, such that, essentially, one of these parts, say 
F1, is the originating cause of the other part, F2. In that case, object F 
is uncaused in every possible world in which F exists. For, suppose to 
the contrary that object F is caused in some possible world W. Now, 
plausibly, the cause of F2 is a part of the complete cause of F since F2 
is one of the caused parts of F. But F1 is the cause of F2. Hence F1 is a 
part of the complete cause of F. Surely F1 is a part of F as well. Thus, the 
cause of F and F itself are not disjoint, which contradicts the prima facie 
evident thesis that causes and effects must be separate existences,129 
that is to say, do not overlap. So we must conclude that the assumption 
that F is caused in W is false. In other words, there simply is no possible 
world in which object F is caused, and hence F is necessarily uncaused. 
We conclude that the case of F is a situation for which the principle that 
concrete contingents are possibly caused does not hold. Rasmussen is 
thus quite right to limit himself to a defeasible reading of this principle. 
Due to cases like that of object F it follows that the principle he adopts 
is warranted as a default rule only.130
 
The next step in Rasmussen’s pathway is to combine his basic principle 
with the premise that it is possible that there is a concrete object that 
cannot have a cause, thus arriving at an argument for there being a 
necessary being that goes back to Duns Scotus (2010a, p. 186):
 
(1) Possibly, there is a concrete object that cannot have a cause 
(premise),
(2) Every contingent concrete object, possibly, has a cause (premise),
(3) There is a necessary concrete object.
The logical derivation of this Scotistic cosmological argument is 
straightforward. According to the first premise there is a possible world 
that contains an object, say A, being uncaused in every possible world 
in which it exists. Now, due to the second premise, object A cannot be 
a contingent object. After all, every contingent object is caused in at 
least one possible world. Therefore, A is a necessarily existing object. 
Object A exists in all possible worlds, including the actual world.131 Both 
premises of this argument seem sufficiently plausible and, moreover, 
together they already entail the conclusion that Rasmussen is looking 
129 The Humean principle that 
cause and effect must be separate 
existences is to be understood 
as the claim that the originating 
cause of the coming into being 
of an object is mereologically 
disjoint with that object.
130 Those who contend that 
there are abstract objects, i.e. 
objects that cannot enter into 
causal relations, might argue 
that, in addition to necessarily 
uncaused concrete contingents, 
there are cases of necessarily 
uncaused abstract contingents. 
A putative example of such an 
abstract object is discussed by 
Peter van Inwagen (Van Inwagen 
2009, p. 6). He considers the 
proposition that Alvin Plantinga 
is an able philosopher. According 
to some philosophers, as 
Van Inwagen explains, this 
proposition, understood as being 
an abstract object that exists 
(and is true) in the actual world, 
has Alvin Plantinga itself as one 
of its essential components or 
constituents. And therefore, 
according to those philosophers, 
this proposition would not exist 
in those worlds in which Alvin 
Plantinga does not exist, making 
it an example of a necessarily 
uncaused abstract contingent.
131 Note that here we implicitly 
appeal to the earlier mentioned 
S5 modal axiom that if it is possible 
that it is necessary that P, then it 
is necessary that P. The specific 
instance appealed to here would 
be that if some object, in our case 
object A, exists necessarily in 
some possible world, then it exists 
in all possible worlds.
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for, namely, that there exists a concrete object in the actual world that 
exists necessarily. And in fact, the conclusion of the argument is even 
stronger, for, since A is both necessary and necessarily uncaused, the 
conclusion of the argument is not ‘just’ that there exists actually a 
necessary being, but that there exists actually a necessary being that 
is uncaused in each and every possible world. So, is this the cosmological 
argument Rasmussen’s pathway arrives at? Is it this argument that he 
ultimately intends to defend? No, this is not the case, for Rasmussen is 
simply not willing to accept premise (1). He argues: ‘Can we just see that 
it is possible for there to be an object that cannot have a cause, or do 
we merely fail to see that it is impossible? If we can just see that such 
an object is possible, it seems that we should just as easily be able to 
just see that the non-existence of such an object is possible, too’ (2010a, 
pp. 186–187). Now, let (1*) be the premise that it is possible for there 
not to be an object that cannot be caused. Given premise (2), if premise 
(1*) would be true, that is, if there would be a possible world in which 
there is no object that cannot have a cause, then premise (1) cannot be 
true, since (1) and (2) together entail, as we have seen, that there is a 
necessarily existing object, i.e. an object existing in all possible worlds, 
which cannot have a cause. So, given (2), if (1*) is true, and thus (1) false, 
the above Scotistic argument needs to be rejected. But, given (2), if (1) is 
true, and thus (1*) false, the conclusion Rasmussen is looking for follows. 
Moreover, as Rasmussen points out, ‘neither one [(1) nor (1*)] seems 
more evident prima facie than the other’ (2010a, p. 187). In other words, 
we have arrived at the epistemic situation of equipollence. Hence, the 
pathway to the conclusion that there actually is a necessary being has 
not been completed yet.
Before I continue with the pathway Rasmussen is following I would 
like to notice a rather significant point. At some stage of his evaluation 
of the Scotistic argument Rasmussen states the following: ‘[1*] says 
that the non-existence of a necessarily uncaused concrete object is 
possible. It follows that the non-existence of a necessary concrete 
object is possible. Now if the non-existence of a necessary concrete 
object is possible, it then follows that there isn’t a necessary concrete 
object […]’ (2010a, p. 187). This reasoning relies on a hidden premise. 
For how is it supposed to follow from (1*) that the non-existence of 
a necessary concrete object is possible? This would only follow if we 
assume that all necessary objects are necessarily uncaused. But why 
should we assume that? Why couldn’t there be a necessary object that 
is caused in all (or some) possible worlds? Indeed, as Peter van Inwagen 
points out: ‘Does ‘x exists necessarily’ entail ‘x is uncreated’? Anyone 
who said that this entailment held would be contradicted by Richard 
Swinburne, if by no one else. For Swinburne holds that the Son and 
the Holy Spirit are necessarily existent beings who were created […] 
by the Father. Revealed theology aside, one might point out, simply 
as a matter of abstract logic, that if A exists necessarily, and if it is a 
necessary truth that if A exists, then A creates B, it follows that B exists 
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necessarily’ (Van Inwagen 2009, p. 5).132 So, the claim that necessary 
objects are necessarily uncaused is groundless, unless good reasons 
for it are provided. Nevertheless, Rasmussen seems implicitly to rule 
out the possibility of caused necessary objects.133 For him necessary 
objects are necessarily uncaused.134 And in fact, it seems to me that 
this is precisely why for Rasmussen the conclusion that there exists a 
necessary being is relevant for natural theology. For, a necessary being, 
if uncaused, would be a good candidate for an ultimate first cause: God. 
But, once we realize ourselves that being necessary does not necessarily 
entail being necessarily uncaused, one might start to wonder whether 
Rasmussen’s quest for a good argument for the existence of a necessary 
being is really helpful to support theism over a-theism, as he seems to 
be thinking. For, surely, God, if anything, is uncaused,135 and therefore 
an argument for a necessary being that does not entail this necessary 
being to be uncaused cannot be sufficient to defend theism. Similarly, 
any adequate natural account of necessarily existing things, that is to 
say, any plausible conception of ‘necessary existence’ according to which 
specific natural things can be said to exist necessarily, renders each 
argument for the existence of a necessary entity useless as evidence 
for theism, unless it establishes certain ‘theistic features’ of this entity, 
such as being the first cause of the cosmos, or, perhaps, being a person 
endowed with libertarian free will and enormously powerful causal 
powers. For now I shall leave these considerations for what they are, and 
I will proceed with my evaluation of Rasmussen’s pathway to a cogent 
cosmological argument for there being a necessary being. Later on in 
this chapter I shall address the question of whether the cosmological 
argument Rasmussen arrives at entails a necessary being having enough 
‘theistic features’ to render his new cosmological argument relevant for 
the project of natural theology.
The next step for Rasmussen is to hold on to his basic principle, that 
is, normally, if X is a contingent concrete object, then, possibly, X 
is caused, and to generalize this principle to arbitrary collections of 
concrete contingent objects. For that, Rasmussen defines the notion 
of a contingent state of existence. A contingent state of existence is 
‘a possible state of affairs of certain contingent individuals, the c’s, 
existing’ (2010a, p. 189). Rasmussen uses the term ‘individual’ as a 
synonym for ‘concrete object’. Hence, a contingent state of existence 
is any possible collection of concrete contingent objects, i.e., any 
collection of concrete contingent objects that exists in at least one 
possible world. For example, if A, B and C are contingent concrete 
objects that jointly exist in some possible world, then {A, B, C} is a 
contingent state of existence. But if there is no possible world in which 
A, B and C all exist together, then {A, B, C} is not a contingent state 
of existence, even though A, B and C are contingent objects. This 
definition enables Rasmussen to formulate his generalized principle, 
which I refer to as principle (3): Normally, if S is a contingent state of 
existence, then, possibly, S is causally explained (2010a, p. 189). Now, 
132 Yet, Peter van Inwagen also 
maintains that he is ‘inclined to 
think that “x exists necessarily” 
does entail “x is uncreated”’, but 
then he immediately continues 
by saying that he will ‘not use this 
thesis as a premise because it is 
controversial and [he knows] of no 
very interesting argument for it’ 
(Van Inwagen 2009, p. 5).
133 Although his assumption is 
unfounded, it does not influence 
the fact that the earlier discussed 
Scotistic argument brings us 
in a situation of epistemic 
equipollence. For, my brief 
explanation above of how this 
equipollence arises does not 
depend on the assumption that all 
necessary objects are uncaused. 
In that sense one can consider my 
explanation as a minor correction 
of the explanation provided by 
Rasmussen himself.
134 Note that premise (2) is 
equivalent to the premise that 
all necessarily uncaused objects 
are necessary. But, of course, 
from this the opposite claim, that 
is, the claim that all necessary 
objects are necessarily uncaused, 
does not follow. Therefore, 
as mentioned, to justify one’s 
commitment to the truth of the 
opposite claim, one needs to 
argue for it, and this is something 
that Rasmussen does not do in 
his paper.
135 The property of not being 
caused by something else is an 
essential part of every adequate 
conception of God. For, if God 
would be caused by some other 
entity, then that other entity 
would be ontological prior to 
God. Moreover God would be 
ontologically dependent on that 
other entity, i.e. without that 
other entity God would not exist. 
Because of both reasons the cause 
of God would be more adequately 
called God than God itself, which 
is absurd. Indeed, traditionally, 
created gods have a specific name. 
They are called idols.
136 It may be assumed that 
Rasmussen holds that the object 
external to S is also a concrete 
object. For else, as becomes 
clear shortly, Rasmussen’s 
pathway never leads to a concrete 
necessary being, which is what 
he promised to get to at the 
beginning of his journey. Still, 
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what does it mean for the obtaining of a contingent state of existence 
to have a causal explanation? The definition Rasmussen provides is as 
follows. The obtaining of a contingent state of existence S is causally 
explained if and only if ‘for every concrete object x in S, x’s existence 
[has] a cause, and for at least one concrete object in S, its existence 
[…] is caused by (the activity or presence of) an object not in (that is, 
external to) S’ (2010a, p. 188).136 So, to say that a contingent state of 
existence is possibly caused137 is to say that, possibly, each concrete 
object in it is caused and, moreover, one of them has a cause outside 
of the contingent state of existence. Thus, while Rasmussen allows for 
there being contingent states of existence having no causal explanation, 
or having a causal explanation that is entirely internal to itself, he claims 
that it is at least possible that a contingent state of existence has a causal 
explanation involving an external cause. This seems prima facie indeed 
sufficiently plausible to accept as a causal principle. However, I will have 
a bit more to say about it in the remainder of this chapter. Principle (3) 
is, as Rasmussen maintains, a relatively modest causal principle, or at 
least, as he holds, it is more modest than the causal principles deployed 
by Richard Gale and Alexander Pruss (1999, pp. 461–467) and Robert 
Koons (1997, pp. 193–212). For Gale and Pruss’s causal principle applies to 
contingent states of affairs in general, whereas Koons’ causal principle 
states that each wholly contingent state of affairs is actually caused 
(2010a, pp. 189–190). Moreover, as Rasmussen explains, principle (3) 
is more modest than the causal principle of the Kalam cosmological 
argument according to which whatever that begins to exist has a cause. 
For, principle (3) allows for there being uncaused beginnings (2010a, 
p. 190). After all, this principle only implies that contingent states of 
existence that began to exist are possibly caused, not that they do in fact 
actually have a causal explanation. Hence (3) seems indeed the most 
modest causal principle thus far.
The next step in Rasmussen’s path to a concrete necessary being is the 
notion of a maximal contingent state of existence. A maximal contingent 
state of existence is a contingent state of existence that entails every 
contingent state of existence compatible with it (2010a, p. 191). It is 
not entirely clear what Rasmussen means with ‘being compatible with’ 
in this context. I take it that, in general, the relation ‘… is compatible 
with …’ is a relation between states of affairs, and that state of affairs 
X is compatible with state of affairs Y if and only if there is a possible 
world W in which both X and Y exist, that is, it is possible for X and Y to 
obtain together. From this it follows that a contingent state of existence 
S is maximal if and only if S contains all contingent objects in those 
possible worlds in which S exists.138 In what follows I shall denote this 
characterization of being a maximal contingent state of existence with 
(4).
Now, after the aforementioned steps, Rasmussen completes his path to 
a necessary concrete object by presenting a new cosmological argument 
we could ask ourselves why we 
should take this external object 
to be a concrete object. Couldn’t 
this external object be in some 
cases, for all we know, an abstract 
object? Most likely Rasmussen 
would respond by saying that 
abstract objects are causally inert: 
they cannot cause anything. But 
then the reader is referred to my 
remarks on causation by abstract 
objects.
137 Surely, ‘being caused’ 
is an ontological notion and 
therefore not equivalent to the 
epistemological notion of ‘having 
a causal explanation’. Yet, in the 
case of states of affairs, I shall 
occasionally use the phrase ‘is 
caused’ merely as a linguistic 
short-hand for ‘has a causal 
explanation’.
138 It is not difficult to see why 
this characterization indeed holds. 
For, let S be a maximal contingent 
state of existence. In that case S 
entails every contingent state of 
existence compatible with it. Now, 
suppose, for reductio, that S does 
not contain all contingent objects 
in some possible world in which 
S exists, say world W. In that case 
there is an object O in W such that 
S does not contain O. Now, surely, 
S is compatible with O because 
there is a world, W, in which both 
S and O exist. But then, since S 
is a maximal contingent state 
of existence, it follows that S 
entails O, which contradicts the 
fact that S does not contain O. 
Vice versa, let S be a contingent 
state of existence that contains 
all contingent objects in those 
possible worlds in which S exists. 
Now, suppose, for reductio, that 
S is not maximal. In that case 
there is a contingent state of 
existence T compatible with S and 
not entailed by S. Thus, there is a 
possible world V in which S and 
T both exist and in which S does 
not (entirely) contain T. Hence 
there is a contingent object in 
V that is not contained in S. But 
this contradicts the fact that S 
contains all contingent objects in 
those worlds in which S exist.
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for a necessarily existing being. This new cosmological argument can be 
schematically represented in the following way:
a Normally, contingent states of existence are possibly causally 
explained (principle [3]),
b There is at least one maximal contingent state of existence, say 
state M (premise),
c Maximal contingent states of existence are no exception to the 
first premise (premise)
d State M is no exception to the first premise (from b, c),
e State M is possibly causally explained (from a, d),
f There is a possible world W, in which M is causally explained 
(definition of ‘possibly’),
g In W an object N not in M causes some object in M (definition of 
‘causal explanation’),139
h State M contains all contingent objects in W (from b, [4]),
i Object N is not a contingent object in W (from g, h),
j Object N is a necessary object in W (from i),
k A necessary object exists (from j, S5).
The argument is quite straightforward. The default rule that contingent 
states of existence are possibly caused entails, combined with the 
premise that there is a maximal contingent state of existence which 
is not an exception to this rule, that there must be a possible world in 
which there exists a maximal contingent state of existence that has a 
causal explanation (2010a, p. 191). So, indeed, premises (a), (b) and (c) 
imply, through two intermediate steps, proposition (f). By definition this 
causal explanation refers to an ‘external cause’, i.e., a concrete object 
not in the maximal state, that causes one of the objects contained in 
that state. Now, surely, this external object must be a necessary object, 
for it is not contained in the maximal state and, according to (4), every 
maximal state contains all contingent objects in those worlds in which it 
exists. But then, according to the S5 axioms of modal logic, this external 
object exists in all possible worlds, including the actual world. Thus, 
there exists a necessary object, which concludes the new cosmological 
argument that Rasmussen’s pathway has arrived at.
An assessment
Is Rasmussen’s cosmological argument tenable? In any case his 
argument is deductively valid. That is to say, the conclusion that there 
exists a necessary object follows logically from the premises. The three 
main premises on which the argument is based are (a), (b) and (c). In this 
section I first discuss and asses the main reasons Rasmussen provides 
for accepting premises (a), (b) and (c). After that I assess the objections 
to his new cosmological argument as discussed by himself in his paper 
(2010a, pp. 196–199). Subsequently I propose a number of additional 
objections of my own. Finally, I shall conclude whether Rasmussen’s new 
139 Note that, as mentioned 
earlier, Rasmussen takes object N 
to be a concrete object. Hence the 
necessarily existing object arrived 
at by his cosmological argument, 
i.e. object N, is in fact a necessary 
concrete object.
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cosmological argument, if we take into account these assessed reasons 
and objections, is sufficiently justified and thus reasonable to accept.
An Assessment of rAsmussen’s  CAse  for ACCepting the 
f irst  premise
As we have seen earlier, Rasmussen introduces the first premise, that 
is, principle (3), as a generalization of his basic principle that, normally, 
contingent objects are possibly caused. He supports this basic principle, 
as we saw as well, by appealing to typical examples, such as armchairs 
and neutrino’s, for which it is quite clear that they can be caused, e.g. 
in furniture factories respectively particle accelerators. Hence, as 
Rasmussen holds, the basic principle is sufficiently plausible. It is natural 
enough to be accepted, especially as a defeasible rule. But how does he 
defend its generalization, that is, how does he ground his premise that, 
normally, contingent states of existence are possibly causally explained? 
In his paper Rasmussen argues as follows: ‘If it is plausible to think 
that an armchair can have a […] cause, then it should also be plausible 
to think that there can be a […] cause of there being certain particles 
arranged armchairwise. It seems, therefore, that examples that motivate 
[the basic principle] motivate another principle in the neighborhood’ 
(2010a, p. 187). His neighborhood principle is that, normally, an 
arrangement of certain contingent concrete objects,140 i.e., a possible 
state of affairs of certain contingent concrete objects that are related 
to one another in a certain way, possibly, has a causal explanation 
(2010a, p. 188).141 As the above citation reveals, Rasmussen accepts this 
neighborhood principle on grounds of the same evidence as he appealed 
to for the justification of his basic principle. For his point is that if some 
given contingent arrangement resembles an object such as an armchair, 
and if contingent objects are possibly caused, then it follows that 
contingent arrangements themselves are possibly caused. However, the 
neighborhood principle talks about arrangements in general, not just 
the regular ordered ones. In other words, a switch is made from natural 
arrangements, i.e., ordered arrangements reflecting ordinary objects 
such as armchairs, to all kinds of arrangements, ranging from perfectly 
natural arrangements to the most haphazard ad hoc arrangements one 
can think of, such as the at this very moment obtaining spatiotemporal 
arrangement of my left toe, your right foot, some piece of wood 
in Ireland and the upper part of the Statue of Liberty. Rasmussen 
justifies his broadening with the observation that if we can conceive 
ordered arrangements being possibly caused, we can conceive ad hoc 
arrangements being possibly caused as well (2010a, pp. 188–189). Indeed, 
why couldn’t there be a possible world in which some supernatural 
agent brings it freely and intentionally about that some haphazard 
arrangement obtains? It would surely be a weird situation, but that does 
not imply it is broadly logically or metaphysically impossible. So, indeed, 
Rasmussen’s broadening from ordinary arrangements to arrangements 
in general seems to be sufficiently justified.142 Rasmussen continues 
his defense of the first premise by claiming that it follows from the 
140 Rasmussen often uses the 
term ‘contingent arrangement’ 
as a short-hand for referring 
to an arrangement of certain 
contingent concrete objects. In 
what follows I shall do the same.
141 As Rasmussen explains, 
this principle now also enables 
mereological nihilists to affirm 
that “armchairs”, understood by 
them as collections of simples 
arranged armchairwise , are 
possibly caused (2010a, p. 187).
142 According to mereological 
universalism any type of 
arrangement, natural or 
gerrymandered, resembles an 
object. Therefore, if mereological 
universalism is true, Rasmussen 
doesn’t need to provide a 
motivation for his switch from 
ordered arrangements to 
arrangements in general. For 
he can directly apply his basic 
principle, i.e., the principle 
that each contingent object is 
possibly caused, to each given 
arrangement. Yet, mereological 
universalism is, as I argue 
in this dissertation, not an 
uncontroversial thesis, to say the 
least.
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neighborhood principle. For, as he briefly remarks: ‘a causal explanation 
of an arrangement includes a causal explanation of the collection of 
objects in that arrangement. So, if any contingent arrangement can 
be causally explained, then so can any contingent state of existence’ 
(2010a, p. 189). This seems rather evident. A precise formal derivation 
of the first premise from the neighborhood principle would however 
proceed as follows. Let S be a contingent state of existence. Then 
there is some possible world W in which state S exists. Now, surely, 
the contingent concrete objects in S can be assumed to be arranged in 
some way in W. Thus, in W, there is an arrangement S* of the contingent 
objects of S. According to the neighborhood principle arrangement S* 
possibly has a causal explanation. But then there is a possible world 
W* in which arrangement S* has a causal explanation. We have already 
seen how Rasmussen defines the conception of a causal explanation for 
a contingent state of existence. But what does it mean for a contingent 
arrangement to have a causal explanation? As he defines, a causal 
explanation for a contingent arrangement consists of the identification 
of a cause of each object in the contingent arrangement and a cause of 
each relation between objects in the contingent arrangement, such that 
there is at least one object not in the contingent arrangement that is 
the cause of an object or a relation between objects in the contingent 
arrangement (2010a, p. 188). At first sight this definition, like that for 
being a causal explanation for a contingent state of existence, seems to 
be a salient equivocation of the meaning of ‘being a causal explanation’. 
For, as one could ask, what is the exact intuition appealed to here? It 
seems to be this. If certain particles arranged armchairwise can have a 
causal explanation, then there is something that produced this specific 
arrangement. So, what we are affirming when we hold that some given 
contingent arrangement has a causal explanation is simply that there is 
something that has produced it. Now, as a matter of fact, this definition 
entails the definition of causal explanation for contingent arrangements 
provided by Rasmussen. For if there is something, say A, that has 
produced the contingent arrangement B, then A has produced each 
object and relationship between objects in B. Thus we have properly 
identified a cause of every object and relation in B, being in each case 
either A itself or some proper part of A. Moreover, surely, either A itself 
or a proper part of A must exist external to the arrangement B, since 
nothing can be its own cause, and this ensures that there is indeed at 
least one object that is not contained in the contingent arrangement 
B, being either A or some proper part of A, and that is the cause of an 
object or relation between objects in the arrangement B. So, it follows 
that B can properly be said to have a causal explanation in the sense of 
the definition provided by Rasmussen. Hence, Rasmussen’s definition is 
not unreasonable.143
From this stipulation it is to follow, as Rasmussen’s aforementioned 
remark alludes to, that S* and the causal explanation of S* in W* 
respectively reduce to S and a causal explanation of S in W* if we simply 
143 A contingent arrangement 
is causally explained according 
to this definition only if each 
object in the arrangement 
is caused. Now, as we have 
seen before, there seem to be 
adequate examples of necessarily 
uncaused contingent objects, 
such as the earlier discussed 
case of an object F essentially 
composed of F1 and F2 such that, 
again essentially, F1 causes F2. 
So contingent arrangements, 
and, for that matter, also 
contingent states of existence, 
that contain one or more of these 
or other types of necessarily 
uncaused contingent objects, 
are themselves necessarily 
uncaused. Further, by slightly 
modifying the aforementioned 
case, it is quite straightforward 
to show that any contingent 
arrangement containing two 
objects A and B and the relation 
‘A causes B’ (assuming that 
causal relationships could be part 
of contingent arrangements) 
is another example of a 
necessarily uncaused contingent 
arrangement. So, the first premise, 
if cogent, must be considered 
as being a default, exception 
permitting, rule, just as the basic 
principle it is derived from.
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remove all relations from S* and all causes of those relations from the 
causal explanation of S*. Yet, notice that this is only true in case the 
external object figuring in the causal explanation of S* is the cause of 
an object in S*. For if that external object would be only the cause of 
one of S*’s relationships, then the causal explanation of S* cannot be 
reduced to a causal explanation of S. After all, what would be the object 
not in S causing one of the objects in S? To avoid this complication 
Rasmussen must include in his definition the requirement that the 
external object causes at least one object in the contingent arrangement. 
Without this modification Rasmussen’s derivation of the first premise 
from the neighborhood principle fails. Yet, I take this modification to be 
unproblematic, and I assume it in this rest of this section.144 And thus, 
indeed, within Rasmussen’s framework, the neighborhood principle 
entails the first premise of his argument: normally, contingent states of 
existence are possibly caused.
So, indeed, Rasmussen’s evidence for his basic principle can be used 
for grounding the first premise as well. Nevertheless I take it that the 
derivation that Rasmussen himself provides is too laborious. I suggest 
the following more direct, and for that matter, also more convincing, 
derivation. The derivation I propose doesn’t appeal to the concept 
of contingent arrangement at all. It relies on the more fundamental 
notion of contingent state of existence only and goes as follows. Let 
S be a contingent state of existence. From the basic principle that 
normally contingent objects are possibly caused it follows that for each 
contingent object si in S there is a possible world wi in which si is caused. 
So, there is some cause ci for si in wi. Now, prima facie there seems to 
be no reason at all to hold that there isn’t some possible world w in 
which all the ci obtain together and cause respectively all si. So, at first 
sight, it might seem that we can conclude our derivation by observing 
that world w is an example of a possible world in which S itself is 
caused. Yet, our derivation cannot be settled so easily. For, suppose S 
consists of the objects s1, s2 and s3. Further, assume s1 causes s2 in w1, s2 
causes s3 in w2, and s3 causes s1 in w3. In that case, following the above 
reasoning, there would be a world w in which s1, s2 and s3 taken together 
would cause s1, s2 and s3 taken together. But this is absurd, for nothing 
can be its own cause. Therefore, to complete our derivation one must 
require that at least one of the ci is not part of S. This isn’t a problematic 
additional requirement, since for any object one can always postulate 
an intrinsic duplicate,145 that is, a second object that has exactly the 
same fundamental characteristics and capabilities as the original 
object. And, moreover, we can stipulate that duplicate to be not a part 
of contingent state of existence S at all. Hence, to avoid problematic 
cases similar to the example above one can simply stipulate one or more 
of such duplicates. And so it follows that S is possibly caused, which 
concludes the derivation of the first premise. This alternative derivation 
amounts to the observation that something (in this case a collection of 
contingent objects) that possibly exists and, moreover, the constituents 
144 Nevertheless, perhaps 
one might want to object that 
this modification is ad hoc or 
arbitrary. For, as one could ask, 
why shouldn’t we require that 
the external object causes at 
least one relation between objects 
in the arrangement? What is 
the justification for choosing 
object here rather than relation 
between objects? A response 
would be that without objects 
no relations between objects can 
obtain, while relations between 
objects are not needed for 
objects to obtain. Thus, a proper 
definition of causal explanation 
for contingent arrangements 
should refer to something outside 
the arrangement causing at 
least one of the arrangement’s 
objects instead of one of its 
relations between objects. So, as 
mentioned, the modification is 
warranted.
145 In his paper Rasmussen, for a 
quite different reason, also makes 
use of the notion of ‘intrinsic 
duplicate’, which he defines as 
follows: ‘An intrinsic duplicate 
of [an object] is an object having 
all the same intrinsic properties 
(e.g., shape, size, mass) as [the 
first] object’ (2010a, p. 185). Now, 
perhaps one might argue that 
a first cause, if there is one, is 
an object for which there is no 
intrinsic duplicate. Indeed, one 
can show that under specific 
conditions there can be only one 
uncaused direct or indirect cause 
of everything else. This is not 
a problem either, since we can 
simply add the assumption that 
there is no first cause to any first 
cause argument in order to arrive 
at a reductio of that assumption, 
thus showing that there is a first 
cause.
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of which (in this case the collection’s objects) are possibly caused, is 
itself possibly caused, which indeed seems to be a sufficiently plausible 
and thus reasonable thesis.
An Assessment of rAsmussen’s  CAse  for ACCepting the 
seCond premise
According to the second premise of Rasmussen’s new cosmological 
argument there is at least one maximal contingent state of existence. 
Thus, on account of characterization (4), there is a contingent state of 
existence that contains all the contingent objects in all possible worlds 
in which it exists. His initial defense of the second premise can be 
paraphrased as follows. A maximally incompatible object146 either exists 
or not. If there is such an object, then it is in itself a maximal contingent 
state of existence, and thus the second premise is true. If, on the 
other hand, there is no maximally incompatible object, then, plausibly, 
contingent objects are in general compatible with one another.147 
Hence, every contingent object is compatible with every other. From 
this it follows that the collection obtained by taking all contingent objects 
together is a contingent state of existence, that is, there is some possible 
world in which this collection exists. Now, surely, the state of affairs of 
all contingent objects taken together is a maximal contingent state of 
existence. So, also in the second case it follows that the second premise 
is true. This concludes Rasmussen’s initial defense (2010a, pp. 191–192).
Yet, interestingly enough, Rasmussen challenges his initial defense by 
suggesting that, for all we know, there might be some wholly compatible 
collections of contingent objects148 that still cannot obtain because they 
are ‘too large’ (2010a, p. 192). Now, if there are such collections, we are 
not justified to conclude that some given wholly compatible collection 
of contingent objects is a contingent state of existence. After all, it 
might be too large to obtain. So, if there are too large wholly compatible 
collections of contingent objects, then the initial defense of the 
second premise fails. Indeed, in the second case of this defense it was 
concluded that the collection of all contingent objects taken together is 
a contingent state of existence because it is wholly compatible, and, as 
mentioned, such an inference is unwarranted. For the wholly compatible 
collection of all contingent objects taken together might nevertheless 
be too large to obtain. Besides, if there are too large collections of 
contingent objects, then the collection of all contingent objects taken 
together, being the largest collection of contingent objects, is in fact 
too large to obtain and thus cannot be a contingent state of existence. 
Now, is there a good reason to accept that there are in fact too large 
collections of contingent objects? The example that Rasmussen provides 
to illustrate that we have indeed a good reason to believe that such 
collections exist is as follows. He assumes that space is continuous, that 
material objects are spatially extended, that material objects do not 
overlap in space and, last but not least, that for every possible shape 
there can be a material object having that shape. These assumptions 
146 Rasmussen defines a 
maximally incompatible object as a 
contingent concrete object ‘which 
is necessarily incompatible with 
every other contingent concrete 
object’ (2010a, p. 191). Thus a 
maximally incompatible object 
is the only contingent concrete 
object in those possible worlds in 
which it exists.
147 As Rasmussen points out: 
‘For example, if there can be a 
particle p that’s incompatible with 
the existence of your favorite 
armchair, then why can’t there be 
a particle q that is incompatible 
with your armchair as well as p? 
Furthermore, why can’t there be 
a particle z that is incompatible 
with your armchair, p, q, and 
anything else?’ (2010a, p. 192). So, 
if there are incompatible objects, 
then plausibly there is a maximally 
incompatible object. But then, 
indeed, in the absence of such an 
object all objects are in general 
compatible.
148 Here and in what follows a 
wholly compatible collection of 
contingent objects is defined as a 
collection of contingent objects 
for which it is true that all its 
objects are mutually compatible. 
Two contingent objects are said 
to be mutually compatible if and 
only if there is a possible world in 
which both of them exist. So, in 
short, all the objects within some 
wholly compatible collection of 
contingent objects are compatible 
with one another, i.e., every object 
in such a collection is compatible 
with each other object in that 
collection.
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entail that the cardinality of the wholly compatible collection of all 
possible material objects is higher than the cardinality of space itself.149 
Hence, ‘there isn’t enough space to fit every possible material object’ 
(2010a, p. 192). And therefore the collection of all possible material 
objects, although wholly compatible, is too large to obtain. In other 
words, although all objects in the collection are compatible with one 
another, i.e. for each pair of objects there is some possible world in 
which that pair exists, there isn’t enough space for all of them to obtain 
together (2010a, p. 192). Rasmussen believes that this example does 
show that we have reasons to assume that there really are wholly 
compatible collections of contingent objects that, despite them being 
wholly compatible, cannot obtain because they simply are too large. 
And, as mentioned, from this it follows that his initial defense fails.
Now, how does Rasmussen overcome this interesting challenge 
to his initial defense of the second premise? He argues as follows: 
‘Nevertheless, even granting the […] assumptions, there may still be 
maximal [contingent] states of existence that aren’t too large. Consider 
a world containing a [contingent] object that necessarily takes up 
all of space.150 Call this object Big Blob. […] Then a contingent state 
of existence consisting of Big Blob, plus all […] [contingent] objects 
compatible with it (non-spatial and/or overlapping ones), is maximal.151 
Therefore, we can support [the second premise] without accepting the 
possibility of a maximally incompatible object’ (2010a, pp. 192–193). 
However, this reasoning fails. First, for all we know, there could be 
two contingent objects (non-spatial and/or overlapping ones) both 
compatible with Big Blob but incompatible with one another. In that 
case the collection of Big Blob, plus all contingent objects compatible 
with it (non-spatial and/or overlapping ones) cannot obtain and thus is 
not a contingent state of existence, let alone a maximal one. Second, 
there might be another reason for Big Blob, plus all contingent objects 
compatible with it (non-spatial and/or overlapping ones) being too 
large to obtain. For, why would space limitations be the only possible 
ontological reason for some collection of contingent objects being too 
large to obtain? Plausibly, there is more to ontology then just ‘fitting 
objects into a region of space’ (2010a, p. 192). Indeed, if there is not 
enough space for some collections of contingent spatially extended 
objects to obtain together, then, in general, there might not be enough 
‘being’ for some collections of contingent objects simpliciter, spatial or 
non-spatial, overlapping or non-overlapping, to obtain together.152 And 
therefore, for all we know, it could be true that the collection proposed 
by Rasmussen, i.e., Big Blob plus everything compatible with it, is in this 
more generic sense still too large to possibly obtain. So Rasmussen has 
not really provided us with a sufficiently convincing reason to accept his 
second premise.
 
Yet, one might rebut the above refutation of the response of Rasmussen 
to his own challenge in the following way. To ground his new 
149 It can be shown within the 
context of mathematical set 
theory that the cardinality of 
the set of all possible shapes 
on a given continuum is indeed 
higher than the cardinality of that 
continuum itself.
150 It seems reasonable to 
presume that such an object is 
metaphysically possible. Perhaps 
there is some type of destructive 
continuous ‘stuff’ occupying all 
space it can take. Surely, if the 
possible world in which that stuff 
exists is a multi-verse, then each 
single universe of the multi-verse 
must contain some part of it.
151 Rasmussen takes it that 
there are non-spatial and/or 
overlapping contingent objects. 
This follows indeed from applying 
the first premise of his argument 
to the collection consisting of Big 
Blob only, as Rasmussen explains 
(2010a, p. 192). Note that he must 
hold that at least one of any two 
overlapping objects, if there are 
such objects, is immaterial, since, 
as said, he assumes that material 
objects do not overlap each other.
152 ‘Being’ perhaps understood 
here along the lines of a 
Heideggerian ontological 
difference, i.e., being as the 
common ground of all beings or 
that by virtue of which all beings 
are beings and which therefore 
itself can not be identified 
with any one of them. This is 
not to say there are not other 
interpretations of ‘being’.
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cosmological argument he adopted a highly generic framework of states 
of affairs. According to this generic framework, a state of affairs refers to 
a collection of objects and, optionally, to properties of, and relationships 
between, those objects. So, as far as this framework is concerned, reality 
is comprised of objects, properties of objects and relationships between 
objects, and nothing else. Hence, objects, properties and relationships 
are all there is to reality. But then, from the point of view of this highly 
generic framework, even time and space itself are objects, properties of 
objects and/or relationships between objects. Indeed, every ontological 
category one could possibly think of is absorbed by his framework as a 
specific conglomeration of objects, properties and relationships. Now, 
what would it mean, under this framework, to say that some collection 
of contingent objects is ‘too large to obtain’? What could possibly 
account for that collection being ‘too large’? Let us assess in more detail 
the example provided by Rasmussen. The reason for the collection of all 
possible material objects being ‘too large’ was the fact that these objects 
were supposed to fit within space. In short, there is not enough space 
to fit all matter. So, what we have here is, on the one hand, the sum of 
all material objects (‘all of reality’s matter’) and, on the other hand, all 
of reality’s space. These two, all of reality’s matter and all of reality’s 
space can properly be understood as two separate objects within the 
framework of Rasmussen. But then, Rasmussen actually misunderstood, 
from the point of view of his own framework, the import of his example. 
For, from the perspective of his metaphysical framework, he should 
have said that his example in fact shows that there are two objects 
that are not mutually compatible, namely all of reality’s matter (or, in 
short, matter) and all of reality’s space (or, in short, space). Hence, what 
Rasmussen did in fact show, within the context of his highly generic 
metaphysical framework, is that there are two mutually incompatible 
objects.153 And this implies, as discussed, that we are sufficiently 
warranted to hold that there must be some maximally incompatible 
object, which, as mentioned as well, straightforwardly entails that the 
second premise is true. Therefore, it can be concluded that, if we accept 
Rasmussen’s highly generic, object-oriented, ontological framework, 
we are justified after all to maintain that the second premise of his new 
cosmological argument is sufficiently reasonable.154
An Assessment of rAsmussen’s  CAse  for ACCepting the 
third premise
The third premise of Rasmussen’s cosmological argument contends 
that maximal contingent states of existence155 are no exception to the 
first premise, that is, one can reasonably infer that maximal contingent 
states are possibly caused. So, for each maximal contingent state there 
is a possible world in which that state has a cause. This premise seems 
prima facie problematic. Let me explain why. According to (4) a maximal 
contingent state contains all the contingent objects in all possible 
worlds in which it exists. Now, let S be a maximal contingent state and 
let A be some contingent object not in S. Then S and A are incompatible 
153 From this it follows that the 
largest collection of contingent 
objects, that is to say, the 
collection of all contingent objects 
taken together, is incompatible, 
since, it contains two objects not 
mutually compatible.
154 So, within Rasmussen’s 
framework, the insight that 
there is not enough space for all 
collections of spatial figures to 
obtain cannot be generalized to 
the conclusion that there is not 
enough ‘being’ for all compatible 
collections of beings to obtain. 
Indeed, this generalization 
is based upon an incorrect 
analogy. For, within Rasmussen’s 
framework, spatial figures do 
not stand to space as beings 
stand to ‘being’. After all, from 
the perspective of Rasmussen’s 
object-oriented framework space 
itself is an (aggregate) object. 
In short, if we take his object-
oriented framework as point of 
departure, it becomes untenable 
to refer to a Heideggerian 
ontological distinction between 
beings and ‘being’, as the above 
presented alleged refutation is 
doing.
155 Hereafter more briefly 
referred to as ‘maximal contingent 
states’.
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because, due to (4), there is no possible world that contains both S and 
A. From this it follows that a maximal contingent state is incompatible 
with all other contingent objects. But then, one may wonder, what 
makes this to be the case? By virtue of what is a maximal contingent 
state incompatible with all other contingents? Perhaps, as one might 
argue, what makes such states incompatible with all other contingents 
is that they are incompatible with everything else simpliciter? But then 
a maximal contingent state cannot be caused at all, since its cause, 
being an object not in the state, would co-exist with it in the same 
possible world, which is impossible in case the state is incompatible 
with every other object whatsoever. Here we seem to have arrived at a 
reason to start doubting the third premise. Further, note that if maximal 
contingent states are indeed incompatible with everything else, then 
it follows that everything is contingent and hence necessary objects 
do not exist.156 Now, Rasmussen himself considers a more immediate 
doubt of the third premise by zooming in straightaway on the latter 
aspect of the existence of necessary objects. He writes: ‘A maximal 
contingent state of existence […] can be causally explained only if a 
necessary concrete object can and does exist. Yet, it is uncertain […] that 
a necessary concrete object exists. Therefore, it is also uncertain […] that 
[the first premise] applies to maximal contingent states of existence’ 
(2010a, p. 193). So, if we take the above two mentioned considerations 
seriously, it might appear that we are indeed justified to doubt the 
applicability of the first premise to the case of maximal contingent 
states of existence.
Nevertheless, the third premise cannot be brushed aside that easily. 
First, remember that the first premise is a defeasible rule, i.e., for every 
given case it holds unless good independent reasons are provided for 
maintaining that the case in question is an exception to the rule. So, 
without a good reason for believing there to be no necessary objects, 
Rasmussen is warranted to apply his first premise to the specific case of 
maximal contingent states. Second, the earlier mentioned generalization 
from maximal contingent states being incompatible with all other 
contingent objects to them being incompatible with all other objects 
simpliciter is in fact, in the absence of good independent grounds for 
this generalization, not convincing enough to treat maximal contingent 
states as an exception. Third, in his paper Rasmussen provides a positive 
motivation for the third premise, which I take to be sufficiently adequate 
for at least an initial justification of that premise. His motivation 
proceeds as follows: ‘We observe that maximal states of existence can 
be intrinsically just like non-maximal ones, differing only in virtue of 
containing more or different objects. Consider, for example, a non-
maximal state of existence that contains every object that is contained 
in some maximal state of existence except for a single [object]. If the 
non-maximal state of existence can be caused to obtain, then shouldn’t 
the slightly more complicated, maximal one be possibly caused to obtain 
as well?’ (2010a, p. 193). Indeed, as Rasmussen argues for here, there is 
156 For, if there would be a 
necessary object, then it exists 
in every possible world. And, 
since a maximal contingent state 
of existence exists in at least 
one possible world, it follows 
that the necessary object exists 
together with each of those 
states in some possible world, 
which contradicts the fact that 
maximal states are taken to be 
incompatible with everything 
else, including the necessary 
object in question. Thus, there are 
no necessary objects if maximal 
contingent states of existence are 
incompatible with everything else.
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nothing specific to a contingent maximal state of existence itself that 
distinguishes such a state from non-maximal contingent states, and 
therefore, if all contingent non-maximal states of existence are possibly 
caused, we have, in the absence of sufficiently convincing arguments 
to believe the contrary, no adequate reason to assume that the same 
would not be true for maximal contingent states, other than plainly 
insisting upfront that necessary objects do not exist, which, until a good 
independent reason for rejecting the logical possibility of necessary 
objects is provided, begs the question against Rasmussen’s cosmological 
argument. Thus, to summarize, in the present dialectical situation, the 
third premise is in fact sufficiently reasonable. Rasmussen is justified to 
take it that maximal contingent states, like the non-maximal ones, are 
possibly caused.
Assessing objeC tions to the new CosmologiCAl 
Argument disCussed by rAsmussen himself
Rasmussen presents four well-known objections from David Hume and 
argues that they don’t form a problem for his cosmological argument 
(2010a, pp. 196–197). Hume’s first objection is that there are no 
necessary objects since conceivability entails possibility and everything 
that exists can be conceived of as not existing (2010a, p. 196). If this 
would be a cogent objection, then there is in fact an adequate reason 
for believing that necessary objects do not exist, and consequently, for 
doubting the third premise of Rasmussen’s argument. Now, the rebuttal 
as given by Rasmussen himself is not entirely clear. Nevertheless, I take 
it that the paraphrasing below accords sufficiently with what he is up to. 
The metaphysical framework on which his new cosmological argument 
is premised refers to abstract states of affairs. These abstract states 
exist regardless of whether they do or do not obtain. Let S be one of 
those states. Then, if we can conceive S not being there, it follows that 
conceivability does not imply possibility, since state S cannot fail to 
exist according to the framework. But, on the other hand, if we cannot 
conceive S not being there, then it is not true that everything that exists 
can be conceived of as not existing. Hence, in either case one of both 
assumptions the objection is based on fails, and therefore the objection 
itself is not cogent. Now, although this rebuttal has some force, it is 
not convincing for those who do not accept Rasmussen’s metaphysical 
framework. Indeed, his rebuttal takes that framework as a given 
starting point. I therefore propose the following alternative rebuttal to 
Hume’s first objection. As we saw, Hume’s first objection is based on 
two underlying assumptions. The first underlying assumption, that is, 
conceivability entails possibility, seems to me plausible. According to 
the second assumption everything that exists can be conceived of as not 
existing. Now, I take it that something that exists can only be conceived 
of as not existing if we are able to conceive the very thing itself. After 
all, without having a proper conception of the thing in question we can 
never establish that we conceive of that thing as not existing. Moreover, 
without a proper conceptualization of the thing in question we cannot 
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even establish that we are conceiving of that thing as not existing. 
Therefore, Hume’s second assumption should at least be restricted 
to the assertion that everything that exists and is conceivable can be 
conceived of as not existing. But then Hume’s first objection, in order 
to become a problem for Rasmussen’s argument, requires us to accept 
the claim that necessary objects are conceivable. For, only if we accept 
this further claim, it would follow, under the objection’s assumptions, 
that there are no necessary objects. Now, the claim that all necessary 
objects are conceivable, in the sense of humans being able to properly 
conceptualize them, does not follow from Rasmussen’s argument at all. 
For, his new argument deductively arrives at the conclusion that there 
must be a necessary being, but this does not entail that that necessary 
being is also conceivable. For all we know it is for human beings 
inconceivable. Hence Hume’s first objection does not go through. And in 
fact Hume’s two assumptions, taken into account the above mentioned 
modification of the second one, can be used to infer that the necessary 
object arrived at by Rasmussen’s argument must be inconceivable. 
For indeed, if the necessary object arrived at would be conceivable, 
then the two assumptions together imply that its non-existence is 
possible, which is absurd since necessary objects exist in all possible 
worlds. Therefore, if the necessary object inferred by Rasmussen’s new 
cosmological argument is properly referred to as the first cause (which 
is, as mentioned, a question to which I shall come back later on in this 
chapter), then the above shows how the assumptions underlying Hume’s 
first objection can actually be used to derive the famous doctrine of 
negative theology, namely the tenet that God, being the first cause, 
exists inconceivably, so that no human conceptualization will ever 
be adequate to grasp or conceptualize God’s nature, that is to say, to 
adequately conceive of God itself.
According to the second Humean objection, the necessary object that 
Rasmussen’s argument arrives at could be a material object, and, as 
the objection proceeds, in that case Rasmussen’s new argument loses 
its significance as a cosmological argument (2010a, p. 197). Rasmussen 
rebuts that it is highly unlikely that a necessary material object would 
be a constitutive part of a proper causal explanation of all concrete 
contingents, both material and immaterial. Now, I agree that this would 
indeed be very unlikely, and so the second objection is not convincing. 
Moreover, in the light of the already discussed modified assumptions of 
Hume, this objection becomes even more untenable. For according to 
these assumptions it follows that no material object can be necessary 
if we are able to properly conceive material objects. Indeed, if we can 
conceive material objects, then due to the second of these assumptions 
it follows that we can conceive of material objects as not existing. But 
then, since according to the first assumption everything conceivable is 
possible, it follows immediately that there is a possible world without 
material objects, which entails that material objects do not exist 
necessarily. Now, I would argue that we are in fact perfectly capable to 
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conceptualize material objects. We have many adequate conceptions of 
such type of objects, both from our ordinary sense experiences and from 
modern scientific discourse. And indeed, anyone who has at least some 
rudimentary understanding of what is meant by ‘material object’ readily 
admits that we can conceive of a possible world in which there are no 
material objects, perhaps because that world only consists of empty 
space and time, or perhaps, if some account of substance dualism is 
true, because it consists of space, time and immaterial conscious agents 
located in space. We are thus warranted to hold that no material object 
is necessary, contra the second objection.
The third objection ascribed to Hume by Rasmussen is the objection 
that ‘it makes no sense to inquire as to the cause of the whole of all 
contingent things, since the uniting of parts into a whole is merely a 
mental abstraction which does not apply to reality’ (2010a, p. 197). Now, 
this objection clearly fails in the case of Rasmussen’s new cosmological 
argument because his argument is premised on causal explanations of 
abstract states of affairs. And those states are not properly understood 
as being aggregated concrete wholes. Indeed, Rasmussen defines causal 
explanations of abstract states of affairs in terms of the causes of the 
concrete objects within those states, and nowhere he does contend that 
such states are themselves possibly caused concrete wholes.
According to Hume’s fourth objection the concept of an uncaused object 
is not contradictory and thus one may not assume that all contingent 
objects are caused (2010a, p. 197). Now, as Rasmussen points out, this 
objection is inapt since his cosmological argument clearly allows for 
there being uncaused objects. After all, the first premise of his argument 
only entails that all contingent objects, being specific examples of 
contingent states of existence, are possibly caused, and this is not the 
same as holding that all contingent objects are actually caused.
Rasmussen also decisively rebuts the Kantian objection that his 
argument begs the question because it presumes the quite doubtful 
premise that a necessary concrete object is possible. As Rasmussen 
points out: ‘One might be agnostic about whether the existence of 
a necessary concrete object is possible and yet find [the premises of 
the new argument] to be evidently true. Once one sees that [these 
premises] can be used to support the existence of a necessary concrete 
object, one may then believe that a necessary concrete object is both 
possible and actual’ (2010a, p. 198). Indeed, there being possibly (and 
thus, due to the S5 axioms of modal logic, also actually) a necessary 
concrete object is a consequence of Rasmussen’s argument, and not one 
of its explicit or implicit starting points.
Another objection goes back to Russell. It comes down to the claim that 
infinite causal series possibly exist and cannot have a proper causal 
explanation. Now, surely, no logical contradiction results from claiming 
157 The assumption that each 
member in the infinite causal 
series is entirely causally explained 
in terms of its predecessor is 
required because of the following 
observation of Rasmussen: ‘It 
is unclear that a causal series, 
even an infinite one, cannot have 
members that are at least partially 
caused by something outside the 
series. For example, perhaps for 
any causal series s, it is possible 
for something outside s to cause 
the members in s to be causally 
connected. It’s hard to see why 
that should be ruled out.’ (2010a, 
p. 198). I agree with Rasmussen’s 
point here. But, if we restrict 
our attention to infinite causal 
series for which each and every 
member is the complete cause of 
its successor, as I do above, then it 
still follows that nothing outside 
the series can partially cause one 
or more of its members, and so 
the proponent of the Russellian 
objection is still warranted to 
maintain that infinite causal 
series cannot have a proper causal 
explanation.
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that infinite causal series are metaphysically possible. And, indeed, 
infinite causal series seem to have no proper causal explanation. For, 
first, there is no first member we could point at for causally explaining 
how that series came into being. And, second, assuming that each 
member fully explains it successor by being its complete cause, it follows 
straightforwardly that there could neither be anything outside the series 
that answers the question of its ultimate origin.157 For any external cause 
of the series as a whole must be at least a partial cause of one or more 
of its members, which contradicts the fact that the complete causes 
of these members are within the series. Nevertheless, it is not clear, as 
Rasmussen points out, how the result that (certain) infinite causal series 
cannot be causally explained could be an objection to his cosmological 
argument. For, after all, ‘even if there are causal series that cannot be 
causally explained, it does not follow that there are contingent states 
of existence that cannot be causally explained’ (2010a, p. 199). Indeed, 
contingent states of existence don’t include relations such as causal 
relationships: they just contain objects. Moreover, there is no reason 
at all to assume that the objects of some given infinite causal series 
cannot, in some other possible world, be causally arranged differently in 
such a way that that state can be properly said to be causally explained 
in that possible world. So, Russell’s objection as rendered by Rasmussen 
doesn’t go through. Nevertheless, I take it that Russell’s reference to the 
possibility of causally unexplainable infinite causal series does point us 
to a much more serious objection against Rasmussen’s new cosmological 
argument, an objection which I shall propose in what follows below.158
does rAsmussen’s  new CosmologiCAl Argument quAlify 
As  An AdequAte f irst  CAuse Argument ?
As mentioned, Rasmussen’s argument for a necessary being from 
a maximal contingent state of existence would only be relevant as 
a defense of theism159 if the necessary being is shown to be a first 
cause, that is, an uncaused object that is the direct or indirect cause 
of everything besides itself. Now, the first thing to mention is that 
Rasmussen’s argument only shows that there is a necessary being that 
is part of the cause of a maximal contingent state of existence in some 
possible world.160 But, surely, this does not say anything about the 
causal behavior of that necessary being in the actual world. Indeed, 
for all we know, it might be the case that the necessary being implied 
by Rasmussen’s cosmological argument does not cause anything 
whatsoever in the actual world. Hence, the necessary being could just 
be sitting there, doing nothing at all, and the whole contingent cosmos 
might be there, without any of its contingent parts being caused by the 
necessary being in question. In that case the necessary being simply 
cannot be called a first cause in the actual world. For, a first cause 
should at least cause something in order to be properly called a cause 
at all. Thus, the being that Rasmussen arrives at is not guaranteed to 
be something we can adequately refer to as a first cause, let alone 
158 Rasmussen also evaluates 
William Rowe’s objection that any 
weak variant of Leibniz’s principle 
of sufficient reason (psr), thus 
including Rasmussen’s first 
premise, is rationally untenable 
because, as Rowe holds, they all 
depend on psr and, according to 
Rowe, psr  is demonstrably false 
(2010a, p. 199). I shall not discuss 
Rasmussen’s evaluation since 
I believe it does not add to what 
was said in the previous chapter.
159 Rasmussen himself is 
definitely interested to draw 
a connection between the 
necessary being entailed by his 
new cosmological argument 
and this being having theistic 
properties. In another paper 
he proposes paths from this 
necessary being to it having the 
properties of volition, infinite 
power, infinite knowledge, and 
infinite goodness (Rasmussen 
2009). Yet, as I argued for earlier, 
I take it that being a first cause is 
an essential property of a being 
properly called God. Therefore, 
without first establishing that 
the necessary being in question 
is in fact a first cause, the 
aforementioned paths just aren’t 
sufficient to support theism.
160 Sure enough Rasmussen’s 
cosmological argument shows a 
bit more than that. After all, the 
fact that the necessary being is 
a part of the causal explanation 
of the existence of some state 
of affairs in some possible world 
entails that that being possibly 
has causal powers. Thus this 
being possibly is not causally inert. 
From this one might, plausibly, 
want to infer that the necessary 
being in question does in fact 
have causal powers simpliciter, 
that is to say, although this being 
is not guaranteed to be causally 
efficacious in all possible worlds, 
the being can be taken to have 
causal powers in all possible 
worlds, including the actual world.
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something that has sufficient ‘theistic features’ to support theism over 
a-theism.
Second, it could be the case that the necessarily existing being in 
question does cause at least something contingent in the actual world, 
perhaps just one contingent particle. Nevertheless, as I shall argue, the 
necessary being that Rasmussen’s cosmological argument arrives at 
is not guaranteed to be a first cause even if we assume that the state 
of existence of all contingent objects in the actual world has a causal 
explanation, and that the necessary being in question is part of that 
explanation. Thus, let us assume that the necessary being does cause at 
least one contingent object in the actual world, and that the state of all 
contingents is caused. Now, according to the aforementioned objection 
of Russell, infinite causal series are possible. And, indeed, Rasmussen 
cannot rule out the existence of such infinite series upfront, because, as 
discussed, by doing so his new cosmological argument would become 
irrelevant. After all, if it would be impossible for there to be infinite 
causal series, then, as we saw earlier, a slightly revised Thomistic 
cosmological argument would already suffice to establish there being 
a first cause. Let us therefore accept the metaphysical possibility of 
infinite causal series. From this it follows that, for all we know, the 
ontological situation in the actual world could be as follows. The actual 
world consists of countably infinitely many contingent objects, denoted 
by {c1, c2, c3, …}. The necessary being in question, let us say N, is the 
cause of c1 and for all i > 1 object ci + 1 is the total or complete cause of 
object ci. In that case {c2, c3, …} is an infinite causal series. Within the 
context of Rasmussen’s framework it is indeed correct to say that N is 
part of the causal explanation of the state of affairs of all actual world’s 
contingent objects. Thus, in short, N is part of the cause of the cosmos 
of the actual world. Yet, it seems to me wholly clear, just by looking at 
the ontological situation for this case, that N in fact doesn’t explain at 
all why the infinite causal series {c2, c3, …} obtains. For the only causal 
act of N is to cause c1. And therefore N just hasn’t anything to do with 
the coming into being of all other contingents in the actual world. 
Hence, it would be wholly inadequate to maintain that in this case N is 
properly referred to as a first cause. But then, since Rasmussen’s new 
cosmological argument is not able to rule out this, or similar, ontological 
situations, it fails to establish that there is a first cause. Indeed, 
generally speaking, it is one thing to be the originating cause of one or 
more contingent objects, but quite another to be the direct or indirect 
originating cause of the maximal state of affairs of all contingent objects 
in the world.
Third, Rasmussen’s new cosmological argument does not establish that 
the necessary being in question is a first cause even if we assume that it 
in fact did cause the state of affairs of all actual world’s contingents. The 
reason for this, as discussed before, is that a first cause is the uncaused 
cause of everything else. So, being uncaused is an inherent feature of 
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being a first cause; being uncaused is part of what it means to be a first 
cause. And this simple observation is fatal for Rasmussen’s argument. 
For, although the necessary being in question might have produced 
the entire contingent cosmos, this does not say anything at all about 
whether the necessary being in question is uncaused. For all we know, 
it might be necessarily caused, that is, it might be caused by a second 
necessary being in the actual world and be caused by that second (or 
another) being in all other possible worlds.161 It might even be the case 
that the necessary being Rasmussen arrives at stands in the actual 
world at the end of a downwards infinite causal series of necessary 
beings each causing the existence of its successor. These types of 
ontological situations are not excluded by Rasmussen’s new argument, 
and therefore the argument doesn’t entail that the necessary being in 
question is an uncaused being. Hence, his argument is not tenable as an 
argument for the existence of a first cause, let alone for the existence 
of a being properly referred to as God. As long as this and the other 
two mentioned problems are not resolved, Rasmussen’s argument is 
insufficient as a cosmological argument relevant for supporting theism. 
At best, Rasmussen’s argument from a maximal contingent state of 
existence rejects naturalistic ‘everything is contingent’-views.
Three additional alternative paths to the existence of a concrete 
necessary being
As mentioned in the introduction to this chapter Rasmussen also 
proposed three alternative paths to there being a concrete necessary 
being. None of these paths requires the possibility of there being a 
maximal contingent state of existence. I briefly assess these paths 
below.
the pAth from it  being possible  to explAin why there is 
At  leAst  one ConCrete Contingent objeC t
The first path is premised upon the principle that for any type of 
contingent concrete objects, it is possible for there to be a causal 
explanation as to why at least one member of that type of contingent 
concrete objects exists (2010a, p. 194).162 Now, of course, in the actual 
world there exists at least one contingent concrete object. Thus, if being 
a contingent concrete object is a type of contingent concrete objects, 
then, it immediately follows that there is a possible world W in which 
the obtaining state of affairs of there being at least one contingent 
concrete object has a causal explanation. Of course this causal 
explanation cannot rely upon a contingent concrete object itself without 
begging the question. As Rasmussen puts it: ‘Now it may seem that an 
explanation as to why there are any members of a type T can’t itself be 
one of the members of T. For example, the explanation as to why there 
are any emeralds can’t itself be one (or more) of the emeralds, it seems. 
After all, the causal activity of an emerald will never tell us why there 
are emeralds to begin with’ (2010a, p. 194). Therefore in W there must be 
161 One could rebut that 
necessary objects cannot be 
caused, perhaps because, as 
one could argue, plausibly, 
such objects did not began to 
exist whereas the effect of a 
cause is always something that 
begins to exist. In short, as this 
rebuttal has it, the concept of 
causation requires effects to 
be temporal. But is this indeed 
the case? Rasmussen writes: 
‘It seems we can grasp the 
relation caused by without also 
grasping the relation caused by 
something spatial. Therefore, 
it is not analytic (determined 
solely by the meaning of “cause”) 
that causal relations can only 
hold between spatial objects’ 
(2010a, p. 199). Now, I agree 
with Rasmussen and I think the 
same line of reasoning applies 
to temporal objects. Grasping 
an object as beginning to exist is 
not necessary for grasping that 
object as an effect. For grasping 
the latter, it is sufficient to grasp 
that there is another object that is 
ontologically prior to it and that is 
responsible for its existence. And 
this other object is then grasped 
as its cause. This all can be true 
of both temporal and a-temporal 
objects. So, there is no reason 
to hold that effects must be 
temporal. The notion of causation 
doesn’t exclude a-temporal 
effects.
162 Strictly speaking, types do 
not have members. Types have 
instances or tokens. So, we should 
say, more precisely, that for any 
type of contingent concrete 
objects it is possible for there to 
be a causal explanation as to why 
at least one member of the set 
defined by that type of contingent 
concrete objects exists. Here, 
the set defined by a type is 
straightforwardly understood as 
being the set of all instances or 
tokens of that type.
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a necessary object that explains why there is any concrete contingent 
object at all.163 And given the S5 axioms of modal logic this necessary 
being exists in all possible worlds, including the actual world. In this 
way the first of the three alternative paths for there being a necessary 
being is completed. Now, Rasmussen contends that ‘we have a new path 
to the existence of a concrete necessary object’ (2010a, p. 195). This 
path is however not new. As an example we could take the discussion 
of the cosmological argument by James van Cleve (van Cleve 1999, pp. 
204–207) to which I briefly referred in the chapter on the cosmological 
argument of Gale and Pruss. Further, as will be clear from what has been 
said before, this first alternative path also fails as a first cause argument 
because it is not guaranteed at all that the necessary being arrived 
at is uncaused. Yet, the alternative path is quite straightforward if we 
compare it with Rasmussen’s new argument from a maximal contingent 
state of existence. This is perhaps remarkable since the first alternative 
path is prima facie no less plausible than Rasmussen’s new argument, 
while providing us with the very same result: there exists a necessary 
being. It has one problem, though, that I would like to mention here. If 
the basic premise on which it is based is cogent, then it seems that there 
is no reason for denying the cogency of the following more general 
principle. For any type of objects simpliciter it is possible to explain 
why there is at least one member of that type of objects.164 And so, by 
taking the type being a necessary object, it would follow that it is possible 
to explain why there exists in the actual world at least one necessary 
object. But how are we ever to explain that without referring to 
necessary objects? Should we try to show that there being at least one 
necessary object follows from the a priori laws of logic themselves? But 
this surely would bring with it a whole new range of additional worries 
and difficulties to which I shall not turn here. In any case, we appear to 
have identified here a real substantial problem for the first alternative 
path of Rasmussen.
the pAth from it  being possible  to explAin why there 
Are exAC tly n ConCrete Contingent objeC ts
The second alternative path as proposed by Rasmussen starts from a 
principle that is similar to the principle on which the first alternative 
path is premised. It states that for any type of contingent concrete 
objects it is possible for there to be a causal explanation as to why there 
are a particular number of members, say n, of that type.165 Now consider 
the type ‘contingent concrete object’ and the state of affairs E of there 
being the number of contingent concrete objects that there are in the actual 
world (2010a. p. 195). According to the aforementioned principle this 
state of affairs has a causal explanation in some possible world W. Now, 
as the second path continues: ‘Every contingent concrete object not 
contained in E is incompatible with E, since E entails that there be only 
and exactly the number of contingent concrete objects contained in E. 
163 One might object, similarly 
as before, that in world W there 
could also be a contingent 
abstract object that explains why 
there is at least one concrete 
contingent object in W. To rebut 
this objection one could hold 
that abstract objects are causally 
inert. Or, if one wants to allow 
for causally efficacious abstract 
objects, as for example I do, 
one can rebut this objection by 
applying the argumentation to 
the more general type of being 
a contingent object instead of to 
the less generic type of being a 
concrete contingent object.
164 Assuming that the relevant 
type has a non-empty extension, 
i.e., there is at least one object of 
that type.
165 The positive number n is 
greater than zero. For if n would 
be zero, there would not be an 
explanandum.
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Therefore […] only a necessary concrete object could [causally explain 
E].166 Therefore, we can infer that a necessary concrete object exists’ 
(2010a, pp. 195–196). The second path is however invalid. For, it might 
be the case that in W there exists a concrete contingent object, say O, 
that directly or indirectly causes all the other n-1 concrete contingent 
objects. And in that case a proper causal explanation of E does not need 
to appeal to a necessary being. Instead it would be sufficient to point 
at object O’s causal effects. One might however want to rebut that in 
that case we still need to explain why O obtains in order to arrive at a 
proper explanation of E, and therefore, as the rebuttal might conclude, it 
is not sufficient just to point at O. Let us grant this rebuttal. What would 
follow? To explain why O obtains we could invoke the first alternative 
path. After all, the first alternative path gives us an explanation for why 
there exists at least one concrete contingent object in W, and there is no 
reason why we couldn’t subsequently assume that one of these concrete 
contingent objects is the direct or indirect cause of all the other 
concrete contingent objects, that is to say, there is no reason why we 
couldn’t take any of these objects to be O. Therefore, if we demand an 
explanation of O, it follows that the second path collapses into the first. 
Besides, if the first path fails, then the second path fails as well. After 
all, if a necessary being explains why there are exactly n>0 concrete 
contingent objects, then that being of course also explains why there is 
at least one concrete contingent object. So, indeed, the second path just 
cannot succeed if the first path doesn’t. At the very best the second path 
is therefore entirely redundant.
the pAth from it  being possible  thAt there is  A  f irst 
CAused Contingent ConCrete pArtiCulAr
The third path towards a necessary being is premised on the principle 
that it is possible that there is a first contingent concrete particular that 
was caused to exist (Rasmussen 2010b, pp. 351–353).167 Now, Rasmussen’s 
third path amounts to the observation that the first contingent 
concrete particular in some possible world, if caused to exist in that 
possible world,168 cannot have been caused by a contingent object, 
and therefore must have been caused by a causally powerful necessary 
being (2010b, pp. 351–352). In one of his recent papers John Turri has 
raised two objections against this third path (Turri 2011, pp. 357–359). The 
first objection is that, as Turri puts it: ‘All that follows is that the cause 
must be either necessary (the opposite of contingent), or abstract (the 
opposite of concrete), or universal (the opposite of particular). We’re 
given no reason to prefer the first of these to the latter two’ (Turri 2011, 
p. 358). The second objection is that it does not follow that the necessary 
being is causally powerful in every possible world. It only follows that 
this being is causally powerful in the possible world in which it causes 
the first contingent concrete particular of that world. That is to say, 
it only follows that the necessary being arrived at is possibly causally 
166 Although Rasmussen does 
not say this explicitly in his 
paper, it is quite important to 
notice that the exact number of 
concrete contingent objects, i.e. 
n, is assumed to be finite instead 
of some infinite cardinal. For if 
the exact number of concrete 
contingent objects would be some 
infinite cardinal, it just doesn’t 
follow that adding one additional 
concrete contingent object would 
change the number of concrete 
contingent objects. For example, 
in order to explain why there 
are exactly a countable infinite 
number of concrete contingent 
objects we can, for explanatory 
purposes, without any problem 
assume a finite, or even countable 
infinite, number of additional 
objects. After all, adding a finite, 
or even countable infinite, 
number of further objects to a 
given countable infinite collection 
of objects doesn’t change the 
cardinal number of that collection.
167 In fact, the principle that 
Rasmussen introduces is more 
subtle. He has it that ‘normally, 
for any intrinsic property p that 
(i) can begin to be exemplified 
and (ii) can be exemplified by 
something that has a cause, there 
can be a cause of p’s beginning 
to be exemplified’ (2010b, p. 351). 
He then goes on to argue that 
the property of being a contingent 
concrete particular is an intrinsic 
property, that can begin to be 
exemplified, and that can be 
exemplified by something that has 
a cause. And this entails the above 
mentioned principle.
168 Note that the 
aforementioned principle implies 
that there indeed is at least one 
possible world in which there 
exists a first contingent concrete 
particular whose existence has 
been caused in that world.
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powerful (2011, p. 358). In order to overcome both objections Turri 
provides the following reformulation of the path:
 
(1) It is possible that the first contingent thing169 is caused to exist 
(premise), 
(2) In the possible case where the first contingent thing is caused to 
exist, a causally powerful necessary being must cause it to exist 
(premise),
(3) A possibly causally powerful necessary being exists (from 1, 2, S5 
modal axioms).
This reformulation indeed solves the two challenges as put forward by 
Turri. Yet, of course, the reformulated argument doesn’t qualify as a 
first cause argument for the same reasons as mentioned before. First, 
it is not guaranteed that the necessary being causes anything at all in 
the actual world. Second, even if it did in fact cause the first contingent 
thing in the actual world, it is not guaranteed that the necessary being 
itself is uncaused. Moreover, contrary to what Turri appears to believe, 
the reformulated argument is still not valid. In what follows I show 
why. Let us assume that the first premise is true. In that case there is a 
possible world W endowed with a temporal order T (which enables us 
to speak about ‘first’) and containing a first contingent caused thing, 
say fct. Now, because fct  is the first contingent thing, it follows that 
(i) there is a t0 in T such that fct  is the only contingent thing in W that 
exists at t0 and (ii) for all t < t0 it holds that there is no contingent thing 
in W existing at t. Note that it might be the case that there is in fact no 
t in T such that t < t0. In that case t0 represents the absolute beginning 
of T in W. This is however not necessary. For all we know there are many 
t’s in T such that t < t0. Now, according to the second premise fct  must 
have been caused by a necessary being. But does this follow? It seems to 
me that there is another possibility that is not ruled out by the argument 
as reformulated by Turri. For, although W is endowed with a temporal 
order T, it does not follow that all things in W are temporal. Indeed, we 
cannot rule out there being one or more a-temporal things in W, each 
one of them being either contingent or necessary. But then we cannot 
rule out either that there exists an a-temporal contingent thing in W, 
say Act, that causes fct. And, since a-temporal things exist outside 
time, there is no t in T at which Act exists. So, the assumption that fct 
is caused by Act is coherent with fct  being the first contingent thing. 
To overcome this challenge one could reply that a-temporal things do in 
fact exist per definition at all t in T. For what makes a thing a-temporal, 
as the reply goes, is that the thing in question would exist even if there 
is no temporal order T in W. In other words, a-temporal things are not 
dependent on there being a temporal order for their existence, and it 
is precisely this feature that distinguishes them from temporal things. 
Thus, as the reply has it, it doesn’t follow at all that a-temporal things 
do not exist at any t in T. For a thing can be a-temporal according to 
169 Italics mine.
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the aforementioned feature while existing at all t in T. In fact, plausibly, 
they exist automatically at each t in T because it is precisely their a-
temporality that ensures that they exist regardless of T. So, Act would 
in fact exist at t0 in T, and this is impossible since fct  is considered 
to be the first contingent in W. Therefore, after all, we can rule out 
there being an a-temporal contingent thing Act in W that causes fct. 
Hence, as the reply concludes, it indeed follows that fct  is caused by 
a causally powerful necessary being. Is this reply convincing? Let us 
have a look at the temporal order T in W. Plausibly there are possible 
worlds without a temporal order. Hence, T exists contingently in W. 
Moreover, by definition, T itself exists at all t in T, and thus T exists at 
t0 as well. But then neither T nor fct  is the first contingent in W, which 
renders the reformulated argument invalid. A way out of this difficulty 
seems to be to claim that T is not a thing. This is however unreasonable, 
since Turri’s reformulation allows for a maximal range of existents to 
be called ‘things’, such as abstracts, universals and tropes. In fact, on 
Turri’s reformulation, everything that exists is properly called ‘thing’. 
But then, since T does exist in W, there is no good reason to deny ‘thing-
hood’ of T in W. Another way to resolve the difficulty is to introduce 
a new, restricted, concept whose extension is obtained by removing 
temporal orders from the extension of the concept of thing. Thus the 
extension of this new concept would be all things not identical to some 
temporal order. Although this would surely be an ad hoc move to make, 
it would help us to obtain a valid reformulation of Turri’s reformulation 
of Rasmussen’s third alternative path. Let us denote the aforementioned 
new ad hoc concept by thing*. In that case the following reformulation 
of Turri’s reformulation is valid:
(1) It is possible that the first contingent thing* is caused to exist 
(premise),
(2) In the possible case where the first contingent thing* is caused 
to exist, a causally power-ful necessary being must cause it to 
exist (premise),
(3) A possibly causally powerful necessary being exists (from 1, 2, S5 
modal axioms).
Needless to say that this reformulated reformulation still not helps to 
arrive at a first cause for the same reasons as Rasmussen’s original third 
alternative path fails as first cause argument. Yet, the above adjusted 
argumentation, if sound, provides us with a necessary being that is 
possibly causally efficacious. Thus, if sound, it requires all worldviews, 
including naturalistic ones, to explain how their ontology accounts for 
there being at least one such being. Some naturalists might respond 
that perhaps some of the fundamental laws of nature are necessarily 
existing abstract objects that have causal powers in at least some of all 
the possible worlds. A full discussion on the nature of natural laws under 
naturalism is however not at stake here.
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Closing remarks
In this chapter I argued that some of Rasmussen’s argumentative paths 
arrive indeed, though not all with the same force, at a necessary being. 
Yet, as I also showed, none of these arguments entail that there is a first 
cause. Nor can they be transformed in cogent first cause arguments. 
Now, since being a first cause is, as discussed, an essential theistic 
property, Rasmussen’s cosmological arguments cannot be invoked to 
warrant theistic worldviews over non-theistic views such as naturalism. 
In the next chapter I turn to a detailed presentation and defense of my 
own proposed new first cause argument.
170 Surely, the thesis of causalism 
as understood in this chapter does 
not rule out there being objects 
that are caused and that are 
the cause of one or more other 
objects.
171 It might perhaps be 
worthwhile to notice that 
the viewpoints of atomism 
and causalism are sometimes 
associated with traditional 
materialistic worldviews that 
deny there being a first cause, 
such as for example Epicurianism. 
The argument developed in this 
chapter thus shows that such an 
association is problematic.
172 Respectively ‘For any 
contingently true proposition, it is 
logically or conceptually possible 
that it has an explanation’ 
(Gale and Pruss 1999) and ‘All 
explainable true propositions have 
explanations’ (Pruss 2004).
173 Respectively ‘Every wholly 
contingent fact or situation 
normally has a cause’ (Koons 1997) 
and ‘Normally, for any intrinsic 
property p that (i) can begin to 
be exemplified and (ii) can be 
exemplified by something that has 
a cause, there can be a cause of 
p’s beginning to be exemplified’ 
(Rasmussen 2010).
Vi Atomism, causalism and the 
existence of a first cause
Introduction
This chapter provides a new first cause argument by showing that 
atomism, i.e. the thesis that each composite object is composed of 
simple objects, together with causalism, understood in this chapter 
as the thesis that every object is a cause or has a cause,170 logically 
imply the existence of a first cause if some additional general premises 
regarding the interplay between parthood, composition and causation 
are accepted. Thus it is shown that a commitment to atomism, 
causalism and the additional premises result in a commitment to there 
being a first cause. The chapter starts with some required preliminary 
stage setting. Next a number of definitions and two basic principles 
regarding the mereological nature of parthood and composition are 
presented. Subsequently the additional premises of the new argument 
are introduced and the conclusion that there is a first cause is logically 
derived from them. The chapter ends with a justification of the new 
argument’s premises. The justification of some of them appeals to the 
aforementioned two principles. Although the present chapter provides 
a new first cause argument, its aim is not particularly to argue for 
the existence of a first cause, but, instead, to show that, under some 
very generic and sensible conditions on parthood, composition and 
causation, one cannot reasonably be both an atomist and a causalist, 
while at the same time deny that there is a first cause.171
The argument presented in this chapter does not rely on the principle 
of sufficient reason, that is, the principle that there is an explanation 
for every contingent truth. Second, it does not depend on any weaker 
variant of this principle either, such as the restricted variants of Gale 
and Pruss (1999) and Pruss (2004).172 Third, the first cause argument 
as proposed in this chapter does not depend on the presumption that 
every contingent object has a cause for its existence. Furthermore, 
fourth, it does not rely on any weaker variant of this presumption, such 
as the restricted variants of Koons (1997) and Rasmussen (2010).173 
Fifth, the proposed new argument does not depend on the notions of 
necessary truths and contingent truths. In addition, sixth, the argument 
does not rely on the notions of necessarily existing and contingently 
existing objects either. Hence, the new argument as proposed in 
this chapter does not depend on any metaphysical modal notion or 
principle. In this respect it is entirely different from the aforementioned 
contemporary first cause arguments of Koons, Gale and Pruss, and 
Towards a  renewed Case for Theism124
Rasmussen, which all do in fact rely upon metaphysical modal concepts 
and corresponding metaphysical modal principles.
Stage setting
Some initial stage setting is indispensable before the new first cause 
argument can be advanced. First, in this chapter anything that exists is 
called an object and an object is something that exists. There may be 
different kinds of objects, e.g. abstract objects in addition to concrete 
objects, and universal objects in addition to particular objects. Still, 
discerning kinds of objects is not relevant for the proposed argument: a 
first cause, if it exists, is an object of some kind. Second, for this chapter 
causality is plausibly understood as a relationship between two objects: 
the cause and the effect. Thus this chapter adopts an objectual, i.e. 
object oriented, conception of causality according to which causation 
is a two-place relation whose relata are objects. Any given object may 
as a cause stand in multiple cause-effect relationships. For example, 
object A may be the cause of object B and object C. In that case effect B 
has A as its cause, and effect C has A as its cause as well. Yet, any given 
object may as an effect stand in only one cause-effect relationship, that 
is, every effect has precisely one cause. Third, the concept of causation 
as deployed in this chapter is limited to causation with respect to 
bringing about something’s existence. In what follows an object is thus 
understood to be the cause of another object if and only if the former 
object brings the latter into existence. In other words, some object 
causes another object in case it is the cause of the existence of that other 
object. Fourth, for this chapter a first cause is defined as an uncaused 
cause whose effect is ontologically prior174 to every other caused object. 
From this definition it follows immediately that there can be at most 
one first cause. After all, suppose to the contrary that there is more than 
one first cause. Let A and B both be first causes. In that case, since A is a 
first cause, the effect of A is ontologically prior to the effect of B. Now, 
because B is a first cause as well, the effect of B is ontologically prior to 
the effect of A, which contradicts the asymmetry of being ontologically 
prior. Thus, indeed only one object can be a first cause.175 So, if there is 
a first cause, it is properly described as the ultimate origin of all other 
objects. Fifth, the new argument is deductive in nature. The conclusion 
that a first cause exists follows logically from the premises, that is, if the 
premises are true then the claim that there is a first cause is also true.
Parthood and composition
The proposed new first cause argument consists of six premises and 
one conclusion, i.e. the conclusion that there is a first cause. Before the 
argument is presented the nature of parthood and composition on which 
the justification of some of its premises is based has to be clarified. For 
that some mereological definitions are required. In this chapter the 
notion of parthood is taken to be a relationship between two objects. 
174 The concept of being 
ontologically prior is difficult to 
explicate. In this chapter an object 
X is considered ontologically 
prior to an object Y in case the 
existence of Y is not required for 
X to exist but the existence of X is 
required for Y to exist. It is taken 
that the cause is ontologically 
prior to its effect and that a part 
is ontologically prior to the whole. 
Notice that the relationship of 
being ontologically prior is a strict 
partial order, i.e., this relationship 
is irreflexive, asymmetric and 
transitive. Let me show this. If X 
were ontologically prior to X it 
would follow that the existence 
of X is not required for X to exist, 
which is absurd. Thus, the relation 
is indeed irreflexive. Moreover, if 
X is ontologically prior to Y and Y 
is ontologically prior to X, it would 
follow that X is both required and 
not required for Y to exist, which 
is absurd as well. Hence, the 
relation is asymmetric. To derive 
transitivity more work is needed. 
Let X be ontologically prior to Y 
and let Y be ontologically prior 
to Z. In that case the existence 
of X is required for Y to exist and 
the existence of Y is required for 
Z to exist. But then the existence 
of X is also required for Z to 
exist. Does it also follow that the 
existence of Z is not required for 
X to exist? Assume, for reductio, 
that the existence of Z is required 
for X to exist. We know that the 
existence of Y is required for Z to 
exist. But then the existence of 
Y is required for X to exist, which 
contradicts the fact that X is 
ontologically prior to Y. Hence it is 
indeed the case that the existence 
of Z is not required for X to exist, 
which completes the derivation of 
transitivity.
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One object can be a part of another object. Parthood is taken to be 
a basic concept and thus not definable in terms of other more basic 
concepts. Object A is called a proper part of object B if and only if A is 
a part of B and A is not equal to B. Object A is called an improper part 
of object B in case A is equal to B. Further, object A is said to contain 
object B if and only if B is a part of A. Another mereological concept 
employed in this chapter is the concept of disjointness. Disjointness 
is defined here in terms of parthood. Two objects are disjoint in case 
they do not share a (proper or improper) part. Further, the notion of 
the sum of two or more objects is a concept that denotes the totality of 
those objects, i.e. those objects taken together. A composite object, also 
called a composite, is an object that has at least one proper part. Now, 
a simple object, also called a simple, a mereological atom, or an atom, 
is an object lacking proper parts. So, a simple object is not a composite 
object and a composite is not a simple. Obviously, every object is either 
a simple or a composite. Another relevant mereological concept is that 
of composition. Composition is not the same concept as the concept of 
a sum. Some objects {Oi}i compose an object O if and only if object O 
is the sum of the Oi and all the Oi are mutually disjoint (Sider 1993). In 
addition, some objects {Oi}i are called a composition of an object O in 
case the {Oi}i compose O. Note that a composite can have more than 
one composition. Now, the nature of parthood and composition on 
which the justification of some of the premises of the new argument is 
based accords with two mereological principles: ‘supplementation’ and 
‘composition-as-identity’. Both principles are clarified below.
supplementAtion
The supplementation principle states that every proper part of an object 
is ‘supplemented’ by another disjoint part of that object (Varzi 2009). 
From this principle it immediately follows that every composite object 
has a composition consisting of two or more objects.
Composition-As- identit y
As mentioned before the sum of some objects is those objects taken 
together, i.e. the sum of some objects is a term to refer to those 
objects as a totality. A sum is thus ontologically neutral, innocent or 
harmless, that is, the sum of some objects introduces nothing beyond 
these objects themselves. Thus, a commitment to sums is not a further 
commitment, since sums are nothing over and above their objects. 
Now, compositions are sums. This implies that the same holds for the 
ontological relation between an object and its compositions, i.e., if 
some objects compose an object, then that composed object is those 
objects taken together. Thus, the composite simply is the composition. 
This principle is often referred to in the literature as composition-as-
identity (Koslicki 2008). It should not be confused with mereological 
universalism. According to mereological universalism every arbitrary 
sum of objects is itself an object. Composition-as-identity does not 
imply universalism. After all, even if all composites are identical to their 
175 One might think that this 
derivation fails since it does 
not exclude scenarios with two 
or more first causes. Take for 
example the following scenario. 
Let A, B and C be uncaused 
objects that together cause object 
E. Let object E be ontologically 
prior to any other caused object. 
Isn’t it the case that in this 
scenario there are three first 
causes instead of one? No, this is 
not the case. The reason is that 
causation is defined as a relation 
between two objects, the cause 
and the effect. In the present case 
the effect is clearly object E. But 
what is the cause of E? Now, the 
cause of E is not object A, not 
object B, and not object C. The 
cause of E is A, B and C taken 
together, that is to say, the cause 
is a fourth object, distinct from A, 
B and C. So, in fact we do have a 
single first cause in this scenario, 
namely the sum of A, B and C. 
I define the notion of ‘sum’ below.
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compositions, it might be the case that some sums are not objects, e.g. 
because these sums do not stand in the proper causal relationships with 
other objects.176 Further, universalism does not imply composition-as-
identity, because, even if all sums are objects, it might be the case that 
composites are something above and beyond their compositions. The 
proposed new argument is based on composition-as-identity. However, 
the new argument does not assume universalism. In fact, universalism 
is a quite implausible position. Surely, the sum of some piece of wood 
in Italy, the left front wheel of some car and the Statue of Liberty does 
not count itself as an object. It is a sum of objects and nothing more. 
For amongst others, it was not caused as a whole, nor does it, as a whole, 
causes anything else.177
Mereological universalism is also referred to as unrestricted 
composition. The denial of universalism is either nihilism or restricted 
composition. According to nihilism sums of two or more objects are not 
objects. Nihilism therefore implies that composition does not occur. 
Restricted composition is a position between nihilism and universalism. 
According to restricted composition some sums are objects and some 
sums are not. It is important to note that restricted composition does 
not imply that there are only a few concise natural necessary and 
sufficient conditions for composition to occur. After all, for all we know 
it might be a brute fact that some sums are objects and other sums are 
not. So, the cases in which composition occurs might be quite irregular. 
In other words, restricted composition does not imply that the Special 
Composition Question,178 i.e. the question under what circumstances 
some objects compose a further object, has a concise natural answer.179 
The defense of one of the premises of the new argument is based upon 
the acceptance of the following sufficient condition for composition 
to occur: some objects compose another object if they together make 
up a ‘demarcated natural kind’. This sufficient condition is explained 
and argued for later on in this chapter. Note that the validity of this (or 
any other) sufficient condition for composition to occur does not imply 
that the Special Composition Question has a concise natural answer. As 
becomes clear later on, the proposed argument does not depend on this 
question having a concise natural answer.
The argument
After these preliminary remarks, definitions and basic principles the six 
premises and the conclusion of the new argument can be presented. 
They are enumerated in the list below.
 1 There are objects,
 2 Every composite object is ultimately composed of simple objects 
(atomism),
 3 Every object is caused by or180 is the cause of another object 
(causalism),
176 A principle that could be 
assumed here is that a sum of 
objects only counts as an object in 
case it causes as a whole another 
object, or, if it was caused as a 
whole. In fact, this seems to be 
an intuitively plausible principle. 
Moreover, the third premise of the 
proposed new argument that is 
presented later on in this chapter 
does actually amount to a closely 
related (yet different) principle.
177 Here the same intuition 
is applied as mentioned in the 
previous footnote.
178 The Special Composition 
Question concerns the nature of 
composite objects. It was raised 
by Van Inwagen and can be more 
precisely formulated as: ‘For 
any collection of objects, what 
are the necessary and sufficient 
conditions for there being 
an object composed of those 
objects?’ (Van Inwagen 1990).
179 For example, an enumeration 
of all the sets of objects for which 
it is true that they compose a 
further object would certainly 
not count as a concise natural 
answer. Examples of concise 
natural answers include the view 
that some objects compose a 
further object if and only if they 
are ‘fastened together’ and the 
view that some objects compose 
a further object if and only if 
‘their activities constitute a single 
life’. Van Inwagen discusses both 
views. He rejects the former view 
and argues for the latter (Van 
Inwagen 1990).
180 The truth-functional 
connective ‘or’ is an inclusive 
disjunction instead of an exclusive 
one. Thus, the third premise does 
not rule out objects that are 
caused and that are the cause of 
one or more other objects.
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 4 The sum of all caused simple objects, if not empty,181 is an object,
 5 The cause of an object is disjoint with that object,
 6 Every caused composite object contains a caused proper part,
 7 There is a first cause (conclusion).
Below a logical derivation of the conclusion from the premises is 
provided, that is, it is shown that if the premises are true, the conclusion, 
that there is a first cause, is true as well. The derivation of the conclusion 
consists of five main steps. First, from (2) and (6) a principle is derived, 
i.e. the principle that every caused composite contains a caused simple. 
Second, this principle is used to infer that the sum of all caused simples, 
denoted by M, is an object. Third, it is shown that M is not a cause. 
Hence, according to premise (3), M is caused by some object A. Fourth, 
it is shown that object A is itself uncaused, and, fifth, it is shown that 
object A is in fact a first cause (and thus the unique first cause).
first  step:  eVery CAused Composite  ContAins A  CAused 
s imple
Now, as stated, the first step is to show that premise (2) and (6) together 
imply that every caused composite object contains a caused simple 
object, i.e. that each caused composite has at least one caused simple 
as a part. In what follows this metaphysical principle is referred to as 
principle (p). To show that principle (p) indeed holds, let C be a caused 
composite object and consider the following step by step algorithmic 
procedure:
 1 Let i : = 0 and C(0) : = C,
 2 According to the sixth premise C(i) contains a caused proper part 
C(i + 1),
 3 If C(i + 1) is a simple object, then stop the procedure,
 4 Let i : = i + 1 and proceed with the second step.
According to premise (2) the sequence C, C(1), C(2), … does not proceed to 
infinity, i.e., there is a natural number n such that C(n) is a caused simple 
object. Due to the transitivity of the part-of relation, it follows that C(n) 
is a part of C. Thus, C contains a caused simple object. So, (p) is derived.
seCond step:  the sum of All  CAused s imples  (CAlled m) 
is  An objeC t
It is shown that the sum of all caused simple objects is an object. Let M 
be the sum of all caused simple objects. According to premise (1) there 
is an object. Premise (3) implies that this object is caused or the cause 
of another object. So, in any case, there is a caused object N. Object N is 
simple or composite. It is now shown that in both cases M is not empty. 
If N is simple, then N is a caused simple, and thus M is not empty. If N is 
composite, then, according to principle (p), N contains a caused simple 
object, and thus M is not empty. It follows that in both cases M is not 
181 If the mereological sum of all 
caused simple objects is empty 
(i.e. if there are no caused simple 
objects), then obviously this sum 
is not an object. Therefore, the 
fourth premise requires the sum 
to be non-empty.
Towards a  renewed Case for Theism128
empty. Therefore, since one of both cases obtains, M is not empty. But 
then premise (4) implies that M is an object.
third step:  m is  not A  CAuse
It is shown that M is not a cause. Suppose, for reductio, that M is the 
cause of another object, i.e. K. According to premise (5) object M is 
disjoint with object K. Thus, K is not a caused simple. Object K is a 
caused composite. From principle (p) it follows that K contains a caused 
simple K*. Object K* is a part of M. From this it follows immediately that 
M and K share K* as a part. But this is contradictory since M and K are 
disjoint. So, the assumption that M is the cause of one or more other 
objects needs to be rejected. Object M is not a cause.
fourth step:  the CAuse of m (CAlled A)  is  unCAused
According to premise (3) M is caused. Let object A be the cause of M. It 
is now shown that A is uncaused. Suppose, again for reductio, that A is 
caused. From premise (5) it follows that A and M are disjoint. So, A is not 
a caused simple, i.e. A is a caused composite. Principle (p) then implies 
that A has a caused simple A* as one of its parts. So, the objects A and 
M share A* as part. But this is surely in conflict with the disjointness of 
A and M. Therefore, the assumption that A is caused is incorrect. Object 
A is uncaused.
fifth step:  A  is  A  f irst  CAuse
Now, object A is the uncaused cause of the sum of all caused simples, i.e. 
M. Does it follow that A is a first cause? To show that A is indeed a first 
cause it also needs to be demonstrated that the effect of A, that is M, is 
ontologically prior to every other caused object. Thus, let B be a caused 
object. In that case B is either a caused simple or a caused composite. 
Principle (p) implies that in either case B has at least one caused simple 
as a part. But then M is indeed ontologically prior to B. So it follows that 
A is a first cause.182
In defense of the premises
The above shows that the new argument is valid, that is, the conclusion 
that there is a first cause follows logically from the premises. Now, are 
there good reasons to think that the premises are true? In what follows 
a justification of each of the six premises is provided.
premise  (1) :  there Are objeC ts
The first premise seems to be evident. Surely there are objects. The 
claim that there are objects is so obvious that it is not even clear how to 
derive this claim from claims that are intuitively more evident than the 
claim to be argued for. This shows that the first premise is sufficiently 
plausible. One could argue that the premise that there are objects is 
an empirical datum. If so, the argument is a posteriori. On the other 
hand one could argue that the claim that there are objects is to such an 
182 If B is a caused atom, then M, 
being the sum of all caused atoms, 
is by definition not ontologically 
prior to B. However, this is not 
problematic at all. For, M surely 
includes all caused atoms. All 
caused atoms are subsumed by 
M. Hence, we can, without loss of 
generality, adjust the definition 
of ‘first cause’ as follows. A first 
cause is an uncaused cause whose 
effect is ontologically prior to, or 
includes, all other effects.
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extent basic or fundamental that it is more properly described as being 
an a priori principle. After all, is there being at least one object not a 
necessary condition for the activity of rational discourse itself? If so, the 
truth of the first premise is already taken for granted once one starts to 
consider the plausibility of that premise, i.e. without objects there would 
be no question of whether the first premise is plausible and thus that 
very question implies that premise (1) is true.
premise  (2) :  eVery Composite  objeC t is  ultimAtely 
Composed of s imple objeC ts
This premise is known as atomism. A thorough defense of atomism is 
surely beyond the scope of the present chapter. In what follows an initial 
justification of atomism is given by providing a response to Schaffer’s 
criticism of atomism (Schaffer 2003). Schaffer argues that there is no 
evidence in favor of atomism.183 He first discusses and justifiably rejects 
some a priori arguments for atomism (2003, pp. 501–502). After that he 
rejects the view that science indicates atomism (2003, pp. 502–505). The 
view that science indicates atomism is understood by him as the claim 
that somewhere in the future there will be a complete microphysics that 
postulates mereological atoms. He rejects this claim because, according 
to him, there is not a good reason to assume that there will ever be 
a complete microphysics, let alone one that postulates atoms. Now, 
Schaffer correctly rejects this claim. There are indeed no good reasons 
to claim that there will ever be a complete microphysics that postulates 
atoms. However, this claim is not the only rendering of the view that 
science indicates atomism. Here a Quinean rendering is proposed 
according to which it is justified to commit to the ontology presupposed 
by our best scientific theories, particularly physics. Thus, following this 
dictum, since physics presumes the existence of a fundamental level 
of basic building blocks (nowadays ‘strings’),184 it is justified to accept 
atomism as a premise. In fact, a fundamental level of basic entities is 
presupposed by all mainstream microphysical theories developed in the 
past 200 years or so, which makes a commitment to atomism perhaps 
somewhat more justified than if only the latest generally accepted 
physical theory would presuppose a fundamental level of basic building 
blocks.
In what follows a second argument for atomism is provided. This 
argument is not found in Schaffer (2003). In order to present this 
argument some additional terminology is needed. Assume a formal 
additive measure of being that measures the amount of being contained 
in each object. Let O be an object and denote the amount of being 
contained in object O by ‘being(O)’. Thus, being(O) is zero in case there 
is no object O. Now, let the objects {Oi}i compose object O. Hence {Oi}i 
is a composition of O. The additive nature of the involved measure 
implies by definition that being({Oi}i) = ∑ i [being(Oi)].185 Now, according 
to the principle of composition-as-identity, object O simply is the objects 
{Oi}i taken together, that is, object O is nothing above or beyond the 
183 In fact Schaffer argues that 
there is no evidence for the 
existence of a ‘fundamental level’. 
Yet, for him this amounts to there 
being no evidence for atomism: 
‘[…] the question of the evidence 
for fundamentality is best 
understood as the question: What 
is the evidence for mereological 
atoms?’ (2003, p. 500).
184 For those who believe 
string theory is (still) too 
speculative I refer without loss 
of argumentative force to the 
standard model of elementary 
particle physics, which is entirely 
accepted and assumes atoms as 
well.
185 Strictly speaking this formula 
is not well-formed since b has 
been introduced as a function 
on objects and not as a function 
on sets of objects. Yet, this is 
not a real problem. We may 
allow the domain of b to consist 
of the class of all sums. In that 
case the formula becomes 
‘being(sum{Oi}i) = ∑ i [being(Oi)]’.
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objects {Oi}i taken as a totality. From this it follows that being(O) = ∑ i 
[being(Oi)]. Next, let O be an object and let Ω and Ω* be two different 
compositions of O such that every object in Ω* is either equal to or 
a part of an object in Ω. In that case Ω* is called a refinement of Ω. It 
follows that being(Ω) = [being(Ω) – being(Ω*)] + being(Ω*). This formula 
indicates that the amount of being at a certain level of composition 
is the arithmetical sum of the amount of being at the previous level 
and the incremental amount between both levels. Now, let {Ωn}n be a 
sequence of compositions of object O such that for all natural numbers 
n composition Ωn + 1 is a refinement of composition Ωn. The sequence 
{Ωn}n is either finite or infinite. Suppose first that {Ωn}n is finite and 
let ΩN denote the final composition in the sequence. It follows that 
being(O) = ∑ (n = 1 to n = N) [being(Ωn – 1) – being(Ωn)] + being(ΩN). How should 
this arithmetical formula be adapted to the case that {Ωn}n is infinite? 
This case is obtained if N proceeds to infinity and the final composition 
ΩN vanishes from the sequence. Hence, the only natural answer appears 
to be that in that case one obtains the formula being(O) = ∑ (n = 1 to n = ∞) 
[being(Ωn – 1) – being(Ωn)].186 After these remarks the second argument 
for atomism can be provided. Suppose, for reductio, that atomism is 
false. In that case there is a composite object C that is not composed of 
simple objects. Due to the principle of supplementation C is composed 
of two or more other objects. So, there is a composition of C. Now, 
since C is not composed of simple objects there is an infinite sequence 
of compositions {Ωn}n of C such that for every natural number n 
composition Ωn + 1 is a refinement of composition Ωn. Because of the 
aforementioned observations it follows that being(C) = ∑ (n = 1 to n = ∞) 
[being(Ωn – 1) – being(Ωn)]. Further, the principle of composition-as-
identity implies that being(C) = being(Ωn – 1) and being(C) = being(Ωn). 
Hence, for all natural numbers n, it follows that being(Ωn – 1) – being(Ωn) = 
0. This implies that being(C) = ∑ (n = 1 to n = ∞) [being(Ωn – 1) – being(Ωn)] = ∑ (n = 1 
to n = ∞) [0] = 0. But then being(C) = 0 which by definition implies that 
there is no object C. This however directly contradicts with the fact 
that C exists. Thus, the initial assumption that atomism is false needs 
to be rejected. Atomism is true. As mentioned earlier Schaffer (2003) 
does not contain this argument. Yet, perhaps surprisingly, he agrees 
that the assumption that ‘there are no composite macroentities at all 
but only fundamental entities in various arrangements’ (2003, p. 509) 
together with a commitment to infinite descent ‘would have the absurd 
consequence that all objects would dissolve into thin air’ (2003, p. 509). 
In this respect Schaffer approvingly cites R.W. Sperry (1976) who writes: 
‘The reductionist approach that would always explain the whole in terms 
of the parts leads to an infinite regress in which eventually everything 
is held to be explainable in terms of essentially nothing’ (citation from 
Schaffer 2003, p. 515). But, this is of course the main point of the second 
argument provided above! The reality of an object inducing an infinite 
regress of compositions would indeed, so to speak, be left hanging in the 
air. Its existence would not truly obtain, that is, the idea of that object 
actually being there would be a sheer delusion. Its existence would be 
186 Note that I’m not claiming 
here that the formula for 
the infinite case can be 
mathematically derived from the 
formula for the finite case. For, 
such a claim would be clearly 
ungrounded. The reasoning is 
qualitative and not quantitative. 
I am arguing that given the 
structure of the formula for 
the finite case, expressing the 
insight that the amount of being 
of some composite is obtained 
bottom-up in precisely two 
ways, namely incremental influx 
of being between the levels of 
composition and inheriting the 
amount of being already available 
at the lowest level, it follows that 
the equivalent structure for the 
infinite case is just an infinite 
sum of incremental infusions of 
being, since in the infinite case 
there is no lowest level. So, this 
conceptual reasoning should 
not be taken for a quantitative 
mathematical derivation of the 
infinite formula from the finite 
one. I especially thank Fred Muller 
for his insightful note on the 
indeed highly problematic nature 
of my argument if understood as a 
formal quantitative derivation and 
not as a qualitative conceptual 
inference.
187 If atomism is false then there 
exists a least one downwards 
infinite sequence of proper parts. 
Hence, if an actual infinite number 
of objects cannot exist it follows 
immediately that atomism is in 
fact true. Now, I believe that there 
is indeed a good argument against 
the existence of an actual infinite 
number of objects. The argument 
is that the assumption that an 
actual infinite number of objects 
exists leads to unacceptable 
absurdities, since in that case 
‘one can subtract equal quantities 
from equal quantities and arrive at 
different answers. For example, if 
we subtract all the even numbers 
from all the natural numbers, we 
get an infinity of numbers, and 
if we subtract all the numbers 
greater than three from all the 
natural numbers, we get only four 
numbers. Yet in both cases we 
subtracted the identical number 
of numbers from the identical 
number of numbers and yet did 
not arrive at an identical result. In 
fact, one can subtract equal 
131VI Atomism,  cAusAlism And the existence of A  f irst  cAuse
an illusory fantasy. So, each sequence of downward compositions for a 
given object indeed terminates, which is precisely the main conclusion 
of the second argument. Note that ‘the reductionist approach that 
would always explain the whole in terms of the parts’ is basically the 
same assumption as composition-as-identity. Thus, it might be the 
case that Schaffer, in the light of his approval of Sperry’s point, avoids a 
commitment to atomism by withholding himself from a commitment to 
composition-as-identity. If so, it may be concluded that Schaffer actually 
accepts that composition-as-identity implies atomism, which is of course 
in accordance with the second argument.187
premise  (3) :  eVery objeC t is  CAused or is  the CAuse of 
one or more other objeC ts
This premise holds that everything that exists is caused by another 
object or is the cause of the existence of at least one other object.188 
The disjunction is inclusive. It may be that an object is itself caused and 
is also the cause of one or more other objects. Note that this premise 
implies that mereological universalism is untenable since it follows 
that the sum of all objects is not an object.189 Premise (3) is reasonable 
enough to accept as a premise. The intuition behind it is that something 
can only exist if it is part of ‘the causal fabric’ of the world. Something 
that is not caused and that is neither the cause of anything else can not 
exist simply because it does not take part in the all-embracing process 
of causation. Premise (3) is thus grounded in the viewpoint that the 
world is a causally intertwined totality. The world does not contain 
fully isolated inert objects since reality is a causally interweaved unity 
in which every object participates. So, indeed, as premise (3) holds, 
everything that exists is caused or a cause because reality is a causally 
connected unity.
Moreover, premise (3) is constantly confirmed by common experience 
and by scientific evidence, which gives us a good reason to accept it 
on empirical grounds. In any case it is cogent as a default or exception 
permitting rule, which is in fact already sufficient to run the new 
argument. In addition premise (3) is a claim about the actual world only. 
It is a claim about reality as given. Therefore, by accepting premise (3) 
we are not committed at all to the far-reaching modal assertion that it is 
metaphysically impossible for there to be a causally inert object, that is, 
an object that is neither a cause nor caused, which would of course be a 
much more controversial assertion to accept.
Now, one could object that abstract objects are causally inert, that is, 
they are uncaused and they do not cause anything.190 As such they 
falsify premise (3). This objection does however not have sufficient 
force. First, there might not be abstract objects, that is, nominalism with 
respect to abstract objects could be true. Nominalism regarding abstract 
objects, i.e. the viewpoint that all objects are concrete objects, is surely 
a defensible position. Due to space limitations this point is not further 
quantities from equal quantities 
and get any quantity between 
zero and infinity as the remainder. 
For this reason, subtraction and 
division of infinite quantities are 
simply prohibited in transfinite 
arithmetic a mere stipulation 
which has no force in the 
nonmathematical realm’ (Craig 
and Sinclair 2009, p. 112). And, 
even if the mathematical realm 
would exist mind-independently, 
the aforementioned stipulation 
would have no force therein 
either.
188 This principle is mentioned 
and accepted already by Aristotle: 
‘Everything has an origin or is an 
origin’ (Physics 203b6). A variant 
of it can be found in Plato’s The 
Sofist. In this dialogue the stranger 
says: ‘My notion would be, that 
anything which possesses any sort 
of power to affect another, or to 
be affected by another, if only for 
a single moment, however trifling 
the cause and however slight 
the effect, has real existence’ 
(Project Gutenberg, Benjamin 
Jowett translation). The principle 
that everything that exists is a 
cause or has a cause is related to 
a contemporary position within 
the philosophy of science known 
as causalism. Causalists such as 
N. Cartwright argue ‘that we are 
entitled to speak of the reality of 
[objects] because we know that 
they have quite specific causal 
powers’ (Hacking 1983). The exact 
opposite of the principle that 
everything that exists is caused 
or a cause is the principle of 
existence from Parmenides of 
Elea. Parmenides maintains that 
something exists if and only if it 
is uncaused and not itself a cause. 
The intuition behind Parmenides’ 
principle is that something can 
only exist if it is completely 
changeless and that being caused 
or being a cause implies change. 
The principle of existence from 
Parmenides is surely problematic 
since it implies that none of the 
regular objects in our world, such 
as tables and chairs, exist.
189 It is not difficult to show that 
this is indeed the case if we use 
premise (5), that is, the premise 
that the cause of the existence 
of an object is disjoint with that 
object. Now, the sum of all objects 
cannot be caused and can neither 
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discussed. Second, even if there are abstract objects, one could argue 
that they are all caused and therefore do not falsify premise (3). After 
all, concepts and propositions are paradigmatic examples of abstract 
objects. Concepts and propositions such as ‘bicycle’, ‘elevator’ and ‘The 
bicycle is in the elevator’ are certainly plausibly understood as being the 
product of human thought and therefore as being caused. The same can 
be maintained for other classes of abstract objects, such as the objects 
of mathematics. One could plausibly argue that mathematical objects 
are caused by a specific activity of human thought, namely abstraction 
from or idealization of concrete objects in nature. This line of thought 
can be further extended, that is, it can be defended that all abstract 
objects are man-made artifacts and thus caused. Note that this line of 
thought collapses into a defense of nominalism with respect to abstract 
objects if one contend that humans can only cause concrete objects, i.e. 
mental contents or material states of affairs. Third, even if some abstract 
objects, such as sets, are uncaused, it might be the case that they are 
the originating cause of other abstract objects. One could for example 
argue that sets are the originating cause of numbers since numbers 
are mathematically ‘constructed’ from sets. So, in that case, uncaused 
abstract objects are causes and therefore they do not falsify premise 
(3). Fourth, suppose that there are causally inert abstract objects after 
all. In that specific case one could recast the new first cause argument 
presented in this chapter by replacing all occurrences of ‘object’ by 
‘concrete object’, i.e. by limiting the domain of discourse to concrete 
objects.191 The conclusion of the new argument would then be that there 
is a unique concrete uncaused cause whose effect is ontologically prior 
to every other concrete caused object. Such an object definitely qualifies 
as a first cause in a metaphysically interesting non-trivial sense.
premise  (4) :  the sum of All  CAused s imple objeC ts,  if 
not empt y,  is  An objeC t
Additional terminology is required to justify the premise that the sum 
of all caused simple objects, if not empty, is itself an object. Koslicki 
(2008) defines kinds as ‘categories or taxonomic classifications into 
which particular objects may be grouped on the basis of shared 
characteristics of some sort’. In her book Koslicki provides examples 
of kinds, such as ‘objects that are currently in my visual field’. ‘children 
born on a Tuesday’, ‘objects that can be used either as doorstops or as 
cleaning supplies’, ‘chairs’, ‘bachelors’, ‘janitors’, ‘hunters’, ‘electrons’, 
‘water’, ‘planets’, ‘diamonds’, ‘tigers’, ‘cats’ and ‘gold’. Now, some kinds 
are natural kinds. Natural kinds are kinds that are rooted in some 
underlying structural uniform regularity out there in nature. There is no 
single conclusive answer to the question how to decide which kinds are 
natural. Still, in the literature criteria are proposed for the identification 
of kinds plausibly thought of as being natural. In what follows the 
criteria examined in Koslicki (2008) are captured. First, a natural kind is 
not ‘arbitrary, heterogeneous or gerrymandered’. Second, the members 
of a natural kind have much more features in common than just the 
be the cause of another object 
because such a cause or effect 
would have to be disjoint with 
all objects taken together. This is 
impossible since there is nothing 
outside the sum of all objects.
190 Both René van Woudenberg 
and Jeroen de Ridder pointed to 
this specific objection.
191 This suggestion was provided 
by Jeroen de Ridder.
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features already present in (or logically implied by) the definition of that 
kind. So, natural kinds are such that we continuously discover previously 
unforeseen common features. In other words, a natural kind is a kind for 
which its specification does not capture everything that is true about its 
members. Third, natural kinds ‘provide grounds for legitimate inductive 
inferences concerning the members in question’. Fourth, natural kinds 
are expected to figure in the laws and in the explanations of science. 
These criteria are best understood as follows. The more criteria are met 
by a given kind, the more plausibly that kind is thought of as being a 
natural kind. The earlier mentioned kinds ‘the objects that are currently 
in my visual field’, ‘children born on a Tuesday’ and ‘the objects that 
can be used either as doorstops or as cleaning supplies’ meet none of 
the above criteria and are thus plausibly rejected as being examples of 
natural kinds. The kinds ‘chair’, ‘bachelor’, ‘janitor’ and ‘hunter’ meet the 
first criterion, but not the other three, and are therefore not plausibly 
thought of as being natural either. On the other hand, the kinds 
‘electron’, ‘water’, ‘planet’, ‘diamond’, ‘tiger’, ‘cat’ and ‘gold’ all meet 
the first three criteria. Besides, most (if not all) of them also satisfy the 
fourth criterion. So, these seven examples are plausibly understood as 
being natural kinds.
Now, the notion of a demarcated natural kind is introduced. 
A demarcated natural kind is a natural kind for which it holds that 
membership is not vague, i.e. the specification of that natural kind is 
such that it is never unclear whether a given object is a member of 
that natural kind or not. With respect to kind membership there are 
no indeterminate cases if the natural kind in question is a demarcated 
natural kind. The boundaries of a demarcated natural kind are not vague, 
i.e. we can draw a clear unambiguous principled line between what 
counts as a member and what does not count as a member. Of the seven 
examples of natural kinds only ‘electron’, ‘water’ and ‘gold’ seem to be 
demarcated natural kinds. After all, biological species such as tigers 
and cats are, according to Darwinism, not demarcated. Also, there is no 
explicit definition of what counts as a planet or a diamond.
The mereological sum of the members of a demarcated natural kind is 
properly defined since there is a clear unambiguous line between what 
does and what does not count as a member of the kind in question. 
Such a sum is not problematic in other ways either since the objects in 
the sum do not overlap each other, i.e., they are all mutually disjoint. 
‘We are simply aggregating concrete particulars’ to utilize a phrase 
from Koons (1997). Now, the sum of all the members of a demarcated 
natural kind is best understood as being an object itself, i.e. the relation 
between the totality of members of a demarcated natural kind and 
each of the individual members of that kind is best understood as the 
relation between a whole and its parts.192 As an example one could take 
the case of water. The totality of all water molecules in the universe 
counts plausibly as an object that can be referred to as ‘the water in 
192 It is required to restrict this 
claim to demarcated natural kinds. 
First, the sums of the members of 
non-natural kinds, e.g. ‘children 
born on a Tuesday’ or ‘objects that 
are currently in my visual field’ 
are not plausibly understood as 
objects. The claim that these sums 
are objects would imply that even 
more gerrymandered sums, such 
as the sum of the bottom of the 
statue of liberty and three atoms 
in the handlebar of some bicycle, 
or the sum of the handlebar of a 
bicycle and one or more atoms in 
someone’s left hand, etc., would 
also count as objects, which is 
unreasonably counterintuitive. 
Moreover, as is shown earlier in 
this chapter, the third premise of 
the new argument implies that 
mereological universalism is false. 
Second, the sums of the members 
of non-demarcated natural kinds 
(such as tigers or cats according 
to Darwinism) are not plausibly 
understood as objects either. So, a 
restriction to natural kinds merely 
does not suffice.
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the universe’ or ‘the universe’s water’. Surely, the fact that currently the 
water molecules are spatially spread across the entire universe does 
not make the totality of water molecules any less a concrete particular 
whole than if all the water molecules would be spatially ‘packed 
together’. Thus, the spatial structure of the universe’s water might 
change, but it is still ‘the water of our universe’, or, ‘the universe’s water’, 
i.e. an object amongst other objects.
Now, the caused simples are a kind, its definition being ‘the objects that 
are both caused and simple’. Surely, this kind is a natural kind. First, it 
is not arbitrary or gerrymandered. Second, the properties of the caused 
simples are not exhausted by being simple and being caused. After all, 
the discipline of string theory193 (or any future discipline having the 
basic building blocks of reality as its subject) is concerned with nothing 
less than an in-depth understanding of all the properties of the ultimate 
constituents of our universe. Thus, if the common features of the 
caused simples would be nothing more than being caused and simple, 
string theory (or any subsequent future discipline having the ultimate 
constituents of the world as its object) would be a rather empty idle 
discipline, which it surely is not. Third, the kind of caused simples is 
plausibly not a conventionalistic or nominalistic type of classification, 
since being caused and being simple refers to some realistic regularity 
or uniformity in nature. Therefore, the kind of caused simples provides 
sufficient ground for inductive inferences. Fourth, as already mentioned, 
the kind of caused simples plays a quite important role in science, i.e. 
in the quest for the most fundamental laws of nature, and in scientific 
explanations (such as, nowadays, within string theory). It follows that 
the caused simples adhere to all four discussed identification criteria for 
natural kinds. So, it is sufficiently reasonable to maintain that the caused 
simples are a natural kind.194
It is now shown that the caused simples are in fact a demarcated natural 
kind. Consider the definition of the natural kind in question, i.e. ‘objects 
that are both caused and simple’. This specification is unambiguously 
clear. After all, the existence of each given object is either caused or 
uncaused, and every given object either does or does not contain a 
proper part. Thus, according to the aforementioned principle, that is, the 
principle that the sum of all the members of a demarcated natural kind 
is an object, the sum of the caused simples, if not empty, is an object, 
which is what is stated by the fourth premise.
premise  (5) :  the CAuse of An objeC t is  disjoint with thAt 
objeC t
The premise that the cause of an object is disjoint with that object is 
justified, since, within the context at issue, causing an object’s existence, 
its negation would have highly counter-intuitive, if not to say rather 
absurd, consequences. Plausibly, the cause of the existence of an object 
193 For those who take string 
theory as (still) too speculative 
I refer instead, without loss of 
argumentative force, to the 
standard model of elementary 
particle physics, which is surely 
accepted as a scientific theory.
194 One might point out that 
there could be different types of 
caused simples. Yet, this does not 
imply that the caused simples 
are not a natural kind. After all, 
exemplary examples of natural 
kinds, such as human beings and 
quarks, consist of different types 
as well, for example ‘man’ and 
‘woman’ (in the case of human 
beings), and ‘up’, ‘down’, ‘charm’, 
‘strange’, ‘top’ and ‘bottom’ (in the 
case of quarks).
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is ontologically prior to that object and each of its parts. So, if an object’s 
cause would not be disjoint with the caused object, it would follow 
that the cause of the object is prior to a part of itself, which seems 
impossible. Nothing is prior to a part of itself. Therefore the cause of an 
object is disjoint with that object. A caused object and its cause have a 
‘separate existence’ (Koons 1997). So, they do not share a common part.
premise  (6) :  eVery CAused Composite  objeC t ContAins A 
CAused proper pArt
According to the sixth premise each caused composite object contains 
a caused proper part. This seems to be a reasonable premise as well. 
Surely, at least one of the proper parts of a caused composite is itself 
caused. It is now shown that the sixth premise is indeed justified. 
Suppose, for reductio, that there is some caused composite, let’s call 
it N, for which none of its proper parts are caused. Thus, each and 
every proper part of N is an uncaused object. In that case N’s proper 
parts taken together, i.e. the totality of the proper parts of N, is not 
caused either. Now, because of the principles of supplementation and 
composition-as-identity,195 the mereological sum of the proper parts of 
object N simply is object N. This implies that N is also uncaused, which 
contradicts the initial assumption. Therefore, this assumption needs to 
be rejected, i.e. every caused composite contains at least one caused 
proper part, which is what is stated by the sixth premise.
Closing remarks
As argued above each of the six premises of the new argument is 
justified for the context in question, i.e. causation with respect to 
bringing about the existence of an object. It was already shown that 
the premises logically imply that there is a first cause. Thus, the new 
argument seems a good argument, i.e. its conclusion follows deductively 
from justified premises. As mentioned in the introduction of this 
chapter, the proposed new argument does not depend on metaphysical 
modal notions, such as those of metaphysical or broadly logical 
possibility and necessity. In this respect it is, as said earlier, wholly 
different from the other new contemporary first cause arguments.196 
One could argue that it is beneficial not to depend on metaphysical 
modal concepts because hitherto there is hardly consensus of 
opinion on their meaning. For example David Lewis, Alvin Plantinga 
and Theodore Sider each offer different accounts of the nature and 
characteristics of metaphysical possibility and necessity (Rocca 2010). 
As explained in the introduction, the primary aim of this chapter was to 
show that, atomism and causalism together imply the existence of a first 
cause if some very generic and sensible conditions regarding the nature 
of parthood, composition and causality are accepted. Thus, to conclude, 
a commitment to a first cause comes quite naturally with a commitment 
to the viewpoints of atomism and causalism.
195 Both principles have been 
introduced and discussed earlier 
in this chapter.
196 i.e. those of Koons (1997), 
Gale and Pruss (1999) and 
Rasmussen (2010).

Vii A critical assessment of the 
argument from causalism and 
atomism
Introduction
As argued for in the previous chapter, the argument for the existence of 
a first cause from the theses of causalism and atomism, supplemented 
by a number of generic principles about the nature of (the relationship 
between) mereological parthood and originating causes, is both logically 
valid and has adequate, that is to say sufficiently plausible, premises. 
This argument will hereafter be referred to as ‘the new argument’. In this 
chapter I turn to a detailed critical assessment of the new argument by 
considering whether the objections against the traditional arguments 
of Aquinas and Leibniz, and the objections against the contemporary 
arguments of Koons, Gale and Pruss, and Rasmussen, as evaluated in the 
previous chapters, have any force against the new argument. Moreover, 
I shall propose and assess a set of additional objections that specifically 
address the new argument. As I intend to show, all discussed objections 
in the previous chapters, including the additional specific ones, do 
not pose a problem for the new argument, which implies that the new 
argument for the existence of a first cause is indeed cogent. We are 
warranted in accepting it.
Objections discussed as part of the traditional Thomistic and 
Leibnizian arguments
If we reconsider the paradigmatic versions of the cosmological 
arguments from Aquinas and Leibniz, as described and examined in the 
second chapter, it seems clear to me that the objections raised against 
both versions have no impact on the new argument. In what follows 
I show that they indeed fail as objections against the new argument.
One objection against the Thomistic argument was that an infinite 
regress of causes might still be possible, even though it is hard for us to 
conceive. But, surely, this objection doesn’t apply to the new argument 
because none of the new argument’s premises assumes that an infinite 
downwards regression of originating causes is impossible. Indeed, 
even if there are one or more downwards infinite sequences of causes, 
the uncaused cause of all caused simples would still be the sole cause of 
all caused simples contained in each and every member of all infinite 
causal sequences. Thus the uncaused cause of all caused simples would 
still adequately be referred to as the ultimate origin or ground of each 
member of all infinite causal series, which is precisely what one expects of 
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something referred to as a first cause. Hence, even if there are infinite 
causal series, the uncaused cause of all caused simples as inferred by the 
new argument is still properly referred to as a first cause.
The second objection against the Thomistic paradigmatic version is not 
a threat for the new argument either. According to this second objection 
one cannot easily infer from there being an initial uncaused cause 
of every finite causal series that the total number of initial uncaused 
causes is one. So, the objection goes, the Thomistic argument has not 
really arrived at one single object that could then properly be called the 
first cause. This objection doesn’t touch the new argument since the 
definition of a first cause as used by the new argument, that is, a cause 
that is uncaused and the effect of which is ontologically prior to every 
other effect, entails that there can be at most one first cause.197 But 
then the conclusion of the new argument, that there is at least one first 
cause, immediately implies that there is in fact precisely one first cause, 
which of course is again exactly what we would expect from something 
referred to as a first cause.
The paradigmatic version of the traditional Leibnizian cosmological 
argument, as described in the second chapter, does not rely on the 
principle of sufficient reason, according to which every contingent 
truth has a sufficient explanation, but on the weaker principle that 
every contingent object has an originating cause. The reason for this 
was, as discussed, that the principle of sufficient reason itself has been 
shown to be problematic by Peter van Inwagen (Van Inwagen 1983, pp. 
202–204). Yet, as became clear, the aforementioned weaker variant 
of the principle of sufficient reason is problematic as well, since under 
two rather plausible conditions on the nature of causation, that is, (i) 
originating causes are disjoint with their effects, and (ii) the cause of a 
caused part of a caused whole is a part of the cause of the caused whole, 
it can be shown that there are uncaused contingent objects. Hence, 
not all contingents have to be caused and thus the weak variant of the 
principle of sufficient reason doesn’t hold unconditionally. This problem 
for the Leibnizian paradigmatic version does however not impair the 
plausibility of the new argument at all, since the new argument does not 
use the modal notions of contingent and necessary objects. And indeed, 
the causal principle on which the new argument is based, that is, every 
object is a cause or has a cause, is different from the weak principle as 
invoked by the Leibnizian argument.
Another serious problem facing the Leibnizian argument is that the 
necessarily existing cause of the sum of all contingent objects is not 
shown to be a first cause of everything else besides itself. For, first, 
there might be one or more other necessary objects that have no 
causal relationship with the necessarily existing cause of all contingent 
objects, and, second, the necessary cause of the sum of all contingent 
197 Indeed, as mentioned in 
the previous chapter, if A and 
A* are both first causes, then 
their effects, say, B and B* 
would have to be ontologically 
prior to each other, but this is 
impossible since the relationship 
of being ontologically prior is 
asymmetrical.
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objects is not shown to be an uncaused object. After all, as we have 
seen on various previous occasions, necessary objects might themselves 
be caused. Therefore it is not shown that the necessary cause of the 
cosmos is uncaused and thus a first cause. Needless to say that this 
second problem for the Leibnizian argument is not a problem for the 
new argument either, simply because the premises of the new argument 
entail that the cause of all caused simples is uncaused and thus 
properly first. In other words, the new argument does not rely on some 
unfounded path from a necessary being to a first cause. Indeed, the 
whole notion of necessary (and contingent) being plays no role at all in 
the new argument.
A third significant worry for the paradigmatic Leibnizian argument 
that we discussed earlier is that it is not shown that the sum of all 
contingent objects is itself a contingent object. Now, since the weak 
principle that every contingent object has a cause may, even if it would 
hold unconditionally, obviously only be applied to contingent objects, it 
follows that the application of this principle to the sum of all contingent 
objects is groundless until a good reason is provided for why this sum 
would be a contingent object.198 This worry for the Leibnizian argument 
does not have an impact on the new argument either. And this is not 
just because the new argument does not refer to contingent objects 
(although this fact in itself already suffices to conclude that the worry 
is not relevant for the new argument), but also, and more importantly, 
because in the case of the new argument the sum of all caused simples 
can plausibly be considered as being an object. For, as I have argued 
in the previous chapter, the collection of caused simples constitutes 
a so-called demarcated natural kind, and each demarcated natural 
kind can itself be considered as being an object. Therefore, in the case 
of the new argument, a reasonable ground is given and defended for 
considering the mereological sum of all caused simple objects as being 
an object. Now, this ground, that is, the fact that the caused simples 
constitute a demarcated natural kind, does unfortunately not help to 
solve the worry for the Leibnizian argument because the contingent 
objects are not plausibly understood as being a natural kind, let alone 
a demarcated natural kind. For, only one of the four criteria for natural 
kinds as discussed in the previous chapter is met by the contingent 
objects. I shall briefly demonstrate this. The first criterion for natural 
kinds is that natural kinds are not arbitrary or gerrymandered. Well, 
this criterion is properly satisfied in the case of contingent objects. The 
kind of contingent objects is characterized by a clear definition, being 
those objects that exist but for which it would have been possible not to 
exist. Yet, the second criterion, the requirement that the members of a 
natural kind have much more features in common than just the features 
implied by their definition, is not met. For we simply are not able to give 
any example of a feature that all contingent objects share and that is 
not already entailed by the definition of contingent object.199 And also 
198 Now one may argue that our 
universe is plausibly understood 
of as being an object. For 
example, as W.L. Craig points out 
in a defense of the Leibnizian 
argument: ‘One thinks of Richard 
Taylor’s illustration of finding a 
translucent ball while walking 
in the woods. One would find 
the claim quite bizarre that the 
ball just exists inexplicably; and 
increasing the size of the ball, 
even until it becomes coextensive 
with the cosmos, would do 
nothing to obviate the need for an 
explanation of its existence’ (Craig 
2007, p. 76). Here the intuition is 
that the existence of the universe 
demands an explanation because 
it is an object, just as the ball or 
any other object in the universe. 
And indeed, as modern cosmology 
learns, the universe is something 
with specific properties (e.g., 
an age, volume, mass, density 
and expansion rate) just like any 
other object, which provides 
further support for the claim that 
the universe is an object. But 
then, these observations, while 
reasonable in themselves, do 
not solve the third worry for the 
Leibnizian argument. After all, 
for all we know, there might be 
many contingent objects outside 
our universe, either within other 
universes or even outside the 
realm of space-time. Moreover, 
it is not guaranteed upfront that 
all objects in our universe are 
contingent. Hence, our universe 
cannot be equated with the sum 
of all contingent objects, and 
therefore, even if our universe 
is an object, the sum of all 
contingent objects does not have 
to be an object at all.
199 Surely, ‘being caused’ is not 
a good example of such a feature, 
since, as I argued for, under 
certain quite plausible conditions 
on the nature of causation 
and parthood, there could be 
uncaused contingent objects.
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the third criterion is not satisfied. After all, ‘being a contingent object’ is 
not shown to provide a sufficient legitimate ground for proper inductive 
inferences. Further, ‘being contingent’ is not a property of objects that 
has been shown to figure in the laws and explanations of science, so 
that the fourth criterion for being a natural kind isn’t met either. In 
fact one might wonder whether ‘being contingent’ is rooted in some 
ontological structural regularity in nature at all. For that surely doesn’t 
follow if we would adopt an epistemic account of possible worlds, such 
as the Kripkean account according to which possible worlds are nothing 
more than just stipulated epistemic alternatives of actual states of 
affairs. We conclude that the contingent objects cannot be taken to be 
a natural kind, and hence neither to be a demarcated one. So the new 
argument’s ground for holding that the sum of all caused simples is an 
object, that is, the sum constitutes a demarcated natural kind and is 
therefore an object, cannot be used to dismiss the worry of Leibniz’s 
traditional cosmological argument that the sum of all contingent objects 
might not be an object. In other words, the principle that demarcated 
natural kinds are objects, as invoked by the new argument, does not help 
to restore the Leibnizian argument.200 The only way to argue that the 
sum of all contingent objects is itself a contingent object seems to be to 
accept mereological universalism. But, as we saw as well, the thesis of 
universalism is itself a highly implausible problematic thesis.
Objections discussed as part of the arguments of Koons, Gale & Pruss, 
and Rasmussen
From what has been said above I conclude that the main problems for 
both the Thomistic and the Leibnizian paradigmatic versions of the 
cosmological argument do not pose difficulties for the new argument. 
Let us now turn to the objections against the contemporary versions 
of the cosmological argument, that is, the objections raised against the 
arguments of Koons, Gale and Pruss and Rasmussen as discussed in 
detail in the previous three chapters.
objeC tions from hume,  K Ant And russell
The aforementioned three contemporary versions of the cosmological 
argument have been confronted with the classic objections from Hume, 
Kant and Russell. Let us see how the new argument holds against these 
objections. I start with the well-known objections from Hume. Hume 
argues that the cosmological argument cannot come off the ground 
since we lack other contingent universes as reference cases for the claim 
that our contingent universe must have a cause. This objection does not 
pose a problem for the new argument. For, the new argument appeals 
to the thesis of causalism in order to infer that the mereological sum of 
all caused simples is either a cause or caused, and, in order to defend 
both causalism and its application to the sum of all caused simples, it is 
surely not required to empirically observe that nearly all worlds in some 
hypothetical observational sample of worlds are caused.
200 Besides, there is still 
another significant difference 
between the caused simples 
and the contingent objects that 
suggest that the sum of the latter, 
contrary to the former, is not 
an object. For, since all caused 
simples are mutually disjoint and 
hence do not overlap each other, 
the sum of the caused simples 
is obtained in an unproblematic 
way by aggregating disjoint 
particulars, whereas this isn’t true 
for the sum of all contingents.
201 Reasons do not have to be 
understood as pure epistemic 
constructs, that is to say, as being 
explanations. For the concept of 
being a reason for an object’s 
existence could have (at least 
partially) ontological import.
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The new argument is also not vulnerable to the Humean objection 
that only logical truths are necessary. Indeed, the new argument does 
not invoke the modal notions of contingent or necessary truths at all. 
As we saw Hume also contends that causes and effects must always 
stand in a relationship of temporal priority, that is to say, causation 
implies that the cause always precedes its effect in time. Now, this 
objection does not have much force against the new argument. First, 
as we have seen in the previous chapters, it is perfectly valid to argue 
that causes do not need to be temporal. For, what appears to be at 
most analytically captured in the concept of causation is the following. 
Object A causes object B if and only if (i) A is ontologically prior to B, and 
(ii) A is ontologically responsible for the existence of B. Now, object A 
is ontologically prior to B if and only if object A could exist without B, 
but B could not exist without A. Thus, the notion of temporality is not 
analytically contained in the notion of being ontologically prior. Further, 
object A is taken to be ontologically responsible for B if and only if A is 
part of the reason201 of the existence of B, which isn’t in itself a temporal 
notion either. Therefore, since none of both notions require temporal 
priority, it follows that the above characterization of causation doesn’t 
include temporal priority either. Thus, according to that characterization 
causes could be both temporal and non-temporal. And indeed, in the 
previous chapters we have seen plausible candidates for non-temporal 
causation. For example, under mathematical Platonism, mathematical 
objects can be said to be the cause of mathematical truths. Thus, 
the objects ‘1’ and ‘2’, together with the relationships of addition and 
equality, can be said to be the originating cause of the truth that 1 plus 
1 equals 2.202 Thus, because the above mentioned characterization 
of causation allows for both temporal and non-temporal causation, 
it follows that Hume’s objection that causal priority entails temporal 
priority is not properly founded after all. And there is yet another 
reason why this objection has no force against the new argument. The 
ontological framework on which the new argument is based is so generic 
that time (and space) cannot be introduced as separate types of reality 
in addition to the type of being an object. For, according to the new 
argument’s ontological framework every one-thing that exists is called 
an object and an object is nothing more than some one-thing that exists. 
In other words, as far as the new argument’s framework is concerned, 
objects and relationships between objects (such as the relationships of 
causation and parthood) are in the end all there is to reality.203 But then 
even time and space itself are objectual, that is, are to be considered as 
(sums of) objects. And thus, in such a generic framework, it becomes 
quite reasonable to think about causation in a much more abstract 
sense, encompassing both temporal and non-temporal causation. For 
only such an abstract metaphysical stance, being surely a much more 
generic perspective than that of traditional physics, makes it possible 
to ask prima facie quite sensible questions such as ‘Is there a cause of 
time? If so, what caused the state of affairs of there being time?’ It is 
precisely these types of sensible metaphysical questions which require 
202 As another example, one 
could argue that the constituents 
of a composite are an integral 
part of the explanation for that 
composite’s existence, so that 
in this case one might want 
to agree that the constituents 
are ontologically responsible 
for that composite’s existence. 
And if these constituents are 
also ontologically prior to the 
composite it would follow that 
they could adequately be called 
the cause of the composite. 
This cause is not temporal if we 
assume that the constituents have 
never been temporally prior to 
the composite, which is defensible 
if we consider the composite 
as being a structured whole 
containing its own structure as 
one of its constituents (cf. Koslicki 
2008). For then, as soon as all 
constituents exist, the composite 
exists.
203 Note that a relationship 
between objects is not considered 
as being some one-thing, that is, 
as being an object. The framework 
has it that the objects are the 
existents or entities that together 
make up the world and that allow 
for there being relationships 
between them, without these 
relationships being themselves 
objectified. Indeed, the framework 
has ‘relationship’ as a primitive 
term in addition to the term 
‘object’. So, the framework does 
not support a reification or 
thingification of the relationships 
between objects. Take for example 
the causal relationship. According 
to the ontological framework the 
cause is an object, i.e. the object 
that produces the effect, and the 
effect is an object as well, and 
the relationship between cause 
and effect is not some third thing 
or entity. The same holds for the 
relationship of part and whole. 
The part is an object, i.e. the 
object that is part of the whole, 
and the whole is an object, and 
the relationship between part 
and whole isn’t some further third 
object either. Everything we need 
and want to say about causation 
and parthood is captured by 
the relata-objects of these 
relationships. And thus further 
existents are not required.
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a concept of causation more generic than Hume is able to offer us, and 
I take it that the new argument’s framework provide us which such a 
much more abstract encompassing notion of causality. Therefore, to 
conclude, the typical Humean presumption that causation can only be 
temporal doesn’t have much force against the new argument.
In our evaluation of the Gale and Pruss’s cosmological argument we 
also looked at Hume’s objection that there is no need to refer to an 
external causal explanation of a given whole in case every part of it 
is properly explained by referring to one or more other parts of that 
particular whole. As became clear this objection is not a concern for 
Gale and Pruss’s cosmological argument. And it isn’t a threat for the 
new argument either. For, the premises of the new argument entail that 
there is a cause of the sum of all caused simples which is disjoint and 
therefore external to that sum. Of course, one might want to challenge 
the new argument’s premise that originating causes do not overlap their 
effects, but I shall address that objection later on in this chapter.
Our treatment of the cosmological arguments of Rasmussen confronted 
us with still some additional objections from Hume. Neither Hume’s 
objection that there are in fact no necessary objects since conceivability 
entails possibility and everything that exists can be conceived of as 
not existing, nor his further objection that the necessary object arrived 
at by cosmological arguments could as well be prime matter itself, 
have any force against the new argument. After all, the new argument 
doesn’t appeal to contingent or necessary objects. And also Hume’s 
objection that the concept of an uncaused object is not contradictory 
and thus one may not assume that contingent objects are caused, has no 
impact on the new argument, simply because, as we have seen, the new 
argument allows for there being uncaused objects, which, on account 
of the premise of causalism, are taken to be the originating cause of at 
least one other object. Moreover, Hume’s objection that one may not 
inquire into the cause of the whole of all contingent things, since that 
whole is merely a concept in the mind and hence non-existent in reality, 
has no force either because, apart from the fact that the new argument 
does not refer to contingents, the new argument provides a specific 
ground for why the sum of all caused simples can properly be considered 
an object that exists in reality instead of just in the mind. So we can 
conclude that none of the classical objections of Hume has sufficient 
force to render the new argument untenable.
I take it that the same holds for the classical objections to the 
cosmological argument of Immanuel Kant. First, Kant’s claim that 
causation is an internal concept of the mind that does not refer to 
an external mind-independent reality has no force against the new 
argument. For, as we have seen earlier, Koons points out in defense of 
his own cosmological argument that ‘the notion of causation has taken 
root once again within philosophy, proving to be indispensable to recent 
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advances in semantics, epistemology and cognitive science’ (1997, p. 193). 
And indeed, we simply cannot avoid to appeal to a notion of causation 
in order to find scientific explanations of most (if not all) phenomena. 
The Kantian objection that cosmological arguments are not cogent since 
they presuppose the ontological argument, which is unsound because 
it is based upon the untenable premise that a necessarily existing being 
is possible, has no impact on the new argument either, for, clearly, the 
new argument does not assume the metaphysical or broadly logical 
possibility of such a being.
What about the classical objections of Russell? One of Russell’s 
objections against all cosmological arguments is that they commit 
the fallacy of composition, that is to say, these arguments apply the 
principle that every contingent object is caused to the total sum of all 
such objects, which is ungrounded. In other words, as Russell contends, 
from the fact that each contingent thing in the universe is caused one 
cannot conclude that the universe itself is caused. Indeed, as Russell 
famously proclaims in his bbc radio debate with Frederick Copleston: 
‘The universe is just there, and that’s all’. But, again, it should be clear 
that his objection does not have any force against the new argument, 
for it is shown as part of the new argument that the effect of the derived 
first cause is defined as the sum of all caused simples, which is shown to 
be an object amongst other objects and thus quite naturally something 
to which the premise of causalism can be applied. Hence, at no point 
in the derivation of the conclusion of the new argument do we run into 
the risk of a category mistake. Quite the contrary, for, as we have seen, 
special attention is given to demonstrate that the sum of all caused 
simples is an object and therefore indeed the kind of entity to which we 
can apply the premise that every object is either caused or a cause.
As we saw Russell also raised the objection that the universality of 
causation is merely heuristic in the sense that scientists should always 
strive to find causes for phenomena, but that this doesn’t imply that 
every contingent thing is guaranteed to have an originating cause. Now, 
surely, this objection is harmless to the new argument for none of the 
premises of the new argument entails the universality of causation. 
Instead, the new argument is premised on the thesis of causalism, which 
is the claim that everything that exists is either caused or itself a cause. 
Now, I take it that causalism can indeed be taken as a cogent description 
of reality, not just for the reasons mentioned in the previous chapter, 
but also, and perhaps more suited to rebut an Russellian objection, due 
to the enormous empirical scientific confirmation of this thesis. In any 
case the thesis of causalism is much more plausible than its negation 
and therefore it is surely sufficiently reasonable to accept this thesis as 
a premise in a metaphysical argument. Indeed, as Peter van Inwagen 
points out: ‘I am happy to admit that I am uneasy about believing in the 
existence of ‘causally irrelevant’ objects. The fact that abstract objects, if 
they exist, can be neither causes nor effects is one of the many features 
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of abstract objects that make nominalism so attractive.’ (Van Inwagen 
2009, p. 19).
A third objection of Russell that we encountered during our evaluation 
of Rasmussen’s cosmological arguments is that it is possible that there 
are infinite causal series. And since, as the objection concludes, such 
series cannot have a proper causal explanation, it follows immediately 
that cosmological arguments for there being a first cause of the whole 
of reality are not tenable. However, as we noted earlier in this chapter, 
this objection fails as an objection to the new argument since the new 
argument’s premises all allow for there being infinite causal series.
objeC tions relAted to Koons’  Argument
Let us now have a closer look at some of the objections that have 
been specifically raised against the cosmological argument of Koons, 
both objections as mentioned and rebutted by Koons himself (Koons 
1997, 2001) and the further objection that I have put forward against 
his argument. One objection was that quantum mechanics provides 
counter evidence to the universality of causation. But surely, this 
objection, to have force against the new argument, should be rephrased 
as the objection that quantum mechanics provides counter evidence 
to causalism, that is, to the premise that everything that exists is either 
caused or a cause. But, is this the case? Does quantum mechanics 
convincingly shows that causalism doesn’t hold in an unrestricted 
sense? The main worry is that according to quantum mechanics so-
called ‘virtual particles’ can come all of a sudden into existence without 
any reason at all, that is uncaused. Therefore, since it is not guaranteed 
that these particles are themselves originating causes of other particles, 
they are alleged examples of objects that are not caused or the cause 
of other objects, which would violate the principle of causalism the 
new argument relies on. However, it cannot be ruled out that easily 
that virtual particles are not in any sense the cause of another object, 
especially since the ontological framework the new argument is built on 
allows for a wide inclusive range of items being properly called objects, 
a range in principle much wider than the collection of items considered 
objects according to quantum mechanics. So, in fact it might still be 
true that these uncaused virtual particles cause objects in some wider 
sense than allowed by quantum mechanics itself. In addition, the claim 
that virtual particles can pop into existence spontaneously, apparently 
without any originating cause whatsoever, would be only defendable 
if we accept upfront an indeterministic interpretation of quantum 
mechanics, such as the Copenhagen version. For, if we would accept one 
of the deterministic interpretations of quantum mechanics, for example 
the interpretation of David Bohm (Bohm 1952) or of Heinz Dieter Zeh 
(Zeh 1970), it does not follow at all that virtual particles can come into 
existence without any cause. And in fact, as I have argued for in the 
chapter on the cosmological argument of Gale and Pruss, there are good 
philosophical reasons to prima facie favor deterministic interpretations 
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of quantum mechanics over indeterministic ones. Besides, one could 
argue that even in the case of the Copenhagen interpretation virtual 
particles do not pop into existence wholly uncaused. For, they originate 
from the quantum vacuum, which is an object in itself, so that, on a 
neo-Aristotelian view of causation, one could adequately hold that 
these particles, although not having an efficient cause (causa efficiens), 
have a proper material cause (causa materialis) and are therefore 
not uncaused. Indeed, as W.L. Craig writes: ‘Even on the traditional, 
indeterministic interpretation, particles do not come into being out of 
nothing. They arise as spontaneous fluctuations of the energy contained 
in the sub-atomic vacuum […] Popular magazine articles touting [sub-
atomic physics] as getting ‘something from nothing’ simply do not 
understand that the vacuum is not nothing, but is a sea of fluctuating 
energy endowed with a rich structure and subject to physical laws’ 
(Craig and Sinnott-Armstrong 2004, p. 6). So, by taking the above 
considerations into account, I conclude that there is no good reason to 
straightforwardly accept that quantum mechanics provides sufficient 
counter evidence to the premise of causalism, and, thus, the objection 
from quantum mechanics, as it stands today, has no real force against 
the new argument.
Another objection against Koons’ argument was the objection referred 
to as the ‘adjusted Ross’ objection. The main point of that objection is 
that, even if we accept that there is an uncaused object that causes the 
cosmos, a vicious infinite regress is still not prevented. In what follows 
I present a slight modification of that objection and argue that it fails 
as an objection against the new argument. Let us indeed accept that 
there is an uncaused object that causes the cosmos. Now consider the 
fact or state of affairs that the uncaused object causes the cosmos. As the 
objection goes, one could still ask what causes this fact. And directly 
after having received an answer one could ask for the cause of the fact 
or state of affairs that the cause of the fact that the uncaused object causes 
the cosmos is causing that very fact, and so on, ad infinitum. Now, this 
specific objection is no threat to the new argument since it appeals to a 
type of causation to which the new argument’s ontological framework is 
not committed at all, namely causation of facts or states of affairs. For, 
as explained in the previous chapter, the notion of causation adopted 
by the new argument’s framework is that of causation of objects by 
objects. In other words, causation within the new argument’s framework 
is a two-place relationship between objects instead of facts or states of 
affairs. Thus, we can ask for the cause of an object, such as the sum of all 
caused simples, but not for the cause of the fact or state of affairs that 
that very cause causes that very object. Hence, a vicious infinite regress 
is prohibited due to the objectual nature of the notion of causation as 
adopted by the ontological framework of the new argument. Moreover, 
it seems to me indeed cogent to limit the notion of causation to objects 
in the context of the new argument, precisely because this context 
is the context of the coming into being of objects due to the actions 
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or effects of other entities or beings (that is, other objects) that have 
certain efficacious powers or dispositions. Finally, the new argument 
allows for there being uncaused objects. So, naturally, there might also 
be uncaused facts.
Other objections against his argument that Koons considers, such as 
that effects typically have contingent causes, or that postulating a multi-
verse helps to avoid an appeal to a first cause, or that one could always 
ask the further question where the cause of the cosmos came from, pose 
no problems for the new argument either, because, first, as stated, the 
new argument does not rely on the notion of contingent objects, and, 
second, if there is a multi-verse, then the mereological sum of all caused 
simples would be co-extensive with it, so that it would follow from the 
new argument’s premises that the first cause is the sole originating 
cause of the entire multi-verse, and third, as we saw before, the premises 
of the new argument deductively entail there being an uncaused cause 
of the sum of all caused simples, and thus the new argument’s premises 
logically exclude that this cause is itself caused.
Yet, in the chapter on Koons’ cosmological argument I provided a further 
objection against his argument that might be a concern for the new 
argument. As pointed out in that chapter one of the main challenges 
for any first cause argument is answering the question what it is that 
we are trying to establish a first cause for. I introduced the term ‘derived 
reality’ to refer to the effect for which the first cause is to be understood 
as being the ultimate originating cause. Now, each first cause argument 
is premised on some underlying ontological framework that sets 
the ontological context for the argument. This ontological context 
determines amongst others the proper candidate for ‘derived reality’ 
for that argument. For example, a first cause argument that argues 
for the existence of an ultimate originating cause of our observable 
universe is not an adequate argument if the underlying ontological 
framework assumes, or at least leaves open, that there might exist a 
multi-verse comprised of many, perhaps infinitely many, universes. For, 
the context set by such a framework entails that the proper candidate 
for ‘derived reality’ is not just our own universe, but the multi-verse, 
even if it would actually only consists of our universe. Now, surely, the 
proper candidate for ‘derived reality’ for the argument of Koons, being 
a contemporary version of the Leibnizian cosmological argument, is 
the mereological sum of all contingent objects. But, and that was the 
core of my objection, Koons argues that there is an ultimate originating 
cause of the sum of all wholly contingent objects, which is not shown to 
be co-extensive with the sum of all contingents simpliciter. Therefore, 
his argument does in the end not establish there being a cause of the 
whole of derived reality, which renders his cosmological argument 
unconvincing as a first cause argument. Is such an objection also cogent 
in the case of the new argument? The new argument shows that there 
is an uncaused cause of all caused simples. Thus, the question becomes 
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whether the sum of all caused simples is the proper candidate for 
‘derived reality’ within the context of the new argument. I think this is 
indeed the case. For, according to the underlying ontological framework 
and the premises of the new argument, every composite object is 
composed of simples and composites are nothing over and beyond 
the mereological sum of the simples they are composed of, that is to 
say, composites are identical to the sum of the simples contained in 
them as a part. Therefore, an uncaused object that is the cause of all 
caused simple objects indeed qualifies as the, direct or indirect, ultimate 
originating cause of all caused composites as well, that is, it qualifies as 
being a first cause.
objeC tions relAted to gAle And pruss’s  Argument
In the chapter on the cosmological argument of Gale and Pruss (Gale 
and Pruss 1999) a large number of objections against their argument 
have been assessed, such as objections addressed by Gale and Pruss 
themselves (1999), objections from Oppy (2000), Davey and Clifton 
(2001) and Almeida and Judisch (2002), and some further objections 
from myself. I already pointed out above that the classical Humean 
objection as mentioned by Gale and Pruss (1999), that is, the objection 
that the Big Conjunctive Contingent Fact might have a sufficient internal 
explanation (and thus doesn’t need an external one) since a whole is 
already properly explained if each part of it is explained by another one, 
has no force against the new argument. The objection that the necessary 
being their argument arrives at is not yet a regress-of-explanation 
stopper fails as an objection against the new argument as well. For, as 
mentioned before, the premises of the new argument already logically 
entail that the ultimate originating cause of the sum of all caused 
simples is uncaused, so there is no need to provide further reasons for 
this ultimate originating cause to be a regress-of-explanation ender, as is 
the case for Gale and Pruss’s argument.
The objection that the universe as a whole cannot have an explanation 
since explanations are supposed to be based on solid empirical 
observations indicating a statistically relevant relationship between 
causes and effects poses no concern for the new argument either, 
precisely for the reasons already mentioned to rebut this objection 
as an objection against the cosmological argument of Gale and Pruss. 
Moreover, the objection that an essentially free and necessarily existing 
being is impossible has no force against the new argument because, 
again, the new argument does not rely on the modal notion of a 
necessary being.
The objection against Gale and Pruss’s argument that, for all we know, 
the cosmos might have been caused by some blind indeterministic 
mechanical causation, surely does not apply to the new argument 
because the claim of the new argument is limited to there being a 
first cause, that is to say, it infers that there is a first cause without 
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establishing what the actual nature of this first cause is supposed to 
be. As such it is a first crucial step to defend the worldview of theism, 
but it of course does not constitute in itself a complete case for theism. 
And I take it that this is not a disadvantage of the new argument 
at all, precisely because all other contemporary arguments that we 
have assessed in the previous chapters do eventually not succeed in 
establishing a first cause, which, as I pointed out before, is the very first 
thing that one must establish in order to provide a rational case for the 
existence of God. Indeed, God, if anything, must at least be the first 
cause of derived reality. In other words, the new argument provides 
the very first crucial ingredient for any theistic worldview, that is, there 
being a first cause, whereas the other arguments might establish one or 
more theistic features, such as there being a necessary powerful being 
endowed with free will, but do not entail the crucial key proposition of 
there being a first cause, so that the new argument is quite relevant, to 
say the very least, to support the worldview of theism over alternative 
worldviews, such as naturalism.
A number of other objections against Gale and Pruss’s cosmological 
argument attack the weak version of Leibniz’s principle of sufficient 
reason which they employ as part of their argumentation, such as the 
objection that the weak principle violates our modal intuitions, or begs 
the question against atheism, or can only be said to be nearly true, or 
entails the (alleged untenable) strong version. Since the new argument 
does not rely on Leibniz’s principle of sufficient reason, nor on any of its 
weaker versions, these objections do not pose any problem for the new 
argument at all.
We have seen that Oppy (2000) presents two specific objections against 
the underlying ontological framework of Gale and Pruss’s argument. The 
first objection, that the argument of Gale and Pruss begs the question 
against materialism or nominalism since their underlying framework is 
based on an ontological commitment to Platonic abstract propositions, 
has no force against the new argument. After all, the new argument is 
not premised on any commitment to Platonic abstracts whatsoever. 
Oppy’s second objection, as we saw, is that Gale and Pruss rely on the 
thesis that each abstract proposition is either atomic or a conjunction 
of atomic propositions. And, as the objection goes, it is not sufficiently 
clear what the notion of an atomic proposition amounts to in Gale and 
Pruss’s framework. Now, this objection does not result in a problem for 
the new argument either since the underlying framework on which it is 
premised includes an explicit mereological account of atomicity, or more 
specifically, of what is meant by being a simple or atomic object.
Two of the objections from Davey and Clifton (2001), i.e., (i) that the Big 
Conjunctive Contingent Fact of the actual world (bccf) is necessarily 
unexplainable, and, (ii) that even if the objection that the bccf is 
necessarily unexplainable fails it still follows that we lack adequate 
149VII A  crit icAl  Assessment of the Argument from cAusAlism And Atomism
epistemic grounds for determining whether or not it is possible for the 
bccf to have an explanation, so specifically address Gale and Pruss’s 
cosmological argument that they have no force at all against the new 
argument. The same is true of the objections proposed by Almeida and 
Judish (2002).
A further objection that I proposed to the argument of Gale and Pruss 
was that in the end their argument does not prevent the possibility 
of an infinite regress of explanations because it does not rule out the 
consistent scenario that there exist infinitely many necessarily existing 
beings {Pn}n such that being P1 intentionally brought the entire cosmos 
into existence, P2 intentionally and necessarily brought P1 into existence, 
P3 intentionally and necessarily brought P2 into existence, and so on, ad 
infinitum. Now, this further objection fails as a good objection against 
the new argument for the already stated reason that the new argument’s 
premises logically entail that the ultimate originating cause of the sum 
of all caused simples is itself an uncaused object, so that scenario’s such 
as the aforementioned one are immediately ruled out in the case of 
the new argument. Another further objection I proposed was that the 
argument of Gale and Pruss is incompatible with human free will, since, 
as I showed, their argument entails that the necessary being freely 
brought all contingent things into existence itself, so that there is no 
room left for free will causation by human agents. Yet, this objection 
does not pose a problem for the new argument either. For, the first 
cause as established by the new argument is only the direct originating 
cause of all caused simple objects. Hence, in this case it does not follow 
that the first cause is the direct cause of all caused objects.
objeC tions relAted to rAsmussen’s  Arguments
In the previous chapter I proposed a number of specific objections to the 
cosmological arguments from Rasmussen. Now, none of these specific 
objections have consequences for the new argument’s credibility. Take 
the objection that, even if the contingent state of existence of all actual 
contingents objects has an originating cause involving a necessary being 
(which is, as I argued, not implied by Rasmussen’s main cosmological 
argument), it does not follow that the necessary being in question is a 
first cause, because, according to Rasmussen’s notion of causation for 
contingent states of existence, it might, for all we know, be the case 
that the necessary being causes just one or a few actual contingents, 
while all other contingents constitute a causally closed infinite causal 
series. Surely, this objection is harmless to the new argument because 
the new argument doesn’t rely upon Rasmussen’s notion of causation 
for contingent states of existence. Indeed, the notion of causation 
as adopted by the new argument’s ontological framework applies to 
objects and not to states of affairs. Another specific objection, which 
targets the first alternative path of Rasmussen, is the observation that 
the explanatory principle on which the first path is based, that is, the 
principle that for any kind of contingent objects it is possible to explain 
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why there are members of that kind at all, leads to serious difficulties. 
This objection does also not threaten the new argument since the 
new argument does not depend on the aforementioned explanatory 
principle. And similar points can be made about the specific objections 
I proposed to the other two alternative paths provided by Rasmussen.
Objections specifically addressing the new argument’s framework or 
premises
Now, in what follows I shall identify some additional objections that one 
might want to raise specifically against the new argument, and that have 
not been discussed thus far. My aim is to argue that these additional 
specific objections do not have sufficient force, and thus are no threat to 
the new argument either.
the objeC tion thAt the underlying frAmeworK of the 
new Argument is  too restriC tiVe
The first objection I want to consider is the objection that the underlying 
ontological framework of the new argument is too restrictive since it 
presumes that the whole of reality can be viewed as nothing more than 
a universe of just objects having parts and entering in causal relations. 
For, as one could object, how can space and time, which do not seem 
to be objects, be handled by the framework? I respond that the object 
oriented nature of the framework is compatible with space and time. 
First, the framework of the new argument is premised on a rather 
inclusive conception of object-hood. An object is just some-thing that 
exists. So, if space and time exist, they can both be introduced as objects 
in the underlying framework. But, surely, this observation will not suffice 
as a response to the objection. Hence, let us have a closer look at space-
time. If space-time, as contemporary cosmology predicts, is finite in 
the past, and is overall in an average state of cosmic expansion, then 
space-time has all kinds of properties, such as a geometrical structure or 
shape, an age and an (average) expansion rate. And we could mention 
more properties of space-time, such as that according to the physical 
theory of general relativity space-time can be curved or transformed 
by other objects. Moreover, in the specific case of space we can also 
point to multiple classical field properties, such as its permittivity and 
permeability. Now, something which has a wide range of properties is, 
as bearer of those attributes, properly seen as being an object. Further, 
there are a number of contemporary quantum gravity theories, that 
is, theories of space-time blending quantum mechanics and general 
relativity, which are based upon a quantization of space-time. So, these 
theories actually propose that not only matter and energy, but also 
space and time itself are quantized, that is, can be understood as a 
composite of space and time quanta, which again supports the thesis 
that the nature of space and time is essentially objectual, and hence 
fits the underlying object oriented ontological framework of the new 
argument.
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Another objection, closely related to the previous one, focuses on the 
mereological features of the new argument’s underlying framework. 
According to this objection the framework is not able to account for 
ordinary material compounds such as tables, houses and motorcycles, 
since these composite objects cannot properly be understood as 
being mereological sums whereas the framework presupposes that 
all composites are sums. The objection comes down to the following 
worry. If composite objects such as tables, houses and motorcycles are 
nothing but mereological sums, as the framework presupposes, how 
are we then able to distinguish between, say, ‘the vast and important 
difference between a heap of disassembled motorcycle parts, piled up, 
as they might be, at the Honda factory or in someone’s garage, and the 
motorcycle in running condition that results from assembling these 
parts in a particular, fairly constrained way[?]’ (Koslicki 2008, p. 4). 
For, as the objection in this particular case would have it, the heap and 
the motorcycle have the very same parts, and hence in both cases the 
mereological sums, and thus the objects themselves, are numerically 
identical, which is absurd. Therefore, the framework is not realistic and 
should be abandoned, which leaves the new argument unfounded. The 
objection can also be illustrated in a similar way by pointing out that 
the framework is not able to solve the classical metaphysical problem 
known as the Problem of Constitution (Koslicki 2008, p. 6), that is, the 
problem how to properly distinguish between, say, a statue and the 
lump of clay which constitutes it. For, as the objection can be rendered, 
the statue and the lump of clay are both objects and thus mereological 
sums according to the framework, which entails, since the statue and 
the lump of clay have precisely the same parts, that they are in fact the 
very same object, which conflicts with our intuition that the statue is 
not numerically identical to the lump of clay that constitutes it.204 So 
again, the objection concludes that the framework is too artificial or 
counterintuitive to accept.
How to respond to this objection? Well, as I shall argue in what follows, 
I take it that the account of parthood and composition for ordinary 
material objects, as developed by Kathrin Koslicki (Koslicki 2008), not 
only solves the raised problems, but is also entirely compatible with 
the mereological principles of the new argument’s framework. As 
such Koslicki’s analysis of the nature of the relations of parthood and 
composition for ordinary material objects qualifies as a cogent rejection 
of the aforementioned objection. Koslicki develops a neo-Aristotelian 
structure-based conception of parthood and composition. As she 
explains: ‘My project […] is […] to put the notion of structure or form 
squarely back at the center of any adequate account of the notions 
of part, whole and object. To this end, I propose in what follows a 
conception of ordinary material objects as structured wholes: it is integral 
to the existence and identity of an object, according to this approach, 
that its parts exhibit a certain configuration or manner of arrangement. 
[…] Moreover, in what is perhaps the most radical feature of my view, 
204 This intuition is properly 
supported by the principle, 
usually attributed to Leibniz, that 
if two objects are numerically 
identical it follows that they 
share the very same properties, 
that is to say, there is not a single 
property that one object has and 
the other hasn’t. Indeed, in the 
case of the statue and the lump of 
clay there seem to be many modal 
and temporal properties that only 
one of them possesses, such as 
‘being constituted by a lump of 
clay’, ‘being essentially a statue’, 
‘being able to survive squashing’, 
‘having come into existence 
after the lump of clay came into 
existence’ or ‘having come into 
existence before the statue 
came into existence’. I obtained 
these examples of differentiating 
properties from Koslicki (2008, 
pp. 179–180).
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I argue […] that the structure which dictates how the remaining parts of 
a whole are to be arranged is itself, literally and strictly speaking, part 
of the whole it organizes. The main historical inspiration for this view is, 
of course, Aristotle […]. In Aristotle’s view, an object, such as a bronze 
sphere, consists of two components, its matter (the bronze) and its form 
(sphericity); as I read him, both the matter and the form of an object are 
taken by Aristotle to be strictly and literally part of the object, just as 
my hand is part of my arm.’ (2008, pp. 5–6). As we see here, on Koslicki’s 
view, an ordinary material compound, such as a table or house, is not 
simply the sum of its material parts. For, the manner of arrangement of 
the material parts, that is, the form or structure of the material object, 
is a (proper) part of the material object as well. A material compound is 
an object only if its material parts expose an intrinsic unity imposed on 
these parts by a structure or form dictating how the material parts are 
to be arranged. Now, this view is compatible with the new argument’s 
framework. I explain why. According to the framework of the new 
argument objects are simply mereological sums. If we follow Koslicki, 
then, as explained above, the structure or form of any object is a proper 
part of that object. Now, a proper part of an object is plausibly itself an 
object as well, especially if we take into account the maximally inclusive 
conception of object as deployed by the new argument’s underlying 
framework. Hence, structures or forms are objects. And thus the new 
argument’s framework can refer to them. Further, since proper parts 
are the constituents of mereological sums, it follows as well that the 
structure or form of an object is contained in the corresponding sum. 
Therefore, within the context of the framework, if we say that some 
given material compound, such as a house or table, is a sum, then, 
what we are actually saying is that it is the sum of its material parts and 
its unifying form or structure. It is thus entirely cogent to commit to 
Koslicki’s structure-based conception of ordinary material objects, that 
is to say, the viewpoint that ordinary material objects are structured 
wholes that contain their structure as a proper part, while at the 
same time remain fully committed to the new argument framework’s 
mereological principle that objects are mereological sums.
Let us now see how Koslicki’s account provides a cogent solution to the 
aforementioned Problem of Constitution. She explains: ‘The Problem of 
Constitution concerns the nature of the relation which obtains between 
an object and what it is made of, e.g., a statue and the clay which 
constitutes it. Metaphysicians are puzzled by this relation, because, 
on the one hand, the statue and the clay are sufficiently similar to one 
another to make it tempting simply to identify them; on the other hand, 
there are sufficient differences between them to make us think that 
we cannot simply be dealing with a single object. The neo-Aristotelian 
thesis that objects are compounds of matter and form yields a solution 
to the Problem of Constitution: the clay now turns out to be merely 
a proper part of the statue (viz., its matter); the “remainder” of the 
statue is made up of [its form or structure] which distinguish it from the 
205 Later on in her book Koslicki 
presents a more formal derivation 
of her solution. She argues: ‘By 
Leibniz’s Law […] we seem to 
arrive at the conclusion that 
objects that are constitutionally 
related must be numerically 
distinct, since they do not share 
all of their properties [note: 
Koslicki refers to “Leibniz’s law” 
as the metaphysical principle that 
if x and y are identical objects, 
then every property of x is also 
a property of y and vice versa; 
and indeed, as we saw in the 
previous footnote, the statue and 
the lump of clay do not have the 
same properties]. Suppose that 
this Leibniz’s Law-style argument 
for the numerical distinctness of 
constitutionally related objects 
is cogent; then, in the case at 
hand, in which a mereologically 
complex object consists of just a 
single material component, the 
following explanation of their 
numerical distinctness is actually 
dictated to us by our endorsement 
of the Weak Supplementation 
Principle [Wsp], which was earlier 
taken to be partially constitutive 
of the meaning of “is a proper 
part of”: by Wsp, we know 
that the something extra which 
distinguishes the statue from the 
lump of clay that constitutes it 
must in fact be an additional part: 
for, according to this principle, 
an object which has a proper part 
must consist of other proper parts 
in addition, which supplement the 
first. Since there is overwhelming 
evidence in favor of the thesis 
that the lump of clay, i.e., its single 
material component, is a proper 
part of the statue, we must now 
look for additional proper parts 
within the statue besides its 
single material component: the 
most likely candidates for these 
additional proper parts are [..] its 
“formal components” [i.e., its form 
or structure]. Thus, assuming Wsp 
and the cogency of Leibniz’s Law-
style arguments for the numerical 
distinctness of wholes and their 
material components, we arrive at 
the conclusion that the [form or 
structure] of a whole as well must 
be counted among its proper 
parts […].’ (2008, pp. 180–181). 
Now, I take it that Leibniz’s Law as 
referred to by Koslicki is a self-
evident metaphysical 
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clay.’ (2008, p. 6).205 Now, this neo-Aristotelian analysis indeed fits the 
underlying framework of the new argument perfectly. For, a statue can 
be understood as the mereological sum of two objects, being a material 
object, that is, the lump of clay that constitutes the statue, and a non-
material or formal object, being the form or structure of the statue. But 
this entails that the statue is not the lump of clay. Indeed, according 
to the aforementioned analysis the lump of clay is only a proper part 
of the statue, and hence not the very statue itself. The same analysis 
applies to the example of the heap of disassembled motorcycle parts 
and the motorcycle in running condition. For, although in both cases 
the material parts are exactly the same, the form or structure of the 
heap, that is, the manner of arrangement of the material parts of the 
heap, differs from the form or structure of the motorcycle in running 
condition. Because both structures are to be considered a proper part of 
respectively the heap and the motorcycle (their formal parts), it follows 
that the corresponding mereological sums, each consisting of the same 
material parts but of a different formal part, are not identical, so that 
the heap and the motorcycle are indeed not the same object. Because of 
the above considerations, I conclude that, if we commit to Koslicki’s neo-
Aristotelian structure-based conception of parthood and composition 
for ordinary material compounds, the objection that the new argument’s 
framework is too abstract or counterintuitive since it does not seem 
to be able to deal with ordinary material objects, such as statues and 
motorcycles, has to be rejected.
A third objection, closely related to the previous two, is that the 
argument’s framework is too restrictive since it can’t account for identity 
through time for ordinary material objects such as tables and ships. Let 
me explain the objection. According to the new argument’s framework, 
some mutually disjoint objects compose an object if and only if the 
latter is the mereological sum of the former. But then, since the 
framework has it that a sum of objects introduces nothing beyond these 
objects themselves, it follows that a composite object is nothing over 
and beyond the objects that compose it. That is, the composite simply is 
the composition. And this, as the objection has it, implies that identity 
through time cannot be accounted for. For, every object is a composition 
of micro-particles. And, at every time instant every object loses and 
gains a few micro-particles. So, given that objects are identical to their 
compositions, there is in fact not a single object that persists through 
time. The table now is a composition of different micro-particles than 
the table one instant of time ago, and therefore it isn’t the same table 
anymore. It’s another object.
This objection can be refuted by appealing again to Koslicki’s neo-
Aristotelian account of composition and parthood. For, indeed, 
the-table-now is not the same object anymore as the-table-one-time-
instant-ago. After all, what we have at this very moment is a sum of 
different micro-particles than what we had one moment before. So, it is 
principle. Further, what Koslicki 
refers to as Wsp is precisely the 
supplementation principle as 
adopted by the new argument’s 
framework. So, the solution that 
Koslicki provides to the Problem 
of Constitution (and related 
problems) is in fact entailed by 
the new argument’s framework. 
Indeed, Koslicki’s proposed 
solution fits the new argument’s 
framework perfectly.
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in fact trivially true that the object now differs from the object before. 
Yet, the table-wise arrangement of the particles has not changed. In 
other words, the structure of both objects is identical and that is what 
allows us to say that we have here something that is identical to what 
we had before: a table. I fail to see how this would not solve the worry 
of lack of identity. There is no mystery at all. From an ontological point 
of view the object now is not the same as the object before. But we 
can still properly speak about this table due to the identity between the 
current structure, that is, the current way the particles are arranged, 
and the previous structure, that is, the way the particles were arranged 
one instant of time ago. Indeed, the-structure-now and the-structure-
one-time-instant-ago are precisely the same, given the spatial-temporal 
continuity between them and the fact that the previous one is entirely 
isomorphic to the current one. In cases where we do not seem to have 
a structure, that is, a spatial arrangement of particles, such as most 
notably in the case of personal identity through time, there isn’t a 
problem for the new argument’s framework either, since we could argue, 
accepting some proper defendable account of substance dualism, that 
each person is identical to a simple object,206 being its mind or soul, so 
that his or her identity through time is guaranteed by the persistence 
of that simple (Woudenberg 2000). Indeed, a simple can’t lose or gain 
parts. So its persistence through time is unproblematic.
the objeC tion thAt the 2nd premise  is  insuffiCient to 
Complete the new Argument ’s  f irst  step
The next specific objection to the new argument that I would like to 
consider addresses its second premise. According to the second premise 
every composite object is ultimately composed of simple objects. Thus, 
the premise amounts to a commitment to mereological atomism. Now, 
the objection I have in mind is not to criticize (my defense of) atomism. 
Instead, the objection has it that a commitment to mereological 
atomism is not sufficient to complete the first step of the new argument. 
Let us revisit the first step. It aims to show that every caused composite 
contains a caused simple. In the previous chapter I referred to this 
thesis as principle (p). To establish (p) an arbitrary caused composite, 
denoted by C, was subjected to a specific algorithmic procedure, which, 
by utilizing premise (6) of the new argument, produced a sequence C(0), 
C(1), C(2), … of parts of C, such that C(0) = C, and for all natural numbers 
n, C(n + 1) is a caused proper part of C(n). Now, according to the first 
step, this sequence must, because of the second premise, eventually 
terminate in a caused simple part of C, which shows that C indeed 
contains a caused simple, and thus, because C was an arbitrary caused 
composite, it follows that principle (p) holds. But, as the objection I have 
in mind goes, the second premise, that is, the thesis of mereological 
atomism, it not sufficient to conclude that the sequence C(0), C(1), C(2), … 
terminates. For, as the objection proceeds, there are cogent examples 
of mereological models that satisfy atomism while at the same time 
they allow for infinite sequences of parts of some caused composite, 
206 Plausibly, in this case, each 
creaturely person is a caused 
simple, which would entail, given 
the new argument’s conclusion, 
that the first cause is the direct 
cause of each creaturely person. 
This surely fits the general theistic 
view regarding the ontological 
relationship between the first 
cause, i.e. God, and every 
creaturely person.
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such that each subsequent member of the sequence is a caused proper 
part of the previous member. Now, if there are such models, then 
atomism by itself cannot imply that the aforementioned sequence 
C(0), C(1), C(2), … terminates. A proper example of such a model, as the 
objection continues, is the following. Consider the open interval (0,1) 
of real numbers. Let every subset of (0,1) be an object. Suppose that all 
objects are caused. Further, the part-of relation for this model is defined 
as follows. An object X is part of an object Y if and only if X is a subset 
of Y. Now, for this model atomism is true. After all, the simples in this 
model are the real numbers in (0,1) and each composite is composed of 
a set of these numbers. Now, take C = C(0) = (0, ½) and let, for all natural 
numbers n, C(n) = (0, 1/(n + 2)). It is clear that C is a caused composite, and 
that the sequence C(0), C(1), C(2), … of parts of C is such that C(0) = C, and, 
for all natural numbers n, C(n + 1) is a caused proper part of C(n). But surely 
this sequence does not terminate. In the given model this sequence 
goes on forever; there will never be a final terminating element, even 
though in the model atomism in fact holds. So, the objection concludes, 
mereological atomism is insufficient to properly complete the first step 
of the new argument. Hence, the new argument is not logically valid and 
should therefore be rejected.
Is this objection adequate? The mathematical model as presented by 
the objection, that is, the model of the real numbers between zero and 
one, seems rather artificial. Why should we believe that this or similar 
far-fetched models have ontological significance? Shouldn’t we require 
a reason for accepting the relevance of such set-theoretical models 
for answering the ontological question of whether atomism allows for 
downwards infinite series of proper parts? Nevertheless, let us for now 
presuppose that, for some reason, the artificial (0,1)-model in fact does 
force us to conclude that atomism, understood as the thesis that all 
composites are composed of simples, is insufficient to infer that there 
are no downwards infinite sequences of proper parts. In that case the 
first step of the new argument is indeed not valid. However, if we look 
at the defense of atomism as provided in the previous chapter, what was 
argued for is that mereological atomism must be true since, if it would 
be false, there would exist at least one infinite sequence of compositions 
such that each member of this sequence is a refinement207 of the 
previous member, which, as I showed as part of my defense, results in 
a contradiction. So, in short, I showed that atomism must hold because 
there are no infinite sequences of ever further refinements of some 
given composite. Now, surely, a downwards infinite series of proper 
parts of some composite can easily be transformed into an infinite 
series of ever further refinements of that composite.208 Therefore, in the 
previous chapter I in fact showed that there are no downwards infinite 
sequences of proper parts, which, as already mentioned, is precisely 
what we need in order to complete the first step of the new argument. 
Thus, if we adjust the second premise so that it states that there are 
no downwards infinite sequences of proper parts, then the objection 
207 See my defense of atomism 
in the previous chapter for a 
formal definition of the term 
‘refinement’.
208 According to the framework’s 
supplementation principle (see 
the previous chapter) every 
proper part of an object is 
supplemented by another disjoint 
part of that object. It is quite 
straightforward to appeal to this 
principle for constructing ever 
further refinements from a given 
downwards infinite series of 
proper parts.
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loses its force.209 Moreover, let us note that the adjusted premise is not 
similar to the traditional Thomistic premise that downwards infinite 
causal series do not exist. For, the adjusted premise maintains that in 
the order of composition there are no downwards infinite sequences 
of proper parts, which is totally different from the Thomistic premise 
that in the order of causation downwards infinite series of causes do 
not exist. Hence, it is not the case that accepting the adjusted second 
premise would render the new argument as just another version of the 
traditional Thomistic argument. Indeed, as we saw, the framework of 
the new argument is entirely compatible with there being one or more 
infinite series of originating causes.
the objeC tion thAt the sum of All  CAused s imples  is 
not prior to eVery CAused objeC t
Another specific objection addresses the fifth step of the new argument. 
The fifth step, as we saw, is to establish that the sum of all caused 
simples is ontologically prior to every other caused object. It goes as 
follows. Let B be an arbitrary caused object. B is either a caused simple 
or a caused composite. Principle (p) entails that in either case B contains 
a caused simple as part. But then, as the fifth step concludes, the sum 
of all caused simples is ontologically prior to B. Now, as the objections 
points out, why would the sum of all caused simples be ontologically 
prior to B? For, from the fact that B contains at least one caused simple, 
it does not follow that B contains all caused simples, and therefore 
there is no reason to conclude that the sum of all caused simples is 
ontologically prior to B. As I shall argue, this objection is not adequate. 
Let us suppose, for reductio, that the sum of all caused simples is not 
ontologically prior to B, that is to say, suppose, for reductio, that B exists 
and that the sum of all caused simples does not exist. The fifth step 
shows that B contains a caused simple, say S, as a part. Obviously, the 
sum of all caused simples exists as soon as there is at least one caused 
simple. So, since it is assumed that the sum of all caused simples does 
not exist, it follows that there are no caused simples. But then, since 
there are no caused simples, S does not exist. However, B contains S as 
a part. Thus, if S does not exist, it follows that B does not exist either, 
and this contradicts with the fact that B does exist, which completes the 
reductio. Hence, the assumption that the sum of all caused simples is 
not ontologically prior to B must be rejected, so that the objection fails.
the objeC tion thAt the new Argument ’s  entAiled f irst 
CAuse doe s not hAVe to be  A  ‘unit y ’
One might also want to raise the objection against the new argument 
that the first cause as entailed by its premises is not shown to be any 
kind of unity at all. For all we know, as the objection goes, the first 
cause as established by the new argument might be a bunch of totally 
unrelated uncaused simples.210 Is this objection cogent? No, it overlooks 
a perhaps trivial yet crucial fact. What the new argument’s premises 
actually entail is that there exists an object that is the uncaused cause 
209 In the previous chapter 
I gave a second reason to accept 
atomism, which, similarly to 
my argument for atomism as 
discussed above, constitutes 
a defense of the adjusted 
premise as well. Let me explain. 
The second reason is that we 
are justified to commit to the 
ontology presupposed by our 
best scientific theories, and thus, 
since microphysics presumes 
a fundamental level of basic 
building blocks, we are justified to 
accept atomism. Now, from this 
Quinean view, it in fact follows 
that we are not only justified to 
accept atomism, but also the 
thesis that downwards infinite 
series of proper parts do not 
exist. After all, there being no 
such series is presupposed by 
all microphysical theories of the 
last two centuries as well. For, as 
all these theories have it, we can 
arrive at the basic building blocks 
from any given object in a finite 
path, e.g., from an object to one of 
its molecules, from that molecule 
to one of its atoms, from the atom 
to one of its elementary particles, 
then to one of the particle’s 
quarks, and, finally, from that 
quark to one of its strings, which 
is one of nature’s basic building 
blocks according to contemporary 
microphysics. Therefore, the 
second reason is also a defense of 
the thesis that in nature there are 
no downwards infinite series of 
proper parts, which, as said above, 
is what we need to complete the 
first step of the new argument.
210 Note that the first cause 
cannot have a caused simple as 
a part. This is because the first 
cause is the cause of all caused 
simples, and, according to the 
premises of the new argument, 
causes and effects are disjoint.
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of the sum of all caused simples. In other words, what has been shown 
is that the first cause is in fact an object. Hence, even if the first cause 
is the sum of many uncaused simples, it is still a unity, for it is a single 
object that contains all these uncaused simples as its proper parts. The 
fact that the first cause is an object is indeed important as a motivation 
for its unity since within the context of the new argument’s underlying 
ontological framework many mereological sums, especially arbitrary 
gerrymandered sums such as the sum of the some piece of art in the 
Louvre and my left hand, are not objects at all. Therefore, following the 
new argument’s framework, being an object is a proper ‘unity indicator’. 
The first cause is an object, not just a sum.
objeC tions Addressing the new Argument ’s  notion of 
CAusAtion or its  CAusAl prinCiples
I continue this chapter with a response to some objections to the notion 
of causation or corresponding causal principles as adopted by the new 
argument’s framework. First, as we saw, the framework understands 
causality as a two-place relationship between objects: the cause and 
the effect. Now, one might object that this is not a proper rendering of 
causation since effects might have more than one cause. However, this 
objection does not have any force since we may simply assume that the 
cause of an effect refers to the total or complete cause of the effect, that 
is to say, to the sum of all objects participating in causing the effect.211 
So, in that case, we still have a causal relationship between two objects. 
Further, one might object that causation is not to be understood as a 
relationship between objects at all. For, as this objection would have 
it, causation is more properly seen as a relationship between events, 
or states of affairs, or facts. However, this objection overlooks that the 
new argument is based upon a very generic framework that presupposes 
a rather inclusive notion of what it is to be an object. Further, the 
framework is quite theoretical in the sense that time and space 
themselves are taken as being objectual. In this sense the framework 
is compatible with events as causes and effects. But more importantly, 
why would an objectual notion of causation be inadequate? A familiar 
category of causation, agent causation, is for example best understood 
as a kind of causation for which the cause is in fact an object, i.e. the 
agent. In contemporary literature agent causation has indeed found its 
place as a defendable notion of causation (e.g. O’Connor 2000, Lowe 
2008). So there are defendable accounts of object causation next to 
states of affairs or event causation. Therefore, a swift de jure objection 
that object causation is just ‘ill conceived’ will not do anymore without 
showing why this notion would in fact be contradictory, which is, as 
I take it, not something that can easily be shown.
In addition to objections to the specific notion of causation deployed 
by the new argument, there are also objections aimed at the new 
argument’s causal premises. An example would be the objection that 
originating causes and their effects do not have to be disjoint. One 
211 In the previous chapter 
I suggested a, as I take it, plausible 
principle regarding the interplay 
between causation and parthood. 
The principle has it that a sum of 
objects only counts as an object in 
case it causes as a whole another 
object, or, if it was caused as a 
whole. Note that this principle 
implies that the sum of all objects 
participating in causing some 
effect can itself be taken to be an 
object, which is important since 
a total or complete cause, has to 
be, within the context of the new 
argument’s framework, an object.
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could argue that John existing at some time t is the cause of John existing 
a time instant later, say at t + ∆t. But then the cause, John at t, is not 
disjoint at all with the effect, John at t + ∆t, so that in general one cannot 
hold that causes and effects are disjoint. This objection can be rebutted 
by arguing that the correct analysis of this situation would be that the 
time-slice of John at t is the cause of the time-slice of John at t + ∆t, and, 
since these time-slices are in fact disjoint, it does not follow at all that in 
this example case cause and effect overlap. Moreover, the relationship 
between the time-slices of John and John himself can be defined in 
terms of mereological parthood, that is, both time-slices are proper 
parts of John, so that the proposed alternative analysis of the situation 
fits the new argument’s underlying framework. But perhaps one might 
argue that for example in biological growth processes, new parts of an 
animal, for example the tail of a horse, grow out of an earlier tail-less 
instance of that horse, so that in this case one might want to claim that 
the effect, that is, the tail, is not disjoint with the cause, i.e. the growing 
horse. Still, as I would respond, we can analyze this situation by either 
appealing to the aforementioned time-slice approach, or by claiming 
that the cause is disjoint to the effect, since the cause may be properly 
understood as being the tail-less horse, while the effect is the non-
overlapping tail.
Another specific objection targets the definition of a first cause as 
deployed by the new argument’s framework, that is to say, a first cause 
is an uncaused cause whose effect is ontologically prior to every other 
caused object. The objection I have in mind here argues that this is not a 
satisfactory definition of a first cause, since it does not guarantee that a 
first cause is the direct or indirect cause of each and every other object. 
Yet, even if there is no causal chain from the first cause to each and 
every other object, the uncaused cause of all caused simples, as entailed 
by the new argument, is still the sole cause of all caused simples that 
are contained in all other objects. Thus the uncaused cause of all caused 
simples would still adequately be referred to as the ultimate origin or 
ground of the caused simples of each and every object, which is what we 
expect of something referred to as the first cause.
Some further objections by an anonymous referee of the new argument
I would like to close this chapter by considering some further objections 
as proposed by an anonymous referee of the new argument. The first 
objection is that philosophers who believe in causally inert abstracta 
reject the third premise of the new argument, that is, the premise of 
causalism according to which each object is caused or a cause, on the 
ground that abstracta do not enter into causal relations. The provided 
response to this worry, as the referee points out, is merely ‘to hold out 
hope for’ nominalism or mind-produced abstracta. Now, in the previous 
chapter I indeed proposed to accept nominalism or mind-produced 
abstracta in order to overcome the objection that abstracta are causally 
inert. However, it is not the case that accepting one of both theses 
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would be just a matter of hope. Quite the contrary, nominalism is surely 
a defensible thesis, and the same holds for the thesis that abstract 
objects exist but are caused by a specific type of human thought, namely 
idealization of concrete objects, as I explained in the previous chapter. 
Besides, I give two additional suggestions which one could follow if 
one does not want to accept nominalism or mind-produced abstracta. 
According to my third suggestion one could argue that abstracta cause 
other abstracta. For example, sets could be understood as the cause 
of numbers since numbers are constructed from sets. As the fourth 
suggestion has it, even if there are causally inert abstract objects, which 
is unlikely since it seems impossible to explain how we could know 
these objects without them being at least partially causally responsible 
for us having this knowledge, we can still limit the domain of the new 
argument to concrete objects. The new argument would then entail that 
there is a unique concrete uncaused cause A whose effect is ontologically 
prior to every other concrete caused object. As mentioned in the 
previous chapter, such an object A definitely qualifies as a first cause 
in a non-trivial sense. To conclude, because of these four suggestions, 
the worry about causally inert abstracta does not pose an irresolvable 
problem for the new argument.
Another objection of the referee against the third premise goes as 
follows. Theists who think that God does not have to create a cosmos 
will surely not accept the third premise. For, God, properly understood 
as an uncaused being, would still exist if He doesn’t create a cosmos, 
which, as the objection has it, violates the third premise. However, this 
objection overlooks the fact that God still causes objects if He does not 
create a cosmos. Indeed, God produces His own thoughts and these 
thoughts are properly understood as being mental objects, so that God 
satisfies the third premise, even if He would decide not to create a 
cosmos.
According to the referee’s third objection ‘It seems possible to have 
a universe where every entity is a person (either a divine person of a 
created person). But then by reasoning parallel to [the fourth premise], 
shouldn’t there be a sum of all the persons in that world? But that sum 
[…] does not seem to cause or be caused by anything outside itself 
[…]’. This objection misunderstands the import of the new argument’s 
framework. As I explained in the previous chapter the framework does 
not rely on metaphysical modal notions such as necessary or contingent 
objects or truths. Hence the concepts and principles as adopted by 
the framework do not claim to hold in every metaphysically possible 
world. For, as mentioned, the notion of metaphysically possible worlds 
is not part of the framework at all. Thus, the new argument’s framework 
concepts and principles are claimed to be cogent only for the world as 
given, i.e., for reality as such. Now, once this is understood, it becomes 
clear why this objection fails. For, evidently, the world does not consist 
only of persons, and hence the objection has not presented us with 
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a falsification of the third premise. But, even if we would suppose that 
all premises of the new argument are claimed to hold for all possible 
worlds, then the objection still fails. After all, every person produces 
thoughts and these thoughts can reasonably be understood as being 
(mental) objects. Thus, even in the case as sketched by the objection, 
the sum of all persons causes another object, namely, the sum of all 
their thoughts. And, again by reasoning parallel to the fourth premise, 
it follows that the sum of all thoughts of all persons can indeed be 
plausibly understood as being a (mental) object, since ‘thoughts of 
persons’ or ‘the mental’ is demarcated and meets, plausibly, all four 
Koslicki criteria for natural kinds.
The fourth and final objection provided by the referee can be rendered 
in the following way. The new argument infers that the non-empty 
sum of all caused simples is an object because the caused simples form 
a demarcated natural kind. But, as the objection points out, if caused 
simples are a demarcated natural kind, then clearly the simples 
themselves are a demarcated natural kind as well. For, it is easy to see 
that the simples, similarly to the caused simples, are demarcated and 
meet Koslicki’s criteria for being a natural kind.212 Hence, the defender 
of the new argument is also committed to the assertion that the sum 
of all simples is an object. But then, because of the third premise of 
the new argument, it follows that the sum of all simples is caused or 
the cause of one or more other objects. Hence, according to the fifth 
premise of the new argument, that is to say, the premise that cause and 
effect do not overlap, there exists something that is disjoint with the 
sum of all simples. But this is impossible since the second premise of 
the new argument, i.e. the premise of atomism, entails that there is in 
fact nothing disjoint with the sum of all simples. Hence, as the objection 
concludes, the new argument leads to a contradiction and must 
therefore be rejected.
Is this objection tenable? Let us have a closer look at natural kinds. Is 
there a necessary condition that should be met by all natural kinds? 
Natural kind terms address ‘aspects’ or ‘segments’ of reality, and should 
therefore not a priori exclude there being multiple aspects or segments. 
These terms allow, at least a priori, for there to be two or more kinds. 
Thus, the definition of each natural kind should in principle allow for 
there being something disjoint with the sum of the members of the 
natural kind. In other words, it should not be the case that the definition 
of a natural kind already logically excludes upfront that there exists 
something outside the sum of its members. This principle seems to be 
evident. The definition of a kind should allow for there being other kinds, 
even if in reality this would in fact not be the case. Take for example 
the natural kind ‘water’. Now, even if Thales would have been right 
after all, i.e., even if the whole of reality would consist of nothing but 
water, so that everything that exists is a (proper) part of the sum of all 
water molecules, then it would still be the case that the definition of 
212 The referee supports the 
claim that the simples meet the 
Koslicki criteria by considering 
each of them. I present the 
referee’s assessment with 
minor textual changes: ‘(i) not 
gerrymandered: if “caused simples” 
is not gerrymandered, a fortiori 
“simples” is not gerrymandered 
either; (ii) specification does not 
capture everything: there might 
indeed be quite a lot of serious 
metaphysics to do to figure out 
what simples are like. Maybe they 
will turn out to be monads. Maybe 
they will turn out to be either 
particles or minds; (iii) grounds 
for inductive inference: it seems 
indeed plausible that you can do 
induction over simples, about as 
plausible as you can do induction 
over caused simples. For example, 
it seems plausible that if all 
simples that we have observed 
have charge but lack mass, then 
we have reason to think that 
no simple has both charge and 
mass; (iv) natural kinds figure in 
laws: caused simples play a role 
in fundamental theory. But so do 
simples. Particle physics will not 
only say that some token quark 
is a caused simple, it will also say 
that it is a simple’. So indeed, as 
the referee shows, the simples 
meet Koslicki’s criteria for being a 
natural kind.
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what it is to be a member of the natural kind ‘water’ allows in principle 
for there to be something outside the sum of all water molecules. 
And indeed, collections of objects for which this is not the case, that 
is to say, collections of objects for which it holds that their definition 
already implies that there cannot be anything disjoint with the sum 
of its members, are not natural kinds, for they do not even allow in 
principle for there to be other kinds.213 Hence, to summarize, we have 
the following necessary condition for natural kinds. If the collection of 
objects X is a natural kind, then it is not analytically true, that is, true by 
virtue of the definition of X, that everything that exists is a part of the 
sum of the members of X. Surely, natural kinds such as water and gold 
meet this condition because their definitions clearly allow in principle 
for there to be an object disjoint with the sum of their members, even 
if Thales would have been right after all or king Midas would have been 
so successful that everything that exists, including himself, would have 
been turned into gold. Now, what about the caused simples? Well, 
obviously the caused simples meet this necessary condition as well since 
the definition of ‘caused simple’, even if in fact atomism would be true 
and all simples in the world would be caused, still allows in principle for 
there to be objects disjoint with the sum of all caused simples, namely 
uncaused simples. So, the necessary condition is compatible with the 
caused simples being a natural kind, which is quite important since the 
defense of the fourth premise of the new argument commits to the 
claim that the caused simples are a natural kind. But take the collection 
of all objects simpliciter. Is this a natural kind? The answer is no because 
the collection of all objects does not meet the necessary condition. 
For, by definition nothing that exists can be disjoint with the sum of all 
objects. The fact that the collection of all objects is not a natural kind 
is consistent with the new argument, since its premises entail that the 
sum of all objects is not an object, which would immediately contradict 
with the collection of all objects being a natural kind.214 Now, and this 
is crucial, under atomism, which is the second premise of the new 
argument, the simples are not a natural kind either! For, indeed, if every 
composite object is composed of simples, then it follows by definition 
that nothing can be disjoint with the sum of all simples, which violates 
the necessary condition for being a natural kind. Thus, we conclude 
that the final objection is unsuccessful.215 The simples do not meet the 
necessary condition and hence they are not a natural kind. Further, the 
explicated necessary condition is not just some ad hoc claim to avoid the 
referee’s objection. In fact, the condition is surely plausible enough to 
reasonably accept it wholly independently of the current context. And 
precisely because of this I conclude that the objection forms actually a 
compelling corroboration of the new argument, so that its real impact 
on it is to increase its overall epistemic credibility. With this response 
I end this chapter. As we have seen none of the discussed objections to 
the new argument poses a problem to the new argument, that is to say, 
none of them goes through.
213 Note the parallel with the 
famous twentieth century’s 
Russell paradox in mathematical 
set theory, which showed that ‘the 
set of all sets’ cannot itself be a 
set, for, if it would, irresolvable 
contradictions arise.
214 Indeed, as discussed before, 
the defense of the fourth premise 
of the new argument commits 
to the thesis that the sum of 
the members of a demarcated 
natural kind is an object. Thus, 
if the collection of all objects 
would have been a natural kind, 
then, since membership of this 
collection is not vague because 
everything that exists is an object, 
it would be in fact a demarcated 
natural kind. But then, due to the 
aforementioned thesis, the sum of 
its members would be an object, 
which contradicts with the fact 
that the third and fifth premise of 
the new argument logically entail 
that the sum of all objects is not 
an object.
215 In the previous chapter 
I proposed four different 
suggestions to refute the 
objection that causally inert 
abstracta falsify causalism. The 
fourth suggestion is that one 
could restrict the scope of the 
new argument to concrete objects 
only. I take it that my current 
response to the fourth and final 
objection provided by the referee 
remains tenable if we accept the 
fourth suggestion. For, as I would 
argue, the principle that natural 
kind terms a priori allow for other 
kinds, also applies to the realm 
of the concreta. That is, there 
isn’t a kind of concrete objects 
of which the definition a priori 
excludes there being other kinds 
of concrete objects.

Viii Conclusions and further work
Introduction
In this chapter I would like to bring together some of the threads of 
the previous chapters and point at some likely fruitful directions for 
further research. More specifically, I would like to do three things. 
First, I start with sharing a relevant observation, a lesson learned if you 
want, which is not directly part of the project’s objectives, but which 
I believe reveals a quite deep and interesting feature of all cosmological 
arguments in general. Second, I indicate two more fundamental worries 
one could have with the new argument and its underlying framework. 
The first worry would not only apply to my argument, but in general to 
all arguments for the existence of an object that is the direct or indirect 
cause of all other objects. The second worry specifically addresses my 
new argument. I shall argue why I take it that the first worry is in fact 
not a real problem for my argument at all. Yet, as I shall explain, I believe 
that the second worry actually reveals an inherent tension in my defense 
of the argument that requires further investigation into how this tension 
can be removed or perhaps significantly reduced.
As mentioned in the introduction of this thesis, my project is part of a 
much broader program that deals with the intellectual respectability 
of (bare or mere) theism. Therefore, in the third and final part of this 
chapter, I expound my view on how the main results of my project 
count as a meaningful contribution to the intellectual discussion of the 
rationality of theism. In this final part I also propose some additional 
insights which, I contend, are promising enough to be worked out in 
more detail by further research. And if so, these supplementary ideas 
can become an intrinsic part, along with the new argument, of a more 
extensive case for theism.
An inherent limitation of cosmological arguments
The cosmological arguments discussed in this thesis can be partitioned 
into two groups. The first group consists of Thomas Aquinas’ second 
of five ways presented in his Summa Theologiæ, the ‘first paradigmatic 
form’ as derived from this second way, and my new argument. All these 
arguments have in common that they aim to establish the existence 
of a first cause. The second group consists of Leibniz’s argument as 
presented in amongst others his Monadology, the ‘second paradigmatic 
form’ derived from Leibniz’s argument, the argument of Koons, the 
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argument of Gale and Pruss, Rasmussen’s argument from a maximal 
contingent state of existence, and Rasmussen’s three alternative paths. 
These arguments have in common that they aim to establish that there 
is a necessary being. Or, more accurately, Rasmussen’s arguments 
purport to establish that there is a necessary existing and causally 
efficacious being that might have, but is not guaranteed to have, caused 
(some part of) the cosmos. The other four arguments in this second 
group aim for more, namely, the existence of a necessarily existing being 
that caused the whole cosmos.
Now, what this overview clearly shows is that none of the cosmological 
arguments discussed in this thesis establish that there is a necessarily 
existing first cause. For, each of these arguments either provides us 
with a necessary but perhaps non-first being or with a first but perhaps 
non-necessary being. Hence, it seems we can’t have both within a 
single argument. Either the argument infers a necessarily existing being 
(being first or non-first) or the argument entails a first cause (being 
necessary or non-necessary). I generalize this observation and contend 
that it holds for all cosmological arguments, either mentioned or not 
mentioned in this thesis. But, if so, what is it that makes this the case? 
Why can’t we have both, being a first cause and existing necessarily, in 
one and the same cosmological argument? The reason why cosmological 
arguments for a necessary being cannot be first cause arguments is 
that they infer a necessary being from contingent beings. They depart 
from some contingent features of the actual world in order to arrive at 
there being a non-contingent, and thus necessary being. But a necessary 
being, as I have argued for in this thesis, might have been caused. So, 
these arguments cannot guarantee that the necessary being they arrive 
at is uncaused, that is, a first cause.
A reason for why, on the other hand, first cause arguments cannot 
also be arguments for a necessary being is that first cause arguments 
typically rely on principles about causality only, such as the Thomistic 
principle that a downwards infinite regress of causes is impossible, 
the principle deployed by the Kalam argument according to which 
everything that begins to exist has a cause,216 or the principle of 
causalism according to which every object is either caused or a cause. 
These and other purely causal principles are not able to distinguish 
between necessary and contingent objects. After all, they apply to 
both types of objects. I verify this for each of the three aforementioned 
principles. The principle that everything is caused or a cause can 
indeed be applied to both contingent and necessary objects, even if all 
necessary objects would be uncaused. For, in that case it follows that 
all necessary objects cause some other object. Note that the principle 
entails that the same is true of uncaused contingents. Every uncaused 
contingent causes some other object. The Thomistic principle applies 
to necessary objects as well. For, there can be objects that are both 
necessarily existing and caused. Consider next the Kalam principle 
216 Craig and Sinclair 2009, 
p. 102
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according to which everything that begins to exist has a cause. Does 
this causal principle also apply to necessary objects? Surely, necessary 
objects might be caused, but could it also be the case that a necessary 
object begins to exist? I argue that this is indeed possible. For, there 
could be a necessary object, say A, that has as an essential property 
that it causes object B at some point in time. But then B does begin to 
exist in each and every possible world, so B is an example of a necessary 
object that (necessarily) begins to exist. Therefore, the Kalam principle 
indeed applies to both contingent and necessarily existing objects, 
similar to the other two principles.217 So, to summarize, the purely 
causal principles do not distinguish between contingent and necessary 
objects. But then first cause arguments, which are built on these causal 
principles, can indeed not simultaneously be arguments for a necessary 
being.
There is also another reason why first cause arguments cannot 
simultaneously infer a necessary being. For, given that, as we have seen 
in this thesis, some contingent objects can be uncaused, it follows that 
an uncaused cause arrived at by a first cause argument is not guaranteed 
to be a necessarily existing object. For all we know the uncaused object 
is an uncaused contingent, similar to the examples I provided in the 
previous chapters.
We may thus conclude that cosmological arguments are inherently 
limited. After all, they cannot arrive at a necessary uncaused object, 
let alone at a necessary first cause. But then, if one wants to infer a 
necessary first cause based on cosmological arguments alone, there 
is no other choice than to build a cumulative case of at least two 
cosmological arguments.
Two further, more fundamental, problems
is  the new Argument inCompAtible  with theism?
One could argue that new argument is incompatible with theism since 
it seems to imply that the derived first cause must be natural instead 
of supernatural. This problem could be expressed as follows. The new 
argument commits us to the claim that the first cause is an object 
amongst objects. And, in addition, just like all the other objects, the first 
cause is a causally efficacious object that has or lacks mereological parts. 
Thus, in terms of its most elementary metaphysical features, the first 
cause is quite similar to each and every other object. Moreover, as the 
argument’s underlying framework has it, the whole of reality is a causally 
interconnected whole, of which the first cause, as any other object, is 
an intrinsic part. From these considerations it would follow that it is not 
possible to draw a principled absolute line between the first cause and 
the other objects, so that the first cause cannot be taken to stand for 
some separate realm of reality. But then, given the obvious existence 
of the natural realm, we cannot reasonably qualify the first cause as a 
217 Note that the Kalam 
principle is more plausible for 
necessary beginnings than for 
contingent beginnings. Let me 
explain. A contingent beginning 
could possibly not have taken 
place. Thus, one might content 
that such a beginning is simply 
a brute or random fact. It 
happened in our world but it 
would not have happened in 
other possible worlds. Yet, in the 
case of a necessary beginning 
this beginning occurs in every 
possible world, which is less likely 
to be a mere brute or random fact 
than a contingent beginning. So, 
there must be a reason for this 
necessary beginning to occur. 
This reason cannot be found in 
the object that begins itself, say 
by arguing that ‘beginning to 
exist’ is some sort of essential 
property of the object. For, that 
object does not exist without 
the beginning, and it would be 
incoherent to argue that a non-
existing object induces its own 
beginning of existence. From 
this is follows that the ground 
for its necessary beginning must 
be found outside the object, 
that is, in some external cause, 
which is precisely what the Kalam 
principle asserts. This external 
cause may be nothing more than 
some collection of metaphysical 
or broadly logical laws, but these 
count in the new argument’s 
framework as a collection of 
abstract objects or even a single 
abstract object.
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non-natural, that is, supernatural entity. Therefore, the most reasonable 
position would be to hold that the first cause as implied by the new 
argument, or, for that matter, as implied by any cosmological argument 
of which the underlying framework is in the relevant aspects similar to 
that of the new argument, is not supernatural, but, just as many other 
objects, part of the natural realm. But then naturalism218 would be true. 
For, if the first cause is natural, everything is.
I propose a two-fold response. My initial response, consisting of 
five parts, is focused on the alleged similarity of the first cause to 
natural objects. First, the first cause is the direct or indirect uncaused 
cause of all other objects, that is, of everything else that exists. Thus, 
identifying God with the first cause would still be compatible with a 
conception of God as ‘The Ultimate’, ‘The Metaphysical Absolute’ or 
equivalents. Second, as discussed in previous chapters, the notion of 
‘object’ deployed by the new argument’s framework is rather inclusive. 
Anything, that is, any-one-thing that exists is called an object. So the 
new argument’s conclusion merely comes down to the assertion that 
there is a first cause, and this doesn’t say anything about what the first 
cause is. Therefore the new argument certainly allows for a first cause 
that represents an entirely different realm of reality. Third, indeed, the 
first cause shares fundamental properties with all natural objects, such 
as entering in causal relations and being either simple or composite. 
But again, this surely should not exclude a theistic interpretation of the 
first cause, for, as I would argue, most, if not all, theistic conceptions 
of God take it that God is causally related to the cosmos, at least to 
the cosmos’s coming into existence. And next to that, many theistic 
philosophers have in fact argued that God is mereologically simple, 
or hold that this could be the case. Fourth, God having causal and 
mereological features doesn’t commit us to the claim that there 
would be no fundamental difference between God and the rest of 
reality. For, God’s essence could still be totally different from that of 
the natural objects that surround us. One could think for example of 
God’s infinitude, inexhaustibility, necessity, eternality, immateriality, a-
temporality, a-spatiality, omnipotence, omniscience and omnipresence. 
Plausibly, there is no ordinary natural object that has such extraordinary 
features. And finally, given the aforementioned observations, I would say 
that in fact the new argument also leaves more than sufficient room for 
those theistic notions of God that include typical negative-theological, 
or even outright mystical, descriptions of the divine, such as ‘The Wholly 
Other’, ‘The Radical Different’, ‘The Beyond’ or ‘The Mystery’.
My other response to the above is that the problem seems to be 
premised on the idea that we have to make a distinction between the 
natural and the supernatural. For, only if we accept this distinction one 
can assert that the first cause as entailed by the new argument is in 
fact plausibly natural and not supernatural. But, one may ask, what is 
natural? Is it space and time with all its contents? Would, if substance 
218 Metaphysical naturalism 
is meant here. Metaphysical 
naturalism holds that the natural 
world is ‘all there is’. According 
to metaphysical naturalism non-
natural or supernatural entities 
do not exist. Metaphysical 
naturalism has to be distinguished 
from methodological naturalism, 
according to which science may 
only posit natural entities or 
causes. Metaphysical naturalism 
implies methodological 
naturalism. But the reverse 
does not hold. Indeed, a 
methodological naturalist 
might leave it open whether 
supernatural entities or causes 
exist, but still hold that the 
supernatural, if it would exist, 
is beyond the potential reach of 
science. See entry ‘Naturalism’ 
of the Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy for more background 
on both positions.
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dualism is true, minds belong to the natural? Or suppose that there 
are abstract objects such as universals, propositions, properties and 
numbers. Would they also belong to nature? Perhaps nature is simply 
that which is subject to the laws as discovered by the natural sciences, 
that is to say, physics, chemistry, biology and astronomy. But then 
again, what determines the proper scope of the natural sciences? 
As Hempel’s Dilemma219 shows it is impossible to define nature by 
referring to those sciences that study nature. Indeed, such a definition 
would be circular. I therefore conclude that the distinction between the 
natural and the supernatural is not helpful. We should speak about the 
world, or better, the whole of reality. In fact, we can refer to the whole 
of reality, to everything that exists taken together, as being. Being is 
by definition everything that exists. Thus God, if God exists, is part of 
being, just as you and I and the chair that I’m currently sitting on. And 
this does nothing to downplay God’s divinity, for precisely those reasons 
I mentioned in my first response. So, to conclude, the first cause is 
itself also a part of being, just as is everything else, and the reason that 
we attribute a special status to it is based on its unique and strikingly 
extraordinary features, such as being the absolute ground of everything, 
the metaphysical ultimate, or, as theists affirm, being God. And for this 
we do not need the ill-defined class of the ‘supernatural’.
is  there A  tension bet ween the frAmeworK’s  generiC 
nAture And its  speCifiC  defense?
The new argument’s framework is based on a quite universal all-
embracing interpretation of the notion ‘object’. An object, within the 
framework’s context, is literally every-one-thing that exists. We can 
hardly conceive of a more generic, more inclusive, notion of object-
hood. And in fact one could argue that this feature of the framework is 
at odds with the defense offered for one or more of the new argument’s 
premises. In what follows I shall illustrate the problem by means of a 
detailed consideration of the third premise of the new argument, that is, 
the premise of causalism. This premise has it that every object is either 
caused or the cause of one or more other objects. To defend causalism 
I appealed to Alexander’s dictum that says that to exist is to have causal 
powers. More precisely my defense rested on a variant of the Eleatic 
principle: one should not posit the existence of anything outside the 
net of causes and effects, since only that which participates in causal 
processes can be said to exist, that is, can be properly called an object. 
It is important to notice that the thesis of causalism does not define 
what an object is. The phrase ‘being caused or cause’ is not the definiens 
of the definiendum ‘object’. So it is not the case that being an object 
means being caused or being the cause of something else.220 Indeed, as 
we have seen, the new argument’s framework considers ‘object’ to be a 
primitive term. The only thing said of ‘object’ is that it is an existent, that 
is to say, something that exists. The starting point of the framework is 
therefore a given totality of objects, called ‘the world’ or ‘reality’. There 
simply are these objects. And what it is for an object to be an object is 
219 Hempel (1969)
220 To put it differently, the 
notions of ‘object’ and ‘being 
caused or a cause’ are not 
intensionally equivalent.
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left open. Hence the notion of object is kept at an intuitive level, with 
the exception of the generic idea that object-hood is to be understood in 
the broadest, most inclusive, sense.
Further, as we saw, the argument’s framework does not answer Van 
Inwagen’s Special Composition Question. No sufficient and necessary 
conditions are provided to describe the circumstances under which 
some objects compose another object. In fact, for all the framework 
is concerned, there might not even be a single finite answer to the 
Special Composition Question.221 The only thing we can do from 
the framework’s perspective is to propose and defend metaphysical 
principles that help us to ‘detect’ objects. For this we could use 
paradigmatic examples of objects, such as tables and chairs. One 
example is the neo-Aristotelian principle proposed and defended 
by Koslicki according to which being a spatially structured whole is a 
sufficient condition for object-hood. This neo-Aristotelian principle is 
context dependent because it is specifically intended to apply to the 
context of ordinary material objects.222 Now, our premise in question, 
i.e., the premise of causalism, is actually an example of such a principle 
as well. This principle is not context dependent. It offers us a necessary 
condition for any X223 to be an object. So, if it can be shown that X is not 
caused, and if it can also be shown that X is not a cause, then we may 
conclude, according to this principle, that X is not an object.224 Further, 
everything that is caused or that causes something else is by definition 
an object.225 Hence, ‘being caused or a cause’ is not only a necessary, 
but also a sufficient condition for object-hood. That is to say, the notion 
of object is extensionally equivalent to the notion of ‘being caused or a 
cause’.
As we know the new argument heavily relies on the principle of 
causalism. However, its defense reveals the very tension that I alluded 
to above. Let me explain. In my defense of causalism I presumed a 
conception of objecthood that is not as generic as the framework has it. 
For, my defense implicitly appeals to a rather specific neo-Aristotelian 
notion of objecthood according to which objects are understood as 
concrete particulars or as substances endowed with causal powers. And 
indeed, if we limit ourselves to these paradigmatic examples of objects, 
the thesis of causalism is sufficiently plausible, to say the least. But 
given that the new argument’s framework adopts a far more universal 
all-encompassing conception of objecthood, the tension between the 
framework and my defense of causalism becomes apparent. For, given 
the framework’s much broader view of what may count as object, why 
should we accept that every object is either caused or a cause? Take 
for example a mathematical point on some geometrical structure or a 
spatial point on some spatial surface. Are these points objects? They 
may very well be. Are they caused or the cause of something else? They 
221 See also Markosian (1998) 
who argues that such an answer 
to the Special Composition 
Question indeed does not exist. 
As a result we are left with, 
as Markosian calls it, brutal 
composition.
222 The fourth premise of the 
new argument, according to 
which the sum of the members 
of a demarcated natural kind is 
an object, is another example 
of a principle for ‘detecting’ 
objects. This principle is surely 
context dependent in the sense 
that it only applies to the specific 
context of demarcated natural 
kinds.
223 Typically X would be a sum of 
already given objects, or X would 
denote some empirical state of 
affairs.
224 As discussed previously this 
principle is closely related to the 
principle that a sum of objects 
is plausibly itself an object just 
in case this sum is caused as a 
whole, or if it, as a whole, causes 
something else.
225 Indeed, for the framework’s 
causal relation is by definition a 
relation between objects.
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may very well not be. So causalism could be false after all. It might apply 
to concrete substances, but it might not apply to all objects.
How to respond to this problem? I believe that the above mentioned 
tension is indeed real and justifies additional research on how it can be 
significantly reduced, or even removed, by modifying the underlying 
framework’s structure. Yet, I would argue that the tension is perhaps not 
as fierce as one might think. For, indeed, it would be counterintuitive 
to hold that some specific notion of causation, say, merely ‘mechanical’ 
causation, would suffice to conclude that all objects are either caused or 
a cause. However, the notion of causation as adopted by the framework 
is actually also quite generic. After all, in the previous chapters we 
saw that it can be taken to apply both to spatial-temporal and to non-
spatial-temporal states of affairs. Moreover, the framework’s concept of 
causation allows us to even consider abstract objects as being the cause 
of other abstracta. For example, I argued that within the mathematical 
realm certain sets of sets226 can be understood as cause of the natural 
numbers and other mathematical objects. Thus, the notion of causation 
as adopted by the framework appears to be generic enough to subsume 
different types of causation. Take as yet another example the notion of a 
sustaining cause, that is, a cause of which the effect comes into being or 
ceases to exist when the cause itself comes into being or ceases to exist. 
There does not seem to be a good conclusive reason for excluding this 
type of causation from the framework’s scope of causation. Therefore, 
since the sustaining cause of an object can properly be taken to be its 
ontological ground, it would follow that the framework’s conception 
of causation seems in fact inclusive enough to render all cases of 
ontological grounding as cases of causation.227
In addition, one can point at a specific reason why the framework’s 
conception of causation must in fact be more inclusive, more generic, 
than perhaps initially expected. For, as one might want to point out, for 
all we know, it might be the case that all caused simples are arranged 
in just one single downwards infinite series.228 In that case every 
caused simple is caused by exactly one other caused simple, namely its 
predecessor in the causal series. But then, given that the new argument 
implies that the sum of all caused simples is caused by the first cause, 
it is quite clear that the sense in which the first cause can be said to 
cause the sum of all caused simples must be significantly different from 
the sense in which each of the individual caused simples can be said to 
cause its successor in the series. After all, the framework cannot allow 
for causal overdetermination. There are (at least) three candidates for 
the distinguishing sense in which the first cause can be said to be the 
cause of the sum of all caused simples. For example, one might have it 
that the first cause causes the sum of all caused simples in the sense 
that the first cause is the single ultimate explanation for the state of 
226 See for example Halmos 
(1991, pp. 42–53) for a full 
exposition of how numbers are 
constructed from sets.
227 In that case the first cause 
as entailed by the new argument 
might very well be the sustaining 
cause of all dependent simples, 
that is, of all those simples in 
need of a sustaining cause. This 
is compatible with theism in that 
many theistic theologians and 
philosophers understand God 
as the sustaining cause of the 
cosmos.
228 I thank Herman Philipse 
for making me aware of this 
possibility.
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affairs of there being caused simples at all. Or, alternatively, the first 
cause could be understood as being ultimately responsible for the 
structured arrangement of all caused simples into a single causally 
ordered series. And, as a third option, it could be that the first cause 
causes the sum of all caused simples in the sense that it causes the 
causal activity of each caused simple causing its successor.229 
Based upon the above observations I conclude that the framework’s 
notion of causation is indeed rather universal. But then the framework’s 
highly inclusive notion of object-hood does not immediately render the 
principle of causalism problematic. After all, this highly generic notion of 
objecthood is ‘matched’ by a quite generic notion of causation, so that it 
is much more likely that for any object there is another object that can 
be understood, in some specific sense, as being its cause or its effect. 
Therefore, the tension within the new argument’s framework, although 
real, is not too fierce. It doesn’t break the framework.
One might however point at another possible tension in the new 
argument’s framework. As we have seen the framework utilized the 
relationship of ‘ontological priority’. Object A is ontologically prior to 
object B if and only if A can exist without B but B cannot exist without 
A. This relationship is of course asymmetric, that is to say, if A is 
ontologically prior to B, then B is not ontologically prior to A. Further, 
the framework holds that the parts of a whole are ontologically prior to 
the whole. Thus, the whole is not ontologically prior to its parts. Note 
that the asymmetry of the ontological priority relation entails that this 
relationship is irreflexive.230 Moreover, as we have seen, the framework 
assumes the principle of composition-as-identity. According to this 
principle composites are identical to their compositions, that is, if the 
objects Xi compose some object X, then X is nothing more than the Xi 
taken together. Now, inspired by a recent argument of Bailey (Bailey 
2011) one could argue that there is an irresolvable tension between both 
commitments, i.e., the commitment to composition-as-identity and the 
commitment to the thesis that the parts of a whole are ontologically 
prior to the whole. For, consider the following slightly modified version 
of Bailey’s argument.231
 1 X is composed of the Xi (assumption)
 2 X is identical to the Xi (from 1, composition-as-identity)
 3 The Xi are ontologically prior to X (from 1, parts are prior to the 
whole)
 4 X is not identical to the Xi (from 3, irreflexivity of the ontological 
priority relation)
 5 X is identical and not identical to the Xi (from 2, 4)
This argument shows that composition-as-identity is incompatible 
with the thesis that parts are ontologically prior to their wholes, and 
therefore the conclusion would be that the new argument’s framework 
229 Nevertheless, one might 
argue that the metaphysical 
possibility of all caused simples 
being arranged in a single infinite 
series does not force us to accept 
a broader notion of causation. 
For, first, one could respond that 
causal overdetermination does 
not have to be a problem (Sider 
2003). Second, one could argue 
that the premises of the new 
argument actually entail, given 
that causal overdetermination is 
to be ruled out, that the caused 
simples are not arranged in a 
single downwards infinite causal 
series. Or, third, one may hold 
that, given that even time and 
space are objectual, our best 
physical theories imply that the 
world is not such that all caused 
simples are arranged in one 
single infinite causal series, so 
that, wholly independent of the 
new argument’s premises, this 
metaphysical possibility can be 
excluded.
230 This follows indeed 
straightforwardly. Suppose that 
X is ontologically prior to X. In 
that case asymmetry implies that 
X is not ontologically prior to X. 
So we arrive at a contradiction. 
Hence, there is no X such that X is 
ontologically prior to X.
231 Bailey’s argument refers to 
the notion of grounding instead 
of the ontological priority 
relationship.
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indeed contains an irresolvable tension. Is this indeed the case? Is this 
tension irresolvable? If we take a closer look at each of the steps of the 
new argument it appears that we actually do not need the relationship 
of ontological priority. For, we can recast the argument in such a way 
that it does not contain any reference to ontological priority. Indeed, the 
only step we would have to adjust is the fifth step, i.e. the step in which 
it is shown that A is a first cause. In what follows I show how this can be 
done. Let us first eliminate the reference to ontological priority in the 
definition of a first cause by adjusting this definition. X is a first cause if 
and only if the effect of X, say Y, is such that without Y there would be 
no effects. This definition still guarantees that there can be at most one 
first cause. For, if X1 and X2 would both be first causes then the effect of 
X1, say Y1, would not exist without the effect of X2, say Y2, and vice versa. 
But this is the case if Y1 and Y2 are identical.232 However, if Y1 and Y2 are 
identical, then surely their causes are identical as well, so that it follows 
that X1 is identical to X2. Now, with this adjusted first cause definition 
the fifth step can be rephrased without any reference to ontological 
priority. Let A be the uncaused cause of the sum of all caused simples, 
i.e. M. To show that A is a first cause it needs to be demonstrated that 
there would be no effects without the effect of A, that is, without M. 
Thus, let B be some effect. In that case B is either a caused simple or a 
caused composite. Principle (p) implies that in either case B has at least 
one caused simple, say C, as part. But then, without M object C, and 
therefore object B, wouldn’t exist. Hence, A is indeed a first cause. I thus 
conclude that the alleged ‘irresolvable tension’ can be resolved after all. 
The framework doesn’t break here either.
The case for theism
As mentioned in the introduction I now turn to the question of whether 
the results of my project would justify the conclusion that theism has 
become more reasonable, that is, rationally more compelling, than it 
was before. Now, the results of my project are two-fold. In the first part 
of this thesis I presented a full and detailed assessment of traditional 
and contemporary cosmological arguments. After that, in the second 
part, I proposed and defended a new first cause argument. Below I first 
discuss the impact of my assessment of the existing arguments. After 
that I shall discuss the implications of the new argument.
Implications of the assessment of the existing cosmological arguments
My detailed analysis of the existing cosmological arguments has 
resulted in a number of clear conclusions. I showed that the first 
paradigmatic form of a traditional cosmological argument is not 
sufficiently warranted since two of its premises are problematic. And 
also the second paradigmatic form was found to be not sufficiently 
justified because it is based upon three problematic premises. With 
respect to Koons’ new cosmological argument I concluded that two 
objections against it are cogent, and together these objections render 
232 Note that it might be the 
case as well that Y1 and Y2 partly 
overlap without being identical, 
but in that case the first cause can 
be taken to be the sum of X1 and 
X2 and would therefore be unique 
as well.
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his argument unconvincing as a first cause argument. Regarding the 
cosmological argument of Gale and Pruss I showed that there are two 
strong objections against it. One renders their argument unconvincing 
as first cause argument and the other objection is a problem for 
their cosmological argument as such, since the objection is that their 
argument has the absurd consequence that the necessary being arrived 
at brings all contingent things into existence itself. The situation for 
Rasmussen’s four cosmological arguments is not that different. I argued 
that his cosmological argument from a maximal contingent state of 
existence is inadequate as an argument for the existence of a first cause. 
Also I demonstrated that the first two of his three alternative paths are 
problematic due to substantial problems, while the third path is not 
suited as a first cause argument.
From the above overview one could easily get the impression that my 
assessment of these arguments diminishes the overall reasonability of 
theism. After all, didn’t I show that all the traditional and contemporary 
cosmological arguments are problematic, and that thus a significant 
part of the rational case for theism, that is, the cosmological arguments, 
has to be given up? Now, the two paradigmatic versions of the classical 
cosmological argument are, as my assessment has shown, surely 
untenable, but, as many atheists and theists will reply, this is not a 
surprisingly new result. Hence, it all comes down to the implications 
of my assessment for the credibility of the contemporary versions of 
the argument. Well, as I argue for below, these implications are quite 
different from the above initial impression.
Let me start with Koons’ cosmological argument. As we have seen 
I showed that none of the known objections to this argument is effective. 
For, first, I showed that the objections mentioned by Koons are either 
cogently refuted by himself, or can be cogently refuted by taking further 
considerations or minor modifications into account. Second, I argued 
that all remaining classical Humean, Kantian and Russellian objections 
to his argument fail as well. And, third, I demonstrated that the 
contemporary objections from Ross and Oppy do not go through either. 
Further I also proposed my own objections to Koons’ cosmological 
argument. However, my additional objections, apart from the worry that 
there might exist uncaused wholly contingent objects, do not threaten 
Koons’ argument. Why not? Well, as we have seen, my additional 
objections are solely meant to show that Koons’ argument is untenable 
as a first cause argument, that is to say, as an argument for the existence 
of an uncaused cause of everything else besides itself. So therefore 
these additional objections do nothing at all to threaten Koons’ 
argument itself, that is, his argument for the existence of a necessary 
fact that is the cause of the aggregate of all wholly contingent facts. 
Thus, given the above, I conclude that my detailed assessment of Koons’ 
argument as argument for a necessary cause of all wholly contingents has 
increased its epistemic credibility.
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The dialectical situation for Gale and Pruss’s argument is quite similar. 
As in the case of Koons’ argument I showed that the objections 
mentioned by Gale and Pruss are properly refuted by themselves or 
can be cogently refuted if we take some further considerations and 
small adjustments into account. Moreover, I demonstrated that all 
remaining classical Humean, Kantian and Russellian objections to 
their argument do not go through, and I showed that the same is true 
of the main contemporary objections from Oppy, Davey and Clifton, 
and Almeida and Judisch. And, third, the additional objections that 
I proposed to Gale and Pruss’s argument, except for my objection that 
their argument doesn’t appear to allow for libertarian human free will, 
are merely meant to show that their argument does not qualify as a 
proper first cause argument, but again, this does not affect the tenability 
of their new argument itself, that is, their argument for the existence of 
a necessary being that freely and intentionally brought it about that the Big 
Conjunctive Contingent Fact of the actual world is true. Thus, given these 
observations, I conclude that my full discussion of Gale and Pruss’s 
argument also increases the epistemic tenability of their argument.
Let us now consider Rasmussen’s four cosmological arguments. His 
main argument, that is, the argument from a maximal contingent state 
of existence is, as I argued, based on sufficiently reasonable premises, 
and the argument’s conclusion that a necessary and possibly causally 
efficacious being exists follows logically from these premises. Moreover, 
I showed that all known objections to this argument as mentioned by 
Rasmussen himself are harmless if we take into account in some cases 
further considerations and minor modifications. The further objection 
that I proposed myself was solely meant to show that this argument 
is not suited as a first cause argument. But this observation, similarly 
as before, does nothing to the epistemic tenability of the argument as 
argument for the existence of a necessary being that is possibly causally 
efficacious. So, also in this case, my discussion has actually increased 
the overall credibility of Rasmussen’s first argument. What about 
Rasmussen’s alternative paths? I showed that the first and second path 
cannot succeed due to substantial problems, but, since both paths are 
actually not new at all and have been criticized before, I would say that 
this observation does not change the dialectical situation with respect 
to the tenability of theism. And the third path is, as I argued, again only 
problematic as a first cause argument, and not, given that we apply some 
adjustments to Turri’s reformulation of it, as an argument for there being 
a necessary, possibly causally efficacious, being.
Therefore, based on the above considerations, I conclude that my 
detailed assessment of the contemporary cosmological arguments 
changes the epistemic or dialectical situation in favor of all three 
arguments as long as we do not view these arguments as first cause 
arguments but, instead, as arguments for the existence of a necessary 
object that is (or might be)233 the cause of the aggregate of all (or 
233 Rasmussen’s arguments, as 
we saw earlier, merely establish 
that the necessary being arrived 
at might have been the cause 
of all or some contingents. The 
arguments of Koons and Gale 
and Pruss establish much more, 
namely that the necessary being 
in question actually is the cause of 
all or some contingents.
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some)234 contingents. And, since surely, given their conclusions, these 
arguments are incompatible with ‘everything is contingent’-types of 
metaphysical naturalism, and, moreover, because their conclusions are 
perfectly compatible with theism, I conclude that my detailed analysis of 
the contemporary arguments of Koons, Gale and Pruss, and Rasmussen 
has increased the overall credibility of theism over naturalism, which is 
quite the opposite of the above mentioned initial impression.
impliCAtions of the new CosmologiCAl Argument
The main intuition behind the new cosmological argument is actually 
quite basic. For, the argument is essentially rooted in the idea that while 
composites are derived from simples we cannot refer to a similar origin 
in the case of those simples themselves. If they have an origin at all, 
then their source must be of a wholly different nature. Thus, composites 
are composed of simples, yet these simples, being indivisible, can only 
have some ultimate origin as their ground. This basic thought may be as 
old as philosophy itself. The ultimate constituents of nature, the ‘prime 
matter’ of the world, must, if caused, have been caused by something 
entirely different from the entities that cause composites from simples. 
One could say that the new argument does actually not do much more 
than to give a precise formalization of this fundamental idea, and to 
explicate from which reasonable premises it follows. We could therefore 
imagine that many would argue that the new cosmological argument 
is to be considered as being nothing more than a supplementary 
justification of a proper basic intuition, namely, the fundamental belief 
that the simples of the world, or for that matter, the whole cosmos, 
must have some absolute uncaused origin, that is, the idea that there 
must be some first cause. For surely, as those who defend this basic 
belief would have it, there must be some ‘metaphysical ultimate’, some 
absolute independent ground of reality in which everything that exists is 
ultimately grounded. Indeed, as Kant puts it: ‘The cosmos sinks into the 
abyss of nothingness, unless, beyond this infinite chain of contingencies, 
something supports it’ (KrV A622/B550). But then, we should ask, how 
does the new argument, being the justification of the in itself already 
plausible or even self-evident idea that there must be some ultimate 
source of reality, a first cause, contribute to the rational defense of 
theism? In what sense does it support theism as such?
Now, as I argued before, any adequate conception of God has it that 
God is at least also the first cause of reality.235 For, if God is not the 
first cause of reality then God is itself caused. But if so, God would be 
causally dependent on some other ontologically more fundamental 
entity, which is simply absurd. Hence, whatever definition of God is 
presumed, being the first cause of the entire world must be part of 
it. This is important since, as we have seen, none of the traditional 
and contemporary cosmological arguments qualifies as a first cause 
argument. Therefore none of these arguments, even if we would take 
them all together, justify the claim that God exists. Precisely for this 
234 As we have seen before only 
Gale and Pruss’s cosmological 
argument entails that the 
necessary being in question is 
the cause of all contingent facts. 
Koons’ cosmological argument 
entails that the necessary fact 
is only the cause of all wholly 
contingent facts, and Rasmussen’s 
arguments only guarantee that 
the necessary being is possibly 
the cause of at least one contingent 
object.
235 This phrase must be carefully 
understood. If there is a first 
cause, then, surely, it is part of 
reality just as any other existent. 
It is thus incorrect to say that the 
first cause causes reality. For, such 
an assertion would entail that 
the first cause also causes itself, 
which is absurd since nothing can 
cause its own existence. So, what 
is actually meant is that reality 
has a first cause, that is, reality 
contains an uncaused object that 
is the direct or indirect cause of 
everything else. In other words, 
the first cause grounds everything 
besides itself.
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reason the new first cause argument is in fact crucial, for only if the 
other arguments are combined with it, we obtain a case for theism. This 
case then begins with the new first cause argument in order to justify 
the existence of a first cause. After that the cosmological arguments of 
Koons and Rasmussen can be invoked to argue that the first cause is a 
metaphysically necessarily existing being, which is one of the qualities 
often attributed to God. Third, the cosmological argument of Gale 
and Pruss can be appealed to in order to argue that this necessarily 
existing first cause is in fact a person that freely intentionally brought the 
universe into existence. Thus, to summarize, without the new first cause 
argument the arguments of Koons, Rasmussen and Gale and Pruss are 
insufficient to arrive at a proper case for theism, while, if we combine 
these arguments with the new first cause argument, we arrive at a 
necessary uncaused free person that freely caused the entire universe. 
And, of course, this comprehensive result does sufficiently justify theism.
So, although the new first cause argument does not entail theistic 
features such as being a person or being omniscient, and so on, the 
argument is in fact crucial for the debate since it establishes the single 
state of affairs that all arguments for the existence of God have to entail, 
and which none of the current contemporary arguments in fact does, 
namely, that there is a first cause. For God, if anything, is the first cause, 
and thus any rational case for theism must first infer a first cause, before 
it can go on arguing for this cause having the proper theistic features. 
Hence, the new first cause argument is the first step in any case for 
theism, only after which other arguments, for necessity, for personhood, 
etc., follow.236
Let us approach the relevance of the new first cause argument for the 
rational justification of theism also from a slightly different perspective. 
In general we can clearly distinguish between two distinct types of 
atheism, say type I and type II atheism. Type i atheists deny that there 
is a first cause of reality. They deny that the world is ontologically 
grounded in some unconditional ultimate uncaused cause of everything 
else. Now, given that ‘being the first cause’ is an intrinsic part of any 
proper definition of God, it follows immediately that type i atheists 
indeed do not believe in God. Type ii atheists actually do accept that 
there is a first cause. They affirm that the whole of nature must of course 
eventually be grounded in some ultimate absolute uncaused cause 
of everything besides itself. Yet, as these type ii atheists have it, they 
believe that the first cause of the world is non-personal. The first cause, 
according to type ii atheists, is some non-personal object. So, it is clear 
that type ii atheists do not believe in God either, for God is understood 
as being personal instead of non-personal. Obviously, the new first 
cause argument addresses type i atheists directly. For, the argument, if 
sufficiently convincing, renders the epistemic position of type i atheists 
untenable. On the other hand the new argument leaves the position 
of type ii atheists totally untouched. For, type ii atheists could actually 
236 Note that any convincing 
argument for the existence 
of a first cause already rules 
out pantheism. For, surely, the 
first cause would have to be 
considered ‘more divine’ than the 
sum of the first cause and all of 
its direct and indirect effects, that 
is, reality as such. So, pantheism 
can be discarded if there is a first 
cause.
Towards a  renewed Case for Theism176
accept the new argument without thereby having to accept theism. So, 
the argument supports theism in the sense that it reduces the viable 
options for atheists to type ii atheism only. And in this way the debate 
between theists and atheists is transformed significantly. For, once 
the existence of a first cause has been accepted as common ground for 
both theists and atheists, the debate can focus solely on the features of 
this first cause, or, to be more specific, on the single question whether 
the first cause is personal (entailing bare theism)237 or not (entailing 
atheism). In this case the seemingly unbridgeable difference between 
atheists and theists would be effectively reduced to a mere difference 
of opinion on just one single specific feature of the first cause, namely 
the question whether it is personal or not. And, I would argue, it is a 
substantial advantage if one would be able to bring the debate to this 
level of convergence. Indeed, a lot is won if the whole debate would be 
reduced to ‘just’ a debate on the specific question of whether the first 
cause is personal or non-personal, instead of the much broader debate 
on the reasonableness of theism as such versus atheism as such.
So, given the first cause as a common ground, there is actually quite a 
lot that theists and atheists share. They agree on the basic structure of 
the world and their difference shrinks to merely a difference of opinion 
on only one feature of the first cause, a gap much easier to close than 
between the views of theists and type i atheists. Thus, again, the new 
first cause argument suggests a two-stage approach for any adequate 
defense of theism. First, theists should argue for the existence of a first 
cause, thereby eliminating type i atheism. Only then should they aim to 
demonstrate that the first cause arrived at is in fact personal, thereby 
eliminating type ii atheism as well. But then the new argument is indeed 
crucial.
Arguments for A personAl f irst  CAuse
As I said the ‘real debate’ should be about whether the first cause is 
personal or not. Now, in the remaining part of this final chapter I will, in 
addition to Gale and Pruss’s argument, suggest three further arguments 
for the claim that the first cause as implied by the new argument is in 
fact personal. Each of these suggestions requires more work in order 
to count as a fully developed argument. This work has to be part of 
future research since it is not within the scope of the present thesis. 
The first of these three suggestions is no more than a hint for a possibly 
feasible argument. It is premised on the classical idea of there being 
an intrinsic resemblance between being and knowledge. It was proposed 
by D. Georgoudis on Prosblogion and I take it to be interesting enough 
to mention it briefly. The second argument, which I will outline in a 
bit more detail, is axiological. It deduces that the first cause has to be 
personal from two premises on the nature of value. The third argument 
is, as I would call it, modal-epistemological, for it is premised on modal 
claims about knowledge. This argument I will develop in much more detail 
than the other two. As the above descriptions indicate none of these 
237 Actually (bare) theism 
comprises of course much more 
than ‘just’ a personal first cause. 
Yet, it is clear that there being a 
personal first cause would defeat 
atheism while being perfectly 
compatible with theism, to say 
the least. Therefore, a rationally 
compelling case for the existence 
of a personal first cause in a 
debate between atheists and 
theists reasonable counts as a 
convincing justification of theism 
over atheism.
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arguments is cosmological, teleological or ontological. So a rational case 
for theism can be built from quite different arguments.
A deep l InkAge bet ween the nAture of cognItIon And the 
nAture of reAlIt y
Let us start with Georgoudis’s hint.238 On Prosblogion he first argues 
that cognition should not be identified with the concepts and 
formalisms it relies on: ‘Concepts and formalisms strike me as being 
mere tools. They are there to serve us in our quest for understanding. It 
is thus understanding which expresses itself in concepts and formalisms, 
and not the other way around. Those who are inclined to do analytic 
philosophy should be careful not to put the cart before the horse. 
[Concepts and formalisms] are useful in testing our understanding, but 
[they] cannot by themselves lead us to better understanding. Concepts 
and formalisms have not a life of their own, and are useful only if one 
uses them properly. Philosophy is not a business of formal/mechanical 
discovery. Not even math, which is understood by many as being the 
paradigmatic case of a business of formal/mechanical discovery, is 
ultimately so’. What Georgoudis points out here is the fundamental 
idea that our understanding or cognition is ultimately a matter of 
personal acquaintance and not merely a set of procedures for producing 
and applying concepts and formalisms. Our personal cognitive 
understanding requires concepts and formalisms, but that does not 
imply that our understanding has to be identified with those concepts 
and formalisms. Cognition is personal understanding, not just formal or 
mechanical concept formation and deployment. On the basis of this 
intuition Georgoudis proposes a justification for the assertion that ‘the 
metaphysical ultimate’, that is, the first cause, is of a personal nature: 
‘Cognition is an intrinsic part of reality. If we find that all cognition is 
ultimately not one of mechanical discovery, and that on the contrary all 
knowledge is ultimately the result of personal acquaintance, then the 
foundations of reality must be of a personal and not of a mechanical 
nature’. Thus, assuming a deep linkage between cognition and reality, if 
cognition is ultimately of a personal nature, then the ultimate ground 
of reality itself is plausibly personal as well. I take this to be a quite 
interesting justification for the personal nature of ultimate reality 
and therefore for the assertion that the first cause is personal. The 
proposed argument can be rendered more schematically as follows. 
The first premise is that cognition exists. Things are being known. 
There is knowledge. Note that this claim is not to be identified with the 
claim that there are subjects who know propositions. What is meant 
is something else. If subject S knows proposition P, then there exists 
something in addition to subject S, proposition P and the relationship ‘S 
knows P’. The additional reified existent can be referred to as ‘knowing 
P’ or perhaps more properly as ‘that what it is to know P’. The second 
premise would be that this very existent, the cognition itself, is deeply 
affiliated to reality in the sense that it not only adequately reflects 
reality but is in fact entirely isomorphic to it. That is, there is a profound 
238 http://prosblogion.
ektopos.com/archives/2011/11/
counterpossible.html#comment-
265513
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parallelism between the order of knowledge and the order of being. But, 
as the third premise would have it, such a deep connection between the 
two is only plausible if the ultimate nature of cognition is similar to that 
of reality. Now, the fourth premise has it that, as we have seen above, 
cognition is ultimately subjective personal acquaintance. So, from these 
four premises the conclusion follows that, plausibly, reality is ultimately 
personal as well. But again, as said, this line of reasoning surely needs 
more work in order to evolve in a fully developed argument.
An order of vAlue of t ypes  of exIstents  wIthIn whIch 
every thIng thAt exIsts  pArtIcIpAtes
I next turn to my suggestion for an axiological argument for the claim 
that the first cause is personal. According to one formulation of Kant’s 
categorical imperative we should ‘act in such a way that we treat 
humanity, whether in our own person or in the person of any other, 
never merely as means to an end, but always at the same time as an 
end’.239 This imperative expresses the intuition that each human being, 
as a person, has a worthiness or dignity that differs in an absolute sense 
from that of all lifeless things. A human being is a someone instead of 
a something. Human persons are self-consciousness autonomous free 
individuals, and as such inherently endowed with a level of dignity that 
no unconscious lifeless thing will ever match. So in general we can say 
that there are types of beings (e.g. human persons) that have a value 
that other types of beings (e.g. lifeless things) lack. But then it seems not 
unreasonable to generalize and hold that all types of beings have some 
level of dignity that is equal to, or different from, the level of dignity of 
other types of beings. We thus arrive at an axiological postulate, the 
postulate of an order of value on the types of being in which all types 
of beings participate. This order is transitive. Indeed, to give a perhaps 
obvious example, if each human being has a higher value than a given 
piece of art, and if each given piece of art has a higher value than some 
given elementary particle, then it follows that each human being has 
a higher value than each elementary particle. Let us now focus on the 
first cause, which is also a being and therefore has a certain value. The 
first cause is the ultimate ground, the unconditional source of reality. 
It is the origin of the world. The first cause, the arche, therefore has an 
ontological primacy above everything else that exists. All derived beings 
came into existence from it. Without the arche nothing would have 
begun to exist. Nothing at all would have come into being.
The question that one may now ask is where the origin of the world, 
the first cause, is to be located on the aforementioned transitive order 
of value. It seems plausible to hold that the first cause, the arche, has 
a value that is at least not lower than that of every human being. For, 
the ultimate source of the world is plausibly not less valuable than 
the beings within the world, such as human beings. The absolute, the 
‘metaphysical ultimate’ cannot be lower in dignity than those beings 
whose very existence is dependent on a cosmos that arises from it. But 
239 Kant, Immanuel (1785), 
Grounding for the Metaphysics of 
Morals
240 Note that for example in the 
biological realm some organisms 
would count as unconscious 
objects (e.g. bacteria) while others 
would count as conscious subjects 
(e.g. birds). Further, the proposed 
distinction is compatible 
with there being grades of 
consciousness. One conscious 
subject (e.g. monkey) can be 
taken to be more conscious than 
another (e.g. butterfly). And at 
some stage conscious subjects 
become self-aware.
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then, since human beings have a value that goes beyond that of lifeless 
things, the transitivity of the order of value entails that the first cause 
is not an impersonal thing. So, assuming that, plausibly, everything 
that exists is either a subjective conscious being or some unconscious 
thing, in short, a subject or an object,240 it follows that the first cause 
has personhood, that is, ‘subject’-features. It is not a something, but a 
someone. Thus, in short, if everything is either an object or a subject, 
and if subjects have a higher value than objects, it follows that the 
first cause, being an entity that has at least the same value as human 
subjects, cannot be a mere object, and therefore must be a subject as 
well. This concludes the second suggested argument for the personal 
nature of the first cause.
the ImplIcAtIons of the IdeA thAt reAlIt y  Is  ultImAtely 
metAphysIcAlly  IntellIgIble
Below I present and assess in full detail my third suggested argument. 
Take the following modal-epistemological principle, connecting possible 
worlds,241 knowledge and truth: ‘If it is metaphysically impossible242 
to know p,243 then p is necessarily false’. This principle seems cogent. 
For, if a given proposition p could be true, then, plausibly, there is 
some possible world in which some subject in fact knows that p is true. 
In other words, if in all possible worlds all subjects do not know that 
some proposition p is true, then, plausibly, that is because that very 
proposition, p, cannot in fact be true. So, if some proposition p cannot 
be known in the actual world, and not in possible worlds quite similar 
to the actual world, and not in possible worlds distinct from the actual 
world, and not even in possible worlds that are radically different from 
the actual world, then it seems plausible to conclude that p is in fact not 
true. On Prosblogion D. Georgoudis commented on my modal-epistemic 
principle as part of a discussion of my proposed argument. In the next 
three sentences I shall paraphrase the way Georgoudis describes the 
basic intuition behind it. The principle expresses a commitment to 
the idea that reality in itself is ultimately intelligible, i.e. amenable to 
understanding or knowable. This commitment seems to be necessary 
for doing metaphysics. For, if the world is ultimately not intelligible, 
or, to put it differently, if what is metaphysically ultimate is not 
intelligible, then why think about metaphysics? Indeed, one can consider 
my proposed principle as being a formalized modal-logic rendering 
of a plausible necessary condition for doing metaphysics, i.e. the 
intelligibility of reality. Moreover, the claim that all possible truths are 
knowable has a very high confirmation and corroboration rate. It holds 
for example of all our everyday assertions and all propositions present 
in our best scientific theories. And of course the principle that reality 
itself is ultimately intelligible, that is, that all possible truths are possibly 
known, is only plausible if we take into account what people and all 
other metaphysically possible actors, either human or non-human, in all 
metaphysically possible words can know. For, the essence of the principle 
is that it is reasonable to hold that every possible truth is always at least 
241 In what follows the S5 system 
of modal logic is assumed, that 
is, it is taken that every possible 
world is accessible from any 
other, which is a valid assumption 
in the case of metaphysical 
possibility. For, in this case, we 
have the universal question what 
is actualizable simpliciter, that is, 
what could obtain at all. Yet, I take 
it that all the argumentative steps 
of my argument are justified even 
if we would not assume S5.
242 Contrary to my first 
cause argument, and to the 
aforementioned two suggested 
arguments for this cause to be 
personal, the third suggested 
argument deploys again the 
modal notions of metaphysical 
possibility and necessity. Now, in 
light of my earlier remarks on the 
nature of these notions, I consider 
this to be an epistemic ‘price’ that 
we have to pay in order to get the 
third argument of the ground. 
But there is also something 
that this argument brings and 
that the other two suggested 
arguments lack. For, as becomes 
clear in the rest of this chapter, 
it entails a personal first cause 
without having to assume upfront 
that a first cause exists. As such 
it does not depend on my first 
cause argument for supporting 
theism. Nevertheless, the third 
suggested argument still depends 
on the first cause argument in 
a weaker or secondary way. For, 
as will become clear later on 
in this chapter as well, it needs 
to assume that a first cause is 
metaphysically possible.
243 Some given proposition p is 
metaphysically unknowable, or, in 
short, unknowable, if and only if 
there is no logically possible world 
W and no subject S such that S 
knows p in W. That is to say, a 
proposition is unknowable just in 
case there is no possible world in 
which that proposition is known. 
Moreover, it is quite important to 
note that ‘subject’ does not refer 
only to human persons. ‘Subject’ 
refers to any possible type of agent 
or actor capable of knowledge, 
or, more precisely, capable of 
knowing at least one proposition.
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somewhere possibly known, in our world, in some similar possible world 
or in a radically different possible world. And this is indeed the case for 
all our everyday and scientific assertions. So, why would there, given 
that reality is ultimately uniform and not arbitrary, be suddenly some 
‘very special truths’ for which the principle does not hold? This is not 
plausible. Because of this reason and the aforementioned considerations 
I take it that the principle can be reasonably accepted.244
Now, on a Cartesian view of knowledge, that is, to know p is to 
be certain245 that p is true, the above principle has an interesting 
consequence. For, take for p the proposition ‘God246 does not exist’. In 
this proposition and in what follows ‘God’ is understood as ‘personal 
first cause’. It seems reasonable to hold that it is impossible to know that 
God does not exist. For, whatever the arguments against the existence 
of God, there will always remain some non-neglectable epistemic 
possibility that God does exist after all, so that we can never truly say, 
on the Cartesian view of knowledge, that we know that God does not 
exist. But then, by taking the earlier mentioned principle into account, 
it follows that it is necessarily false that God does not exist. Hence, 
it is necessarily true that God exists. The aforementioned principle, 
combined with the claim that it is impossible to know that God does not 
exists, thus supports247 bare theism:
 1 For all p, if p is unknowable, then p is necessarily false (first 
premise; the principle),
 2 The proposition ‘God does not exists’ is necessarily unknowable 
(second premise),
 3 Therefore, ‘God does not exists’ is necessarily false (from both 
premises)
 4 Therefore, necessarily, God exists (conclusion; from (3)).
Further, I take it that, reasonably, the prior plausibility of the premises 
(1) and (2) of my argument is higher than the prior plausibility of the 
proposition that God necessarily exists, which, I would say, makes the 
argument relevant for the debate between theists and atheists. Now, is 
this argument for a personal first cause sufficiently convincing?
# 1
The atheist might object that it is also impossible to know that God 
exists. And thus, by similar reasoning, it would follow also that it is 
necessarily true that God does not exist. However, I would argue that 
there is a possible world in which some subject can truly say that he or 
she knows that God exists. Take a possible world in which God exists248 
and in which there is an afterlife, such that all who enter the afterlife in 
that possible world will encounter the divine. In that case, those subjects 
who enter the afterlife will in fact know that God exists. So, it is not 
impossible to know that God exists. Note that a similar move to reject 
244 In fact, since at least 
Parmenides many ancient 
philosophers accepted the 
core idea expressed by the 
principle. Aristotle is a well-
known example. He holds that 
reality is essentially intelligible, 
that there is a strict parallelism 
between reason and being, 
that ‘being’ and ‘being-known’ 
are extensionally equivalent. 
And this is precisely what the 
principle affirms: all truths are 
knowable. In addition to ancient 
thinkers such as Parmenides 
and Aristotle, also philosophers 
from the modern area would 
agree with the principle. 
For example transcendental 
idealists, or G.W.F. Hegel who 
famously proclaimed the intrinsic 
intelligibility of being: ‘What is 
reasonable is real; that which is 
real is reasonable’. Contemporary 
worldviews committed to 
the principle include, but are 
not limited to, various forms 
of internal realism and neo-
Aristotelianism.
245 Note that the certainty, as 
intended here, does not have to 
be absolute. It is not the case that 
a subject S must conclusively 
logically eliminate each and every 
extremely remote skeptical non-P 
scenario for having Cartesian 
knowledge that P. In order for S to 
have Cartesian knowledge that P 
it is sufficient that P is true and S 
is in an ideal epistemic situation 
regarding P, i.e., S cannot else 
but believe P. It would be self-
denial for S to hold that S doesn’t 
believe P. Hence, S has Cartesian 
knowledge that P if and only if P 
is intuitively self-evident for S or 
S has an incorrigible experience 
that P. So, absolute certainty is 
indeed not required.
246 Here and in what follows 
God is defined as ‘personal first 
cause’. That is, God is an uncaused 
personal being that is the indirect 
or direct cause of everything 
else that exists. This definition 
is logically consistent. Note that 
this definition doesn’t require God 
to be omniscient, omnipotent 
or omnipresent. It also doesn’t 
require that God exists necessarily 
or that God is all-good. Yet, as 
discussed before, a cogent 
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the argument is not open to the atheist. For, if God doesn’t exist, then, 
plausibly, there is no afterlife.249 And besides, even if there would be 
an afterlife, then entering it would not bring a subject in the epistemic 
condition of knowing that God does not exist.
Yet, the atheist might want to offer three additional objections, which 
I shall present and respond to in what follows. The second objection was 
suggested by Alexander Pruss.
#2
The main principle on which the argument for theism is based can be 
formulated as: ‘If p is possibly true, then p is knowable’. This principle 
entails that every truth is knowable. But from that, as Fitch has shown 
in his 1963 paper ‘A Logical Analysis of Some Value Concepts’, it can be 
logically deduced that every truth is in fact known! An atheist might 
reason that this is a highly problematic, if not absurd, consequence. 
Thus, as the atheist would have it, the proposed argument is not 
convincing and should be rejected.
I would respond as follows. Now, it is indeed the case, following Fitch, 
that the principle entails that every truth is in fact known (call this 
consequence T). But why hold that T is false? After all, for all we know, 
there might be an omniscient being in the actual world knowing all 
truths. So, even though T does seem problematic for atheism, it does 
not follow that T is false. It would be begging the question for the 
atheist to deny T solely because T does not fit with atheism and favors 
theism (since the theist can hold that God knows all truths). Indeed, 
the fact that my principle entails T is not sufficient to reject it. For, it 
would be unreasonable for the atheist to initially accept the principle as 
plausible (which I would contend it is), but then, when it becomes clear 
(after a quite complex non-trivial deduction) that it has a consequence 
unpleasant for atheism, to reject the principle.
Nevertheless, the atheist could insist that she has actually offered 
a reductio ad absurdum of my principle. After all, if we combine my 
principle with Fitch’s result, we arrive at a conclusion that is way too 
absurd for atheists to accept, namely that all truths in the actual world 
are known. I would reply to this as follows. First, I provided some 
intuitive support for the principle. The atheist can therefore only 
reasonably reject the principle if she also argues why this intuitive 
support for it is not convincing. And for doing that the alleged reductio 
is surely not sufficient. Second, and much more importantly, the 
reductio offered by the atheist, if accepted, does in fact not show that 
my modal-epistemic principle fails. It only shows that the conjunction of 
this principle and Fitch’s result fails. Hence, for the atheist to arrive at 
her desired conclusion that my principle fails, she has to accept Fitch’s 
result. However, I argue below that Fitch’s result cannot reasonably be 
argument for a personal first 
cause is surely sufficient to refute 
naturalism and atheism, and to 
warrant (bare) theism.
247 Strictly speaking it does not 
entail bare theism if it is assumed 
that bare theism includes the 
claim that God has (one or more 
of) the ‘omni’-attributes, such 
as omniscience, omnipotence or 
omnipresence.
248 One might think that taking 
a possible world in which God 
exists begs the question since 
it seems to be that by doing so 
I appeal to God’s existence to 
show that God exists. However, 
I’m not appealing to God’s 
existence. For, my appeal to the 
mere logical possibility of there 
being a God is not the same 
as assuming that God actually 
exists. Let me clarify this. I claim 
that it is logically possible for God 
to exist. That is, I’m claiming 
only that there is a possible 
world, either the actual world 
(‘our world’) or another possible 
world, in which God exists. For, 
even if God does not exist in 
the actual world, it would still 
be true, given that the concept 
of God (personal first cause) is 
consistent, that there is another 
non-actual logically possible 
world in which God exists. Thus, 
I am not assuming that God 
actually exists. Indeed, such an 
assumption would surely render 
the argument circular. It would 
be a clear case of begging the 
question. Further, as mentioned, 
the argument does not rely on the 
claim that God is by definition a 
necessary being. Hence my appeal 
to the mere logical possibility of 
God’s existence does not reduce 
the argument to the ontological 
argument.
249 Note however that we 
cannot logically exclude the 
metaphysical possibility of there 
being an afterlife without God. 
After all, an atheistic substance 
dualist might want to argue 
that the human mind can exist 
separately from the human 
body, so that an afterlife without 
God remains a metaphysical 
possibility.
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accepted, neither by atheists nor by anyone else. Thus the proposed 
reductio of my principle fails after all.
To begin with, let us notice that Fitch’s proof, that is, if all truths are 
knowable, then all truths are known, is highly counterintuitive. In fact, it 
is not merely counterintuitive, but truly paradoxical. It should therefore 
not surprise us that Fitch’s proof is referred to in the literature as the 
Knowability Paradox. Its fundamental paradoxical character stems from 
the fact that it is undeniably absurd to believe that the mere possibility 
that all truths can be known already entails that all truths are in fact 
actually known. Fitch’s proof leads to a collapse of the obvious and 
clear difference between possible knowledge of all truths and actual 
knowledge of all truths, which is seriously disturbing. As Kvanvig points 
out: ‘the idea that there is no distinction between knowable and known 
truth […] is too much to ask’ (Kvanvig 2006, p. 205). Therefore, like any 
other deep paradoxical result, we should only accept Fitch’s proof if 
there is no reason to doubt whether this proof holds. And this is not 
the case at all. There is a good reason to doubt whether Fitch’s proof 
is valid. In the introduction of his thorough book on Fitch’s Paradox 
of Knowability Kvanvig argues: ‘I pursue […] a strategy for solving the 
knowability paradox in terms of the general category of the fallacies 
involved in substituting into intensional contexts. It is well known that 
such substitutions are not always valid: from the fact that Clark Kent is 
Superman and that Lois adores Superman, one can’t infer she adores 
Clark; and from the fact that 9 is the number of planets, we can’t infer 
that the number of planets is necessarily greater than 7 simply because 
9 is necessarily greater than 7. […] When we examine the logical details 
of the paradox, it involves substitutions into intensional contexts as 
well, and that fact should alert us to the possibility that the substitution 
is illicit.’ (Kvanvig 2006, p. 4). Kvanvig’s strategy is to demonstrate that 
Fitch’s proof amounts to a substitution into a modal context, and might 
therefore be a modal fallacy. This lack of trust in the validity of the proof 
gives us enough reason, given the proof’s huge paradoxical implications, 
not to accept it. Thus, after Kvanvig the burden of proof has shifted 
again to the proponents of Fitch’s result. For they now must argue why 
Fitch’s proof is not just another example of a failure of substitutivity in 
intensional contexts. And a well-known attempt of Williamson (2000) 
to do so has been extensively addressed and finally rejected by Kvanvig 
(2006). Besides, Kvanvig does much more than raising sufficient doubt 
on Fitch’s proof. In his book he develops a so-called neo-Russellian 
treatment of quantification that does actually entail that Fitch’s proof is 
indeed a special instance of an invalid substitution into a modal context. 
His neo-Russellian notion of quantification shows that the substitution 
in Fitch’s proof is in fact mistaken, by enabling us to explain precisely 
why it is a failure of modal substitutivity. Thus, if we accept Kvanvig’s 
neo-Russellian treatment of quantification, it follows that Fitch’s proof is 
not only doubtful, but indeed actually invalid. It goes beyond the scope 
of this chapter to present the neo-Russellian notion of quantification.250 
250 Kvanvig’s neo-Russellian 
treatment of quantification is not 
an ad-hoc proposal. It is akin to 
the Kripkean treatment of names 
as terms that ‘reach out directly 
into the world’ without such reach 
being mediated by a definite 
description. The neo-Russellian 
notion of quantification holds 
‘that the connection between 
the quantifier and the domain 
of quantification is unmediated’ 
(Kvanvig 2006, p. 5). In the 
neo-Russellian treatment of 
quantification the domain of 
quantification does not ‘enter 
the picture at a later semantical 
stage, the stage at which an 
evaluation of the truth-value 
of the proposition expressed is 
calculated’ (2006 p. 5). In other 
words, the neo-Russellian view 
of quantification ‘proposes that 
modal contexts introduce the 
need to tie the domain more 
closely to the thought expressed 
by a quantified sentence.’ (p. 203).
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Enough has been said to see that Fitch’s proof is simply too doubtful 
to reasonably accept, which concludes my refutation of the second 
objection.
#3
The atheist might reject my response to the first objection. After all, 
someone could, even encountering God in the afterlife, believe that he 
or she is dreaming, or hallucinating, or being deceived. Therefore, on the 
Cartesian view of knowledge, it is impossible to know that God exists 
after all. But then, given my modal-epistemic principle, it also follows 
that, necessarily, God does not exist. And thus the proposed argument 
fails. My response would be that even if someone could think that he or 
she is dreaming, hallucinating or being deceived, it still does not follow 
that God’s existence is unknowable. For, take a possible world in which 
God exists. In such a possible world there is a subject that knows that 
God exists, namely God. Indeed, in that world God knows that God 
exists. So, it is not impossible to know that God exists.251
#4
Another objection would perhaps be to argue that there might be some 
true mathematical Gödel sentence G that cannot be proven by any 
proper mathematical system. Hence, G is unknowable. But then not 
all truths are knowable, and therefore my principle (which entails that 
all truths are in fact knowable) fails. My response would be that G is in 
fact knowable. For, there is a possible world in which G is known. Take 
again a possible world in which God exists and in which God’s direct 
mathematical intuition is perfect. In this possible world God can be 
taken to know all logico-mathematical truths immediately by direct 
intuition,252 and therefore God knows G as well.
In the rest of this chapter I present and refute further objections that 
have been raised by people participating in discussions about the 
argument on Prosblogion and elsewhere.
#5
Let p be the proposition that there are no unicorns. Now, one could 
propose the following parody of my argument. Whatever the arguments 
against not-p, there is always some non-neglectable possibility that 
unicorns do exist after all, so that, on the presumed Cartesian view of 
knowledge, we can never truly say that we know that unicorns do not 
exist. Hence, according to the presumed modal-epistemic principle, it is 
necessarily true that there are unicorns. But this is clearly absurd. And 
hence that principle must be false.
Let me respond to this objection. Take a possible world W1 in which 
(i) intelligent agents exist, (ii) space-time is relatively limited in extent, 
and (iii) physics and technology are extremely advanced. In this world 
it might be the case that intelligent agents are able to scan the whole 
251 Note that we do not have to 
affirm that God knows to be God 
in all metaphysically possible 
worlds in which God exists. For, 
it is sufficient for there to be at 
least one metaphysically possible 
world in which God exists and 
in which God knows to be God, 
which is surely a reasonable given 
that God, being the ultimate 
ground and origin of being, is 
in an maximally ideal epistemic 
situation regarding its own nature. 
Besides, in order to know this 
nature God doesn’t have to reach 
out beyond its own condition of 
existence.
252 Let me briefly clarify this 
statement. We know for example 
by immediate intuition that ‘a = a’ 
or that something cannot both 
have and lack a certain property 
at the same time in the same 
way. Both truths are for us self-
evident and therefore part of our 
knowledge under the Cartesian 
view. Now, the difference 
between us and God existing in 
the possible world in question, 
is just that for God in that world 
not only these two truths, but 
in fact all logico-mathematical 
truths (including Gödel’s theorem 
itself) are wholly self-evident, 
and therefore, on the Cartesian 
view of knowledge, part of God’s 
knowledge in that world. Further, 
notice that knowing all logico-
mathematical truths does not 
have to be an essential property 
of God. That is to say, there 
might be many other possible 
worlds in which God does not 
know all logico-mathematical 
truths. Moreover, knowing all 
logico-mathematical truths is 
certainly not the same as being 
omniscient. My response to the 
fourth objection therefore doesn’t 
assume that God is possibly 
omniscient.
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of space-time for specific objects. In that world one would then be 
able to establish that there are no unicorns. Or, alternatively, suppose 
the intelligent agents in question are able to establish that the planet 
they live on is the only location in space-time that allows for life. Let 
us also suppose that their physics and technology are so advanced 
that they are able to scan their entire planet for there being unicorns. 
In that case they would be able to know that there are no unicorns. So 
it is not impossible to know that there are no unicorns. But then my 
principle doesn’t apply. One may reply that, under the Cartesian view, 
these agents still don’t know that unicorns do not exist. For, they cannot 
sufficiently rule out the possibility that the scanner they use is not 
broken, that they didn’t forget to scan some part of space-time, and so 
on. I would say that this doesn’t constitute a problem for the argument. 
For, there is still at least one possible world in which it is in fact known 
that unicorns do not exist. Take a possible world W2 in which God exists 
and in which God is alone since God decided not to create anything.253 
In that world God, being the solitary personal first cause of that world, 
does know that unicorns do not exist. Thus, my metaphysical principle 
cannot be invoked to conclude that unicorns exist. Note that an appeal 
to W2 suffices to refute all kinds of similar objections, such as the 
objection that, if my principle would hold, it would follow that Superman 
necessarily exists, or that there necessarily exists a flying teapot, or a 
spaghetti monster, etc. For, in W2, God knows that Superman doesn’t 
exist, and that there are no flying teapots, spaghetti monsters, etc. It 
is thus not impossible to know that Superman doesn’t exist, and that 
there are no flying teapots, spaghetti monsters, etc. Further, note 
that the appeal to possible world W2 (or, for that matter, any possible 
world in which God exists) also refutes the objection that my principle 
could be used to infer the existence of an impersonal first cause. For, 
indeed, in W2 God, being the personal first cause, knows that there is no 
impersonal first cause. So, it is not impossible to know that there is not 
an impersonal first cause. And, moreover, an appeal to W2 (or, again, 
any possible world in which God exists) also refutes the objection that 
my principle entails pantheism. For, in any possible world in which God 
exists, God knows that pantheism254 is false. In fact my principle doesn’t 
entail polytheism either. For, again, in every possible world in which 
God exists God, being the personal first cause of that world, obviously 
knows that polytheism is false. So it is not impossible to know that 
polytheism is false. Hence, to conclude, the modal-epistemic principle 
cannot be used to infer Superman, unicorns, flying teapots, spaghetti 
monsters, impersonal first causes, pantheism or polytheism.255 Indeed, 
the principle can only be used to infer a personal first cause: God. But, as 
one may finally reply, couldn’t we say that both the propositions ‘God is 
perfectly good’ and ‘God is not perfectly good’ are impossible to know? 
But then the principle entails that God is necessarily perfectly good and 
necessarily not perfectly good, which is absurd, forcing us to abandon 
the principle after all. Again, I would say that none of these propositions 
is necessarily unknowable. Take a possible world W3 in which God exists 
253 One might object that God, 
being the first cause, should 
create something. I reply that the 
example can be understood as 
the situation in which God does 
not create anything external to 
God. In that case God can still be 
said to produce its own internal 
thoughts, being mental objects, 
and therefore God would still be 
the first cause of W2. Besides, we 
can also take as another example 
the possible situation in which 
God creates precisely one causally 
inert thing in W2, not being a 
unicorn. In that case the objection 
has no force either.
254 Pantheism here understood 
as the worldview that there is 
no first cause because reality 
is assumed to be a single given 
‘holy’, ‘sacred’ or even ‘divine’ 
uncaused whole of which 
everything that exists is a part.
255 Actually, since the 
propositions ‘pantheism is true’, 
‘there is an impersonal first cause’ 
and ‘polytheism is true’ entail that 
God (understood as personal first 
cause) does not exist, it follows 
that these propositions are in fact 
necessarily unknowable as well. 
But then the proposed modal-
epistemic principle in fact entails 
that pantheism and polytheism 
are false, and that an impersonal 
first cause does not exist. Indeed, 
precisely because my principle 
entails that God, personal first 
cause, exists, it also entails that 
the others are not true. Yet, one 
can also provide a direct derivation 
of the other claims. Take the claim 
that there is no impersonal first 
cause. This can be derived as 
follows. An impersonal first cause 
is not a person and hence not able 
to know that it is the impersonal 
first cause (since only persons can 
know things). Moreover, on the 
Cartesian view of knowledge, no 
person is able to know that there 
is an impersonal first cause, since 
there being an impersonal first 
cause is not something a person 
can establish by incorrigible 
empirical observation, a priori 
logical proof, immediate intuition 
or conclusive testimony. Hence 
it’s impossible to know that there 
is an impersonal first cause. 
But then the main principle 
indeed implies that there is no 
impersonal first cause.
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and in which God is perfectly good. In that world God knows that God 
is perfectly good. So, it is not impossible to know that God is perfectly 
good. The same reasoning holds for a possible world in which God is 
not perfectly good. But then it is not impossible to know that God is not 
perfectly good either, which concludes my refutation.
#6
Another objection would be to point out that the concept of ‘God’ 
might be logically self-contradictory, and if so, God doesn’t exist. My 
response to this is that the concept of God, understood as personal first 
cause, that is, as uncaused being that is the direct or indirect cause of 
everything else, is in fact logically consistent. For, both ‘person’ and ‘first 
cause’ can plausibly be taken to be logically coherent concepts. Indeed, 
the concept of ‘person’ is an inherent part of our ordinary language, 
and the first cause argument I provided and defended in the previous 
two chapter’s shows that the existence of a first cause follows logically 
from consistent premises, so that the concept ‘first cause’ cannot be 
incoherent either. Moreover, both concepts, as I would argue, do not 
have any mutually conflicting attributes. But then they are independent 
from each other, so that the combined concept of ‘personal first cause’ 
does not result in a logical contradiction either. Therefore, unless 
someone provides a good reason for believing that this combined 
concept is nevertheless inconsistent, we are justified to hold that the 
concept of God is coherent. Indeed, for the objection to have force one 
would at least have to suggest some sketch of an a priori proof that 
the concept of God is logically contradictory, which, I take it, cannot 
be done if we restrict our definition of God to personal first cause. 
Further, this definition clearly does not require God to be omniscient, 
omnipotent, omnipresent or omnibenevolent. Hence, we do not need 
to assume that, say, ‘omniscient personal first cause’ or ‘omnipotent 
personal first cause’ are logically coherent concepts. For all we know, 
these significantly more complex concepts might be incoherent. And if 
so, the modal-epistemic principle cannot be used to infer that there is an 
omniscient or omnipotent personal first cause.256
# 7
Another objection might be that, even if the concept of God is logically 
consistent, so that there is no a priori logical proof for the claim that 
God doesn’t exist, it might still be the case that it is not impossible 
to know that God doesn’t exist. For, as the objection would go, there 
might be some omniscient being who knows everything, including 
the fact that God doesn’t exist. To this objection my response is as 
follows. One cannot exclude God’s existence by empirical incorrigible 
observation,257 by immediate self-evident intuition or by conclusive 
testimony. Moreover, since the concept of God, that is, personal first 
cause, is logically coherent, one cannot exclude God’s existence by a 
priori logical analysis either. But then, given that, on the Cartesian view 
of knowledge, a priori logical proof, empirical incorrigible experience, 
256 See for example Whitcomb 
(forthcoming). Whitcomb argues 
that omniscience is impossible. 
From that he concludes that 
God does not exist. But this 
doesn’t follow if we define God 
as personal first cause. For, if 
omniscience would be impossible, 
it would follow that God is a non-
omniscient personal first cause.
257 An opponent of the argument 
might perhaps say that there is a 
possible world in which a being B 
exists that is able to empirically 
observe every single thing that 
exists. But then, assuming that 
B hasn’t observed God, it would 
follow that B knows that God does 
not exist. Yet, I would respond 
that, if B is not the first cause, 
and thus not the ultimate origin 
or ground of the world, B cannot 
know with sufficient certainty 
that B has seen everything that 
exists. For, B cannot rule out that 
B missed observing something. 
And therefore B cannot know 
that God does not exist. Indeed, 
only a subject that is the ultimate 
origin or absolute ground of the 
world might ‘oversee’ reality and 
thus might know what exists and 
what doesn’t. All other subjects 
are simply not in the epistemic 
position to have such ‘oversight’ 
and therefore cannot have that 
knowledge.
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self-evident immediate intuition and certain conclusive testimony 
exhaust the ways by which any subject could know that God does not 
exist, it follows that it is indeed impossible to know that God does not 
exist. No agent can really eliminate the epistemic possibility that God 
exists. The belief that God does not exist thus always remains falsifiable. 
Hence, the second premise of the argument is properly warranted. In 
fact, it shows that there cannot be an omniscient being who knows that 
God does not exist! So, if an omniscient being exists, then it would have 
to know that God does exist.258 An example would be God Himself if God 
is omniscient.
#8
Another objection might be that, on the Cartesian view of knowledge, 
there is no possible world in which that world’s God knows that God 
exists. For, as the objection has it, even God could be hallucinating 
or dreaming or being deceived, so that even God’s belief that God 
exists is falsifiable. In order to provide a proper response to this 
objection I first say a bit more about the Cartesian conception of 
knowledge. The Cartesian conception can be understood as being 
an internalistic account of epistemic foundationalism for which the 
collection of foundational beliefs is restricted, in its most limited form, 
to propositions known by logical proof, incorrigible experience or 
immediate self-evident intuition. But then, on the Cartesian view, radical 
skepticism doesn’t destroy all candidate instances of knowledge. For, 
even under hyperbolic doubt, there are instances of proper incorrigible 
or self-evident beliefs, such as ‘I exist’, ‘I’m having at this very moment 
the experience of seeing red’, ‘1 + 1 = 2’ or ‘a = a’. So, the Cartesian view 
of knowledge does not require that everything we know must be 
discursively provable in an absolute sense.
On the other hand it is of course true, on the Cartesian view, that in 
many cases one is not justified to claim to know something. Yet, of 
all epistemic situations, the situation of God believing that God exists, 
is surely the most adequate, the most ideal, situation for which we 
would be justified to hold that the subject in question can be taken to 
be sufficiently certain about the proposition in question. Hence we are 
warranted to assert that in those possible worlds in which God exists, at 
least God can be said to know that God exists.
So, I think the objection can be refuted if we make use of the concept 
of ideal epistemic situation. There is no ideal epistemic situation in 
which some subject S is justified to hold that S has incorrigible access 
to the fact of there not being a God, whereas, there is in fact an ideal 
epistemic situation in which a subject S is justified to assert that S 
has certain access to the fact of there being a God, namely God in all 
possible worlds in which God exists. For, if W is a possible world in 
which God exists, then, in W, for God the belief that God exists can be 
taken to be self-evident or incorrigible, and thus a proper instance of 
258 It thus follows that 
omniscience entails (bare) theism. 
For, if there is an omniscient 
being, then, since it is impossible 
to know that God doesn’t exist, 
this being doesn’t know that God 
doesn’t exist. But then, since 
the being is omniscient, it is not 
true that God doesn’t exist. So 
God exists, which concludes the 
derivation.
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knowledge under the Cartesian view. After all, there is an epistemically 
quite relevant difference between a world’s God asserting that God 
exists, and, say, John asserting that God does not exist. For, in the 
former case God has direct access to its own mental states, whereas, 
in the second case, John does not have direct access to God (or to 
God’s mental states). Thus, while the former case, God asserting that 
God exists, is properly referred to as epistemic ideal, the second case 
is not epistemically ideal at all. Thus, on the Cartesian conception of 
knowledge, we are indeed sufficiently justified to hold that the former 
case is an adequate example of a foundational belief, whereas the 
second case isn’t at all.
To put the point slightly differently, surely God, in those possible worlds 
in which God exist, knows that God exists. For, who else in that possible 
world could be in a better epistemic position regarding its very own 
existence than that possible world’s God? So, it is definitely plausible 
to maintain that, if anyone, at least God knows that God exists. And 
for this we don’t need God to be omniscient either. God is in fact a 
rather special being in the sense that God is the unconditional origin or 
ultimate ground of reality. And so, as being the absolute first cause of 
everything else that exists, God is in an ideal epistemic situation with 
respect to God’s own identity. God’s belief that God exists is therefore 
sufficiently incorrigible or basic. Indeed, God’s belief that God exists is 
surely not less warranted than John’s belief that John exists, or Mary’s 
belief that Mary exists. So God’s belief that God exists counts as 
knowledge, even under the Cartesian view.259 
#9
Opponents of the argument might want to say that the argument’s 
appeal to the Cartesian conception of knowledge remains problematic. 
Now, as I argued above, it is certainly not the case that skepticism 
precludes Cartesian knowledge. For, as mentioned, the Cartesian 
conception does not require that everything known is absolutely 
provable. Take the claim that I exist. This is an instance of Cartesian 
knowledge, but not absolutely provable. Or take the claim that I have 
now such and such experiences. This is an instance of Cartesian 
knowledge as well, but again, not absolutely provable. Still, one might 
want to object that the first premise of the argument, the modal-
epistemic principle, cannot be known to be true if we adopt the 
Cartesian view of knowledge. For, as the objection has it, the truth 
of this principle cannot be established by logical proof, incorrigible 
observation, self-evident intuition or conclusive testimony. However, 
this further objection doesn’t succeed either. For, I’m definitely not 
claiming to know that the main principle is true. I’m only claiming that 
this principle is sufficiently plausible or reasonable to accept, so that 
we are justified to employ it as a premise in a reasonable (but not 
necessarily conclusive) argument for God’s existence. Nevertheless, one 
might want to propose yet another, related, objection. This objection 
259 Under the Cartesian 
conception of knowledge God 
might be the only being that 
knows that God exists. On 
the other hand there might be 
possible worlds in which God 
exists and in which God is able to 
bring certain subjects in such an 
epistemic condition (for example 
by direct revelation) that they also 
come to know that God exists. 
Perhaps God is the only being that 
is able to bring other subjects in 
such a condition. Now, I would 
argue that direct revelation is 
indeed metaphysically possible. 
A subject S unequal to God can 
come to know that God exists 
by direct revelation from God 
towards S. This would be an 
instance of incorrigible experience 
and therefore an example of 
Cartesian knowledge. But then 
the first premise of my argument 
cannot be used to infer the absurd 
worldview that I am God, such 
as for example solipsism would 
have it. For, the proposition ‘I am 
not God’ is not unknowable if we 
allow for direct revelation, and 
thus it does not follow that ‘I am 
God’ is true. Yet, I take it that 
‘I am not God’ is surely knowable 
even without assuming the 
metaphysical possibility of direct 
revelation. For, we can of course 
plausibly assert that for me the 
proposition ‘I did not invent the 
universe’ is an incorrigible true 
belief. Indeed, solipsism is absurd.
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proceeds as follows. The argument is based on the Cartesian conception 
of knowledge. Although this conception indeed allows for instances 
of knowledge, it is also the case that the Cartesian conception is one 
of many feasible conceptions of knowledge. And, since no reason is 
given to adopt the Cartesian view instead of one of these others, the 
whole argument is problematic after all. Does this objection hold? Now, 
surely, there are many accounts of knowledge, many views on what 
it means for a subject to know a proposition. But, as I respond, that 
doesn’t imply that we do have to defend the Cartesian conception of 
knowledge against other alternative notions of knowledge. After all, the 
argument’s premises are about Cartesian instances of knowledge, so 
we do not have to be Cartesians ourselves in order to accept them. In 
other words, we do not have to commit ourselves to the idea that the 
Cartesian conception of knowledge is the most adequate in order to 
claim that certain properties of this conception are plausibly true, such 
as those expressed by the two premises of the argument. Consider as an 
example the following analogy. We do not have to embrace the classic 
conception of beauty over others in order to accept certain assertions 
about this classic conception. By parallel reasoning, we don’t have to 
embrace the Cartesian view of knowledge in order to accept premises 
about it. Indeed, someone who does not accept the Cartesian notion 
of knowledge might reason as follows: ‘I do not embrace the Cartesian 
conception of knowledge. I prefer another view on knowledge. Yet, 
I accept that, if some proposition is unknowable under the Cartesian 
conception, then that proposition is necessarily false’. Thus, for believing 
a (conditional) claim about the Cartesian conception one doesn’t have 
to embrace that conception itself. We can put this point also as follows. 
It is sufficient to affirm, from the third person point of view, that reality 
in itself is intelligible, that is to say, that each possible truth is known 
in the Cartesian sense in some possible world by some human or non-
human subject, without having to become, from the first person point of 
view, Cartesian epistemologists ourselves. Indeed, on meta-level we can 
plausibly accept the intrinsic intelligibility of reality without having to 
embrace ourselves on object-level a Cartesian epistemology.260
# 10
Finally, opponents of the argument could try to refute the modal-
epistemic principle upon which the argument is based by proposing 
cogent examples of possibly true propositions that are nevertheless 
unknowable. Take the claim that there is a diamond buried under 
thousand feet of granite that no one will ever find. Is this a proper 
counterexample to the principle? I would say it is not. For, there are 
many possible worlds in which it is in fact known that the diamond 
buried under thousand feet of granite exists. One could think of a 
possible world in which a human being, or perhaps some extraterrestrial 
intelligent being, discovers the diamond by using advanced technical 
equipment. One might respond that this will not do since the fact that 
no one will ever find the diamond is part of the claim’s state of affairs. 
260 If we denote ‘Proposition p is 
possibly knowable in a Cartesian 
sense’ by cK (p) then the first 
premise of my argument can 
be rendered as ‘For all p, if p is 
possibly true then cK (p)’, while 
the second premise in that case 
becomes: ‘not cK (God does not 
exist)’. These premises can be 
accepted by Cartesians and non-
Cartesians. The premises entail 
that God necessarily exists, and 
this result does not refer to cK 
anymore.
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However, in that case I reply that the proposed state of affairs is not 
possible, since, as I pointed out, for any diamond buried under thousand 
feet of granite there will always be some possible world in which that 
specific diamond is discovered after all. Take as another suggested 
counterexample the claim that, due to the Heisenberg uncertainty 
principle of quantum mechanics, it is not possible to know the position 
and momentum of a particle simultaneously, yet particles do have a 
position and momentum. This counterexample also fails since there are 
metaphysically possible worlds in which quantum mechanics does not 
hold. Consider for example a classical Newtonian possible world W. In 
world W the position and momentum of all particles can be known.261 
Let us consider another counterexample. Put a single die in a sealed 
opaque container and shake it. Now shake it again. It is impossible to 
know that after the first shake the number one was rolled, therefore the 
number one was not rolled. Similarly the number two was not rolled, 
etc. Hence, we can conclude that no face was rolled, which is absurd. 
Now, this alleged counterexample is inadequate as well. For, again, the 
modal-epistemic principle is not saying that everything that is true 
in our world can in fact be known in our world. Of course not, that 
would be unfounded. The principle has it instead that everything that 
is unknown in all logically possible worlds must be false. And the ‘dice’-
example is not a counter example to this assertion. Indeed, it is quite 
easy to construct a logically possible world in which it is in fact known 
by some subject that after the first shake the number one was rolled. 
Take for example a possible world in which there is some extraterrestrial 
species that observes every event on earth (perhaps without us knowing 
it, although this is not relevant for the construction) and that is able to 
see through walls and other closed surfaces. Such a world is logically 
possible, and therefore the proposition that the number one was rolled 
is not unknowable. Thus, this example doesn’t refute the principle either.
Perhaps another kind of counterexample could help to refute the 
principle. Suppose that John considers the following proposition: ‘God 
understands my atheism’. Now, as John could argue: ‘There is a possible 
world in which God exists, in which I am an atheist, and in which it is 
also true that God understands my atheism’. So, as John concludes, the 
proposition ‘God understands my atheism’ is possibly true. Yet, this 
proposition is surely unknowable. For, knowledge entails belief, and, no 
atheist can believe that God exists. Is this a convincing counterexample 
to the modal-epistemic principle? I would respond that, surely, no 
rational agent S can believe that God understands S’s atheism. For, 
indeed, this belief would entail that God exists, which contradicts S’s 
atheism. The proposition is thus an example of a principle that is a priori 
impossible to believe by any rational agent.262 Now, I take it that, in our 
formulation of the principle, we may reasonably preclude this sort of 
logically unbelievable propositions. In other words, we may reasonably 
restrict the scope of the principle to propositions p for which there is an 
agent in some possible world that could rationally believe p. As a similar 
261 One might reply that the 
following conjunction still counts 
as a counterexample: ‘Quantum 
mechanics is true and elementary 
particle E has position P and 
momentum M’. For, as one might 
say, this conjunction is necessarily 
unknowable, yet possibly true. 
I respond that this conjunction 
is not necessarily unknowable. 
For, take a possible world in 
which quantum mechanics is 
true and in which there exists 
an observer O that knows that 
quantum mechanics is true and 
that is able to observe E directly 
without having to rely on light 
waves. In that case O knows the 
aforementioned conjunction. 
But then this conjunction is 
not unknowable. Moreover, the 
conjunction is not a c-proposition, 
so that it is not a problem for 
the alternative rendering of my 
argument. Further on I introduce 
the notion of c-proposition and 
also present the alternative 
rendering.
262 The proposition in question 
is a performative contradiction 
that cannot be rationally believed.
Towards a  renewed Case for Theism190
alleged counterexample, take the proposition ‘I do not exist’. One might 
argue that this proposition is possibly true. In fact, it was actually true 
at some time. Yet, that proposition cannot be known, since no one can 
know that he or she does not exist. I respond again that, of course, no 
rational agent S can reasonably believe that S does not exist. But then, 
given the aforementioned reasonable restriction of the principle’s scope, 
that is, the restriction of the principle to propositions p that are possibly 
rationally believable, this second counterexample is inadequate as well.
As a last resort one may try to appeal to more ‘construed’ 
counterexamples, such as:
 1 This proposition is unknown by anyone,
 2 p and nobody knows p,
 3 There are no subjects,
 4 There are no known propositions.
These alleged counterexamples are artificial. Take the first two. Why 
should we accept these self-referential or meta-propositions as 
convincing defeaters of the main principle? After all, I would argue that 
self-referential or meta-propositions easily lead to logical difficulties and 
should therefore be avoided. In addition, why should we believe that the 
third and fourth proposition are relevant for the question of whether 
the modal-epistemic principle holds? I answer that we should not since 
it seems more than reasonable to limit the modal-epistemic principle 
to possible worlds in which at least some proposition is, or can be, known. 
After all, there is no point at all in considering possible worlds that do 
not allow for knowledge. Indeed, if we exclude such possible worlds 
from the scope of the principle, then the principle does not become any 
less plausibly true. For, if a proposition p is unknowable in all possible 
worlds that allow for knowledge, then that proposition p is by definition 
also unknowable in all possible worlds simpliciter, and vice versa, if 
some proposition p is unknowable in all possible worlds simpliciter, 
then proposition p is of course also unknowable in those possible 
worlds that allow for knowledge. So, in short, the above four alleged 
counterexamples are in fact nothing more than merely ‘loophole’ cases. 
We can easily avoid them by adopting a slightly alternative rendering of 
the main modal-epistemic principle. For that I need to introduce three 
supplementary definitions.
First, let a c-state be a concrete state of affairs of one or more concrete 
particulars, having each zero or more concrete properties, and all 
standing to each other in zero, one or more relationships. Second, let a 
c-proposition be a proposition that either affirms or denies there being 
a c-state, such as for example the propositions ‘Peter’s car is blue’, ‘Eva 
is a friend of Ed’, ‘There are no horses’, ‘There are people’, ‘God exists’ 
and ‘God does not exist’. Third, let a K-world be a possible world in 
which at least something is known. Now, only subjects (i.e., agents) 
263 Indeed, since propositions 
are, plausibly, not concrete 
objects, (1) and (2) do not refer 
to concrete states of affairs, and 
are therefore not c-propositions. 
However, suppose one would 
like to argue that propositions 
are concrete objects. Would it 
then follow that (1) and (2) are 
c-propositions? Now, (1) might in 
that case perhaps be understood 
as a c-proposition. Yet, (1) is 
self-referential and could on that 
ground be excluded from the 
scope of the modal-epistemic 
principle. Proposition (2) on the 
other hand would also in that case 
not count as a c-proposition. For, 
‘p, but nobody knows p’ would be 
a c-proposition only if it either 
affirms or denies there being 
some c-state. But, what would be 
the c-state affirmed or denied by 
‘p, but nobody knows p’? It seems 
to me that there is no single c-
state X such that ‘p, but nobody 
knows p’ either affirms X or denies 
X. Perhaps one might reply that ‘p, 
but nobody knows p’ both affirms 
the c-state expressed by ‘p’ and 
denies the c-state expressed by 
‘There is somebody that knows 
p’. Yet, this is not the same as 
either affirming or denying a 
single given c-state, which is what 
a c-proposition is by definition 
required to do.
264 Of course (3) cannot be 
true in a K-world. Proposition (4) 
cannot be true in a K-world either, 
since, as mentioned, each subject 
knows at least one proposition. 
Thus each K-world contains 
known propositions.
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can know things, thus a K-world is a world that contains one or more 
subjects. And, vice versa, a world that contains at least one subject is 
also a K-world. For, every subject S at least knows that S exists. Besides, 
according to the negative introspection axiom of S5 epistemic modal 
logic, if a subject S does not know p, then S knows that S does not know 
p. So, indeed, every subject knows at least something.
Given these definitions, the modal-epistemic principle can be rendered 
in the following way: ‘If p is a c-proposition that is true in at least one 
K-world, then there is a possible world in which p is known’. I would say 
that this principle is similar to the original one, except that it is more 
modest. For, it only applies to c-propositions, and its antecedent now 
requires that there must be a K-world in which p is true. Moreover, it 
seems more plausible than the original rendering. For the proposition 
p in the antecedent is quite basic in the sense that it is about concrete 
particulars. Besides, it is now required as well that p is true in a possible 
world that contains subjects that are able to know propositions. 
So, in a sense, proposition p is ‘closer to’ the logical possibility of 
there being a subject that in fact knows p. Further, it follows that the 
aforementioned four alleged counterexamples do indeed not refute the 
proposed alternative rendering of the principle. For, (1) and (2) are not 
c-propositions,263 and the other two, (3) and (4), cannot be true in a K-
world.264 265
Now, let p be the c-proposition that God does not exist. As I argued 
before, there is no possible world in which p is known. Hence it follows 
that there is no K-world in which p is true. But then the principle 
entails that God exists in all K-worlds, including ours (since our world is 
obviously a K-world).266 From this we see that the alternative rendering 
of the principle comes with a price. It no longer follows that God is a 
necessary being. After all, for all we know there might be one or more 
non-K-worlds, and in those worlds God (being a subject) does not exist. 
Nevertheless, it follows that God exists in our actual world, either 
necessarily or contingently. And this is surely sufficient to support 
theism.
265 As another alleged 
counterexample one may 
point at the Big Fact, that is, 
the conjunction of all truths, 
and argue that the Big Fact is 
true in all possible worlds, yet 
unknowable since omniscience 
is impossible. However, by 
appealing to the alternatively 
rendered modal-epistemic 
principle we can refute this 
alleged counterexample without 
having to argue that omniscience 
is possible. For, the Big Fact is 
not a c-state. Another objection 
one may want to propose is that 
the first premise, that is, the 
claim that all possible truths are 
knowable, is itself unknowable, 
and therefore, if true, necessary 
false. However, I would argue that, 
plausibly, it is not metaphysically 
unknowable that all possible 
truths are knowable. For, God, if 
God exists, is the ultimate origin 
and ground of reality itself. But 
then it is conceivable that there 
is a possible world in which God, 
the absolute source of being, in 
fact knows the essence of being, 
and thus could know that being 
is intelligible, i.e. that all possible 
truths are in fact knowable. 
Besides, the first premise is not 
a c-proposition, so this objection 
does not impose a problem for 
the alternative rendering of my 
argument.
266 This consequence should 
perhaps not surprise us for a 
different reason as well. For, if 
there are conscious subjects, then, 
given the rather deep problems 
of ‘eliminative’, ‘reductive’ and 
‘emergence’ explanations of 
consciousness, there does not 
seem to be a cogent naturalistic 
answer to what David J. Chalmers 
has coined the ‘hard problem of 
consciousness’ (Chalmers 1995). 
But then, the only sufficiently 
tenable explanation of the 
phenomenon of consciousness 
seems to be a personal one, and 
plausibly theistic. This line of 
reasoning is referred to as the 
argument from consciousness. See 
Moreland (2009) for a full and 
detailed account.

Veel filosofen hebben de werkelijkheid herleid tot een eerste beginsel. 
Presocraten zoals Anaximander noemen de absolute oorsprong van 
de wereld ‘het apeiron’, Plato en de neo-platonisten spreken over ‘het 
ene’, en Aristoteles heeft het over de ‘arche geneseos’. Monotheïsten 
spreken over God en Duitse idealisten zoals Fichte, Schelling en Hegel 
noemen de grond van de wereld ‘het absolute’, terwijl vitalisten zoals 
Schopenhauer de oerbron aanduiden als ‘de wil’. Zij allen menen dus dat 
er in laatste instantie ‘iets’ moet zijn waarin de wereld gegrond is, ‘iets’ 
waarop alles wat bestaat uiteindelijk teruggaat.
Nu is het voor ons mensen inderdaad lastig, ik zou haast zeggen 
onmogelijk, om ons een wereld zonder ultieme grond voor te stellen. 
Wij kunnen haast niet anders dan denken dat de wereld teruggaat op 
een laatste drager, welke het antwoord vormt op de vraag waarom er 
überhaupt iets is en niet veeleer niets. Een wereld waarin alles wat 
bestaat voor haar bestaan afhankelijk is van weer iets anders betreft 
namelijk een grondeloze in ‘het niets’ wegzinkende menigvuldigheid van 
louter contingenties, hetgeen voor ons intuïtief absurd lijkt. Daarom 
zijn wij prima facie gerechtvaardigd om te denken dat er een oorsprong 
van de wereld is, een ‘metaphysical ultimate’. Er moet ten slotte een 
onvoorwaardelijke grond van alles zijn, ook al hebben wij op voorhand 
geen idee wat de aard van deze grond is.
 
Sinds Plato zijn er bovendien verschillende kosmologische argumenten 
ontwikkeld voor het bestaan van een eerste oorzaak van de wereld, of 
preciezer, van een onveroorzaakte entiteit dat geldt als de directe of 
indirecte oorzaak van alle andere entiteiten. En als zo’n entiteit bestaat 
dan moet zij ook uniek zijn omdat geen twee entiteiten elkaars directe 
of indirecte oorzaak kunnen zijn. In een kosmologisch argument wordt 
het bestaan van een unieke eerste oorzaak, een wereldgrond, deductief 
afgeleid uit het empirische feit dat er contingente of veroorzaakte 
dingen bestaan. Bekende voorbeelden zijn, naast Plato die een 
kosmologisch argument presenteert in zijn De Wetten, Aristoteles’ 
argument voor een eerste onbewogen beweger in zijn Physica en 
Metaphysica, de tweede weg van ‘de vijf wegen’ van Thomas van Aquino 
in zijn Summa Theologiæ en Leibniz’ argument in o.a. zijn Monadologie 
voor het bestaan van een wezen dat geldt als de noodzakelijk bestaande 
oorzaak van de kosmos als contingent geheel. Na Kant verslapte in de 
negentiende eeuw de aandacht voor kosmologische argumenten. De 
laatste decennia is er echter sprake van een heuse renaissance van 
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deze argumenten. De hernieuwde belangstelling ervoor kan mede 
verklaard worden door de ineenstorting van het verificationisme in 
de tweede helft van de vorige eeuw en de hiermee gepaard gaande 
enorme herleving van de metafysica. Verschillende nieuwe versies van 
het kosmologisch argument, ongevoelig voor Kants en andere klassieke 
bezwaren, zijn inmiddels in de wijsgerige literatuur voorhanden. Deze 
hedendaagse argumenten maken volop gebruik van twintigste-eeuwse 
ontwikkelingen, zoals de mogelijke werelden semantiek voor de modale 
logica en de formele mereologie.
In het eerste gedeelte van mijn dissertatie analyseer ik zowel klassieke 
als hedendaagse kosmologische argumenten. Nu is uiteraard geen enkel 
kosmologisch argument voor het bestaan van een noodzakelijk bestaand 
wezen houdbaar indien de lege wereld ook een mogelijke wereld is. 
Daarom geef ik eerst een nieuw a priori argument voor de these dat de 
lege wereld, ‘het totale niets’, geen mogelijke wereld kan zijn. Dit a priori 
argument is gebaseerd op het axioma van Brouwer dat stelt dat alle 
mogelijke standen van zaken ook noodzakelijk mogelijk zijn. Hieruit volgt 
inderdaad dat de lege wereld, een wereld zonder entiteiten, onmogelijk 
is indien we aannemen dat al het mogelijke causaal veroorzaakbaar is en 
bovendien dat er in elk geval één mogelijke stand van zaken is.
Mijn analyse van klassieke kosmologische argumenten richt zich op 
twee exemplarische klassieke argumenten, namelijk het Thomistische 
en het Leibniziaanse argument. Ik laat zien dat beide argumenten 
in hun klassieke vorm problematisch zijn. Vervolgens onderzoek ik 
de hedendaagse kosmologische argumenten van R. Koons (1997), 
R. Gale en A. Pruss (1999) en J. Rasmussen (2010). Het argument van 
Koons is gebaseerd op het beginsel dat we van een gegeven volkomen 
contingente stand van zaken mogen zeggen dat zij veroorzaakt is, 
tenzij we een goede reden hebben om in de desbetreffende situatie te 
denken dat zij niet veroorzaakt is. De conclusie van Koons’ argument 
luidt dat er een noodzakelijke oorzaak is van de mereologische som van 
alle volkomen contingente feiten. Ik laat zien dat geen van de bekende 
objecties tegen dit argument effectief is. Dit geldt niet alleen voor de 
klassieke Humeaanse, Kantiaanse en Russelliaanse objecties, maar 
ook voor de objecties die Koons zelf noemt en voor de hedendaagse 
objecties van J. Ross en G. Oppy (1999). Wel toon ik aan dat Koons’ 
argument problematisch is als een deductief argument voor het bestaan 
van een eerste oorzaak, namelijk een onveroorzaakte entiteit dat de 
oorzaak is van alles buiten zichzelf.
Het argument van R. Gale en A. Pruss vertrekt vanuit het principe dat 
iedere ware contingente propositie mogelijk een verklaring heeft. Het 
argument concludeert dat er een noodzakelijk wezen bestaat dat vrij 
en intentioneel de conjunctie voortbracht van alle ware contingente 
proposities. Ik laat zien dat alle klassieke Humeaanse, Kantiaanse 
en Russelliaanse objecties tegen dit argument falen, en dat precies 
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hetzelfde geldt voor de hedendaagse objecties van G. Oppy (2000), 
K. Davey en R. Clifton (2001) en M.J. Almeida en N.D. Judisch (2002). 
Daarnaast toon ik echter aan dat hun argument niet onproblematisch 
is als argument voor het bestaan van een eerste oorzaak. De premissen 
impliceren namelijk niet dat het noodzakelijk bestaande wezen zelf 
onveroorzaakt is.
Rasmussens argument vertrekt vanuit de premisse dat normaal 
gesproken contingente standen van zaken mogelijk causaal verklaarbaar 
zijn en dat een zogenaamde maximaal contingente stand van zaken 
hierop geen uitzondering is. De conclusie van het argument is dat er 
een noodzakelijk wezen moet bestaan dat mogelijk causaal werkzaam is. 
Ik laat zien dat alle bekende objecties tegen dit argument onhoudbaar 
zijn. Wel toon ik aan dat Rasmussens argument problematisch is 
als argument voor het bestaan van een eerste oorzaak. Rasmussen 
heeft ook een drietal alternatieve redeneerpaden ontwikkeld om tot 
zijn conclusie te komen. Ik betoog dat het derde pad na modificaties 
succesvol impliceert dat er een mogelijk causaal werkzaam noodzakelijk 
wezen bestaat, maar dat ook hier niet besloten kan worden tot het 
bestaan van een eerste oorzaak van de werkelijkheid.
Hoewel de argumenten van Koons, Gale en Pruss en Rasmussen dus 
succesvol zijn in het beargumenteren dat er een noodzakelijke (zelfs 
bewuste en vrije) entiteit bestaat die kan gelden als oorzaak van de 
kosmos, volgt niet dat zij ook impliceren dat dit noodzakelijke wezen 
geldt als de eerste oorzaak van de werkelijkheid. In het tweede gedeelte 
van mijn dissertatie ontwikkel ik een nieuw argument voor het bestaan 
van een eerste oorzaak. Het argument is dat mereologisch atomisme, 
de these dat alles wat bestaat in laatste instantie uit fundamentele 
enkelvoudige bouwstenen bestaat, en causalisme, de these dat alles 
wat bestaat participeert in het causale weefsel van de werkelijkheid, 
dus veroorzaakt en/of oorzaak is, gezamenlijk impliceren dat er een 
eerste oorzaak van de wereld moet zijn. Beide thesen, atomisme en 
causalisme, zijn goed verdedigbaar. In mijn dissertatie geef ik een 
verdediging van beide thesen. Hiertoe werk ik ondermeer een nieuw a 
priori argument uit voor atomisme. Bovendien geef ik een verdediging 
van enkele aanvullende, ondersteunende, premissen waarvan mijn 
nieuwe argument voor het bestaan van een eerste oorzaak eveneens 
gebruikmaakt, zoals dat oorzaak en gevolg mereologisch disjunct zijn, 
dat de som van de leden van een bepaald door mij nader gedefinieerd 
type natuurlijke soorten een object vormen, en dat ieder veroorzaakt 
object een veroorzaakt strikt deel bevat.
De argumentatie zelf verloopt heel kort gezegd globaal als volgt. Neem 
de som van alle veroorzaakte atomen. Deze som is zelf geen oorzaak 
omdat er anders veroorzaakte atomen buiten deze som zouden moeten 
bestaan, wat onmogelijk is. Maar dan volgt vanwege causalisme dat deze 
som veroorzaakt moet zijn. Nu kan de oorzaak van deze som zelf niet 
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veroorzaakt zijn omdat anders de oorzaak van genoemde som uit één 
of meerdere veroorzaakte atomen zou bestaan, zodat de som en haar 
oorzaak elkaar zouden overlappen, wat eveneens onmogelijk is. Kortom, 
de oorzaak van de som van alle veroorzaakte atomen is onveroorzaakt 
en is daarom de eerste oorzaak van de wereld.
In mijn dissertatie bespreek ik een groot aantal denkbare objecties 
tegen mijn nieuwe argument voor het bestaan van een eerste oorzaak, 
waaronder alle besproken objecties tegen de klassieke argumenten 
en tegen de hedendaagse argumenten van Koons, Gale en Pruss en 
Rasmussen. Ik laat zien dat geen van deze objecties een vruchtbare 
objectie tegen mijn argument oplevert. Wel wijs ik op een spanning 
die aangewezen kan worden tussen enerzijds de generieke natuur van 
het metafysische raamwerk waarin het argument geformuleerd is en 
anderzijds de specifieke verdediging van bepaalde premissen van het 
argument. Ik betoog dat deze spanning niet van dien aard is dat het 
argument aan kracht verliest. Ook toon ik aan dat het argument niet 
op gespannen voet staat met theïsme. Er volgt namelijk niet, zoals ik 
uiteenzet, dat de afgeleide eerste oorzaak niet God kan zijn.
 
Vervolgens laat ik zien hoe we tot een rationele cumulatieve casus voor 
theïsme kunnen komen door mijn argument voor het bestaan van een 
eerste oorzaak te combineren met de argumenten van Koons, Gale en 
Pruss en Rasmussen. De casus vangt aan met genoemd nieuw argument 
voor het bestaan van een eerste oorzaak om allereerst te concluderen 
dat er een eerste oorzaak van de wereld is. Vervolgens worden de 
argumenten van Koons en Rasmussen ingezet om te betogen dat deze 
eerste oorzaak een noodzakelijk bestaande entiteit is. Daarna wordt een 
beroep gedaan op het argument van Gale en Pruss om te concluderen 
dat de noodzakelijk bestaande eerste oorzaak van de wereld in feite 
een bewust en vrij wezen is. Zo bereiken we de conclusie dat er een 
noodzakelijk bestaand en bewust en vrij wezen bestaat dat geldt als 
de eerste oorzaak van de werkelijkheid. En een dergelijk uniek wezen 
kan met recht God genoemd worden. We zien dus dat het nieuwe 
argument voor het bestaan van een eerste oorzaak van de wereld 
cruciaal is om tot een casus voor theïsme te komen. Alleen wanneer we 
de argumenten van Koons, Gale en Pruss en Rasmussen met dit nieuwe 
argument combineren kunnen we immers het bestaan afleiden van een 
wezen waaraan we met recht de naam ‘God’ kunnen geven. Want wat 
is God als God niet in ieder geval ook geldt als de eerste oorzaak van de 
werkelijkheid, als de ultieme zijnsgrond van al wat is?
Tot slot van mijn dissertatie presenteer ik nog een drietal aanvullende 
argumenten voor de claim dat de eerste oorzaak van de wereld 
inderdaad geen levenloos ding is, maar een immaterieel bewustzijn, 
geen ‘iets’ maar een iemand. De eerste twee aanvullende argumenten 
vereisen een beroep op mijn nieuwe argument voor het bestaan van een 
eerste oorzaak. Zij gaan namelijk al uit van het bestaan van een eerste 
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oorzaak en laten vervolgens zien dat deze oorzaak een immaterieel 
bewustzijn is, dus een subject in plaats van een object. Mijn derde 
argument heeft een dergelijk beroep op het bestaan van een eerste 
oorzaak niet nodig omdat zij rechtstreeks het bestaan afleidt van een 
immaterieel bewust wezen dat de eerste oorzaak van de wereld is. De 
drie aanvullende argumenten kunnen aan genoemde cumulatieve casus 
worden toegevoegd om haar zo nog verder te versterken.
Het eerste argument ontleen ik aan D. Georgoudis en vertrekt vanuit de 
klassieke idee van een hechte parallellie tussen denken en zijn, tussen 
de kenorde en de zijnsorde van de werkelijkheid, tussen enerzijds kennis 
over de wereld en anderzijds de wereld zelf. Indien kennis over de wereld 
in laatste instantie geen kwestie is van louter formele mechanische 
ontdekking, maar van innerlijke begripsvorming, van het subjectief 
vertrouwd raken met oftewel het persoonlijk verstaan van de wereld, 
dan is het redelijk om te veronderstellen dat de grond van de wereld zelf 
evenmin een formele mechanische natuur heeft, maar in plaats daarvan 
ten diepste eveneens een subjectkarakter heeft.
Het tweede argument is axiologisch van aard. Het is verdedigbaar 
dat de eerste oorzaak, het eerste beginsel van alles, een waardigheid 
heeft die in elk geval niet lager is dan de waardigheid van alles wat 
direct of indirect uit haar is voortgekomen, zoals ieder mens. Maar 
dan, precies omdat ieder menselijk subject een waardigheid heeft die 
boven die van levenloze objecten uitgaat, volgt uit de transitiviteit van 
de waardigheidsrelatie, samen met de premisse dat alles wat bestaat 
ofwel een subject ofwel een object is, dat de ultieme ontstaansoorzaak 
van de wereld geen levenloos ding is. De oorsprong van de wereld moet 
daarom, net zoals ieder mens, subjectkarakter bezitten. Zij is dus geen 
object, maar een subject. De eerste oorzaak van de wereld is geen iets, 
maar een iemand.
Het derde argument is een modaal-epistemisch argument en bestaat uit 
twee premissen. De eerste premisse stelt dat een propositie die in geen 
enkele mogelijke wereld door geen enkel mogelijk subject, menselijk 
of niet, gekend kan worden noodzakelijk onwaar is. Of anders gezegd: 
wat mogelijk waar is, is ook kenbaar. Deze premisse lijkt niet onredelijk. 
Immers, indien een propositie p mogelijk waar is, dus waar in één of 
meerdere mogelijke werelden, dan lijkt er inderdaad een mogelijke 
wereld voorstelbaar waarin één of ander subject, menselijk of niet, ook 
daadwerkelijk kan weten dat p waar is. Kortom, als geen enkel mogelijk 
subject, in geen enkele mogelijke wereld, dus niet in de actuele wereld, 
noch in gelijksoortige werelden, noch iets andere werelden, noch in 
radicaal afwijkende werelden, kan weten dat p waar is, dan is dat omdat 
p zelf eenvoudigweg niet waar kan zijn. De intuïtie achter de eerste 
premisse is de these dat de wereld uiteindelijk intelligibel is. De wereld 
heeft ten diepste een logos-matige structuur. En deze vooronderstelling 
lijkt inderdaad een essentiële aanname voor het beoefenen van 
Towards a  renewed Case for Theism198
theoretische- en metafysica. Waarom zouden we ons immers overgeven 
aan een zoektocht naar de oorsprong van de wereld indien we het niet 
op zijn minst aannemelijk zouden vinden dat de werkelijkheid voor 
ons of voor andere mogelijke intelligenties in beginsel kenbaar is, dat 
de wereld een logische structuur heeft die uiteindelijk doorgrond kan 
worden? In mijn dissertatie geef ik een aantal aanvullende redenen voor 
de plausibiliteit van de eerste premisse.
De tweede premisse luidt dat het onmogelijk is te weten dat God niet 
bestaat. Ook dit lijkt geen onredelijke premisse. God wordt begrepen 
als een subject dat eerste oorzaak is. Dat het inderdaad metafysisch 
onmogelijk is om te weten dat God niet bestaat volgt uit de volgende 
redenering. Er zijn vier kandidaten voor de wijze waarop iemand zou 
kunnen weten dat God niet bestaat. De eerste is te laten zien dat 
het begrip God contradictoir is. Er is echter op geen enkele wijze een 
logische tegenspraak af te leiden uit de idee van een persoonlijke eerste 
oorzaak. De tweede is het hebben van de intuïtie dat God niet bestaat. 
Echter, de uitspraak dat God niet bestaat is zeker niet zelfevident. De 
derde manier is niet-corrigeerbare empirische ervaring. Dit is echter 
ook niet mogelijk omdat we middels empirische ervaring, hoe dwingend 
en verstrekkend ook, nooit kunnen uitsluiten dat God bestaat. De 
vierde manier betreft een onfeilbare getuigenis. Echter, geen enkele 
getuige, hoe betrouwbaar ook, kan iemand in een zekere positie brengen 
ten aanzien van het niet bestaan van God. Kortom, het is inderdaad 
onmogelijk om te weten dat God niet bestaat.
Uit beide premissen, dus enerzijds ‘alles wat mogelijk waar is, is mogelijk 
kenbaar’, en anderzijds ‘Het is onmogelijk te weten dat God niet 
bestaat’, volgt deductief de conclusie dat God bestaat in alle mogelijke 
werelden. God bestaat dus metafysisch noodzakelijk.
Aan het eind van mijn dissertatie bespreek ik vele objecties tegen dit 
argument en laat ik zien dat geen van deze objecties standhoudt. Ik 
noem er twee. Men kan tegenwerpen dat het ook onmogelijk is te 
weten dat God bestaat. Maar dan volgt uit de eerste premisse van mijn 
argument dat het noodzakelijk onwaar is dat God bestaat, zodat het 
argument faalt. Het is echter niet onmogelijk te weten dat God bestaat. 
Neem immers een mogelijke wereld waarin God bestaat. In deze wereld 
bestaat er wel degelijk een subject dat weet dat God bestaat, namelijk 
God zelf. Het is dus niet onmogelijk te weten dat God bestaat.
Volgens een tweede objectie faalt het argument omdat, indien het 
argument correct zou zijn, eveneens zou volgen dat bijvoorbeeld 
eenhoorns, Superman, het vliegende spaghettimonster of vliegende 
theepotten noodzakelijk bestaan, wat absurd is. Neem het vliegende 
spaghettimonster. Het is, aldus de objectie, ook onmogelijk te weten 
dat dit monster niet bestaat. Geen enkel kennissubject kan namelijk 
uitsluiten dat er zich niet toch ergens een vliegend spaghettimonster 
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bevindt. Maar dan volgt direct uit de eerste premisse van het argument 
dat het vliegende spaghettimonster noodzakelijk bestaat, wat zoals 
gezegd absurd is. Echter, het is helemaal niet onmogelijk te weten 
dat het vliegende spaghettimonster niet bestaat. Beschouw namelijk 
een mogelijke wereld waarin God bestaat en waarin God besluit niets 
te scheppen, of waarin God besluit exact één causaal inert object te 
scheppen ongelijk aan een vliegend spaghettimonster. In deze mogelijke 
wereld is er wel degelijk een subject dat weet dat het vliegende 
spaghettimonster niet bestaat, namelijk God zelf. Het is dus helemaal 
niet onmogelijk om te weten dat het vliegende spaghettimonster 
niet bestaat. En daarom faalt ook deze tweede objectie. Hetzelfde 
geldt natuurlijk voor analoge objecties gebaseerd op de vermeende 
onkenbaarheid van het niet bestaan van eenhoorns, Superman, 
vliegende theepotten, enzovoort.
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